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Preface and Acknowledgements  
Founded in 2003, the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) has become an 
institutional, multi-disciplinary entity.  In 2006 the ARP made significant and sustaining 
progress toward realizing its goals to:  
1. Position NPS as a recognized leader in defense acquisition research.   
2. Establish NPS acquisition research as an integral part of policy-making for 
Department of Defense officials.   
3. Create a stream of relevant information concerning the performance of DoD 
Acquisition policies with viable recommendations for continuous process 
improvement.   
4. Prepare the DoD workforce to participate in the continued evolution of the 
defense acquisition process.  
5. Collaborate with other universities, think tanks, industry and government in 
acquisition research.  
Since inception, over 100 reports and papers have been published, thereby making a 
significant contribution to the body of literature on the defense acquisition process.   
Through these research products, ARP sponsors are receiving substantial help with and 
insights into the pressing business issues of the day. 
The synergy between faculty research and student classroom instruction has been 
exceptional with many relevant and current instructional materials emerging from research 
products, thus enhancing the student educational experience. Faculty are “refreshed” in 
defense-relevant subject matter, and students are better prepared to enter the acquisition 
work force.  In recognition of these successes, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) provided $1M in funding for additional 
projects.  This funding expands the ARP by 30% and is a pilot for future increases in 
research funding.   
Researcher opportunities provided by the Chair offer significant benefits to 
researchers: (1) provision of funding saving researchers “marketing“ time; (2) ties with 
sponsor POCs thus assuring DOD relevant research; (3) assistance with final formatting, 
editing and publishing thus relieving researchers from the “non-intellectual” aspects of their 
research.  Each of these is a substantial benefit but the growing connectivity between 
researchers and sponsors is paying large dividends to all concerned.  While we at the Naval 
Postgraduate School like to think of our institution as the world’s leader in defense 
acquisition research, we also recognize that, because of our limited size and resources, we 
are able to study only a few of acquisition’s myriad of complex issues and challenges.  We 
know that genuine progress in acquisition research can be achieved and sustained only to 
the extent that scholars from a broad range of institutions and disciplines are engaged to 
participate.  Once this “critical mass” of researchers is formed, we may anticipate that 
acquisition will become a field of its own, with perhaps a variety of acquisition journals, 
acquisition conferences, and university courses in acquisition management and policy.  
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb=====- ii - 
=
Such intellectual capacity, we may hope, will before long prevail against acquisition’s 
perennial and often pernicious problems. 
Accordingly, the year 2006 was especially significant for the NPS Acquisition 
Research Program in taking major strides toward expanding the program’s reach in 
important ways to other institutions.  The number of research institutions participating as 
collaborators grew to 35 with the formation of a Virtual University Consortium.  Most 
noteworthy was, as mentioned above, our securing sponsorship from USD(AT&L) to fund 
research proposals selected from a nationwide call, or Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) 
(copy available at www.acquisitionresearch.org).  We’re truly excited at the prospects of 
receiving innovative and cutting edge proposals from the top minds around the country.  We 
trust that this new sponsorship will act like good seeds sown in fertile soil, yielding rich fruits 
of profitable acquisition research for many years to come. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
• Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) 
• Program Manager (Infantry Combat Equipment) 
• Program Executive Officer (Integrated Warfare Systems) 
• Program Executive Officer (Littoral and Mine Warfare) 
• Project Manager (Modular Brigade Enhancements) 
• Program Executive Officer (Ships) 
• Dean of Research, Naval Postgraduate School 
We also thank UGS Corporation and the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and 
acknowledge their generous contributions in support of this symposium.  
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, US Navy (ret)    Associate Professor 
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The NPS “A Team” 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.) — Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
the DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, supervises student MBA projects 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply-chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990 where he advised 
and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the Aegis project. This 
was the DoD’s largest acquisition project with an annual budget in excess of $5 Billion/year. 
The project provided oversight and management of research, development, design, 
production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of Aegis cruisers, 
destroyers and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. From 1980-
1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of Legislative Affairs 
followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a Surface Warfare 
Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments included 
numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam as well as the Indian Ocean and the Persian 
Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned a MS in Electrical Engineering and a MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
Keith F. Snider — Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management in 
the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management.  
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Academic Associate for resident NPS acquisition curricula.   
Professor Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point.  He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  He is a former member of 
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the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.   
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.   
Karey L. Shaffer — Program Manager for the Acquisition Research Program at the 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer 
is responsible for operations and publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and 
the Principal Investigator. She has also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition 
Research Symposiums hosted by NPS.  
Shaffer has also served as an independent Project Manager and Marketing 
Consultant on various projects. Her experiences as such were focused on creating 
marketing materials, initiating web development, assembling technical teams, managing 
project lifecycles, processes and cost-savings strategies.  
From 2001-2002, Shaffer contracted to work as the Executive Assistant to the Vice 
President for Leadership and Development Human Resources for Metris Companies in 
Minneapolis.  In this capacity, she introduced project lifecycle and process improvements to 
increase efficiency. Likewise, as a Resource Specialist contractor at Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide in Minneapolis, she developed and implemented template plans to address 
continuity and functionality in corporate documents; in this same position, she introduced 
process improvements to increase efficiency in presentation and proposal production in 
order to reduce the instances of corruption and loss of vital technical information.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc. and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and secured a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the Operations 
Manager, she also designed MWTC’s Conference site, managed various marketing 
conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer has her BA in Business Administration (focus on International Business, 
Marketing and Management) from the University of Montana. She is currently earning her 
MBA from San Francisco State University.  
A special thanks to our editor Jeri Larsen for all that she has done to make this 
publication a success, to David Wood and Carl Matsen for production, to Ian White for 
graphic support, to Lindsay D’Penha for CD programming, to Jordy Boom for conference 
website development. We would like acknowledge Arlene Pulido, Jennifer Watson, Bon 
Troung, Toan Tran and Jason Munoz of the staff at the Graduate School of Business & 
Public Policy for all the administrative support on the backend to make the Symposium a 
success. Our program success is directly related to the combined efforts of many.  
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Announcement and Call for Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 5th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 14-15, 2008 
in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and 
the exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  We 
seek a diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, and industry 
who are well placed to shape and promote future research in acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers 
from academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of 
acquisition.  The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential research 
areas of interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement policy, supply chain 
management, public budgeting and finance, cost management, project management, 
logistics management, engineering management, outsourcing, performance 
measurement, and organization studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 9, 2007.  The Program Committee will 
make notifications of accepted proposals by December 7, 2007.  Final papers must be 
submitted by April 4, 2008 to be included in the Symposium Proceedings. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, 
and contact information for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 20 minute 
presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should include the same 
information as above as well as a description of the panel subject and format, along with 
participants’ names, qualifications and the specific contributions each participant will make 
to the panel.   
Submit paper and panel proposals to www.researchsymposium.org . 
ACQUISITION RESEARCH: 
CREATING SYNERGY FOR INFORMED CHANGE 
5th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium 
May 14 - 15, 2008 
Monterey  California 
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Primary objective is to attract outstanding researchers and scholars to 
investigate topics of interest to the defense acquisition community. The 
program solicits innovative proposals for defense acquisition management and 
policy research to be conducted during fiscal year (FY) 2008 (1 Oct 07 -30 Sep 08).  
Defense acquisition management and policy research refers to 
investigations in all disciplines, fields, and domains that (1) are involved in the 
acquisition of products and/or services for national defense, or (2) could 
potentially be brought to bear to improve defense acquisition.  It includes but is 
not limited to economics, finance, financial management, information systems, 
organization theory, operations management, human resources management, and 
marketing, as well as the “traditional” acquisition areas such as contracting, 
program/project management, logistics, and systems engineering management.  
This program is targeted in particular to U.S. universities (including U.S. 
government schools of higher education) or other research institutions 
outside the Department of Defense.  
The Government anticipates making multiple awards up to $100,000 each for 
a basic research period of twelve months.  NPS plans to complete proposal 
evaluations and notify awardees in early August 2007. 
 





BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT 
Acquisition Research Program 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Open until 4:00 pm PDST 1 June 2007 
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May 17, 2007 
Keynote Speaker 
8:00 a.m. – 
9:15 a.m.  
Keynote Speaker 
Mr. Shay D. Assad – Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics) 
 
Keynote Speaker:  Mr. Shay Assad assumed his position as 
Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) 
on April 3, 2006. As the Director of DPAP, he is responsible for all 
acquisition and procurement policy matters in the Department of 
Defense (DoD). He serves as the principal advisor to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
the Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology, and 
the Defense Acquisition Board on acquisition/procurement 
strategies for all major weapon systems programs, major 
automated information systems programs, and services 
acquisitions. He is responsible for procurement/sourcing 
functional business process requirements in the Department’s 
Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) and Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP). Mr. Assad is 
DoD’s advisor for competition, source selection, multiyear contracting, warranties, leasing and 
all international contracting matters. 
Before assuming this position, Mr. Assad was the Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations 
and Logistics (Contracts), Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. He had held the 
position as the Marine Corps’ senior civilian contracting official since June 2004. 
Upon graduating with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1972, he served two tours of 
duty aboard U.S. Navy destroyers and won recognition as Outstanding Junior Officer, Fifth 
Naval District. He then served as a Naval Procurement Officer at the Naval Sea Systems 
Command, where he was responsible for the negotiation and administration of the Aegis 
Weapons Systems engineering and production contracts. 
In 1978, Mr. Assad began working for the Raytheon Company. Between 1978 and 1994 he 
served in several increasingly responsible contract management positions in Raytheon's largest 
Electronics and Missile divisions gaining extensive experience in defense, commercial and 
international contracting. He was intimately involved in numerous major programs such as 
PATRIOT, HAWK, AMRAAM, PAVE PAWS, BMEWS, Standard Missile, Aegis ER, Sparrow and 
Ballistic Missile Defense. In 1994, he was promoted to Vice President – Director of Contracts for 
Raytheon, and was subsequently promoted to Senior Vice President, Contracts in 1997. As 
such, he was responsible for the contract negotiation and administration activities ($20 Billion) in 
all of Raytheon's businesses – both government and commercial. 
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In addition to his contracting duties, Mr. Assad was given numerous program and business 
management special assignments by Raytheon's Executive Office. These assignments 
spanned participation in all three of Raytheon's major operating businesses – Government, 
Aviation, and Engineering and Construction. 
In 1998 he was promoted to Executive Vice President and served as the Chief Operating Officer 
and subsequently, as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Raytheon's Engineering and 
Construction (RE&C) business. RE&C was a $2.7 billion international company with more than 
15,000 professional and craft employees, 24 product lines and 11 major offices worldwide. 
After his retirement from the Raytheon Company, in 2001, Mr. Assad established a small 
business primarily providing consulting and retail services. 
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Donald Summers, Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School 
Discussants:  
William Eggers, Global Research Director, Deloitte Research Public Sector 
E. Sanderson (Sandy) Hoe, Partner at McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP 
Jim Hearn, Director for Federal Programs and Budget Process, Senate 
Budget Committee 
Papers:  
The Folly of Consequence-free Budget Scoring  
Gerald S. Koenig, Hannon Armstrong Advisory Services 
The Budget Scoring Alternatives Financing Methods for Defense 
Requirements 
LT Leonard Leos, USN, LT Paul Rouleau, USN, and LT Mark 
Wadsworth, USN, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
 
Chair:  Donald E. Summers, LtCol, USMC (Ret.), CMA, CFM is Lecturer in Financial Management, 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School.  He received an MS from the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  Before retiring from the USMC, he was Program Budget Coordinator for the 
Chief Financial Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps.  He has been employed as a senior financial analyst 
for Household Credit Services and as the executive assistant to the Chairman/CEO (Mr. Bill Agee) of 
Morrison Knudson Corporation.  His interests are financial & managerial accounting, federal budgeting 
and armed forces comptrollership. 
Discussant: William Eggers, Global Research Director, Deloitte Research Public Sector, is a Senior 
Fellow at the New York-based Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. He examines how technology can 
be used to reinvent government structures for greater efficiency. In addition he is the Global Director for 
Deloitte Research-Public Sector, where he is responsible for research and thought leadership for 
Deloitte’s public-sector practice. 
He is the author of two new books on transforming government: Government 2.0: Using Technology to 
Improve Education, Cut Red Tape, Reduce Gridlock, and Enhance Democracy (Rowman and Littlefield, 
2005) and Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector (Brookings, 2004). 
Eggers is a former appointee to the US Office of Management and Budget’s Performance Measurement 
Advisory Commission and the former Project Director for the Texas Performance Review/ e-Texas 
initiative. The two performance reviews Eggers was involved in identified over $2.5 billion worth of 
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savings and non-tax revenues for the state. Over 60 percent of the recommendations in the reviews were 
enacted into law. Mr. Eggers also served as a Commissioner for the Texas Incentive and Productivity 
Commission and a designee on the Texas Council on Competitive Government. 
In addition, Eggers was the Chair of the Government Reform Policy Committee for then Governor George 
W. Bush during his first presidential campaign. In this capacity he coordinated research for the campaign 
in government management and reform issues. 
Mr. Eggers is the former Director of Government Reform at the Reason Public Policy Institute, a Los 
Angeles-based think tank. A nationally recognized expert on government reform, Eggers is the 1996 
winner of the prestigious Roe Award for leadership and innovation in public policy research and the 2002 
APEX award for excellence in business journalism. Mr. Eggers is also the co-author of Revolution at the 
Roots: Making our Government Smaller, Better, and Closer to Home (The Free Press). The book was 
named the winner of the 1996 Sir Anthony Fisher International Memorial Award for the book "making the 
greatest contribution to the understanding of the free economy during the past two years." 
Prior to joining the Reason Foundation, Mr. Eggers assisted reformers in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union with the transition from socialist to free-market economies as a policy analyst at The 
Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. 
Mr. Eggers has advised dozens of cities, states, and foreign countries and trained hundreds of public 
officials on restructuring government. 
Mr. Eggers graduated magna cum laude from the University of California at San Diego. 
Discussant: E. Sanderson (Sandy) Hoe, Partner at McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP, work 
encompassed counseling and litigation on behalf of clients on a broad range of government contracts 
laws and regulations. His expertise extends from issues in contract formation, including bid protests, the 
negotiation of subcontracts and the structuring of complex private financing, to the preparation of complex 
claims, and to resolution of post-award contract disputes through litigation or alternate dispute resolution 
methods. His clients include major companies in the defense, telecommunications, information 
technology, financial, and health care industries.  
Sandy has counseled clients on government socio-economic programs, the flowdown of requirements to 
government subcontractors, the application of international agreements such as the Buy American Act 
and Trade Agreements Act to government contractors and a host of other issues. He has litigated multi-
million dollar contract disputes involving government allegations of contractor defective pricing and failure 
to perform. His litigation experience includes challenges to government refusal fully to reimburse 
contractors terminated for convenience. He has settled major prime - subcontractor disputes through 
mediation. He served on the ABA committee that prepared model flow-down terms and conditions for 
subcontracts under government prime contracts following adoption of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
in 1984. He also is expert on efforts by the government to outsource work to the private sector and co-
chairs the ABA's Public Contract Law Section, Privatization and Competitive Sourcing Committee. 
In the area of finance, and to help clients take advantage of government initiatives to privatize certain of 
its activities, Sandy successfully has counseled clients in the creation of third-party financed government 
contracts, including long-term leases, and related ancillary agreements for such items as ships, aircraft, 
military housing, energy facilities and information technology. Clients in this field have included major 
contractors, banks, investment bankers and insurance companies.  
Sandy is the author of "Law for Engineers" (George Washington University, 1980) and "Flow-Down 
Clauses in Subcontracts," Briefing Papers (Federal Publications, Inc.). He was a professorial lecturer in 
Engineering Law at George Washington University (1980-1984) and has lectured for Federal 
Publications, Inc., the National Contract Management Association, the American Bar Association, and 
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industry groups. He served for six years on the Steering Committee of the Section on Government 
Contracts and Litigation of the District of Columbia Bar, including three years as co-chair.  
For several years, Sandy also practiced telecommunications regulatory law, appearing before numerous 
state public utility commissions in hearings to open the local exchange markets for new entrants under 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
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The Folly of Consequence-free Budget Scoring 
Presenter: Gerald S. Koenig is Managing Director of Hannon Armstrong Advisory Services, a firm that 
advises government and corporate clients on the economics and financing of critical infrastructure needs. 
He has over twenty years of experience in senior executive and legal positions and served both on the 
White House staff under President Ronald Reagan and in the Office of Secretary of Defense under 
Richard Cheney. Mr. Koenig received a BS in engineering from West Point, an MA in International 
Relations from USC, and a JD in International Business Transactions from the George Mason University 
School of Law; he is a member of the District of Columbia Bar. 
HA Advisory Services advises government and corporate clients on how to use multiyear Federal funding 
to acquire critical infrastructure needs. HA Advisory Services is an affiliate of Hannon Armstrong Capital, 
which for over 25 years has provided financing for government infrastructure projects.  
Things and actions are what they are, and the 
consequences of them will be what they will be; 
why, then, should we desire to be deceived? 
Bishop Joseph Butler 
1692-1752 
Overview 
Current Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget scoring rules cheat taxpayers and 
warfighters by ignoring the high cost of not acquiring cost-effective upgrades to critical combat 
weapons.  Treating paid-over-time procurements as if they are paid-up-front budget outlays 
necessarily perpetuates waste and inefficiency where we can least afford it: on the modern 
battlefield. As a result, the current acquisition process for such upgrades involves a simplistic, 
two-step process.  First, determine if paying the entire cost up-front of an upgrade is less 
expensive than the net present value of paying for the upgrade over time.  Once paying up-front 
is “discovered” to be the cheaper option (as nearly always occurs), the next step is to abandon 
the upgrade as soon as it fails to compete successfully for scarce procurement budget dollars.  
An extremely conscientious program official may repeat this process for a number of budget 
cycles.  But in the end, the outcome is predictable.  The game is just rigged that way. 
The problem is that these policies have real consequences that squander taxpayer 
dollars while degrading battlefield performance.  Many of America’s major combat weapons 
systems have engines that are so old and obsolete that modern upgrades would easily pay for 
themselves in fuel and maintenance savings while dramatically increasing combat range and 
battlefield reliability.  The private sector is willing to give the DoD such upgrades at no upfront 
cost in exchange for annual “mortgage-like” payments that are never greater than verified 
savings in fuel and maintenance.  How can we know this?  Because the DoD has routinely used 
such “paid-from-savings” contracts for over a decade to upgrade infrastructure on military 
bases.  Similar contracts are widely used by the DoD to acquire vast amounts of information 
technology and telecommunication assets.   
But when legislation was introduced in Congress to extend paid-from-savings contracts 
to combat platforms, the CBO “scored” the legislation so high that it effectively killed the 
legislative effort. The CBO insists that paid-over-time acquisitions should “score” for budget 
purposes in the same manner as if an outright purchase was made—even if the payments-over-
time are limited by law to the verified savings produced by the acquisition.  By counting the 
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payments and ignoring the savings as “speculative,” the CBO ensures wasteful outcomes; the 
more an upgrade saves, the more the CBO will assert it costs. 
The CBO claims that accounting for acquisitions in any other manner is inconsistent with 
the Budget Act of 1967.  The fact is that that Act and all Federal budget laws are silent on this 
issue.  The CBO’s position is really a hunch—no more than one interpretation of general 
principles.  The CBO’s counterpart in the Executive Branch, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), reaches the opposite conclusion. 
The CBO views its scoring policy in a consequence-free vacuum and sees its role as a 
dispassionate arbiter of how to apply general budget principles to specific legislation.  Actual 
outcomes are seen as irrelevant—or, at the very least, as highly speculative and, therefore, 
properly dismissed.   
Supporting this dysfunctional acquisition system is an almost smug attitude among many 
defense acquisition policy apparatchiks. Unfortunately, military and civilian officials who should 
be fierce advocates for warfighters on such policy issues are missing in action on this issue.  
Since the Boeing tanker lease scandal, anyone who challenges the orthodoxy of traditional 
defense procurement is considered, at best, politically tone-deaf. 
Government accounting procedures should serve the mission of the government—not 
vice-versa.  If the National defense mission of the Federal government is important enough to 
siphon off wealth from citizens in the form of taxes, the first rule should be that every tax dollar 
must buy the most combat power possible.  Budget rules that frustrate this purpose need to be 
changed.   
Why Inefficiency Matters on Combat Platforms 
The President’s 2006 State of the Union address should resonate in many quarters, 
including in the President’s own Executive Branch.  Nowhere is the “addiction to oil” that the 
President cited more serious than in the Federal government, which enjoys the distinction of 
being the largest single consumer of energy in the world.  Within the Federal government, the 
Department of Defense leads all agencies in consumption of oil.  This is not surprising, 
considering the vast arsenal of tanks, ships, aircraft and bases that the DoD uses in its critical 
warfighting operations.   
What is surprising, however, is how brave Americans are sent into battle with obsolete 
oil-consuming systems that would be cheaper to replace with state-of-the-art upgrades.  Some 
of our most famous aircraft and other weapons systems are long overdue for new engines since 
their forty-year-old engines are underpowered and undependable—and waste billions of 
taxpayer dollars on fuel.   
Breaking any addiction requires that one first admit there is a problem.  As taxpayers, we 
have a problem with Federal accounting rules that are rigged to waste our tax dollars.  As for 
warfighters, their problem is that these same policies send them into battle with second-rate 
equipment.  But all of us have a common problem: Federal accountants clearly could not care 
less about these outcomes; their attitude is simple:  It’s not my department. 
Since the American Revolution, how the government buys military goods and services 
been a source of constant concern—and with good reason.  Failing to get the most for each 
taxpayer dollars is always bad, but it is hard to imagine a greater abomination than when 
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American warfighters are sent into battle with second-rate equipment when first-rate equipment 
could bought at less cost.  Historically, war profiteers and corrupt bureaucrats are the usual 
suspects, but here the culprits are myopic budget officials.    
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that some of our best-known weapons are 
grossly underpowered by forty-year-old engines that cheat warfighters of combat range and 
power while cheating taxpayers by guzzling gas and requiring ever-increasing amounts of 
maintenance.  Reengining with state-of-the-art engines could give warfighters the best “bang for 
the buck” while taxpayers would harvest a windfall in savings.  The savings are so great and so 
certain that the private sector has offered the DoD a compelling offer: Let us give you the new 
engines, and you can pay us back from the savings—but only if and when those savings 
materialize. 
The DoD routinely accepts such offers when the stakes are low, such as upgrading 
energy systems on military bases.  Congress created Energy Savings Performance Contracts in 
the 1990s for exactly this purpose.  Since then, billions of taxpayer dollars have been saved 
using these “paid-from-savings-over-time” contracts.  The advantage is not just a matter of 
making defense contractors guarantee savings.  The real advantage is that these contracts 
break the cycle in which aging engines rarely compete successfully for full, up-front funding in 
the Federal budget process.   
That cycle is, after all, how these assets got to be old and obsolete in the first place.  
Nevertheless, many OMB and CBO budget officials fail to see this is a problem, despite it being 
documented in numerous DoD and Air Force studies and reports to Congress.  The accountants 
remain fixed in their belief that if replacing obsolete engines was important enough, the DoD’s 
limited capital budget would be allocated to that purpose.  These same accountants are not 
bothered that the other major part of the defense spending, the “operations and maintenance” 
budget, is being drained by these gas-guzzling maintenance hogs year-in and year-out—even 
when offered a paid-from-savings solution that pays for the new engines out of savings from 
existing operations and maintenance budget levels. Tough luck, soldier, is their bottom line. 
Of course, buying anything over time is more expensive than paying cash up-front.  But 
as long as there is a National Debt, even capital appropriations from Congress cost the 
taxpayers interest.  Thus, the issue is really how much more interest does an Energy Savings 
Performance contract cost the taxpayers, and what do the taxpayers get for that extra cost?  
Moreover, the real world choice is not just between buying outright or buying over time.  The 
third—and most often selected—choice is simply to do nothing. 
Unfortunately, doing nothing can be the worst choice of all.  This is exactly what is 
occurring in a surprising number of combat fleets, from Abrams tanks to B-52 Bombers.  To be 
clear, a legacy tank, aircraft or ship itself may still have decades of useful life.  After all, it’s hard 
to wear out a tank.  And until some new enemy advances Panzer-technology, the Abrams tank 
is unlikely to meet its match on a battlefield anytime soon.  The same goes for B-52 and the 
Joint STARS aircraft fleets—and any number of other legacy fleets.   
But technology advances at different rates in different areas.  So, while these ships, 
tanks and aircraft may still be perfectly suited for battle, their engines often are not.  Engine 
technology has advanced so profoundly in the last few decades that state-of-the-art engines can 
quickly pay for themselves in fuel and maintenance savings—and do this while providing greater 
power, combat range and battlefield reliability.  A recent Air Force study estimated that 
reengining the B-52 fleet alone would pay for itself in less than half of the remaining life of the 
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airframe, extend combat range by 30% and save so much fuel that even in peacetime, it would 
be equivalent to taking over 144,000 cars off the road each year. 
None of this is disputed by the DoD, Congress or the White House.  So, why are we still 
sending brave Americans into battle with obsolete equipment that costs taxpayers more than 
state-of-the-art alternatives?  The reason is simple: Federal accountants are blocking combat 
upgrades that save money and lives because their accounting rules are based on bad logic. 
Just as with energy system upgrades on military bases, there are generally three 
choices with obsolete engines.  First, you can buy the upgrade outright, assuming that 
reengining B-52s, Joint STARS or Abrams tanks can compete for scarce capital appropriations. 
Second, you can buy the upgrade over time, matching payments with the savings produced by 
the upgrade, thereby spending no more in any given year than would have otherwise been 
spent.  Third, you can do nothing.   
Again, no one disputes these alternatives.  In fact, a recent DoD study submitted to 
Congress even identified the lifecycle costs for each of these three alternatives for replacing the 
forty-year-old engines on one of America’s most successful combat aircraft: Joint STARS: 
Option A: Outright Purchase: $ 1.0 Billion 
Option B: Purchase Over Time: $ 1.2 Billion 
Option C: Do Nothing: $ 1.5 Billion 
Any reasonable person would quickly understand that Option A is the best choice.  And 
if for some reason Option A is not possible, Option B is the next best alternative.  Clearly, 
Option C is the worst choice. 
But when viewed through the prism of Federal budget policy, the logic gets twisted in 
this way:  Because Option B costs more than Option A, Option B must be eliminated from any 
further consideration.  So the choice is between Option A and Option C.  But history shows 
Option A is not a realistic possibility, since the DoD usually has more urgent priorities than 
replacing engines that, after all, still work.  So Option C is the end result. 
Privately, everyone agrees that Option A is not likely to happen.  Like a frog in boiling 
water, Federal decision-makers never really feel the pain of creeping obsolescence in weapons 
systems.  As a result, even the most economically sound upgrades rarely compete successfully 
for budget dollars against higher priorities.  Nor is this necessarily a bad decision.  Imagine 
having to choose between upgrading Humvees with either new armor against roadside bombs 
or a new engine.  New armor will save lives right away, so it should (and does) get priority.     
This example is representative of the difficult choices made every day.  The point is that 
even if we assume that DoD and Congress sort out these priorities properly, shouldn’t Option B 
at least remain on the table for consideration?  If “paid-from-savings” contracts are a legitimate 
tool for upgrading the rear echelon, why shouldn’t the tool be available on the front line? 
Several years ago, a bipartisan group of Senators and Congressmen ranging from 
Senators Sue Collins to Pat Roberts to Hillary Clinton introduced legislation that would allow the 
DoD to use Energy Savings Performance Contracts to upgrade combat aircraft, ships and 
vehicles.  This was a bill (S. 2318 / H.R. 3339) that appealed to hawks, environmentalists and 
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anti-government waste advocates equally.  There was no apparent opposition until the CBO and 
OMB accountants successfully killed the effort.   
The CBO asserted that Energy Saving Performance Contracts outlays are real, but their 
savings are speculative—even though they are, by law, a mathematical identity.  The House 
Energy Committee Chairman, Joe Barton, called the CBO’s reasoning “absurd,” and Senate 
Energy Committee Chairman (and former Budget Committee Chairman) Pete Domenici stated: 
“CBO views these contracts as outlays by the federal government.  The truth is that these 
contracts cost the government nothing.”   
But because of the CBO, Congress was barely able to muster the votes to reauthorize 
these contracts for use in upgrading military buildings, gagging down a $2.8 billion “score” from 
the CBO. Tragically for our warfighters and taxpayers, the CBO’s Alice-in-Wonderland 
accounting estimated an expansion of these contracts for use on combat systems at about $15 
billion.  This “cost” was too much for anyone to ignore, but not enough for anyone to engage in a 
political firefight with the CBO.  So, the Energy Act of 2005 was passed with Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts for military buildings fully reauthorized, but nothing authorized for 
battlefield assets.  
The great irony is that the CBO’s scoring policy makes it painful to save a little taxpayer 
money and impossible to save a lot. 
Contributing to and applauding this perverse outcome is the OMB, the accountants for 
the Executive Branch, including the DoD.  To their credit, the OMB believes that Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts cost the government nothing.  But the OMB went out of its way to 
disparage using this proven tool to upgrade combat systems.  The reason?  Only that, “it is 
inconsistent with Federal fiscal and procurement policies.”  No kidding… 
In a less dangerous world, wasting defense dollars by equipping our warfighters with 
second-rate equipment that costs more than first-rate alternatives would simply be irrational.  
But for the foreseeable future, irrational budget policies will continue to have very real and 
dangerous consequences for the brave Americans we send into battle.   
Warfighters deserve more respect than these accountants give them.  And the Bush 
Administration and Congress should get serious about where their priorities are: with the 
taxpayers and warfighters, or with the accountants. 
Background 
The original statute creating Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) was the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Public Law 102-486, enacted October 24, 1992, codified at 42 USC 
8287.  The CBO scored the ESPC provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 at zero. 
The sunset date of the original statute was amended to become October 1, 2003, by the 
Energy Conservation Reauthorization Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-388, enacted November 13, 
1998).  Again, the CBO scored the ESPC provisions of the Energy Conservation 
Reauthorization Act of 1998 at zero. 
The CBO reversed this decade-old policy of scoring ESPCs at zero on April 7, 2003 in 
their Cost Estimate for H.R. 1346, in which the CBO stated:  
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Currently, federal agencies can enter into an ESPC, a specific type of long-term 
contract, for the purchase of energy efficiency equipment, such as new windows and 
lighting.  Using such equipment can reduce the energy costs for a facility.  When using 
an ESPC, the savings from reduced energy bills are used to pay for the purchase of the 
new equipment over several years.  The commitment to make such payments is made 
when the ESPC is entered into.  Thus, consistent with governmentwide accounting 
principles, CBO believes that the budget should reflect that commitment as new 
obligations at the time that an ESPC is signed.  Currently, agencies can use ESPCs to 
purchase new equipment over a 25-year period without an appropriation for the full 
amount of the purchase price. 
DOE estimates that agencies entered into ESPCs valued over $800 million since 1988.  
CBO estimates that, because the federal building inventory is aging, those contracts 
would continue to be used over time at roughly the same rate currently used, or $75 
million in 2004 and increasing after that.  Thus, we estimate that extending the 
authorization for ESPCs would increase direct spending by about $64 million in 2004 
and $1.1 billion over the 2004-2013 period. 
This Cost Estimate was prepared by Lisa Cash Driskill and approved by Peter H. 
Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 
The following day, on April 8, 2003, the CBO published their Cost Estimate for H.R. 6, 
which states:  
Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs). Section 11006 of H.R. 6 would 
provide permanent authorization to use ESPCs and would expand their use. The 
expansion would allow agencies to use an ESPC to construct replacement buildings by 
committing to pay private contractors a portion of the budget savings expected from 
reduced operations, maintenance, and energy costs at such new buildings. CBO 
estimates that this provision would cost $75 million in 2004, $879 million over the 2004-
2008 period, and $2.8 billion over the next 10 years.  
Again, this section of the Cost Estimate for H.R. 6 was prepared by Lisa Cash Driskill 
and approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 
In sum, the CBO recognized that ESPCs cost the government nothing and scored ESPC 
authorization and reauthorization at zero in 1992 and 1998, respectively.  In 2003, with no 
meaningful explanation, CBO reversed this policy and scored ESPCs as direct spending.  
For its part, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejects the CBO’s new ESPC 
scoring policy and continues to score ESPCs as budget-neutral except for termination liability, 
which is scored only if and when such termination actually occurs.  This OMB policy is set forth 
in the July 25, 1998, OMB memorandum Federal Use of Energy Savings Performance 
Contracting (Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb /memoranda/m98-13.pdf). 
This policy, originally established in the Clinton Administration, was reaffirmed as the 
policy of the Bush Administration by the Secretary of Energy in letters to the Chairmen of the 
House and Senate Energy Committees, dated April 8, 2004, in which Secretary Abraham 
states: 
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The legislation itself extending ESPC authority is considered budget neutral and does 
not require additional resources, as the Office of Management and Budget classifies all 
budget authority and outlays for ESPCs as absorbing discretionary resources.  However, 
ESPCs actually save the government money, because the upfront costs of ESPC 
efficiency improvements are recovered through the energy savings that result.  
Moreover, payments to the contractors are contingent upon realizing a guaranteed 
stream of future cost savings. 
Improved energy efficiency and conservation at Federal facilities is an important 
component of this Administration’s commitment to the cost-effective use of public dollars 
and protection of the environment.  The Administration urges Congress to act quickly to 
the authorization of this important program. 
Thus, the consistent position of the Executive Branch through both the Clinton and 
current Bush Administrations is that ESPCs should be scored at zero.  The reasoning for this is 
compelling since, contrary to CBO’s claim that the government’s “commitment to make such 
payments is made when the ESPC is entered into,” the government’s commitment to make 
payments under an ESPC only is made when, and to the extent, savings are achieved in each 
year of the ESPC.  This is set forth explicitly in 42 USC 8287 (B), which states:  
Aggregate annual payments by an agency to both utilities and energy savings 
performance contractors, under an energy savings performance contract, may not 
exceed the amount that the agency would have paid for utilities without an energy 
savings performance contract (as estimated through the procedures developed pursuant 
to this section) during contract years. 
Thus, contrary to the CBO’s assertion that its new ESPC scoring policy is, “consistent 
with governmentwide accounting principles,” no other entity within the federal government has 
ever accepted the CBO’s policy.  Just the opposite is true:  Not scoring ESPC payments is, and 
always has been, the governmentwide accounting principle. 
Economic Logic Compels ESPCs Scoring at Zero 
The fundamental economic basis for not scoring ESPCs is that the opportunity cost of an 
ESPC (i.e., the government’s next best alternative to the ESPC) is to continue to pay (what by 
law must be) a higher amount for ongoing energy and maintenance costs on the aging 
infrastructure that the ESPC would upgrade. 
The fact that ESPCs must reduce pre-existing government obligations makes ESPCs 
unique among all financing vehicles available to the government.  Scoring ESPC payments 
without deducting the higher payments the government would otherwise make results in double 
counting of the true scope of the government obligation.   
Put another way, if a government obligation of $100 is replaced with a lesser 
government obligation of $90, the correct scoring is not $190.  While one could argue that the 
proper score in this case is $90, proponents of ESPCs only ask that the more conservative 
amount of $100 be recognized as a complete offset to the original $100.   
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The fact is that using an ESPC cannot increase Federal obligations.  At worst, the 
Federal obligation remains at the same level it would have been if no ESPC were used.  It is this 
worst-case scenario that produces a zero score in any rational budget treatment.   
Accounting Logic Compels ESPCs Scoring at Zero 
Recognizing that accounting principles sometimes differ from their underlying economic 
theory, it is worth reviewing ESPC scoring through a purely accounting prism.  In the most 
general sense, Federal accounting divides Federal spending into Operations & Maintenance 
(O&M) accounts and Capital accounts.  In a classic Federal acquisition, an upgrade is 
purchased by an agency using Capital appropriations provided for that specific purpose by 
Congress, almost always without any statutory offset requirements.  In such a case, the entire 
amount of that Capital appropriation is properly scored as direct spending.  Linking this to its 
underlying economic justification, it can be said that Congress could spend that appropriation on 
anything else; thus, its opportunity cost is the full amount of the Capital appropriation. 
An ESPC is fundamentally different from such a classic Federal acquisition, precisely 
because it only draws on the existing stream of the applicable O&M account over the term of the 
ESPC.  The key factor that compels a zero-score accounting treatment is that the ESPC cannot 
ever draw more from that O&M account than would have been drawn if the ESPC had not been 
executed.  Moreover, the ESPC can never create Federal obligations from any Capital account.  
Again, linking this to its underlying economic justification, Congress could not spend that portion 
of the O&M account appropriation on anything else, since it would be spent on fuel and 
maintenance for the aging asset in the absence of an ESPC; thus, the opportunity cost of an 
ESPC is spending the same (or greater) amount of O&M appropriation. 
In sum, unless there is a contract termination, ESPCs cannot ever lead to an increase in 
the amount of money that Congress would have otherwise appropriated for any O&M or Capital 
account. 
To be clear, termination of an ESPC can trigger a Federal obligation that would exceed 
the normal O&M account funding stream.  Congress recognized this when it created ESPCs in 
1992 and explicitly set forth how such an event should be scored.  This provision, codified in 42 
USC 8287, states:   
1. A Federal agency may enter into a multiyear contract under this subchapter for a period 
not to exceed 25 years, without funding of cancellation charges before cancellation, if— 
(i) such contract was awarded in a competitive manner pursuant to subsection 
(b)(2) of this section, using procedures and methods established under this subchapter;  
(ii) funds are available and adequate for payment of the costs of such contract for 
the first fiscal year;  
(iii) 30 days before the award of any such contract that contains a clause setting 
forth a cancellation ceiling in excess of $10,000,000, the head of such agency gives 
written notification of such proposed contract and of the proposed cancellation ceiling for 
such contract to the appropriate authorizing and appropriating committees of the 
Congress; and  
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(iv) such contract is governed by part 17.1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
promulgated under section 421 of title 41 or the applicable rules promulgated under this 
subchapter.  
Thus, the proper accounting treatment to provide for possible termination is not a matter 
for debate or interpretation; it is explicitly established by Congress in Federal law.  To the extent 
that the CBO justifies its radical scoring of ESPCs by citing termination liability exposure, it is 
contrary to the consensus of Congress expressed in this statute. 
Moreover, this law makes tremendous sense and reaches the proper economic result.  
Accounting for termination costs is clearly appropriate when a termination occurs.  But since no 
one knows the future with certainly, the termination liability amount should be discounted by the 
likelihood of a termination actually occurring.  Historical data shows that less than 1% of all 
Federal contracts are terminated, either for government convenience or contractor default.  
Twelve years of experience shows that ESPCs’ rate of termination is much better than these 
government-wide averages.   
What Does It Matter? 
This CBO scoring policy has a tremendously adverse impact and is against Federal 
Government interests.  Simply put, this CBO scoring policy undermines the original purpose for 
which Congress intended ESPCs, which is to permit agencies to introduce rational economic 
upgrades that permanently reduce net costs to the taxpayer. 
This CBO scoring policy further undermines the beneficial expansion of ESPCs to the 
non-installation applications, as was provided for in H.R. 3339 and S. 2318.  These upgrades to 
combat aircraft, tanks and ships are where the majority of benefits to the Federal government 
would accrue.  Because ESPCs in this application also increase the combat range and reliability 
of military forces, the adverse impact of this CBO policy will result in American forces being sent 
into battle with less than the best available weapons and support systems per dollar spent.   
While a healthy debate can always be made on what is the right level of military 
spending, it is unconscionable that once that level is set, we do not provide our warfighters the 
most powerful capability that this amount of money can buy.   
In a Perfect World 
While the immediate solution would be to reverse the CBO’s scoring policy on paid-from-
savings contracting, there is a more proactive approach that should be considered.  The best 
solution is to adopt more responsible policy along the following lines: 
a. The overall acquisition process should result in the compilation and maintenance of a list 
of acquisitions that make economic and operational sense, using rational and 
intellectually honest lifecycle cost-benefit analysis. 
b. Pay for as many of these acquisitions as possible with the limited capital appropriations 
available each year.  Regardless of how the projects are prioritized (economic priorities 
will often lose out to political, strategic and tactical priorities), at the end of the process 
there will be unfunded but worthy acquisitions. 
c. For each unfunded but desired acquisition, determine if the potential cost of the 
acquisition would be offset by a corresponding savings generated by the acquisition. 
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d. In cases where such an offset is sufficient to cover a multi-year amortization of the 
acquisition, Federal agencies should be encouraged to use multi-year contracting 
authority to match the rate of new spending for the upgrade to the rate of new savings 
generated by the upgrade. 
e. Require agencies to consider total savings to the US Treasury, not just savings in their 
corner of the Federal government.  Rational accounting rules for a national government 
should not encourage tribalism. 
Finally, it should be recognized that some upgrades do eventually get funded through 
the traditional acquisition process.  Defenders of the status quo are quick to point to these 
examples as evidence that the traditional system works.  The flaw in this logic is that years of 
potential savings are lost forever while upgrades wait in line for full funding.  The net effect of 
this folly is that taxpayers and warfighters are cheated for the sake of blind obedience to a 
bureaucratic system that serves no one but itself. 
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Abstract 
This research investigates procurement scoring and the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
use of alternative financing methods, such as leases and public-private ventures.  One of the 
major impediments to using alternative forms of procurement financing for acquiring defense 
capabilities is in the budgetary treatment, or “scoring,” of these initiatives by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the congressional 
Budget Committees.  The current scoring policy that has been applied to many initiatives 
essentially negates the financial advantage for using alternative forms of financing.  Therefore, 
this research examines existing policies and their adherence to statutes and the role of the 
various government organizations and committees in actual recording of obligations and outlays 
related to financing alternatives used by federal agencies.  Preliminary evidence suggests that 
this emerging area has major importance for future DoD acquisitions in a resource-constrained 
environment.  Included are recommendations for changes in budgetary scoring that encompass 
the full scope of federal obligations and expenditures while promoting efficient, more rapid and 
fiscally responsible acquisitions. 
Executive Summary 
Due to the increasing fiscal pressure caused by the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and 
the growing burden of entitlement programs, the Department of Defense (DoD) must consider 
alternative forms of financing, including leases and public-private partnerships (PPPs), to fund 
necessary programs.  This research examines the budgetary treatment, or scoring, of these 
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financial arrangements by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and the House and Senate Budget Committees.  Every congressional 
legislation must be scored in accordance with the federal budget process.  Scoring legislation is 
the process of tracking budget authority, projecting future federal outlays based on the budget 
authority, and recording the actual obligations and outlays in budget execution.  The scoring 
process can greatly affect a bill’s ability to be passed based on the financial considerations 
made by the CBO, OMB or Congressional Budget Committees.   
This research introduces the current applications of leasing and PPPs in the public and 
private sectors.  Additionally, an in-depth analysis of the current scoring process conducted by 
the CBO, OMB and the Budget Committees will be discussed.  These government bodies 
represent the executive and legislative authorities for financing.  This analysis will be applied to 
three case studies, the budgetary treatment of Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC), 
and two cases involving the use of PPPs in the Operation and Maintenance of Military Family 
Housing. 
Current scoring and general federal budget policies negate the advantages of using 
alternative forms of financing such as leasing and PPPs.   Therefore, they are not used in the 
acquisition of major defense assets, even though they have proven to generate substantial 
benefits for the private sector by providing greater flexibility in financing, encouraging 
innovation, reducing risks, and saving time and money on projects.  This research identifies the 
scoring policies of both the OMB and CBO and recommends a revised scoring policy that 
applies financial responsibility as well as fair treatment of the advantages of these initiatives.  
The end goal is not to develop a solution that will revamp the current budget process, but to 
provide a policy that will to secure funding for needed defense programs while satisfying the 
requirements of fiscal accountability. 
Introduction 
The conventional method of procurement for major government acquisitions is full-cost 
and up-front funding.  Full-cost funding means that appropriations must be sufficient to cover a 
capital project prior to any obligations being incurred.  In other words, the full cost of the 
program must be accounted for in the first year of obligation.   The policy provides transparency 
in the budget; in other words, all programs are scored in the same manner so that proper cost 
comparisons can be made between projects.  Additionally, full funding secures funds for the 
total cost of the project, minimizing the need for additional funding in the future.   
Full-cost funding forces military departments to analyze each project’s cost and benefits 
throughout its life.  It ensures that future congressional action is not required to pay for previous 
congressional spending decisions.  Also, full-cost funding empowers program managers to be 
responsible for time, schedule, and cost parameters of a project.  While full-cost funding 
certainly has its benefits, the policy can cause major fluctuations in appropriations that might 
eliminate the ability to fund a justified program.  Particularly with large acquisitions, full-cost 
funding consumes a large portion of a military department's available funding resources, thus 
reducing the funds available for other programs.   
With the growing cost of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), particularly with Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) and growing technology costs, the Department of Defense (DoD) is 
under increasing pressure to secure funding for large capital projects with a smaller percentage 
of the budget designated for new procurement of combat capability.  Therefore, alternative 
financing arrangements, including but not limited to incremental funding, operating leases, out-
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leases, share-in-savings contracts, and public private partnerships (PPPs), have attracted 
interest as potential alternative financing methods.  The potential advantages and 
disadvantages of these financing methods will be analyzed, along with the scoring methods that 
determine their cost.   
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the Executive Branch, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Congressional Budget Committees for the Legislative 
Branch have the collective responsibility for determining the benefits and costs for DoD 
appropriations bills.  This power, as dictated in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
empowers these agencies as the official “scorekeepers,” who determine the actual cost of 
programs and their relationship to the overall National Military Strategy.  However, operating 
under the same scoring guidelines, divergent scoring results arise between the OMB, CBO and 
the Budget Committees based on different interpretations of the scoring principles.   
This research focuses on the benefits of alternative financing and the scoring of these 
benefits from alternative financing agreements.  With increasing fiscal pressure, these methods 
are necessary to provide funding for needed acquisitions.  In the GWOT and the more hostile 
world in which we live, the Warfighter cannot wait until the next budget cycle for the equipment 
needed to complete the assigned mission.  A revised scoring policy is recommended to permit 
the DoD to fund additional procurement projects within the same budget constrains, using 
fiscally sound, generally accepted accounting principles.   
Background into Scoring 
The term “scoring” describes the process in which the CBO and OMB estimate the 
budget authority required by proposed legislation.  Budget authority is the authority provided by 
law to incur financial obligations that will result in monetary outlays (OMB, 2006, June).  
Scorekeeping determines in a dollar amount the budget effects of legislation and forecasts 
future outlays needed to fund a program.  The “scorekeepers” consist of the Congressional 
Budget Committees, the CBO, and the OMB.  The scoring process and principles used by these 
entities greatly impact the scored “cost” of a program and, consequently, the ability of the 
legislation to be passed by Congress.  The current scoring guidelines greatly limit the 
advantages of alternative financing arrangements that attempt to draw on private-sector 
expertise and funding.  This section analyzes the scoring rules that apply to lease, lease-
purchase, and capital acquisition arrangements and addresses the disadvantages of the current 
guidelines.  It also provides a background into Energy Savings Performance Contracting 
(ESPC). 
The scoring guidelines contained in OMB Circular A-11 embody two fundamental 
principles of federal budgeting: 
Federal commitments should be recognized up-front in the budget; at the time those 
commitments are made. 
Budget should be comprehensive, capturing all financial activities of the federal budget 
(President’s Commission on Budget Concepts, 1967, October). 
These principles form a policy known as full-funding that requires agencies to request all 
funding for a project up-front.  Prior to 1991, the budget authority and outlays for most leases 
were recognized annually over the lease term in the form of annual lease payments.  This policy 
allowed agencies to acquire an asset without Congress’ consent for the full funding of the asset.   
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In 1991, new guidelines issued by the OMB scored capital leases and lease-purchases 
as up-front and requiring full funding.  The policy is designed to force decision-makers to 
determine the entire cost of a project prior to approving the legislation.  The up-front funding 
allows for greater Congressional control over appropriations and also allows Congress to 
evaluate multiple pieces of legislation on a cost basis.  This “transparency” provides Congress 
with a “standard” with which to monitor the spending of both individual agencies and the entire 
federal government on an annual basis.   
Full funding also better aligns Congressional budget estimates with the Anti-deficiency 
Act (31 USC 1341), which prohibits the government from entering into obligations for the 
payment of money before an appropriation is made, unless authorized by law.  Full funding is a 
policy rather than a law, which means that the interpretation of the policy can impact the 
budgetary treatment of a program.  Whether an asset is acquired via direct purchase, lease, or 
through a combination of the two, scoring rules are currently biased towards full funding.  These 
financial arrangements, as well an analysis of the impact of the current scoring rules, will be 
addressed below. 
Federal Budget Principles: Purchases, Leases, and Alternative 
Financing 
Direct Purchases 
A simple example of budget scoring is an outright purchase: the government’s budget 
commitment is the purchase price of the asset.  Budget authority is assessed equal to the 
purchase price of the asset at the time when authority is received to acquire the asset.  Outlays 
are then recorded when actual cash payments are made to the seller (CBO, 2003).  Outright 
purchases can be financed through borrowing at a low interest rate from the US Treasury (e.g., 
Treasury Bills sold publicly), whereas leases require a higher interest rate due to private-sector 
financing.  The scoring policy does not account for several inherent costs of directly purchasing 
an asset.  Full-funding an asset requires the government to assign a larger proportion of the 
available budget authority to the asset, leaving less budget authority available for other assets in 
any given fiscal year.  Under this policy, a larger opportunity cost exists as decision-makers 
must often decide between two mutually exclusive programs rather than funding both.  Military 
Departments must often delay or cancel large capital investments that will offer better 
performance and lower long-term costs to realize short-term savings.  Benefits generated by 
these large projects are realized over several years, whereas the costs must be realized up-
front.  Outright purchasing may force elected officials to choose between two or more justifiable 
programs, when both programs could be funded through other means.   
Leasing 
To distribute the acquisition cost of an asset over its years of use, the government has 
the ability to lease the asset, or in some cases, to enter into a partnership with private 
companies to acquire the asset.  A simple lease arrangement involves an owner (lessor) renting 
the use of an asset to another party (lessee).  For example, the rental of an automobile from 
Avis implies no ownership.  However, leases can be structured in an almost limitless number of 
complex arrangements in which all terms are negotiable, and third-party financing may be 
involved.   
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To limit the discussion, leases within government are placed into four broad categories: 
operating leases, capital leases, and lease purchases with or without substantial private risk.  
The distinction between the different lease types determines how the CBO, OMB and the 
Budget Committees score budget authority for legislation.  Each lease category is discussed 
below. 
To be considered an “operating” lease, a lease must satisfy the following stringent 
criteria: 
Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor during the term of the lease and is not 
transferred to the Government at or shortly after the end of the lease period.  
The lease does not contain a bargain-price purchase option.  
The lease term does not exceed 75% of the estimated economic lifetime of the asset.  
The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of the lease does not 
exceed 90% of the fair market value of the asset at the inception of the lease.  
The asset is a general-purpose asset rather than a special-purpose asset for the 
Government and is not built to unique specification for the Government as lessee. 
There is a private-sector market for the asset.  
Risks of ownership of the asset should remain with the lessor (OMB, 2006, June, part 8-
appendices). 
Any lease not satisfying these stringent criteria will be viewed as a “capital” lease.    
Requirements 5 and 6 (the need for a private-sector market for the asset and the requirement 
for the asset to be general purpose) essentially eliminate operating leasing for military 
equipment procurement.   
In both operating and capital leases, ownership remains with the lessor and is not 
transferred to the government at the conclusion of the lease period.  In contrast, lease-purchase 
arrangements allow ownership of the asset to be transferred (GAO, 1997).  Determination of 
risk is another crucial determination in the budget-scoring process.  In OMB Circular A-11, risk 
is defined in relation to the government-specific characteristics of the project.  The more 
governmental the project, the greater amount of risk is assigned to the government.  Legislation 
and lease-purchases use the following criteria to determine the amount of risk borne by the 
government.   
There should be no provision of Government financing and no explicit Government 
guarantee of third-party financing.  
Risks of ownership of the asset should remain with the lessor unless the Government 
was at fault for such losses. 
The asset should be a general-purpose asset rather than for a special purpose of the 
Government and should not be built to unique specification for the Government as lessee.  
There should be a private-sector market for the asset.  
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The project should not be constructed on Government land.  
The ambiguity of these guidelines demonstrates that they are more “policies” rather than 
scoring “rules.”  The interpretation of these guidelines has been the source of frustration for 
many private-public partnership initiatives.   
The budgetary treatment of the four categories of lease arrangements is summarized in 
Table 1 below.  




Amount equal to asset cost recorded 
up-front; amount equal to imputed 
interest costs recorded on an annual 
basis over the lease period 
Amount equal to asset cost scored over the 
construction period in proportion to the 
distribution of the contractor’s costs; amount 
equal to imputed interest costs recorded on 




Amount equal to asset cost recorded 
up-front; amount equal to imputed 
interest costs recorded on an annual 
basis over the lease term 
Scored over lease term in an amount equal 
to the annual lease payments  
Capital Lease Amount equal to asset cost recorded 
up-front; amount equal to imputed 
interest costs recorded on an annual 
basis over the lease term 
Scored over lease term in an amount equal 
to the annual lease payments  
Operating Lease Amount equal to total payments under 
the full term of the lease or amount 
sufficient to cover first-year lease 
payments plus cancellation costs 
recorded up-front  
Scored over lease term in an amount equal 
to the annual lease payments  
(CBO, 2003, p. 9) 
Table 1. The Budgetary Treatment of Leases and Private/Public Ventures 
For lease-purchases and capital leases, budget authority will be scored against 
legislation in the year in which the budget authority is first made available.  The recorded 
amount is the estimated net present value of the Government’s total estimated legal obligations 
over the life of the lease term.  From a budget perspective, purchases, lease-purchases, and 
capital leases all attempt to acquire an asset over its total life and are scored similarly.  The only 
major difference involves the treatment of outlays in lease purchases with substantial private 
risk.   
Scoring Policy of Operating leases 
Operating leases are different from capital leases or lease purchases because the 
lessee has no intention to purchase the asset.  The budget authority for operating leases will be 
scored in the first year budget authority is made available in the amount sufficient to cover the 
Government’s legal obligations (OMB, 2006, June).  Budget authority for operating leases is 
scored for the full cost of future lease payments in the first year of a lease; or, if a cancellation 
clause exists, budget authority for the first year is scored equal to the first year’s payment plus 
cancellation fees, with following years to be scored incrementally.  
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Advantages of Leases 
Leasing provides a number of important advantages in addition to reducing the budget 
authority assigned to a project.  Leasing generally offers a higher degree of flexibility in 
operating assets, allowing modification of assets to meet changing needs.  A compliment of 
services typically is included with a lease, allowing an organization to draw on the expertise and 
resources of the lessor.  Leasing also conserves capital, which would be required in either a 
down payment or outright purchase.  In the private sector, lease payments can be considered 
an operating expense and, thus, offer an important tax advantage.  As a non-tax paying entity, 
the government does not have this advantage.  However, leasing affords a government agency 
the ability to spread the acquisition costs over multiple budgetary periods, which will more likely 
correspond with the useful life of the equipment.  Significant up-front costs of direct purchasing 
may pressure an agency to settle for lower-priced equipment that fails to meet the requirements. 
Alternative Financing Agreements: Public-private Partnerships 
In August 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) published Alternative 
Approaches to Finance Federal Capital, which examined the increased usage of alternative 
financing by Federal agencies. The GAO identified ten alternative financing approaches used by 
Federal agencies to fund projects: 
1. Incremental funding, 
2. Operating leases, 
3. Retained fees, 
4. Real property swaps, 
5. Sale-leasebacks, 
6. Lease-leasebacks, 
7. Public-private partnerships, 
8. Out-leases, 
9. Share-in-savings contracts, and 
10. Debt issuance. 
The GAO report further recognized that these arrangements would be beneficial to 
agencies in that they would be able to acquire capital assets without first having to secure 
sufficient appropriations to cover the full cost of the asset (GAO, 2003, August).  Of these 
financing approaches, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have the greatest potential for DoD 
procurement of military equipment.   
The scoring of public-private partnerships has been a very controversial and important 
budget issue to those seeking to utilize private-sector resources in government projects.  
Because no two public-private partnerships (PPPs) are arranged exactly the same, each PPP 
must be carefully examined prior to any scoring determination.  Several of these financing 
agreements will be examined in the included Case Studies.  The major debate revolves around 
the determination of financial obligation and risk incurred under each of these agreements.  
Because of the complexity and individuality of many of these arrangements, there is usually no 
precedent to guide the scoring of these arrangements. 
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PPPs can be used by the government to affordably take advantage of an underutilized 
asset, benefiting from private-sector expertise, or leverage private-sector financing in the short-
term to acquire a public asset.  Leasing may only be small part of the PPP.  In some cases, the 
government may benefit from the revenue a leased asset generates rather than benefit from the 
use of an asset—serving as the lessor rather than the lessee (CBO, 2003, p. 26).  
Unfortunately, the Budget Committees, OMB and CBO are typically conservative in their scoring 
of these arrangements and typically do not discount the inherent benefits of these contracts 
from the overall budget authority assigned to the contract. The result is up-front budget authority 
scoring for the project, which may exclude the legislation from being passed.  In Case Study 
Number One, various alternative financing strategies involving governmental housing and 
buildings will be examined for potential applications to finance military capital acquisitions. In 
another Case Study, share-in-savings contracts will be examined utilizing the Energy Savings 
Performance Contracts case. Together, these case studies will demonstrate how current 
scoring guidelines are used to score alternative financing arrangements based solely on the 
financial obligation without sufficient regard to the program’s benefits.   
Barriers to Alternative Financing 
A 2003 report written by the Congressional Budget Office addressed the government’s 
concern involving the use of long-term leasing agreements; in particular, their ability to: 
1. Reduce the budget’s ability to fully depict the Federal Government’s financial 
commitments. 
2. Undermine fiscal policy by circumventing controls such as limits on deficits and caps on 
Federal Spending. 
3. Allow an agency to avoid facing the full costs of purchasing an asset at the time it 
decides to buy it, thus making acquisitions that are not cost-effective more likely. 
4. Raise the costs of some investments because a lease purchase is, over the life of an 
asset, inherently more costly to the government than a direct purchase (CBO, 2003, p. ix 
summary). 
Due to these concerns, there is a large incentive to capitalize the majority of lease 
agreements, which scores the lease similar to a direct purchase.  Since the lease involves 
payments over time, there is an inherent interest cost disadvantage when delaying the payment 
of an asset.  The scorekeepers use the prime rate or an average of the interest rate of 
marketable Treasury securities as their standard discount rate.  Since private leasing firms 
require a return that exceeds the prime rate, leasing arrangements incur an additional cost: the 
difference between the prime rate and the negotiated rate.  The scoring rules also assume that 
parity exists between public and private firms when operating, managing, or maintaining an 
asset.  The additional services and expertise of the private-sector firm are not incorporated into 
the current scoring guidelines. 
Scoring Case Studies 
 Practical Usage of Alternative Financing 
Introduction 
As previously mentioned, the GAO identified 10 capital financing approaches in use by 
government agencies as alternatives to the conventional full-funding approach (GAO, 2003, 
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August).  Five of these 10 approaches were selected for examination on the basis of their 
potential application towards funding large DoD procurements of capital equipment.  These 
financing strategies include: Incremental funding, Operating leases, Public-private partnerships, 
Share-in-savings contracts, and Debt issuance.   The combined effects of these are reducing 
the up-front budgetary impact of capital projects, making use of all existing public resources, 
and incorporating private-sector efficiencies within government projects, which has been a 
stated goal of every administration since Thomas Jefferson’s.   
In 1996, Congress passed legislation in the National Defense Authorization Act; this bill 
created the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) to address the costly challenge of 
maintaining adequate housing for service members.  Of the 300,000 military housing units in 
existence, an estimated 200,000 units were in need of repair at an approximate cost of $16 
billion, which would restore the units to acceptable conditions (DoD, 1999).  The Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) also possesses legislative authority to utilize alternative financing 
techniques.  To alleviate the large up-front costs of their projects, these agencies selected 
various PPPs as alternatives to conventional funding.  Several MHPI and VA projects are 
presented below to discuss the scoring determination and potential broader application to 
capital procurement for the DoD.   
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
In a 2003 study by the GAO, PPPs were identified as the most prevalent alternative 
financing method, with over 54 different agreements in existence within US agencies (GAO, 
2003, August).  PPPs are a particularly popular alternative-financing technique for the DoD due 
to their great flexibility and ability to apply private-sector capital and expertise to public needs 
and resources.  In this symbiotic relationship, each party benefits from its participation in the 
partnership.  The government is unable to be the most efficient provider of all necessary 
services and equipment items for the public sector. OMB Circular A-76 acknowledges this 
reality and provides guidelines with which to outsource public requirements to the private sector 
and promote efficiency (OMB, 2003, May).  In some cases, adaptable technologies or industrial 
capacity already exist in the private sector that could address the requirements of the military.  A 
PPP can be formed to exploit these opportunities in a manner conventional full-funding 
procurement cannot. 
Despite the efficiencies of PPPs, the scoring of PPP legislation has become increasingly 
conservative—limiting the flexibility originally granted by statuary authority to several Federal 
agencies.  The CBO and OMB believe that Federal agencies are using special purpose public-
private ventures as a way to access private capital without triggering lease-purchase guidelines 
and to avoid recording obligations up-front in their budgets.  This section will discuss these 
concerns and other scoring issues using several examples from the DoD’s privatization of 
military housing and the VA’s enhanced-use lease authority.    
The majority of PPPs involve the Federal Government’s real property or other 
underutilized assets that can be developed, revitalized, or managed by the private sector.  The 
key element of a PPP is that the government possesses some non-monetary asset that has 
value to the private sector.  In a typical fully funded contract, the government must set aside 
funds sufficient to cover all obligations in the first year of the project.  In PPP agreements, the 
government is able to barter an asset or use existing conditions in lieu of full payment to reduce 
their obligations.  These assets can include loan guarantees, longer lease terms, debt issuance, 
guaranteed minimum rates of occupancy, or even the transfer of the asset at the completion of 
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the lease term.  Figure 1 depicts the wide degree of versatility of PPP contracts in managing 
responsibility throughout the life of an asset. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Degree of Government Responsibility in PPP Contracts   
(Dovey & Eggers, 2007, p. 5) 
Below is a listing of the most common PPP relationships in existence.   
Design-Build (DB): Under this model, the government contracts with a private partner 
to design and build a facility in accordance with the requirements set by the government. After 
completing the facility, the government assumes responsibility for operating and maintaining the 
facility. This method of procurement is also referred to as Build-Transfer (BT). 
Design-Build-Maintain (DBM): This model is similar to Design-Build except that the 
private sector also maintains the facility. The public sector retains responsibility for operations. 
Design-Build-Operate (DBO): Under this model, the private sector designs and builds a 
facility. Once the facility is completed, the title for the new facility is transferred to the public 
sector, while the private sector operates the facility for a specified period. This procurement 
model is also referred to as Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO). 
Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM): This model combines the responsibilities of 
design-build procurements with the operations and maintenance of a facility for a specified 
period by a private-sector partner. At the end of that period, the operation of the facility is 
transferred back to the public sector. This method of procurement is also referred to as Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT). 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT): The government grants a franchise to a private 
partner to finance, design, build and operate a facility for a specific period of time. Ownership of 
the facility is transferred back to the public sector at the end of that period. 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO): The government grants the right to finance, design, build, 
operate and maintain a project to a private entity, which retains ownership of the project. The 
private entity is not required to transfer the facility back to the government. 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate/Maintain (DBFO, DBFM or DBFO/M): Under this 
model, the private sector designs, builds, finances, operates and/or maintains a new facility 
under a long-term lease. At the end of the lease term, the facility is transferred to the public 
sector. In some countries, DBFO/M covers both BOO and BOOT.   
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PPPs can also be used for existing services and facilities in addition to new ones. Some 
of these models are described below. 
Service Contract: The government contracts with a private entity to provide services 
the government previously performed. 
Management Contract: A management contract differs from a service contract in that 
the private entity is responsible for all aspects of operations and maintenance of the facility 
under contract. 
Lease: The government grants a private entity a leasehold interest in an asset. The 
private partner operates and maintains the asset in accordance with the terms of the lease. 
Concession: The government grants a private entity exclusive rights to provide, operate 
and maintain an asset over a long period of time in accordance with performance requirements 
set forth by the government. The public sector retains ownership of the original asset, while the 
private operator retains ownership over any improvements made during the concession period. 
Divestiture: The government transfers an asset, either in part or in full, to the private 
sector. Generally, the government will include certain conditions with the sale of the asset to 
ensure that improvements are made and citizens continue to be served (Dovey & Eggers, 2007, 
p. 5). 
PPP Examples: Government Privatization Initiative 
The statuary authority originally granted in 1996, and later made permanent in 2005, 
allows the government to enter into public-private partnerships without individual project 
approval from Congress (10 USC 2871-2885).  The relative complexity of PPP contracts 
frequently generates disagreements amongst the CBO, OMB, and agency representatives 
concerning the interpretation of the scoring guidelines.  The goal of the CBO and OMB is to 
provide to decision-makers an accurate account of the amount of legal obligations of the federal 
government.  PPPs represent a valuable method of accessing private capital and expertise 
independent of the scoring determination made by the CBO/OMB.  The following DoD and VA 
case studies analyze the value of the PPPs and the scoring issues in the cases.   
Public-private Partnership Case Study 1: Ft. Hood Family Housing, LLP 
Description of Project 
In 2001, Fort Hood Family Housing was selected as one of the first PPPs by the Army 
when it contracted Actus Lend Lease to manage all aspects of the development, financing, 
construction, and property management for the Fort Hood Family Housing project (Fort Hood 
Family Housing, 2007).  The partnership detailed a 50-year lease to maintain the 5,912 units 
located at Fort Hood, Texas (CBO, 2003, p. 28).   
Financial Details 
At the conclusion of the initial 50-year lease, the Army has the option to renew for 
another 25-year lease term.  If the Army does not renew, all assets remain government 
property.   
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The housing project has an estimated cost of $260 million.  The burden of that cost will 
be divided: $186 million will come in the form of a loan entered into by the partnership; Bank 
One will provide $20 million in private equity; and the Army will invest $52 million in equity.   
Actus will also provide $6 million in equity at the end of the fifth year for additional 
development.  The contract also provides Actus with a preferred return on equity of 10-12%, 
and a portion of partnership earnings up to a predetermined ceiling.  Actus will also receive 
payment equal to a fixed percentage of the project’s gross revenue for its management 
services.   
Scoring Impact and Issues 
The Army was able to obtain in excess of $273 million in financing for an up-front cost of 
$52 million (CBO, 2003, p. 42).  Only the Army’s direct investment of $52 million was scored by 
the OMB as an immediate obligation.  The transfer of land and pre-existing housing units to 
Actus had no budget impact based on the absence of any cash transaction between the two 
entities.  A summary of budgetary treatment of asset sales and barters by the CBO and OMB is 
included in the table below.  The rental of the housing units to service members was viewed as 
individual transactions between private parties.  This distributed the budget impact for the 
housing expenditures to an annual expense vice an up-front cost.  Additionally, the $186 million 
obtained via loan is viewed by the Army as debt of a private entity and not the government.  
According to the contract details, the Army does not have a legal obligation to cover the costs of 
the partnership’s financing. However, the housing units are located on government land, and the 
management terms of the contract effectively place the housing under government control.   
The actual budgetary impact and actual cost of this PPP has particular significance as 
the Fort Hood Family Housing, LP, was one of the first PPPs initiated by the DoD.  The scoring 
debate has two clearly polarized sides.  From the scorekeepers’ perspective, the government’s 
total obligations remain hidden in the financial framework of the partnership, blinding Congress 
of the needed information to calculate future budget impact.  Also, an important underlying issue 
remains: is this type of partnership actually cost-effective?  The deal stipulates a mandated 10-
12% return on equity plus a management fee based on the partnership revenues.  Could the 
government provide this service at similar cost and service levels?  Another critical issue for the 
CBO/OMB is the long-term (50 years) lease agreement that represents a long-term commitment 
to the Fort Hood, Texas base.  The long-term lease limits the year-to-year budget control of 
Congress and obligates the Federal government to unspecified future obligations.  
From the service and partnership perspective, the PPP allows the DoD to immediately 
resolve the issue of substandard and insufficient military housing that threaten the quality of life 
and retention of the military.  The costs of the project are distributed throughout the life of the 
project.  The venture utilizes the housing allowances of the individual service members to 
finance the agreement over the lease term.  Actus Lend Lease, with over 30,000 managed 
units, is able to offer considerable private expertise that helps achieve a more efficiently run 
housing project and higher customer-satisfaction levels (Fort Hood Family Housing, 2007).  The 
agreement also alleviates the DoD of housing funding that can now support other missions such 
as Iraqi reconstruction and development. 
PPPs also provide stronger incentives to complete the project on-time and under budget.  
In 2003, the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office reported that 73% of non-Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) projects were over budget, and 70% were delayed—versus only 22% of PFI 
contracts delivered over budget, and 24% delivered late (Dovey & Eggers, 2007, p. 7).  The 
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UK’s previous experience in public-private partnerships has demonstrated that non-financial 
cost factors such as quality, service, timeliness, and expertise can often justify the involvement 
of the private sector in providing public financing.   
This case study highlights the scoring impact of these alternative financial arrangements.  
For the Fort Hood Family Housing Project, should the up-front obligation for the government be 
scored at $52 million or $273 million?  The CBO asserts that although only a small portion of the 
total investment has been fronted by the DoD, the DoD has overall controlling interest in the 
project.  The venture is structured to fulfill the service needs; the Army shares in the earnings of 
the venture above a threshold, and also controls the housing units at the end of the lease.  
Additionally, military tenants have preferential status for obtaining occupancy, and the venture 
must maintain affordable rents for service members (CBO, 2003, p. 29).  The argument is made 
that Fort Hood Family Housing Project is a purely government-driven project.   
The issue is not whether or not the contract is structured for the service’s interests—of 
course it is.  The issue is whether this type of alternative financing is beneficial to both the 
service and, more importantly, the government as a whole.  In this case, the Army should have 
the flexibility to improve existing military housing with a lower up-front cost of $52 million.  
Congress and Army leaders must realize, however, that the total obligation to the government 
will exceed the $273 million total investment upon conclusion of the project.  A balance between 
Congress’ desire to control the purse versus the services’ need to supply critical services to 
their members must be reached.  The budgetary impact of CBO/OMB scoring will continue to be 
analyzed in the following case studies.   
Public-private Partnership Case Study 2: Chicago West Side Regional 
Headquarters (CWSRH) 
The Department of Veteran’s Affairs (VA) was granted authority to enter into enhanced-
use lease contracts in 1991 (38 USC 8161-8169).  The legislation allows the VA to lease 
government land to private entities for up to 75 years for the purpose of developing the land for 
VA or private needs.  Payments resulting from the lease can be used by the VA without further 
Congressional oversight (CBO, 2003, p. 31).  The VA then has the option of leasing back the 
privately developed facilities for their uses.  The VA can enter into these agreements without 
Congressional approval and only must notify Congress within 60 days of the enhanced-use 
lease agreement.  Enhanced-use leases are particularly attractive to the VA due to their vast 
holdings of underdeveloped land and facilities.    
Description of Project 
The Chicago West Side Regional Headquarters (CWSRH) project’s enhanced-use lease 
is an example of the flexibility of PPPs, but the project also presents difficult scoring issues to 
the CBO/OMB.  In 2002, the VA entered into a series of agreements used to fund a new $60 
million Chicago headquarters building and parking facility (CBO, 2003, p.33).   
Financial Details 
The project involved numerous interdependent agreements.  West Side Enhanced-use 
Lease Trust was created, with the VA named as sole beneficiary.  A four-acre plot adjacent to 
the VA Medical Center in downtown Chicago was included in the trust, using a 35-year 
enhanced use lease agreement.  MedPark, a private contractor, would be responsible for the 
construction, outfitting, and management of the office and parking facilities.  The Illinois 
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Department Finance Authority would issue $9 million in taxable revenue bonds to help fund the 
project.  The proceeds from the bond issuance would be loaned to the Trust to pay for the 
design and construction of the facility.  Under the lease terms for the building, the VA is 
obligated to a two-year lease for a minimum of 95% of the office and parking facilities.  The 
leases are automatically renewing unless the VA renders written notice prior to the end of the 
lease term.  Additionally, if the VA occupies any portion of the building, it must cover at a 
minimum the amortization and interest of the trust’s loans plus all the trustee’s expenses (CBO, 
2003, p. 34). 
Scoring Impact and Issues 
In October 2001, the OMB and VA settled how obligations and outlays would be treated 
for lease-back agreements (CBO, 2003, p. 44).  A leaseback agreement is a lease in which the 
government is the lessor vice the lessee.  The agreement stipulated that VA leasebacks of 
terms up to two years in length would be treated as operating leases, as long as the VA had no 
right of first refusal on future lease terms.  The property lease was drafted to be a non-cash 
barter transaction without budget impact. The revenues received by the VA from the trust would 
offset the VA’s initial investment and be under the agency’s discretion.  The initial lease of the 
building was designed to be an operating lease, and the borrowing of the Trust to be private 
borrowing.  The VA does not have right of first refusal for future leases as mandated by their 
2001 agreement with the OMB.  The CBO is concerned with the VA’s obligation to cover the 
cost of capital for the Trust even if the agency reduces its usage of the facility.   
The CBO points out that the CWSRH enhanced-use lease agreement represents a 
significant long-term obligation by the VA and is not actually limited to the initial two-year lease 
term.  As such, the budget impact of the project far exceeds the VA’s estimation.  Congressional 
scoring is only rendered on new legislation; since the project was passed under existing 
authority, the scoring issues remain unresolved.  From the VA’s perspective, the agreement was 
crafted with only limited, future risk to the government.  The facilities were built in a highly 
popular section of downtown Chicago—increasing the likelihood of finding replacement tenants 
if demand for usage fell below initial levels.  Additionally, the VA benefited, as sole beneficiary of 
the Trust, from proceeds from the leasing.  The obligation of the Trust to the VA would help the 
Trust obtain funding and reduce risk from private creditors.   
The VA’s Chicago project is a demonstration of how a government agency was able to 
utilize an underdeveloped asset to fulfill an immediate need.  The project was designed to limit 
the initial up-front cost of the venture to the initial two-year lease agreement, with construction 
and design of the facilities to be paid for via private equity.  Future lease agreements would be 
entirely governed by the private trust for the 35-year agreement, with the VA receiving 
preferential treatment in facility usage.  Utilizing the legislative authority, the VA was able to 
construct the optimal size facility and benefit from any private usage of the facility.  The project 
is an example of how a PPP was used to finance and successfully create an otherwise 
unaffordable project.   
An obstacle to greater usage of this type of funding is the budgetary treatment from the 
OMB and, particularly, the CBO.  In 2002, HR 3947, the Federal Property Management Reform 
Act, was introduced that would give federal landholding agencies additional authorities in 
acquiring, managing, improving, and disposing of their property assets; it also provided 
incentives to manage these assets efficiently (CBO, 2002).  Although the bill did not receive the 
necessary approval, it did clarify the position of the CBO towards PPPs.  In its Cost Estimate for 
the Bill, the CBO stated it viewed, “hybrid entities like public-private business ventures” as 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 390 - 
=
=
governmental.  Meaning that, since the purpose of the venture is mostly or entirely 
governmental, any borrowing or outside financing activities would be viewed as new federal 
borrowing authority.  Additionally, it felt that most, if not all, of the public-private ventures should 
be subject to the lease-purchase scoring guidelines contained in OMB Circular A-11.   
The scoring of private involvement remains a frustrating issue as the CBO reserves the 
right to alter its interpretation of the scoring guidelines.  For six years (1996-2002), the CBO 
scored military housing ventures consistently with the OMB.  However, in 2002, the CBO 
changed its position, viewing the ventures as additional borrowing.  In regards to share-in-
savings contracts, the CBO reversed a decade-old policy of scoring ESPCs budget-neutral to 
scoring them as additional budget authority.  Other agencies, such as General Services 
Administration (GSA), support legislation that expands the authority to utilize private 
partnerships (Perry, 2002, April 18).  While the CBO’s role is to remain objective and impartial, 
its interpretation of scoring guidelines dictates policy for privatization initiatives.  If Congress 
seeks to build on the recent successes in military housing or VA’s enhanced-use contracts, its 
members should offer directed scorekeeping that promotes efficient economic use of DoD 
resources.  It is our belief that the efficiencies of these ventures can be translated on a larger 
scale to the procurement, management, and disposal of military capital equipment.  The DoD 
can more efficiently procure and manage its assets, but only if it receives legislative authority 
and budgetary treatment allowing it to do so.    
The decision to undertake a project must be separated into two parts:  
1. Is the project worthwhile to undertake? 
a. Do the benefits exceed costs?  
b. Does the return exceed the required rate of return on investment? 
c. Does this project warrant the limited resources that it will consume? 
2. Given that this project is worthwhile, what is the best method to finance the project? 
ESPC Case Study 
Energy Savings Performance Contracting (ESPC) is the most cost-effective means of 
completing building energy upgrades and associated savings.  The concept has existed since 
1992, but it was not implemented by the Department of Energy until 1995 (DoE, 2006, June).  
ESPC is a means of using utility savings to pay for all project costs.  There are many 
possibilities of projects, such as energy-management systems, interior and exterior lighting, 
boiler replacement or repair of steam systems, and replacement of Heating, Ventilation, and Air 
Conditioning (HVAC) (Washington State Department of General Administration, 2007).  This 
form of contracting normally guarantees project costs, savings and performance of installed 
equipment.  However, the majority of risk is borne by the contractor, not the government. The 
government must fully fund the project—which often causes debate about the direct costs and 
overall benefit.  
The Department of Energy explains: 
An ESPC project is a partnership between the customer and an energy service company 
(ESCO).  The ESCO conducts a comprehensive energy audit and identifies 
improvements that will save energy at the facility. In consultation with the agency 
customer, The ESCO designs and constructs a project that meets the agency’s needs 
and arranges financing to pay for it.  The ESCO guarantees savings sufficient to pay for 
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the project over the term of the contract.  After the contract ends, all additional cost 
savings accrue to the agency.  Contract terms up to 25 years are allowed. (DoE, 2006, 
June) 
Since 2005, more than 400 federal ESPC projects, in 46 different states, by 19 different 
federal agencies (altogether worth $1.9 billion) have generated $5.2 billion in energy cost 
savings (2006, June). 
The use of ESPCs is ideal for organizations which seek out alternative means of funding 
programs.  As the Department of Defense (DoD)’s discretionary portions of the budget continue 
to become strained, high competition for those funds may leave critical programs dry.  Many 
facilities throughout the DoD were built shortly after World War II.  Few new facilities have been 
built replacing the old.  Dated DoD equipment and assets—such as the B-52 bomber, SH-60 
helicopter and many others—are continuously being funneled additional funds.  This funding is 
higher than normal funding for these assets due to increased maintenance, poor fuel economy, 
dated insulation techniques, and lack of funding to support replacements.  Thus, the DoD 
continues to live with existing problems.  The ESPC is a means to cut costs while continuing 
overall functionality of facilities and assets.  Other means of financing, such as PPPs and 
various forms of leases, are used successfully today by the private sector and will become a 
way of life for many organizations.   
A perfect example of the benefits of an ESPC pertains to many homeowners. A 
homeowner will evaluate the cost of improving his/her home with the expected benefits.  The 
homeowner may attempt to determine some form of payback period or return on investment.  
The homeowner must determine the means of financing such improvements as well.  The 
government and its facilities are no different.   But many vendors are willing to offer their 
supplies and equipment to help defer the required payments over some time frame, but at some 
higher price.   Assume the proposed cost to renovate or improve a home was $10,000.  This 
improvement would replace the windows, lighting and appliances.  The home would become 
more efficient and reduce utility costs.  The vendor and homeowner would agree upon some 
baseline on expenses once improvements were installed, and the difference would be used to 
“pay off” the vendor for its services.  If there are no savings, the vendor does not get paid.  
Assume for contract period is eight years.  Table 2 illustrates two scenarios.  The first assumes 
the homeowner paid the vendors $10,000 up-front; then he realizes a 30% or 50% reduction in 
his existing $5,000 annual utility expense.  The second scenario assumes the homeowner pays 
for the improvement in some agreed-upon ESPC with the vendors over five-years—with the 
same 50% reduction in annual utility expense and a 3.00% rate of inflation.   
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Table 2. ESPC Scenarios 
Table 2 illustrates in Scenario 1 that if the improvement is fully funded up-front in Year 0, 
there is a positive Net Present Value on the investment for both the 30% and 50% reductions in 
utility expenses.  Scenario 2 demonstrates with no initial investment, a positive Net Present 
Value on the investment for both the 30% and 50% reductions in utility expenses.  The vendor 
would also benefit from assisting the homeowner with the improvements.  It is a win-win 
situation.  The homeowner does not have to “fully fund” the project and achieves the same 
result with an alternate form of financing.   Today, many private companies and local 
governments implement ESPCs.   
Within the government and many federal agencies, there are different points of view 
pertaining to ESPCs and their application in the budget.  The first is that ESPCs should be 
scored at zero because they pay for themselves.  The other is that the funds must be obligated 
in case of contract issues such as The Anti-deficiency Act.    The Anti-deficiency Act, also 
known as 31 USC Section 1301(a), is one of the major laws in which the Congress exercises its 
constitutional control of the public purse.  Thus, ESPCs continue to be debated, and their role 
within the budget is uncertain.  Yet, as demonstrated above, ESPCs are clearly a viable solution 
to cut costs for the DoD’s facilities and assets.   
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 set new federal energy goals.  The act states that one 
goal was to “cut energy usage by 2 percent per year from 2006-2015” (DoE, 2007).  The federal 
government may not achieve this goal without improving existing conditions at its facilities or 
with its equipment.   The budget continues to be strained due to the Global War on Terrorism, 
increased health costs, a need for social security reform, and other political issues.  One means 
to cut existing costs without having an effect on the budget is the usage of ESPCs for existing 
facilities and equipment.  Recently, a step in the right direction was made by the Air Force.  On 
March 1, 2007, the Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman a contract with the same principles 
as the ESPC.  The contract was for the initial $12.5 million E-8C Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System (STARS) engine replacement.  The contract defines the, “non-recurring 
engineering work required to replace engines on the E-8C Joint STARS aircraft” (Stratford, 
2007).  Other enhancements for the Boeing 707-based platform are scheduled with a similar 
contract.   The Air Force decision was based on the Boeing 700-300C series aircraft refurbished 
by Northrop Grumman, which have performed much better than the Air Force E-8C.  Thus, this 
has created an opportunity for the Air Force to maximize the benefits of the ESPC to improve 
 Cost of Repair 10000 exp yr $5,000 reduction $1,500       
  inflation 1.03 new exp $3,500         
              
  NPV 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Scenario 1 2,795 10,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 
Scenario 2 2,266 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 1,500 1,500 30% 
Vendor (30%) 530 10,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 0 0 
              
Scenario 1 11,326 10,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
Scenario 2 3,776 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 2,500 2,500 50% 
Vendor (50%) 7,549 10,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 0 0 
              
 Payback period for scenario 1 would be $10,000/$1,500 which is 6.67 years.     
 There is no payback period for scenario 2 due to not making any investment into the project.  
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the E-8C’s reliability, reduce maintenance costs, and make the aircraft more fuel-efficient—
allowing less “in-air” refueling and allowing increased on-station time.  Thus, both the contractor 
and the government benefit from the ESPC. 
New technologies, especially energy-saving advancements, should be used when 
feasible in a world where prices continue to rise as resources continue to become scarce.  
United States companies should be provided an incentive to explore new technologies and 
processes to innovate and create savings which not only help them, but improve the efficiency 
of the government and, thus, benefit the taxpayer.  If such were the case, ultimately the 
productivity of our country would increase, resources would be conserved, and the economy 
would grow while helping fund our government.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Recommendations 
This research addressed only a limited number of the total available options to finance a 
capital asset.  All factors being equal, the time-value of money dictates that payment of an asset 
up-front will necessarily be less costly than delayed payment.  However, the analysis presented 
here has hopefully addressed several scenarios in which government agencies would be able to 
leverage their available resources and incorporate the private sector via some form of Public-
private Partnership to achieve a cost-effective alternative to up-front funding.  The current 
scoring guidelines in OMB Circular A-11 provide a negative bias towards using alternative 
approaches to full-funding.  In many cases, agencies are forced to seek alternative funding 
measures or do without the asset.  Several recommendations to modify the current budget-
scoring process and scoring guidelines in an attempt to promote improved economic efficiency 
in public projects are presented below.   
Scoring of Leasing  
The crucial question in categorizing a lease is determining what constitutes purchase of 
an asset.  Long-term leases that provide the government with ownership of the asset are scored 
up-front in an amount equal to the net present value of the future lease payments for the asset.  
Conversely, leases that provide the government with only partial use of the asset’s economic life 
can be scored in annual obligations as an operating lease (CBO, 2003, p.viii).  The 
scorekeepers apply strict criteria in determining between an operating or capital lease.  The 
result, and intent of the guidelines, is that almost all DoD equipment is acquired via purchase or 
capital leases.  The OMB guidelines for operating leases have two additional requirements to 
the four basic criteria used by the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  These two 
requirements include:    
1. There is a private-sector market for the asset.  
2. The asset is a general-purpose asset rather than being for a special purpose of the 
government and is not built to the unique specification of the government as lessee 
(OMB, 2006, June, pp. 3-4).   
These two rules are specifically designed to eliminate operating leases as a financing 
option for the procurement of military equipment.   Table 3 outlines the criteria for Public vs. 
Private-Operating-Lease determination. 
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OMB Requirements to be Considered an 
Operating Lease (Public)  
(OMB, 2006, June, pp. 3-4) 
Basic Criteria in Lease Determination 
(Private)  
(Lee, 2003, pp. 10-11) 
Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor 
during the term of the lease and is not 
transferred to the Government at or shortly after 
the end of the lease period. 
The lease transfers ownership of the property to 
the lessee by the end of the lease term. 
The lease does not contain a bargain-price 
purchase option. 
The lease contains an option to purchase the 
leased property at a bargain price. 
The lease term does not exceed 75% of the 
estimated economic lifetime of the asset. 
The lease term is equal to or greater than 75% 
of the estimated economic life of the leased 
property. 
The present value of the minimum lease 
payments over the life of the lease does not 
exceed 90% of the fair market value of the asset 
at the inception of the lease. 
The present value of rental and other minimum 
lease payments, excluding that portion of the 
payments representing executory costs, equals 
or exceeds 90% of the fair value of the leased 
property. 
The asset is a general purpose asset rather 
than being for a special purpose of the 
Government and is not built to unique 
specification for the Government as lessee. 
 
There is a private-sector market for the asset.  
Table 3. Public vs. Private Operating Lease Determination 
The stricter guidelines were adopted in 1991 in response to the frequent use of lease-
purchases in the 1980s to acquire assets, including propositioned ships or buildings.  The CBO 
cited four major concerns of the increased use of leasing that helped inspire the new guidelines. 
It asserts that leasing has the ability to: 
1. Reduce the budget’s ability to fully depict the Federal Government’s financial 
commitments; 
2. Undermine fiscal policy by circumventing controls such as limits on deficits and caps on 
discretionary spending; 
3. Allow an agency to avoid facing the full costs of purchasing an asset at the time it 
decides to buy it, thus making acquisitions that are not cost-effective more likely; and 
4. Raise the costs of some investments because a lease-purchase is, over the life of an 
asset, inherently more costly to the government than a direct purchase (CBO, 2003, p. 
ix). 
We propose to limit the guidelines to the four basic criteria accepted in the private sector 
with one additional caveat.  A fifth guideline would include a proposal that highlighted the 
following issues:  
1. The estimated total use (years) of the asset by the government.  
2. The reason as to why operating leasing would be preferred over direct-purchase, lease-
purchase or other type of financing. 
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3. Explicitly address ownership options for the asset.  Also discuss the probability the asset 
would be damaged in its use and ultimately be required to be purchased.   
4. Salvage value for the asset at completion of the lease—discussing any outside markets 
for the asset to determine potential market value. 
The proposal would be submitted to the OMB, CBO, and Congressional Budget 
Committees as part of the legislative process.  If these new guidelines for operating leases were 
adopted, greater flexibility would be restored to the DoD in financing its requirements.  The 
guidelines would not hinder Congress’s ability to allocate financial resources effectively. 
Scoring of Alternative Financing  
Alternative financing consists of almost any financing option or combination of options 
that can be used in lieu of conventional full-funding.  The private sector has metrics such as 
profit or stock price that help motivate corporate executives in their selection of the most 
beneficial financing method for their company.  Without these incentives, the federal budget 
process remains a delicate balance between agency needs and Congressional control of the 
purse.  Current scoring guidelines are designed to provide the decision-makers in Congress 
with the most informative representation of current and future government obligations.  The 
legislation also has the effect of biasing full-funding versus other forms of financing.  Yet, in 
certain situations, the needs and resources of the government can be combined with the 
capabilities of the private sector to form a partnership that is beneficial to both parties.  Public-
private Partnerships represent the most practical financing method available that harnesses 
these capabilities and addresses the needs of the DoD.  
Unfortunately, the financial details of Public-private Partnerships are typically unique and 
involve complex financial relationships, causing few useful precedents to be available to help 
predict the scoring outcome.  The National Council for Public Private Partnerships (NCPPP) 
cites one of the major impediments in the budget scoring policy to be the ambiguity surrounding 
the current scoring guidelines (2007).  The OMB scoring rules represent policy vice actual hard-
fast rules and are intentionally vague to allow interpretation by the CBO or OMB.  Reviewing the 
scoring determination through an open forum between concerned policies would not only clarify 
the intent of the rules, but also improve adherence to the scoring rules.  The Council also 
asserts that scoring confusion could further be eliminated if an “Alternative Financing” 
committee was formed by the OMB to assist agencies that seek private-sector involvement 
(2007).  The committee can be established independently from the OMB to eliminate any 
conflicts of interests or questions of neutrality.    
Additionally, the scoring process would be improved if the scoring rules placed greater 
emphasis on economic efficiency rather than the determination of outlays.  For instance, share-
in-savings contracts that have outlays resulting only from the net savings to the government 
should be scored as budget neutral or have some other discount factor that reflects the financial 
benefits of the deal.  Public-private Partnerships are particularly penalized in this manner as 
many benefits from these ventures do not have an explicit value that can be readily estimated.  
The inability to easily or accurately estimate these benefits causes them to be ignored in the 
scoring process.  In these cases, representatives from the prospective Alternative Financing 
committee could provide their best estimate of the projected savings of private involvement—
either by discounting the budget authority scored for the project or by including this dollar 
amount independent of the scoring estimate.  In either manner, Congress would be informed of 
the benefits of the alternative financing.  The current scoring rules are overly conservative and 
neglect to include the majority of the benefits of PPP in scoring budget authority.  
 =




The consistency and transparency in the budget process that were the intent of the 
scoring guidelines also have the affect of altering the feasibility of alternative financing ventures.  
Currently, there are many opportunities to improve the aging infrastructure and reduce the 
lifecycle costs of a project through greater private-sector involvement.  A major impediment to 
realizing this goal is the interpretation of the scoring guidelines by the CBO and OMB and the 
absence of legislation authorizing such private-sector participation.  The government would 
benefit from either a revision to the current scoring guidelines or a more comprehensive 
interpretation of the current scoring rules.  We assert that if these changes are implemented, 
then the soldiers and sailors in the field would have a better probability of being provided the 
equipment necessary to complete their National Security mission at a time when we are faced 
with ever-shortening supply of money during the Global War on Terrorism.   
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Division 
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David Lamm, Associate Professor emeritus, Naval Postgraduate School 
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Outsourcing for Optimal Results: Six Ways to Structure an Evaluation of 
Alternatives 
Francois Melese, Naval Postgraduate School 
Alternative Strategies for Managing MK48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity 
William Lucyshyn, University of Maryland 
 
Chair: Reuben S. Pitts III, Head, Warfare Systems Department, NSWC Dahlgren Division 
 
Discussant: David Lamm, Professor Emeritus from the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
(GSBPP), served at NPS as both a military and civilian professor from 1978 through his retirement in 
January 2004, teaching a number of acquisition and contracting courses, as well as advising thesis and 
MBA project students.  During his tenure, he served as the Academic Associate for the Acquisition & 
Contract Management (815) MBA Curriculum, the Systems Acquisition Management (816) MBA 
Curriculum, the Master of Science in Contract Management (835) distance learning degree, and the 
Master of Science in Program Management (836) distance learning degree.  He created the latter three 
programs.  He also created the International Defense Acquisition Resources Management (IDARM) 
program, which brings acquisition education in-country to over 20 allied nations.  Further, he created the 
Advanced Acquisition Program (AAP), a distance learning certificate program for the civilian acquisition 
workforce throughout the country.  Finally, in collaboration with the GSBPP Acquisition Chair, he 
established and served as PI for the Acquisition Research Program, including inauguration of an annual 
Acquisition Research Symposium.  He also developed the Master of Science in Procurement & 
Contracting degree program at St Mary’s College in Moraga, CA, and served as a Professor in both the 
St Mary’s and the George Washington University’s graduate programs. 
He has researched and published numerous articles and has written an acquisition text entitled Contract 
Negotiation Cases: Government and Industry, 1993.  He served on the editorial board for the National 
Contract Management Journal and was a founding member of the editorial board for the Acquisition 
Review Quarterly, now known as the Defense Acquisition Review Journal.   He served as the NPS 
member of the Defense Acquisition Research Element (DARE) from 1983-1990. 
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Prior to NPS, he served as the Supply Officer aboard the USS Virgo (AE-30) and the USS Hector (AR-7).  
He also had acquisition tours of duty at the Defense Logistics Agency in Contract Administration and the 
Naval Air Systems Command where he was the Deputy Director of the Missile Procurement Division. 
He holds a BA from the University of Minnesota and a MBA and DBA both from The George Washington 
University.  He is a Fellow of the National Contract Management Association and received that 
association’s Charles A. Dana Distinguished Service Award and the Blanche Witte Award for Contracting 
Excellence.  He created the NCMA’s Certified Professional Contracts Manager (CPCM) Examination 
Board and served as its Director from 1975-1990.  He is the 1988 NPS winner of the RADM John J. 
Schieffelin Award for Teaching Excellence.
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Outsourcing for Optimal Results: Six Ways to Structure an 
Evaluation of Alternatives 
 
Presenter:  Francois Melese, PhD, joined the NPS faculty in 1987. He earned his undergraduate degree 
in Economics at UC Berkeley, his Master’s at the University of British Columbia in Canada, and his PhD 
at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. After five years as a faculty member in the Business 
School at Auburn University, Francois joined NPS as part of the Defense Resources Management 
Institute (DRMI). In his time at NPS, he has taught public budgeting and defense management in over two 
dozen countries and has published over 50 articles and book chapters on a wide variety of topics. More 
recently, at the request of the State Department and NATO Headquarters, he has represented the US at 
NATO Defense meetings in Hungary, the Ukraine, Germany and Armenia. His latest article (co-authored 
with Jim Blandin and Sean O’Keefe) appeared in the International Public Management Review. The 
article (available at www.ipmr.net) is entitled “A New Management Model for Government: Integrating 
Activity-Based Costing, the Balanced Scorecard and Total Quality Management with the spirit of the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.” 
Francois Melese, PhD, Professor of Economics  
Defense Resources Management Institute 
School of International Graduate Studies 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-2009 
E-mail: fmelese@nps.edu  
 
Abstract 
This study presents six ways to structure an evaluation of alternative outsourcing 
opportunities. According to the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-76, the 
decision to outsource government positions or functions involves a comparison of “bids” or 
“proposals”—Invitations for Bids (IFB) for well-defined, routine commercial activities; Requests 
for Proposals (RFP) for more complex, more difficult to define activities. The paper suggests 
replacing the conventional decision sciences approach that currently dominates defense 
guidance, with a more intuitive constrained optimization approach borrowed from economist’s 
“characteristics approach to demand theory.” One of the key insights derived from the economic 
approach is that alternatives are generated as part of a two-step optimization and appear as 
(response) functions and not points in Cost-Effectiveness space. One important implication is 
that what have previously been viewed as dominated (inferior) alternatives may prove to be 
superior under different budget scenarios. The study discusses concepts of intra- and inter-
program analysis, cost as an independent variable, expansion paths, “knees of the curve,” and 
opportunity costs, and offers an intuitive discussion of the hazards of applying cost/effectiveness 
ratios to rank alternatives. In the spirit of government competitions, anyone that discovers 
another constrained optimization approach to structure a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
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Alternative Strategies for Managing MK48 Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity 
Presenter: William Lucyshyn is the Director of Research and a Senior Research Scholar at the Center 
for Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland.  In 
this position, he conducts research on the public policy challenges posed by the increasing role 
information technologies play in both the public and private sectors.   
Previously, Mr. Lucyshyn was a member of the Senior Executive Service and served as a program 
manager and the principal technical advisor to the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), on the identification, selection, research, development, and prototype production of 
advanced technology projects.  Prior to this appointment, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the 
US Air Force, serving in various special operations and acquisition positions.    
He received his Bachelor Degree in Engineering Science from the City University of New York in 1971.  In 
1985, he earned his Master’s Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology.  
He was certified Level III, as an Acquisition Professional in Program Management in 1994.   
Expertise:  Market–based Government, Information Security Policy, Supply Chain 
2101 Van Munching Hall 
College Park, MD 20742 
Phone: (301) 405-8257 
E-mail: Lucyshyn@umd.edu  
Abstract  
Since 1972, Sailors have delivered more than 10,000 MK481 torpedoes to Pacific Fleet 
submarines. During that 29-year period, the IMA achieved numerous awards and earned a 
reputation for outstanding torpedo reliability.  Manning shortfalls in the Navy’s torpedo-man 
rating drove the decision to outsource production to the private sector. In 2001, the MK48 
torpedo Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) at Pearl Harbor was outsourced to a contractor 
team led by Raytheon. All but two of the 181 military billets that existed at the IMA were 
reallocated to other critical areas.    
Outsourcing is a management strategy that contracts out organizational activities to 
vendors or suppliers who specialize in these activities in order to perform them more efficiently.  
Outsourcing or “contracting out” still requires the government to remain fully responsible for the 
provision of all services and management decisions.  If implemented correctly, outsourcing can 
be used to introduce competitive pressure.  This pressure generally incentivizes performance 
improvements and cost reductions.  
This case study will compare the operation of the Pearl Harbor IMA with that of the Navy 
Submarine Torpedo Facility IMA, Yorktown, which is still manned primarily by active-duty 
sailors.   
 
                                                
1 The Mark 48, in production since 1972, is a heavyweight torpedo still carried on all US submarines and 
designed to detonate on contact or in proximity to a target.   
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Panel 13 - Considerations for Acquisition Process Improvements 
 
Thursday, 
May 17, 2007 
Panel 13 - Considerations for Acquisition Process Improvements 




Dr. Nancy L. Spruill, Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis, Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
Papers: 
Review of Defense Acquisition Structures & Capabilities 
Paul Alfieri and Mark D. Lumb, Defense Acquisition University 
An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 
Investments Could Improve DoD’s Acquisition Outcomes 
Katherine Schinasi, US Government Accountability Office 
DoD Contract Termination Liability: An Analysis of Special Termination 
Cost Clause (STCC) 
Rene Rendon and John Mutty, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Chair: Dr. Nancy L. Spruill, Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis, Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), received her Bachelor of Science degree in 
Mathematics, in 1971. From 1971 to 1983, she held a variety of positions with the Center for Naval 
Analyses, including Technical Staff Analyst, Professional Staff Analyst and Project Director. She earned 
her Master of Arts in Mathematical Statistics in 1975 followed by her Doctorate in 1980.  
Dr. Spruill served on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1983 to 1993. Initially, she 
was the Senior Planning, Programming, and Budget Analyst in the Manpower, Reserve Affairs and 
Logistics Secretariat. Later, she served as the Director for Support and Liaison for the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. Then she served as the Senior Operations Research 
Analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation.  
In 1993, she joined the staff of the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), serving as the Chief of Programs 
and Analysis Division for the DMA Comptroller. Her role included oversight of the Agency's $800M 
program. Subsequently, she served as Acting Deputy Comptroller and was a member of the Reinvention 
Task Force for the Vice President's National Performance Review. Her reengineering work was 
implemented and resulted in a mapping organization that is customer focused and reduced in the 
management layers from eleven to three.  
In March 1995, she was selected as the Deputy Director for Acquisition Resources for the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(AT&L)). In February 1999, she was appointed 
Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis (ARA) for USD(AT&L). In this capacity she is responsible for 
the coordination of all defense acquisition and technology planning, programming, and budgeting process 
activities, as well as funds control, Congressional actions in the authorization and appropriations 
processes, and special analyses for the Under Secretary. She also manages the studies program for 
OSD and oversees USD(AT&L)'s office automation system and manages its information system network.  
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Dr. Spruill has been a member of the Senior Executive Service since 1995. She is a certified 
Acquisition Professional and an active member of the American Statistical Association. Her many honors 
and awards include the Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, the Defense Medal for 
Meritorious Civilian Service, and the Hammer Award. She has contributed papers in publications of the 
statistics and defense analyses communities and authored articles in the general press on how politicians 
use - and abuse - statistics.  
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Review of Defense Acquisition Structures & Capabilities 
 
Presenter:  Paul Alfieri, Defense Acquisition University, graduated from the United States Naval 
Academy, Annapolis, MD, in June, 1969.  He completed Navy flight training in November, 1970, and was 
designated a naval aviator.   Dr. Alfieri served 24 years in the US Navy, in which he was a helicopter pilot 
and an Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officer.  While in the Navy, he earned a Master’s degree in 
Aeronautical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, in 1977.  Dr. Alfieri spent 
8 years at the Naval Air Systems Command and became an acquisition specialist there.  At NAVAIR, Dr. 
Alfieri was a Deputy Program Manager (HARM missile) and Program Manager (F404 engine).  Since 
leaving the Navy, he completed studies for his doctorate in Education at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, VA, 
in 1998.  For the last 16 years, he has been on the faculty of the Defense Acquisition University, where he 
has served as Department Chair of the Test & Evaluation Department and is currently the Director of 
Research.  In 2002, Dr. Alfieri graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in 
Washington, DC, with a Master’s degree in National Security Affairs. 
Author:  Mark D. Lumb, Defense Acquisition University, graduated from the University of Notre Dame, 
South Bend, Indiana, in May of 1982.   He completed the Infantry Officer Basic Course at Ft Benning, GA, 
and was assigned as Second Lieutenant to a reinforced heavy brigade in southern Germany.  Lumb 
spent the next 10 years in various Infantry assignments, alternating between Mechanized and Light 
Infantry Divisions.   In 1991, he transition from the Infantry Branch to the newly formed Army Acquisition 
Corps, spending the remainder of his Army career in various acquisition assignments, including anti-tank 
missiles, ground robotics and rotary-winged aircraft.  While in the Acquisition Corps, he earned a Master’s 
Degree in Acquisition and Contract Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, in 
1991.   Lumb culminated his Army Acquisition career as the inaugural Program Manager of the Army’s 
UH-60M, Blackhawk helicopter improvement program. After retiring from the Army in 2002, Lumb joined 
the Defense Acquisition University where he served as a member of the faculty in the Acquisition 
Program Management Department and, most recently, in his current position as the Director of Program 
Development. 
Dr. Paul A. Alfieri 
Director of Research 
Defense Acquisition University 
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060 
Phone: (703) 805-5282 
 
Mr. Mark D. Lumb 
Director of Program Development 
Defense Acquisition University—South Region 
Huntsville, AL 35806 
Phone: (256) 722-1072 
 
Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Process has been the subject of many 
reform initiatives and improvement attempts over the last several decades.  The acquisition 
process is deliberately structured for oversight (checks and balances) and decentralized control.  
Separate, independent offices/staffs within the DoD make requirements determination, resource 
allocations, and programmatic decisions (milestone decisions).  Coupled with inter-service 
competition for missions and dollars, this process involves stakeholders with competing 
interests and is certainly not designed for efficiency.  Rapid growth in technology, foreign 
competition for military systems, and changing threats further exacerbate the problem. The 
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results can usually be categorized as: too many requirements, too many programs, unstable 
budgets, insufficient funds, ever-changing requirements. 
Most stakeholders in the process have much to gain and much to lose.  Whether we talk 
in terms of political dominance, global power, military deterrence or maximization of budget 
share, the stakes of the game are very high.  This fact is certainly not lost on Congress.  In 
Public Law `109-163, FY06 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 814), Congress 
directed the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), acting under the direction and authority of 
USD(AT&L), to conduct a major review of all DoD acquisition organizations.  From this 
legislation, it appears that Congress desires more control over the acquisition process and, 
more importantly, improved acquisition outcomes.   
While conducting the Defense Acquisition Structures & Capabilities Review, the DAU 
was asked to specifically examine the structure of the DoD’s acquisition organizations and to 
address the capabilities and capacities that acquisition organizations require to successfully 
discharge their acquisition missions.  This study will provide an additional examination of 
capability shortfalls and gaps, along with appropriate recommendations for reform and 
improvement. 
Employing a survey-instrument methodology, utilizing both written responses and face-
to-face interviews, and gathering data from the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, 
Field Operating Activities and numerous key leaders throughout the Department of Defense, 
this paper will attempt to explore the relationship between organizational re-structuring, 
acquisition capabilities and capacities, and positive acquisition outcomes. 
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An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 
Investments Could Improve DoD’s Acquisition Outcomes 
 
Presenter:  Katherine Schinasi, US Government Accountability Office 
 
What GAO Found 
To achieve a balanced mix of executable development programs and ensure a good 
return on their investments, the successful commercial companies GAO reviewed take an 
integrated, portfolio management approach to product development. Through this approach, 
companies assess product investments collectively from an enterprise level, rather than as 
independent and unrelated initiatives. They weigh the relative costs, benefits, and risks of 
proposed products using established criteria and methods, and select those products that can 
exploit promising market opportunities within resource constraints and move the company 
toward meeting its strategic goals and objectives. Investment decisions are frequently revisited, 
and if a product falls short of expectations, companies make tough go/no-go decisions. The 
companies GAO reviewed have found that effective portfolio management requires a 
governance structure with committed leadership, clearly aligned roles and responsibilities, 
portfolio managers who are empowered to make investment decisions, and accountability at all 
levels of the organization. 
In contrast, DOD approves proposed programs with much less consideration of its 
overall portfolio and commits to them earlier and with less knowledge of cost and feasibility. 
Although the military services fight together on the battlefield as a joint force, they identify needs 
and allocate resources separately, using fragmented decision-making processes that do not 
allow for an integrated, portfolio management approach like that used by successful commercial 
companies. Consequently, DOD has less assurance that its investment decisions address the 
right mix of warfighting needs, and, as seen in the figure below, it starts more programs than 
current and likely future resources can support, a practice that has created a fiscal bow wave. If 
this trend goes unchecked, Congress will be faced with a difficult choice: pull dollars from other 
high-priority federal programs to fund DOD’s acquisitions or accept gaps in warfighting 
capabilities.  
 =




Figure 1. Costs Remaining vs. Annual Appropriations for Major Defense Acquisitions 
Why GAO did this Study  
Over the next several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $1.4 
trillion in major weapons programs. While DOD produces superior weapons, GAO has found 
that the department has failed to deliver weapon systems on time, within budget, and with 
desired capabilities. While recent changes to DOD’s acquisition policy held the potential to 
improve outcomes, programs continue to experience significant cost and schedule overruns.  
GAO was asked to examine how DOD’s processes for determining needs and allocating 
resources can better support weapon system program stability.  Specifically, GAO compared 
DOD’s processes for investing in weapon systems to the best practices that successful 
commercial companies use to achieve a balanced mix of new products, and identified areas 
where DOD can do better.  In conducting its work, GAO identified the best practices of: 
Caterpillar, Eli Lilly, IBM, Motorola, and Procter and Gamble. 
What GAO Recommends 
GAO is making several recommendations for DOD to implement an integrated portfolio 
management approach to weapon system investments. DOD stated that it is undertaking 
several pilot efforts to improve the department’s approach and that implementation of any new 
business rules will be contingent upon the outcomes of these efforts. 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin-getrpt?GAO-07-388  
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. 
For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. 
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DoD Contract Termination Liability: An Analysis of Special 
Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
 
Presenter: Rene Rendon is on the faculty of the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he teaches acquisition and contract 
management courses in the MBA and Master of Science programs. Prior to his appointment at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, he served for more than 22 years in the United States Air Force as an acquisition 
contracting officer, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 
Author: John Mutty is a faculty member of the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He teaches Defense Financial Management courses 
in the MBA and EMBA programs. He served in the United States Navy as a pilot and as a Financial 
Management sub-specialist, retiring at the rank of Captain. 
Rene G. Rendon 
Senior Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93945-5197 
Phone: (831) 656-3464 
E-mail: rgrendon@nps.edu 
John E. Mutty 
Senior Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93945 
Phone: (831) 656-2205 
E-mail: jmutty@nps.edu        
Abstract 
The specific purpose of the research was to review current policies, practices, and 
procedures for funding and managing Contract Termination Liability within the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  The research proposes alternative approaches for improving the DoD’s ability 
to manage Contract Termination Liability and discusses the resulting effect of each alternative 
on defense acquisition practices.  First, we provide a brief review of regulatory and policy 
guidance on Contract Termination Liability as reflected in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and the Financial Management Regulations (FMR).  We then discuss the current 
practices and procedures for funding and managing Contract Termination Liability. Next, we 
present program management challenges and observations and findings based on our research 
of current Contract Termination Liability policies and real-world practices.  A discussion of 
alternative approaches to funding Contract Termination Liability is then presented, including the 
use of Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC).  Finally, this research concludes with a 
summary and recommendations on how the DoD could improve the policies and practices for 
managing Contract Termination Liability. 
A copy of the complete report is available at the following website: www.acquisitionresearch.org: 
Report Number NPS-CM-06-042 
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This research paper explores the Department of Defense (DoD) policies and practices 
for managing Contract Termination Liability.  The specific purpose of the research was to review 
current policies, practices, and procedures for funding and managing Contract Termination 
Liability within the DoD.  Alternative approaches for improving the DoD’s ability to manage 
Contract Termination Liability are proposed and the resulting effect of each alternative on 
defense acquisition practices is discussed.  Recommendations on how the DoD could improve 
the policies and practices for managing Contract Termination Liability are provided. 
This research found that the regulations and policies pertaining to the management and 
funding of Contract Termination Liability are inconsistent and subject to interpretation.  Program 
managers, finance and budget managers, and contracting officers have differing interpretations 
of the requirement for funding Contract Termination Liability.  Furthermore, the practices and 
procedures used in defense acquisition program offices reflect this inconsistency. 
A review of current practices and procedures for funding and managing Contract 
Termination Liability and historical data of past contract terminations found that the probability of 
a contract termination for convenience is very small, and program managers’ approaches to 
managing Contract Termination Liability reflects this probability. The normal procedure for 
handling the potential liability associated with a contract terminated for convenience is to 
“budget” for the liability. Then, in coordination with the contractor, the required amount of 
funding is tracked on a regular basis. In this case, budgeting for Termination Liability does not 
mean obligating funds specifically for that purpose.  
Interviews with various acquisition program offices indicate that program managers are 
generally satisfied with the current method for managing Contract Termination Liability because 
the procedure they currently use allows them to keep all of the funding appropriated for their 
program.  Furthermore, program managers are not in favor of a “tax” that would negate the 
requirement to budget for Contract Termination Liability. A tax would deprive them of funds that 
they currently have at their disposal. Additionally, if all programs were taxed, there is a general 
concern that the pooled funds would likely be lost—either the Military Departments (or DoD) 
would use them to solve other problems if they were not required to cover a liability, or 
Congress would look upon the funds that had been set aside as a “slush fund,” making them 
tempting for other uses. 
Interviews also indicated that support for increased use of STCCs is not evident, either 
at the program level or the OMB or Congressional level. Congress has expressed its concern 
through report language. OMB correspondence has indicated that support for more than one 
STCC per service is unlikely.  However, it should be noted that those programs that have 
significant funding problems and/or are concerned about the possibilities of termination do 
support additional use of STCCs. In fact, these programs would prefer to have a STCC that 
covers more cost elements than the standard STCC. 
Finally, this research concluded with the following recommendations for the DoD’s 
management of Contract Termination Liability:  1. Remove the ambiguity and improve the 
consistency in the regulations pertaining to the management of Contract Termination Liability; 2. 
Refrain from imposing a tax system to provide funding for potential Contract Termination 
Liability, and 3. Continue to use STCCs for the larger programs with funding or longevity 
concerns. 
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Regulatory and Policy Guidance 
This section of the research report focuses on the regulatory and policy guidance on 
Termination Liability and the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC).  The regulatory and 
policy guidance covering Termination Liability (and, specifically, Special Termination Cost 
Clauses (STCC)) is found in the DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) and the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).  In addition, the Air Force 
Financial Management Regulation is also discussed as an example of Agency-specific guidance 
on contingent liability.   
 Termination Liability 
The DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) defines Termination Liability as: 
The amount of prepayments that cover payments required by the contract, and any 
damages and costs that may accrue from the cancellation of such contract.  Funds 
prepaid for Termination Liability will convert to cover actual expenditures in the event 
that the contract not be terminated prior to performance completion. Termination Liability 
may not apply to articles/services provided under other authorities of the Foreign 
Assistance Act or AECA. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 15) 
The Financial Management Regulation (FMR) categorizes Contingent Liabilities (CLs) as 
probable, possible, or remote (DoD, 2006c).  The terms probable, reasonably possible, and 
remote identify three areas within that range as follows: 
1. Probable: The future event or events are likely to occur. 
2. Reasonably possible: The chance of the future event or events occurring is more than 
remote but less than likely. 
3. Remote: The chance of the future event or events occurring is slight. 
Probable CLs must be covered by a commitment of funds. Probable CLs are most likely 
to become actual liabilities. Commitments are not required for possible CLs and should not be 
established for remote CLs (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 4, Ch. 13, pp. 241-242). 
The budgeting for Contingent Liabilities is discussed in the following excerpts taken from 
the DoD Financial Management Regulation: 
 Special Provisions for Determining the Amounts of Commitments  
Contingent Liabilities Remaining Under Outstanding Contracts. There are 
contingent liabilities for price or quantity increases or other variables that cannot be 
recorded as valid obligations in the cases of (1) outstanding fixed-price contracts 
containing escalation, price redetermination, or incentive clauses, or (2) contracts 
authorizing variations in quantities to be delivered, or (3) contracts where allowable 
interest may become payable by the US Government on contractor claims supported by 
written appeals pursuant to the “Disputes” clause contained in the contract (see 
subparagraph 080202.D, below). Amounts to cover these contingent liabilities should be 
carried as outstanding commitments pending determination of actual obligations. The 
amounts of such contingent liabilities, however, need not be recorded at the maximum or 
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ceiling prices under the contracts. Rather, amounts should be committed that are 
estimated conservatively to be sufficient to cover the additional obligations that probably 
will materialize, based upon judgment and experience. In determining the amount to be 
committed, allowances may be made for the possibility of downward price revisions and 
quantity underruns. Each contingent liability shall be supported by sufficient detail to 
facilitate audit. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 3, Ch. 8, para. 080202)   
 Budgeting for Termination Liability on Incrementally Funded RDT&E 
 Contracts 
The legal requirements of the Anti-deficiency Act and the long-standing policy of not 
committing a successor Congress to a course of action both make it necessary that the 
unliquidated obligation for an incrementally funded, multiple-year contract be sufficient at all 
times to cover the cost of terminating that contract for the convenience of the Government.  
Budgeting to cover Termination Liability will not increase the total amount budgeted for 
the program. It will require that the distribution of funds by fiscal year be shifted more towards 
the earlier years of the contract than if funds had been budgeted only to cover the actual bill to 
be paid each year. The distribution of funds by fiscal year shall be such that, if a contract is 
terminated at any point during the fiscal year, all termination costs can be financed from the 
unliquidated obligation on the contract without recourse to reprogramming of funds, 
supplemental appropriations, or awaiting the appropriation of funds for the succeeding fiscal 
year’s funding increment. All programs shall adhere to this policy with the following two 
exceptions, both of which are to be used rarely. 
a. Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC). DoD FAR Parts 249.50170 and 252.249-7000 
permit the use of STCC in fixed-price incentive contracts and incrementally funded cost 
reimbursement contracts. If contracts containing an STCC are terminated before 
completion, the special termination charges are covered by the unobligated balance of 
the applicable appropriation, subject to any congressional approval required for 
reprogramming. The extent to which the STCC can be used is limited to the ability of the 
Service or Agency to cover expected termination costs from unobligated balances. A 
recordable obligation under the STCC arises when the contract is actually terminated. If 
a proposed STCC would require an above-threshold reprogramming action when a 
program is terminated, the approval to use the STCC shall be obtained from the USD 
(Comptroller) before the contract or contract modification is awarded. All STCCs, 
regardless of dollar amount, require prior notification of the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees. 
b. Statutory Waivers. The Department is not required to budget for, or obligate funds 
sufficient to cover, Termination Liability in connection with an incrementally funded 
RDT&E contract if Congress has expressly exempted the program or contract from that 
requirement. When this situation arises, however, the budget exhibits for the program 
shall clearly indicate the value of the unfunded Termination Liability by year for the 
current year, budget year, and the outyears covered by the FYDP. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 2A, 
Ch. 1, para. 010214) 
Termination Liability is considered a contingent liability since adequate funds must be 
committed to cover the liabilities resulting from the termination of contracts, including any 
potential or Contingent Liabilities (Gill, 2003).   
The DoD FMR explains Contingent Liabilities as follows: 
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Contingent Liability—The term has two meanings. As a budgetary term, it represents 
variables that cannot be recorded as valid obligations. Such variables include (1) 
outstanding fixed-price contracts containing escalation, price redetermination, or 
incentive clauses, or (2) contracts authorizing variations on quantities to be delivered, or 
(3) contracts where allowable interest may become payable by the US Government on 
contractor claims supported by written appeals pursuant to the "DISPUTES" clause 
contained in the contract. As a proprietary accounting term, it represents an obligation, 
relating to a past transaction or other event or condition that may arise in consequence, 
as a future event now deemed possible but not probable. When the liability is 
determined to be possible, but not probable, the potential liability is disclosed as a 
footnote to the financial statements. When the potential liability becomes probable, it is 
recorded in the accounts as a current liability or a reduction of an asset. The budget 
definition is the preferred usage. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 15) 
Thus, according to DoD FMR, Volume 2A, Chapter 1, "all termination costs can be 
financed from the unliquidated obligation on the contract without recourse to reprogramming of 
funds, supplemental appropriations, or awaiting the appropriation of funds for the succeeding 
fiscal year's funding increment" (2006c).  The two exemptions to this are a Special termination 
Cost Clause (STCC) and a Statutory Waiver.  
In addition, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 080512 of the DoD FMR states that in the 
case of termination of a contract, the contract shall be decreased to an amount that is sufficient 
to meet the settlement costs under the termination. 
The Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Financial Management Reference System 
(2005, February) provided more detailed guidance on funding termination costs.  The AFMC 
FMRS states the following concerning funding termination costs: 
The funded activity should commit the estimated funds to cover the expected contingent 
liability (CL).  This estimated CL amount is in excess of the contract awarded amount 
recorded as an obligation. The financial manager must record commitments for CLs 
against the applicable FY and appropriation cited on the contract.  Normally, funds for 
CLs are maintained locally. Funds are committed for a contingent liability at the time of 
contract award, based on the amount provided by the contracting officer [...]. 
Commitments are not recorded for STCC or contingent termination liabilities.  
Obligations are recorded when the action to terminate is taken. (AFMC, 2005, February)  
The AFMC FMRS further states that funds are committed for all “probable” CLs (funding 
for “possible” or “remote” CLs is not necessary) as defined in a matrix.  “The CL Matrix is used 
to identify, categorize according to probability, and track CLs throughout the life of a contract [...] 
must be reported to SAF/FM semi-annually” (AFMC, 2005, February). 
As indicated above, the DoD FMR refers to two exceptions to the policy of budgeting for 
Termination Liability.  These include the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) and the 
Statutory Waiver.  These will be discussed below. 
 Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
Regulatory and policy guidance related to the use of Special Termination Cost Clauses 
is found in the DoD FMR  (Section: “Budgeting for Termination Liability on Incrementally Funded 
RDT&E Contracts,” p. 3) and the DoD FAR.   
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Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 49 provides guidance on 
contract terminations, the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) provides the guidance and 
prescribes the clause specifically for Special Termination Costs.  The DFARS guidance at 
249.501-70 states the following: 
249.501-70 Special Termination Costs. 
(a) The clause at 252.249-7000, Special Termination Costs, may be used in an 
incrementally funded contract when its use is approved by the agency head. 
(b) The clause is authorized when— 
(1) The contract term is two years or more; 
(2) The contract is estimated to require— 
(i) Total RDT&E financing in excess of $25 million; or 
(ii) Total production investment in excess of $100 million; and 
(3) Adequate funds are available to cover the contingent reserve liability for 
special termination costs. 
(c) The contractor and the contracting officer must agree upon an amount that 
represents their best estimate of the total special termination costs to which the 
contractor would be entitled in the event of termination of the contract. Insert this 
amount in paragraph I of the clause. 
(d)   (1) Consider substituting an alternate paragraph I for paragraph I of the basic 
clause when— 
(i) The contract covers an unusually long performance period; or 
(ii) The contractor’s cost risk associated with contingent special 
termination costs is expected to fluctuate extensively over the period 
of the contract. 
(2) The alternate paragraph I should provide for periodic negotiation and 
adjustment of the amount reserved for special termination costs. Occasions 
for periodic adjustment may include— 
(i) The Government’s incremental assignment of funds to the contract;  
(ii) The time when certain performance milestones are accomplished by 
the contractor; or 
(iii) Other specific time periods agreed upon by the contracting officer and 
the contractor.  
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A review of the DFARS clause reveals that the clause may be used on incrementally 
funded contracts when: the contract term is two years or longer and is estimated to require in 
excess of $25 million of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds or a total 
of over $100 million of production investment.    
Incrementally funded contracts are those contracts in which funds are incrementally 
obligated throughout the period of performance.  Typically, cost reimbursement RDT&E 
contracts are incrementally funded and require the use of the Limitation of Funds Clause at FAR 
52.232-22.  This clause requires the contractor to notify the Contracting Officer in writing 
whenever it has reason to believe the cost it expects to incur in the next 60 days, when added to 
all costs previously incurred, will exceed 75% of the total amount allotted on the contract (DoD, 
2006b, 52.232-22). 
Another requirement of the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) is that there will be 
adequate funds available to cover the contingent reserve liability for special termination costs.   
In addition, the clause states that the contractor and the contracting officer must agree 
upon an amount that represents their best estimate of the total special termination costs to 
which the contractor would be entitled in the event of termination of the contract.  These special 
termination costs are identified within the DFARS in the actual Special Termination Costs clause 
as follows: 
252.249-7000 Special Termination Costs. 
As prescribed in 249.501-70, use the following clause: 
SPECIAL TERMINATION COSTS (DEC 1991) 
(a) Definition. “Special termination costs,” as used in this clause, means only costs in the 
following categories as defined in Part 31 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR)— 
(1) Severance pay, as provided in FAR 31.205-6(g); 
(2) Reasonable costs continuing after termination, as provided in FAR 31.205-
42(b); 
(3) Settlement of expenses, as provided in FAR 31.205-42(g); 
(4) Costs of return of field service personnel from sites, as provided in FAR 
31.205-35 and FAR 31.205-46I; and 
(5) Costs in paragraphs (a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this clause to which 
subcontractors may be entitled in the event of termination. 
(b) Notwithstanding the Limitation of Cost/Limitation of Funds clause of this contract, the 
Contractor shall not include in its estimate of costs incurred or to be incurred, any 
amount for special termination costs to which the Contractor may be entitled in the 
event this contract is terminated for the convenience of the Government. 
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(c) The Contractor agrees to perform this contract in such a manner that the Contractor’s 
claim for special termination costs will not exceed $________. The Government shall 
have no obligation to pay the Contractor any amount for the special termination costs 
in excess of this amount. 
(d) In the event of termination for the convenience of the Government, this clause shall 
not be construed as affecting the allowability of special termination costs in any 
manner other than limiting the maximum amount of the costs payable by the 
Government. 
(e) This clause shall remain in full force and effect until this contract is fully funded.  (End 
of clause)(DoD, 2006a, 252.249-7000)  
Thus, the Special Termination Cost Clause limits the amount of special termination (as 
agreed between the government and the contractor) costs that the Government is liable for in a 
Termination for Convenience.  It should be noted that the STC clause does not apply to the 
regular termination costs as outlined in FAR 31.205-42.   
 Agency Approval for STCC 
As stated in the DFARS clause, the use of the STC clause is subject to approval of the 
agency head.  A review of the various agency FAR supplements provides some perspective on 
how this approval is obtained. 
The Air Force FAR supplement at AFFARS 5349.501-70 provides additional and specific 
policy related to the use of the Special Termination Cost Clause.  AFFARS 5349.501-70 
specifically states the following: 
5349.501-70 Special termination costs. 
(a) Contracting officers shall refer to Volume 2A, Chapter 1, Section 010213, paragraph 
C.2 of DoD 7000.14-R, DoD Financial Management Regulation, for Congressional 
notification and additional approval requirements for Special Termination Cost 
Clauses (STCCs). Because STCCs require special notification to Congress and 
entail a long approval process over which the Air Force has little control, the 
contracting officer should allow SAF/AQCK sufficient time to process requests to use 
DFARS 252.249-7000, Special Termination Costs (i.e., not less than 90 days prior to 
contract award). The request shall include the following: 
(i) A detailed breakdown of applicable cost categories in the clause at DFARS 
252.249-7000 (a)(1) through (5), which includes the reasons for the 
anticipated incurrence of the costs in each category; 
(ii) Information on the financial and program need for the clause, including an 
assessment of the contractor’s financial position and the impact of a failure to 
receive authority to use the clause; and 
(iii) Clear evidence that only costs that arise directly from a termination would be 
compensated under the clause. Costs that would be incurred by the 
Government, regardless of whether a termination occurs, shall not be covered 
by an STCC. 
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(b) The contracting officer shall obtain SAF/FM approval prior to authorizing any 
increase in the Government’s maximum liability under the clause. (Air Force, 2006, 
5349.501-70) 
The AFFARS is the only agency-level FAR guidance that gives more specific instruction 
on the coordination and review process, as well as on the Congressional notification 
requirement for the use of STCCs.  This guidance also identifies the requirement for referencing 
the DoD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) for specific notification and approval 
requirements. 
 Statutory Waiver 
The second exception to the Termination Liability funding policy is the Statutory Waiver.  
This exception is explained in the FMR as follows: 
Statutory Waivers. If a program is exempted by Public Law from the requirement to 
budget for Termination Liability, the fiscal year increments may be budgeted on a pay-
as-you-go basis, providing only sufficient funds to cover the disbursements expected to 
be made in that fiscal year. When this situation arises, however, the budget exhibits for 
the program shall clearly indicate the value of the unfunded Termination Liability by year 
for the current year, budget year, and the outyears covered by the FYDP. (DoD, 2006c) 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the regulatory and policy guidance pertaining 
to the funding of Termination Liability and the use of STCCs is found in two different functionally 
oriented regulations—the Financial Management Regulation (FMR) and the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR).  This regulatory guidance on budgeting for Contract Termination Liability from 
two different functional areas of DoD acquisition increases the potential for different 
interpretations or even misinterpretation of the DoD policy.  These differences in policy 
interpretation are reflected in the practices and procedures used by the various DoD services.   
Observations and Findings 
The researchers conducted interviews with various DoD program management offices 
and analyzed samples of DoD contracts related to the management of Termination Liability.  
Based on these reviews, interviews, and analyses, the research team identified the following 
observations and findings: 
1.  Inconsistent Approach 
There is an inconsistent approach among the various military and DoD agencies to 
managing Termination Liability funds on contracts.  Although all program offices that were 
interviewed in this research manage Termination Liability based on the funds obligated on 
contract, the procedures used for ensuring the obligated funds are adequate and sufficient to 
cover Termination Liability expense at any point during the contract period of performance 
varied.  Some program offices maintained close coordination with their contractors to monitor 
and ensure sufficient obligated funds to cover estimated Termination Liability expenses 
throughout the contract period, while other program offices depended solely on the contractor to 
monitor the obligated funds to ensure sufficient coverage for Termination Liability.  Some 
program offices conducted periodical “budget drills” to determine if the amount of obligated 
funds at any given time would be sufficient to cover the estimated Termination Liability at that 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 418 - 
=
=
point in time.  Some program offices used the Contractor Funds Status Report (CFSR) as an aid 
in monitoring the estimated Termination Liability expenses.      
2.  Diffused Guidance 
The regulatory and policy guidance pertaining to Termination Liability are diffused 
between the Federal Management Regulation (FMR) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR).  The FMR is the main source of financial management policy and guidance used by DoD 
financial and budget managers, while the FAR is the main source for contract management 
policy and guidance used almost exclusively by DoD contracting officers.  These two 
functionally based regulations lead to differing interpretations of policy, guidance, and 
procedures related to the management of Termination Liability by the financial-management 
and contract-management functional areas.  
3.  Insufficient Databases 
There is no DoD-wide, Service-wide, Command-wide, or Center-wide database; yet, one 
is needed to conduct a proper analysis to determine the total number of contracts that require 
funding for Termination Liability, the total amount of Termination Liability funding on these 
contracts, the total number of contracts containing a Special Termination Cost (STC) clause, 
and the total amount of estimated Termination Liability expenses being managed at the Service 
levels because of these STC clauses.  These databases would provide the data that would be 
considered a critical part of the business case needed to calculate the extent of the funding 
being budgeted for Termination Liability expenses. 
4.  Declining Acceptability of Special Termination Cost Clause 
Because of the current acquisition climate of defense acquisition program cost overruns 
and schedule delays, the increased use of the current Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
would not be well received by the Congress or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  
Furthermore, program managers are not necessarily receptive to requesting approval of a 
STCC from their higher headquarters.   
Alternative Approaches to Funding Termination Liability 
Our research identified the following alternative approaches to managing and funding 
contract termination Liability. 
1.  Impose a “Tax” on All Programs Subject to Termination Liability for the 
Purpose of Establishing an Insurance Fund to Cover Termination Liability. 
The advantages of this alternative include the benefit for program managers of not 
having to commit funds to cover TL, thus allowing better use of funds for program execution.  
Additionally, since the required Termination Liability funds would be identified prior to any 
termination, any concerns for possible Anti-deficiency Act violations should subside.  Finally, for 
the Military department, significantly fewer dollars would be tied up unproductively for TL and 
would be available for program execution. 
The disadvantages of this option include the fact that those programs not at risk for 
termination would have to pay this TL tax, thus decreasing their amount of budget for executing 
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the program.  For not-at-risk programs, this tax would make program management more 
difficult. The dollars associated with this tax would not be available until late in the fiscal year if 
they were not used to cover a termination; if they were used to cover a termination, the program 
would lose the money permanently—presenting a lose-lose proposition for the program 
manager.  Finally, another disadvantage would be that at-risk programs would not have the 
funds required to pay for the tax available for program execution, thus, putting these programs 
at an increased disadvantage. 
Some of the potential questions related to this alternative include the following: 
• Who determines the “tax”? Those programs at greatest risk should logically be taxed 
more than those programs not at risk.  
• Who determines the risk of a possible program termination? 
• Would the insurance fund provide an attractive target for Congressional rescissions as 
well as Department reprogrammings? 
• When and how would the unused portion of the funds be returned to the programs? 
2.  Allow Coverage of Termination Liability to be Assumed at the Major Command 
or PEO Level. 
One advantage of this alternative is that program managers could use all of the funds 
appropriated for their programs for program execution.  Additionally, the use of STCCs with the 
associated Congressional notification would not be required.  Another advantage of this 
approach is that the uncertainty of fund availability (as opposed to the tax approach) would be 
eliminated.  Finally, there would not be a pot of funds to be targeted by Congress or the 
Department. 
The disadvantages of this option include the fact that this approach is similar to the 
STCC approach—which has not enjoyed strong support from the OMB or the Congress.  
Additionally, concerns regarding possible Anti-deficiency Act violations would likely increase.  
Finally, another disadvantage would include the fact that paying for a program’s termination 
costs would likely adversely impact other programs. 
Some of the potential issues related to this alternative include the following: 
• This approach would appear to the OMB and Congress as an attempt to forego 
budgeting for Termination Liability. 
• A program termination late in the fiscal year could be difficult to fund. Above-threshold 
reprogramming requests are rarely certain or timely. 
3.  Increase the Use of Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC) 
The advantages of this alternative include the benefit that program managers would be 
able to use all of the funds appropriated for their programs for program execution.  The 
uncertainty of fund availability (as opposed to in the tax approach) would be eliminated for 
program managers. 
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The disadvantages of this option include the fact that Congress and the OMB have 
already exhibited a lack of enthusiasm for the increased use of STCCs.  Additionally, the 
paperwork involved with STCCs is considered onerous by the programs that have completed it. 
Recommendations 
Based on the research findings, the following recommendations are provided. 
1.  Remove ambiguity and improve consistency in the regulations.   
The current regulations pertaining to the management of contract termination lend 
themselves to differing and inconsistent interpretations among the Services and functional areas 
(program management, financial management, and contract management).  If the “liberal” 
interpretation of current regulations is different from what is desired or is the intent of the 
agencies, these regulations should be revised to remove any ambiguity and to improve the 
consistency between the functional areas.   
2.  Do not impose a tax system to provide funding for potential Termination 
Liability. 
The taxing of program offices for the purpose of generating a pool of funds to use for 
Termination Liability results in a lose-lose proposition for program offices and may result in more 
disadvantages than advantages.  In addition, the potential issues related to this alternative 
would require additional research and analysis. 
3.  Continue to use STCCs for the larger programs with funding or longevity 
concerns. 
For larger, major defense acquisition programs that have a lower probability of 
termination due to visibility, political ties, or urgency of need, the DoD should continue to 
support the use of STCCs to allow for greater use of program funds for program execution. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to explore current Department of Defense 
mechanisms for addressing Contract Termination Liability, review current practices and 
procedures for funding and managing Termination Liability, and propose alternative approaches 
to improve the DoD’s ability to manage Termination Liability and its effect on defense acquisition 
programs.  This research reviewed the regulatory and policy guidance on Contract Termination 
Liability.  A review of current practices and procedures for funding and managing Termination 
Liability was conducted based on interviews and document reviews with the Air Force, Navy, 
and other various DoD agencies.  Program management challenges and preliminary 
observations and findings were then presented.  A discussion of alternative approaches to 
funding Termination Liability was discussed, including the use of Special Termination Cost 
Clauses (STCC).  Finally, recommendations were presented. 
The regulations and policies pertaining to the management and funding of Contract 
Termination Liability are inconsistent and subject to interpretation.  Program managers, finance 
and budget managers, and contracting officers have differing interpretations of the requirement 
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for funding Termination Liability.  Furthermore, the practices and procedures used in defense 
acquisition program offices reflect this inconsistency. 
In addition, the probability that a government contract will be terminated for convenience 
is very small. Program managers and contractors are aware of the statistics, and their approach 
to Termination Liability reflects that knowledge. The normal procedure for handling the potential 
liability associated with a contract terminated for convenience is to “budget” for the liability. 
Then, in coordination with the contractor, the required amount of funding is tracked on a regular 
basis. In this case, budgeting for Termination Liability does not mean obligating funds 
specifically for that purpose.  
Additionally, program managers are not in favor of a “tax” that would negate the 
requirement to budget for TL. For the most part, they are satisfied with the status quo because 
the procedure they currently use to handle TL allows them to keep all of the funding 
appropriated for their program. A tax would deprive them of funds they currently have at their 
disposal. In fact, a program that has funding problems could be put in jeopardy by having to 
relinquish funding to pay for a tax. Program managers feel as though the statistics support their 
current approach. 
Furthermore, if all programs were taxed, there is a general concern that the pooled funds 
would likely be lost for good—either the military Departments (or DoD) would use them to solve 
other problems if they were not required to cover a liability, or Congress would look upon the 
funds that had been set aside as a “slush fund” and be tempted to use them elsewhere.  
Also, support for increased use of STCCs is not evident, either at the program level or 
the OMB or Congressional level. Congress has expressed its concern regarding STCCs through 
report language. OMB correspondence has indicated that support for more than one STCC per 
service is unlikely.  However, it should be noted that those programs that have significant 
funding problems and/or are concerned about the possibilities of termination do support 
additional use of STCCs. In fact, these programs would prefer to have a STCC that covers more 
cost elements than the standard STCC. 
Finally, this research recommended that the Department of Defense: remove the 
ambiguity and improve the consistency in the regulations pertaining to the management of 
Termination Liability, not impose a tax system to provide funding for potential Termination 
Liability, and continue to use STCCs for the larger programs with funding or longevity concerns. 
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Our guiding assumption in organization of our research and this report is that to 
understand the defense acquisition process and reform arguments, it is necessary to know 
something about the organizational and managerial context in which such reform must take 
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place. Consequently, this report for the 2007 NPS Acquisition Symposium is organized into four 
parts: (i) an analysis of the Enterprise organization and management initiative now underway in 
Department of Defense (DoD), demonstrating (ii) how it encompasses the new approach to 
defense capabilities thinking, planning and management as a preamble to our argument for 
acquisition system and process reform.  Along the pathway to presentation of our acquisition 
reform proposals, we show (iii) the role of better business practices and information technology 
in adding value to DoD acquisition and resource management in terms of improved organization 
strategy based on lessons from economics in the private sector in evolving from bureaucracy to 
hyperarchy and netcentric organization. It this section, we draw lessons from the manner in 
which businesses operate in the new global economy and how the development of new 
information technology should enable managerial reform. This analysis supports the types of 
change we recommend later in the report in a way that adds value to DoD acquisition and 
resource management. We advance our analysis in part by applying lessons from economic, 
information and value-chain theory and practice, illustrating the utility of this approach using the 
examples of Toyota Motor corporation and the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG); by 
employing these examples, we demonstrate both possibilities and obstacles to be overcome in 
reorganizing the DoD and its acquisition and resource management processes to better meet 
market demand and to respond to changes in the threat environment. Part of this argument 
includes assessment of the application of new technology, particularly IT, and the principle of 
netcentricity and hyperarchy in DoD reorganization and acquisition/resource management 
reform. We assert the necessity for understanding something about the new economics of 
organizations and a critique of bureaucratic organization as critical intellectual components of 
support for our proposed reforms. Finally, (iv) we advance two approaches to reform in terms of 
magnitude of change in DoD acquisition, procurement and resource management: (a) an 
argument for marginal adjustment based on our view of the need for implementation of longer-
term capital and performance-oriented budgeting in combination with radical DoD business 
process reengineering, consistent with the principles, methods and goals of enterprise 
management, and (b) a much more radical conversion of the DoD to an approach that we term 
"marketization and privatization" of defense acquisition systems and resource-management 
processes. We note that these options are not mutually exclusive, as both are needed. 
Preface 
Problem: If a cop in Anytown, USA, pulls over a suspect, [ideally] he checks the person's 
ID remotely from the squad car. He's linked to databases filled with Who's Who in the world of 
crime, killing and mayhem. In Iraq, there is nothing like that. When our troops and the Iraqi army 
enter a town, village or street, what they know about the local bad guys is pretty much in their 
heads, at best. Solution: Give our troops what [some of] our cops have. The Pentagon knows 
this. For reasons you can imagine, it hasn't happened... This is a story of can-do in a no-can-do 
world, a story of how a Marine officer in Iraq, a small network-design company in California, a 
nonprofit troop-support group, a blogger and other undeterrable folk designed a handheld 
insurgent-identification device, built it, shipped it and deployed it in Anbar province. They did this 
in 30 days, from Dec. 15 to Jan. 15. Compared to standard operating procedure for Iraq, this is 
a nanosecond... Before fastening our seatbelts, let's check the status quo. As a high Defense 
Department official told the Journal's editorial page, "We're trying to fight a major war with 
peacetime procurement rules." The department knows this is awful. Indeed, a program exists, 
the Automated Biometric Identification System: retina scans, facial matching and the like. The 
reality: This war is in year four, and the troops don't have it. Beyond Baghdad, the US role has 
become less about killing insurgents than arresting the worst and isolating them from the 
population. Obviously it would help to have an electronic database of who the bad guys are, 
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their friends, where they live, tribal affiliation—in short, the insurgency's networks... The Marine 
and Army officers who patrol Iraq's dangerous places know they need an identification system 
similar to cops back home. The troops now write down suspects' names and addresses. Some, 
like Marine Maj. Owen West in Anbar, have created their own spreadsheets and PowerPoint 
programs, or use digital cameras to input the details of suspected insurgents. But no Iraq-wide 
software architecture exists... On the night of Jan. 20, Maj. West, his Marine squad and the 
"jundi" (Iraq army soldiers) took the MV 100 and laptop on patrol. Their term of endearment for 
the insurgents is "snakes." So of course the MV 100 became the Snake Eater. The next day 
Maj. West e-mailed the US team digital photos of Iraqi soldiers fingerprinting suspects with the 
Snake Eater. "It's one night old and the town is abuzz," he said. "I think we have a chance to tip 
this city over now." A rumor quickly spread that the Iraqi army was implanting GPS chips in 
insurgents' thumbs... Over the past 10 days, Maj. West has had chance encounters with two 
Marine superiors—Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, who commands the 30,000 joint forces in Anbar, 
and Brig. Gen. Robert Neller, deputy commanding general of operations in Iraq. He showed 
them the mobile ID database device... I asked Gen. Neller by e-mail on Tuesday what the status 
of these technologies is now. He replied that they're receiving advanced biometric equipment, 
"like the device being employed by Maj. West." He said "in the near future" they will begin to 
network such devices to share databases more broadly. Bottom line: “The requirement for 
networking our biometric capability is a priority of this organization." As he departs, Maj. West 
reflected on winning at street level: "We're fixated on the enemy, but the enemy is fixated on the 
people. They know which families are apostates, which houses are safe for the night, which 
boys are vulnerable to corruption or kidnapping. The enemy's population collection effort far 
outstrips ours. The Snake Eater will change that, and fast." You have to believe he's got this 
right. It will only happen, though, if someone above his pay grade blows away the killing 
habits of peacetime procurement. [comments in brackets, italics and bold added by Jones 
and McCaffery.] (Henninger, 2007, p. A14).  
Introduction 
In previous research sponsored under the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) acquisition 
research program, we have argued (2005) that there are mismatches and discontinuities 
between the acquisition decision process and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution System (PPBES). We identified a number of problems associated with the 
misalignment of these two Department of Defense (DoD) resource-decision systems. To reduce 
misalignment, we recommended significant business process reengineering of both systems. 
We are pleased to observe that some of what we recommended was implemented by the 
former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) 
Kenneth J. Krieg and the military departments and services (MILDEPS). However, in May 2006, 
the Under Secretary stated that while some successful reengineering had been done, more was 
needed. In December 2006, the USD AT&L noted that he was planning to do more of this within 
his own staff and within the decision processes he controls.  
With respect to further changes to bring better alignment between the acquisition 
decision process and PPBES, we now conclude that not much more is likely to occur soon 
despite the need for resolution of the many mismatches between the two processes. The 
initiative to further reform PPBES has disappeared with the departure of former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld as champion of administrative transformation, and the absence of 
funding to finance it due to the continued demands placed on the DoD to finance OIF and the 
Long War. Without additional PPBES and budget reform, we do not believe it is possible to 
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improve the fit between resource allocation and acquisition decision processes in the near term 
to any significant degree. 
In 2006, we presented our research at the NPS Acquisition Symposium that argued for 
implementation of capital budgeting in the DoD and across the federal government, with 
emphasis on mirroring to some extent how it is done in the private sector. We also explained 
how capital budgeting could be implemented within the DoD without changing the congressional 
decision process, and explained some of the issues to be resolved to do so. We are pleased to 
observe that the office of the USD AT&L has been implementing some of our recommendations 
on capital budgeting. 
For the 2006-2007 acquisition funding cycle, we have concentrated on four areas that 
we report upon in this paper for the 2007 NPS Acquisition Symposium. Our guiding assumption 
in organization of our research and this report is that to understand defense acquisition process 
reform, it is necessary to know something about the organizational and managerial context into 
which such reform must take place. Accordingly, we provide analysis of the Enterprise 
organization and management initiative now underway in the DoD, and show how it 
encompasses the new approach to defense capabilities thinking, planning and management as 
a preamble to our argument for acquisition system and process reform.  Along the pathway to 
presentation of our acquisition reform proposals, we show how the development of new 
information technology should enable managerial reform of the type we recommend in a way 
that adds value to DoD acquisition and resource management. We advance our analysis in part 
using the example of the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG) to demonstrate both possibilities 
and obstacles to be overcome in the application of IT and the principles of netcentricity. We also 
assert the necessity for understanding something about the new economics of organizations as 
a critical intellectual component of support for the arguments we make for defense acquisition 
and resource-management reform. 
The first part of this report provides an assessment of the efforts currently in progress to 
apply enterprise management in the Navy and the DoD. In this report, for purposes of 
description and analysis of the Enterprise organizational framework and structure under which 
change has been partially implemented in the DoD, we use the example of the Navy and the 
Naval NETWAR FORCENET Enterprise or NNFE.  
In the second part of this report, we examine the introduction of capabilities-based 
thinking, planning and decision-making into the enterprise organization and management 
systems, and into the analysis required to support defense acquisition planning and decision-
making. We identify and analyze some of the issues faced in application of capabilities-based 
planning and resourcing, especially those relating to definition of capabilities and deriving 
methods to crosswalk from (a) traditional program-based proposal and acquisition management 
to (b) capabilities-based proposal and management. As we indicate, implementation of 
capabilities-based planning and management in the defense acquisition process changes and 
adds to the tasks to be performed and the information needed for decision and execution by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)—particularly the US AT&L and the Secretary 
(SECDEF), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the military departments and services 
(MILDEPS): e.g., data needed to build the POM, the SECDEF budget proposal and to perform 
medium-term capital asset acquisition planning and decision-making at various levels within the 
DoD.  
The third part of this report explains the role of new technology, including information 
technology (IT), in a new approach to defense acquisition and budgeting. We argue here that IT 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 428 - 
=
=
provides the basis and potential for almost all managerial and systems reform in the DoD, 
basing some of our conclusions on evidence from theory and private-sector practice. More 
broadly, to understand how defense acquisition can and should be done incorporating new 
technology, we explain the vital role of IT in moving from bureaucracy to hyperarchy and 
netcentric organization to add value in reform of defense acquisition and resource management, 
i.e., to enable the types of change we advocate subsequently in the report. This part of the 
report also advances the relevance of the new economics of organization as a component part 
of the theoretical and practical underpinnings for reform of defense acquisition and resource 
management. In essence, we argue the necessity for relying on markets and the private sector 
in moving from bureaucracy to hyperarchy and netcentric organization. 
The fourth and final part of the report outlines and articulates our proposals for 
fundamental reform of the entire defense acquisition management system and decision 
process, based on and integrated with the DoD Enterprise organization and management 
initiative and capabilities-based analysis, decision-making and implementation. We have 
developed two approaches to reform. The first is a marginal adjustment set of changes to the 
current system to make it more efficient and productive (i.e., to reduce cycle-time, reduce costs 
and improve quality per investment dollar) through business process reengineering, enterprise 
management and improved use of information technology (IT).  
The second proposal is for a much more comprehensive and radical reform of how the 
DoD acquires and procures weapons platforms and systems. The comprehensive reform 
proposal we refer to as, "privatization and marketization of DoD acquisition." In essence, this 
proposal argues that to operate defense acquisition more like a business, using better business 
methods and processes, it is necessary, literally, to make DoD acquisition a business: i.e., to 
move much of the present DoD process out of the government and to firms in the private sector. 
In addition, we argue that in facing the make-or-buy decision as all corporate entities must, 
increased and better acquisition and procurement of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) weapons, 
systems and equipment from a worldwide market will get the US taxpayer greater "bang for the 
buck" in acquiring weaponry for defense and will better and more quickly meet warfighter needs.  
We argue that the key advantage of the more comprehensive reform approach is to take 
full advantage of the competitive dynamics of an international defense capital asset market in 
the same way that large firms in the private sector operate presently—rather than relying on the 
system and process the DoD uses now which is, in essence, a gigantic, disconnected and 
inherently ineffective government bureaucracy that resembles in form a Cold War-era, Soviet-
style, long-range planning hierarchy in which the process has become the product. We argue for 
a transition to a system in which the product is the focus of decision effort, and we outline how 
such a system would operate and some of the most important issues to be resolved in 
privatizing DoD weapons systems acquisition. 
The complex nature and consequent length of this report made it impossible to 
reproduce the entirety in these Proceedings. To read the rest of this paper in full text, please 
see www.acquisitionresearch.org.  
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Business management reform efforts have been part of the US Defense Department 
agenda for decades. Current reform efforts have explicitly established the goal of generating, 
harvesting, and reinvesting savings from business management reform to buy more capital 
items; that is, they have focused on a measurable reallocation from operating and support costs 
to investment within a given budget top-line.  While this would seem to be good news for the 
acquisition community, recent increases in the defense top-line, largely related to the war on 
terrorism, have not necessarily resulted in greater allocations for acquisition. An examination of 
the factors affecting the top-line suggests that near-term budget uncertainty is likely. An 
examination of current and past defense management reforms suggests that efficiency-seeking 
business management reforms are not likely to generate sufficient resources to cover a budget 
decline or finance significant capital reinvestment.  Instead, management reform, including on-
going reform of acquisition management, should be sustained for reasons of stewardship and 
accountability. 
Keywords: Defense management, defense budgets, management reform  
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Introduction 
After six years of increasing budgets and an active defense management reform agenda 
in the G.W. Bush Administration, it now appears that defense budgets may be headed for a 
more uncertain near-term future, and the future role of management reform initiatives may be 
equally uncertain.  Despite significant increases in defense spending, resource allocation 
decisions are favoring operating expenses over capital investments.  External pressures from 
the budget deficit, rising costs for entitlement programs, pressure from other discretionary 
programs in the federal budget and public opinion regarding defense activities suggest that total 
resources allocated for defense will be constrained in the foreseeable future.  Internal pressures 
from rising costs for manpower, health care, operations and maintenance are constraining 
discretionary spending inside the defense budget—even as acquisition costs are also 
increasing. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the individual service components have 
been looking toward major management reform initiatives as a means to save and reinvest 
resources within current budget projections. What are the implications of this budgetary and 
management environment for acquisition? 
Why the Near-term DoD Budget May Be Uncertain 
When one asks whether the DoD budget top-line will rise or fall, there are both historical 
patterns which should be considered as well as internal and external factors that affect those 
patterns.  
Figure 1 displays three measures of the defense top-line over the period 1940-2011.  In 
absolute terms, since WWII, defense outlays appear as a cyclical pattern with a lower limit of 
about $350 billion and an upper limit of about $550 billion in FY2006 dollars. The cycles are 
fairly consistent with a wavelength ranging from 15 to 21 years. Fiscal Year 2007 is 18 years 
since the last peak in 1989, suggesting that if the long-term pattern repeats, defense will face 
declining absolute top-lines beginning within the next few years and continuing for 7-10 years. 
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Figure 1. Defense Top-line 1940-2011: Various Measures  
(OMB, 2007) 
In relative terms, since WWII, defense spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen 
rather steadily from a peak of 14.2 percent in 1952 to a low of 3 percent in 1999-2000. In 2006, 
defense spending stood at about 4.1 percent of GDP. Similarly, defense spending as a 
percentage of federal outlays has also fallen significantly, from a peak of 69.5 percent in 1954 to 
a low of 16.1 percent in 1999. In 2006, defense was 19.8 percent of federal outlays. Today, 
approximately 1/5 of federal government spending is for national defense, and 4/5 are for other 
functions of government; in the 1950s, 2/3 of government spending was defense. Should the 
long-term trends continue, defense can expect declining relative top-lines. 
Simply identifying the trend of the last 50 years does not mean that trend will apply to the 
next 3-5 years. We do not have the knowledge to make a point prediction. More than a long-
term trend is needed, and there are other factors that may affect the top-line—those both 
external and internal to the department. Apart from the obvious effects of the war, certain 
external factors are associated with federal fiscal policy and political dynamics.   
External Fiscal Factors 
Deficits. As of 2006, the US has experienced four consecutive years of budget deficits 
following four consecutive years of budget surpluses. The Bush Administration’s position is that 
it will eliminate such annual deficits by 2012. When an administration or congress wishes to 
reduce a deficit, generally it requires a combination of increasing revenues and decreasing 
outlays. If defense maintains even a steady proportion of federal spending during an overall 
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decline, it will lose top-line.2  But the correlation between defense spending and deficits may be 
even more closely connected.  
Defense Spending vs Budget Deficit (Surplus), 1979-2006
in constant 2006 dollars
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Figure 2. Defense Spending and Deficits, 1979-2006  
(OMB, 2007) 
Figure 2 plots budget deficits against defense spending from 1979 to 2006. It is readily 
apparent that as defense spending rose, deficits increased; as spending on defense fell, deficits 
fell to the point of achieving surpluses. Defense spending does not necessarily cause deficits; 
rather, each could be affected by a third factor such as an unstable international situation. 
However, the apparent relationship suggests near-term uncertainty for the defense budget as 
deficit-reduction policies take hold. 
Mandatory Programs. Defense spending has fallen from 2/5 of federal spending to 1/5 
in the past 40 years, supplanted by mandatory spending; see Figure 4. From 1966 to 2006, 
interest on the debt and “all other spending” accounted for roughly the same proportion of 
federal spending—about 41 percent. The remaining 59 percent was largely defense spending in 
1966; at that time, defense spending was three times more than Social Security spending. In the 
intervening 40 years, the proportion of federal spending on defense was reduced more than 50 
percent while Social Security rose by 40 percent. Health programs, new in 1966, represent 
nearly as much as defense in 2006.3   
                                                
2 Of course, if growth is kept below the rate of inflation, there could be deficit reduction with a nominal 
increase in the top-line. 
3 If one allocates the health-care related programs from defense and “all other spending” and adds them 
to the Medicare & Medicaid wedge, the total health care portion grows to about 25 percent while defense 
falls to about 19 percent. See table 16.1 of the Historical Tables that accompany the federal budget for 
Fiscal Year 2008. 
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Figure 3. Components of Federal Spending  
(OMB, 2007) 
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this shift will continue. It estimates that 
in 2016, the mandatory programs will cost $1,274 billion more than in 2006—rising to a total of 
$2,793 billion (CBO, 2006). That is more than all the projected federal outlays, mandatory and 
discretionary spending in 2007. The CBO projects that in the period from 2008-2017, 
discretionary budget authority will increase at 2.0 percent per annum, relative to GDP growth of 
4.5 percent, while mandatory spending will grow at 5.9 percent (CBO, 2007).   
Non-defense Discretionary Spending. Defense top-lines not only feel pressure from 
growing entitlement programs, but may also face pressure from other discretionary programs. 
From 1985 to 2006, total discretionary outlays as a percentage of GDP fell from 10.0 percent to 
7.8 percent. Of those 2.2 percentage points, defense spending accounted for 2.1 and other 
discretionary spending accounted for 0.1 (CBO, 2007).  Nearly the entire reduction in 
discretionary spending was absorbed by defense. The last few years of that history tell a 
different story, however.  From 2001 to 2006, total discretionary outlays as a percentage of GDP 
rose from 6.3 percent to 7.8 percent. Of that 1.5 percentage point increase, defense accounted 
for 1.0 point and non-defense accounted for 0.5 (CBO, 2007).  Figure 4 displays a 40-year trend 
in discretionary spending separating defense from non-defense spending. We see again the 
cyclical nature of defense spending with a counter-cyclical, but steadily upward trend in non-
defense spending.  
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Figure 4. Defense & Non-defense Spending by Administration  
(OMB, 2007) 
External Political Factors 
How responsive are Washington decision-makers to the demands of the public? The 
evidence strongly suggests that if the general public believes defense spending is too high, 
defense spending declines and vice-versa. Studies conducted at the end of the Cold War 
demonstrated empirically that the desires of the public are reflected in future spending decisions 
(Hartley & Russett, 1992; Higgs & Kilduff, 1993).  
Updating that research, Figure 5 displays the direction and strength of public opinion 
about defense spending with subsequent changes in that spending. Change in defense 
spending correlates strongly with the direction and strength of public opinion. When public 
opinion favors increased defense spending, spending has tended to go up the following year; 
when the public favors a decrease, spending tends to drop the following year. The intensity of 
public opinion also forecasts the significance of the gain or drop. In combination with the data in 
Figure 1, one might conclude that the public has a “comfort zone” of appropriate defense 
spending that ranges between $350 billion and $550 billion (FY2006 dollars). Yet, defense 
spending for FY08 is projected to be $593 billion (FY2006 dollars). 
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Democratization of Defense Spending, 1973-2006
Direction and strength of public opinion vs change in defense outlays one year later
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Figure 5. Public Opinion and Defense Spending  
(Authors, derived from Smith, 2007; OMB, 2007) 
What does the public currently believe about defense spending? The polling data used 
in Figure 5 indicates that in 2006, 39.4 percent of Americans favored reduced defense 
spending, contrasted with 26.8 percent who favored an increase (Smith, 2007). The Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland researches American 
attitudes regarding international and foreign policy issues. An extensive survey in 2005 asked a 
representative sample of Americans to reallocate a hypothetical $1000 in income taxes across 
federal programs in the proportion they believed was most appropriate. Before the reallocation, 
they were shown the actual 2006 budget.  These survey respondents would have cut the DoD 
baseline budget by 31 percent and war supplemental appropriations by 35 percent. They would 
have reallocated most of those resources toward reducing the deficit and improving education.  
They favored increases in international affairs programs and would have reallocated defense 
spending away from strategic and heavy capacity (e.g, nuclear weapons, bomber aircraft and 
capital ships) toward manpower, communication, intelligence and special operations capabilities 
(PIPA, 2005).   
To summarize, there has been fiscal pressure on the defense top-line from growth in 
mandatory spending accounts and non-defense discretionary accounts. We are again at a time 
when deficits are a point of concern. Politically, the current Administration faces increased 
congressional opposition to military policies; public support of defense spending is waning.  
Time will tell how that manifests in spending decisions. External factors are vital when 
considering current defense management reform, but internal factors may be more important.  
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Internal factors affecting defense spending are those defense leaders are more able to 
directly control. They include budgeting and spending for acquisition, personnel, and operation 
and maintenance. The policy of budgeting for the war separately also confounds analysis of 
defense spending. Before looking at specific factors, let us take a broad view.  From the low 
point of the 1990s “procurement holiday” to today, the DoN’s budget has increased 46 percent 
in real terms, but the size of the fleet fell from 354 battleforce ships to 280; aircraft inventory fell 
from 2,559 to 2,330; and the number of personnel (uniformed and civilian) fell from 929,358 to 
829,531 (Navy, 2007b). While spending increased by half, the naval forces are 15 percent 
smaller.  The last time defense experienced twelve continuous years of budget growth was 
1979-1990 during which time the fleet grew from 530 to 587 ships. 
To sustain the current goal of a 313-ship Navy, there needs to be sufficient shipbuilding 
budget authority to consistently build an average of eleven ships a year. Since 1998, Navy 5-
year budgets have planned to build eight ships per year but have succeeded in building only six 
ships per year. To get to twelve will require nearly doubling the annual shipbuilding budget, 
currently at $11 billion (CRS, 2006b). Can management reform efforts generate $10 billion from 
the other accounts? 
Acquisition Costs 
The Department’s appetite for major acquisition programs and the cost performance of 
those programs continue to be important issues. The Joint Strike Fighter, F-22A, the Army 
Future Combat System, the Air Force’s Transformational Satellite System, the Navy’s DD-1000 
and Virginia-class submarine programs have all experienced significant cost growth, quantity 
reductions or schedule slips (CRS, 2005). In early 2007, the Navy acquisition executive issued a 
stop-work order for the relatively affordable Littoral Combat ship when the first ship in the class 
experienced costs 50 percent over budget.  Thus, one comes to the difficult realization that just 
as other internal and external factors are putting pressure on the fiscal resources available for 
recapitalization, acquisition itself is a source of fiscal stress. 
Personnel Costs 
Pay and benefits for personnel have increased in recent years. At the same time, 
accrual accounting changes have illuminated some costs (such as the accrued costs of retiree 
heath care) which have always been there, but weren’t explicitly recognized. The activation of 
tens of thousands of reservists and guardsmen for the Iraq war resulted in higher pay and 
increased long-term liabilities because their benefits packages have been expanded. Figure 7 
plots Department of the Navy spending from 1997-2008 on pay, allowances and family housing 
against the total number of active and reserve Navy and Marines. In constant dollars, the cost 
per troop has risen 47 percent. In an effort to hold outlays constant, the policy has been to 
reduce the size of the force. 
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Personnel spend per service member (constant FY06 dollars)
FY97: $44.7K                                                               FY08: $65.6 K
 
Figure 7. Rising Personnel Costs, Measures  
(Navy, 2007) 
Operations and Maintenance Costs 
Looking back, O&M spending in the Department of the Navy since 1997 (including the 
significant Marine Corps participation in GWOT) has remained a steady 32 percent of DoN 
spending, but that is at a time when the force structure has decreased 15 percent (Navy, 
2007b). Looking forward, the war’s toll on equipment will drive up O&M requirements for the 
next few years, particularly in depot maintenance (GAO, 2006).  However, that is not readily 
apparent in the budget.  The FY2008/2009 defense budget, like all defense budgets since 9/11, 
was tallied and submitted separately from the wartime supplemental budget. Because of that 
practice, the baseline budget for Marine Corps depot maintenance shows a decrease from $372 
million in 2006 to $71 million in 2008 (Navy, 2007a).  Separately, the Marine Corps requested 
an FY2008 supplemental appropriation of $490.6 million for this account. If one has the 
wherewithal to marry the two, they will see that depot maintenance is actually projected to 
increase from $372 million to $562 million, not decrease. Program and budget analysts, in an 
attempt to separate a “peacetime” budget from the cost of war, now produce twice the number 
of documents (leading to twice the legislation and twice the number of accounts to manage)—
none of which individually accurately portrays the true level of activity.  
Other supplemental appropriation issues 
The wartime supplemental appropriations confound analysis of defense spending 
further.  When the Navy submitted its FY2008 budget, it announced cuts in the acquisition of 
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aircraft (Castelli, 2007) but replaced a large number of those aircraft in the supplemental 
requests.  For example, nine H-1 helicopters were cut from the base, but requested in the 
supplemental; eight H-60 helicopters were cut from the base, but nine were requested in the 
supplemental; four V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft were cut from the base, and three were requested in 
the supplemental (despite the fact the V-22 has not been used in the war) (Navy, 2007).  
Theses practices cause distortions in baseline budgets that may negatively affect future DoD 
budgets after the use of supplemental appropriations ceases unless some type of “recapture” 
takes place. 
Summary 
Will the defense top-line rise or fall over the next few years? Long-term historical trends 
suggest that by all measures (%GDP, %Outlays, constant dollars), defense spending is likely to 
fall. If one takes into consideration factors in the near-term, we see evidence of downward 
pressure. External factors such as growing entitlement programs and growing discretionary 
programs restrict the room for growth in the defense budget, particularly during periods when 
there is political pressure to reduce deficits. In addition, the newly-elected Democratic 
leadership in Congress and the direction and strength of public opinion question increased 
defense spending.  Internal factors push for a higher top-line but include significant inflationary 
effects, so top-line increases have bought less force structure (but not necessarily less 
capability). Supplemental appropriations for the war are likely to continue and provide an 
opportunity for the defense department to seek relief from budget pressures.  The Bush 
Administration requested a significant defense budget increase in FY2008, 11 percent more 
than in FY2007; but the DoD is already exhibiting signs of fiscal stress. No one can say for 
certain what will happen in the future, but it appears the defense budget is under both increased 
stress as well as increased scrutiny. 
Defense Business Management Reform 
How does this budget situation relate to business management reform within the DoD?  
A review of the recent history of defense business management reform and an examination of 
the current management reform agenda suggest some implications for both budgeting and 
managing in a time of uncertain budgets. 
 Recent History of Defense Business Management Reform 
The George W. Bush Administration also came to office with a management focus. The 
President’s Management Agenda (PMA) addresses five areas targeted for management reform 
throughout the federal government: human capital, improved financial management, competitive 
sourcing, electronic government, and budget and performance integration (Rumsfeld, 2003). 
In the DoD, an initial management objective was to “increase effectiveness through 
increased accountability and efficiency” (Rumsfeld, 2002), with emphasis on cost reduction, 
improving quality, reducing redundancies, and adopting best business practices.  Secretary 
Rumsfeld emphasized the creation and use of metrics to quantify performance improvements, 
and he sought to focus the Department’s resources on core functions (Francis & Walther, 2006). 
To improve its efficiency, the DoD is tackling several significant challenges: cost reduction, 
organizational realignment and cultural issues (Walker, 2004).  
The DoD has identified six major, strategic, high-leverage initiatives called Business 
Enterprise Priorities (BEPs).  These BEPs include achieving better visibility into personnel, 
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acquisitions, materiel, finances, common supplier engagement and real property accountability 
(DoD, 2006a). Oversight of defense business transformation is conducted by the Defense 
Business Board, an advisory panel consisting of private-sector executives chartered to provide, 
“independent advice and recommendations on effective strategies for the implementation of 
best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense” (DoD, 2007).The 
Department’s Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) and Defense Business 
Transformation Agency (DBTA) were created to institutionalize parts of the DoD change 
program. DBTA’s strategic objectives include improving financial stewardship, enabling rapid 
access to information, and reducing the costs of defense business operations (Pair, 2007).  
DBTA has established seven directorates to manage its reform agenda—including the Defense 
Business Systems Acquisition Executive. 
The Army, Navy and Air Force have developed service-specific management reform 
agendas, as well.  Lean Six Sigma is the Army’s tool of choice to drive across-the-board 
elimination of unnecessary or wasteful processes, the reduction of process variability, and the 
improvement of quality (Army, 2006).  The Air Force intends to create new processes through 
its Smart Ops 21 program, which encompasses the tools of Lean, Six Sigma and Theory of 
Constraints (Lopez, 2005).  The Navy’s Sea Enterprise initiative aims to reduce costs in order to 
provide internally generated resources for reinvestment and recapitalization (Clark, 2002).   Sea 
Enterprise has identified three imperatives: change the culture, improve processes and 
structures, and harvest savings.4 The Navy is also undertaking a challenging enterprise 
realignment to create a more matrixed organization and to create a culture of enterprise-wide 
thinking. 
The current management reform agendas have a defining distinction: they focus on 
generating internal savings through effective cost management to support investment and 
recapitalization for the operating forces.  This vision has been much more explicit than those of 
past reform efforts.  It provides a measurable objective, and it aligns with the core values and 
mission of the organization.  
There are practical issues associated with this objective, of course, such as how to re-
allocate operating funds to investment accounts effectively in an execution year, how to track 
and apply savings within the current accounting systems, and how to distinguish between “real” 
savings and future cost avoidance.  Even if these obstacles can be overcome, there are larger 
issues that threaten to undermine the management reform agenda and, in turn, reduce or 
eliminate recapitalization funds derived from management reform. 
Management Reform at Risk? 
The current defense management reform agenda is driven by three factors: (a) to align 
changed business practices with force transformation; (b) to generate resources internally to 
support recapitalization and investment in future combat systems; and (c) to reduce internal 
pressures on the defense budget as well as to respond to external pressures on the defense 
budget. If these imperatives are as strong as they appear, what then could undermine the 
current reform effort and make it unsustainable? There are four clear possibilities.  
                                                
4 For a more thorough description of current reform efforts, see (Dawe & Jones, 2005) and (DoD, 2006b). 
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1. War Costs. If operations in Iraq and Afghanistan persist, costs associated with the base 
defense budget and the war effort will continue to diverge—particularly if war funding 
continues to be provided through non-traditional budget “bridges” and supplemental 
appropriations, a pattern unseen in the budgeting for past wars (CRS, 2006a). In this 
case, management associated with the base budget will operate in an increasingly 
constrained environment, while unconstrained spending will continue to be associated 
with the war. This is hardly an environment that will drive culture change and cost 
management throughout the organization. Moreover, these conditions invite the 
migration of base budget functions to the less constrained and less cost-managed war 
budget—resulting in distortions in the base budget that will affect future budget 
decisions.  
2. Losing the Vision. Alternatively, Congress could demand that appropriations for the war 
efforts migrate to the base budget.  In that case, it is likely total defense resources will 
erode as they are combined and become more transparent. Thus follows the second 
possibility: losing the reform vision to current-year “budget drills” to meet unfunded 
needs or to fill budget “wedges” in the execution year. Successful reforms may depend 
on demonstrating that the cost reductions and management reforms have generated the 
desired savings and that the savings have been applied to the stated objective. Failure 
to sustain or account for the results can lead to a loss of credibility for senior leaders 
(Roberto, 2005). If budget reductions cause the recaptialization goals to disappear in 
favor of simply meeting reduced budget targets, much of the motivation for reform could 
be lost.     
3. Change Fatigue.  “Repetitive Change Syndrome” is experienced when organizations too 
frequently adopt change initiatives. Such frequency generates chaos, burnout, and 
incapacity to make further change, thus, harming daily operations (Abrahamson, 2004).  
Observers warn against adopting change initiatives too frequently (Abrahamson, 2004). 
Defense management reform has been a continuous theme for over twenty years. 
Sustaining transformation could now depend on learning more about how the 
organization perceives the change agenda through analysis of communications and 
feedback and by examining the knowledge, attitudes, and actions of the receptors of 
communications about transformation. 
4. Leadership Change. Leaders change frequently in the DoD among both uniformed and 
senior civilian leaders. It often appears that management reform initiatives do not survive 
leadership transitions, notwithstanding the success or failure of any particular reform 
initiative. The current Administration is in its final two years; sustaining its management 
agenda beyond the election horizons may not be a high priority in the permanent DoD 
bureaucracy. A new management agenda will replace the current “transformation” 
agenda, though the next administration will almost certainly face the same challenges to 
find more efficient defense business-management practices and seek reinvestable cost 
savings from these efficiencies.  Learning to institutionalize the principles and processes 
of management reform will be important to future leadership transitions. We recommend 
a research and education project to facilitate the sustainment of improvements in 
defense business management practices through the expected leadership transition of 
2008-2009. 
 Management Reform in a Declining Budget 
How then should management reform be considered, if budgets are likely to decline and 
significant organizational risk factors threaten sustainment of defense business-management 
reform initiatives? 
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Efficiency-seeking management reforms will be insufficient to make up the budget 
shortfall.  Claimed cost savings can be initially impressive.   For instance, the Naval Air Systems 
Command claims FY 2007 savings-to-date amounting to 13.9 million—composed of permanent 
cost reductions ($6.1 million) and potential cost reductions from improved practices ($7.8 
million) (Navy, 2007c).  Overall, the Navy’s business transformation advocate claims combined 
savings from Sea Enterprise initiatives of $27.7 billion from FY 2003-2005 (McCarthy, 2006). In 
both cases, some of the savings are realized in current-year operations; more are the result of 
projected cost reductions and revised future spending requirements. Nevertheless, these 
savings are not likely to close the budget gap if defense budgets decline and there is insufficient 
evidence to indicate whether any of these savings can be tracked to reinvestment in capital 
accounts. Even if efficiency-seeking savings reduce a significant portion of the internally 
generated fiscal stress, cost-reduction measures through management initiatives will not likely 
close the entire fiscal gap because they only address the internal sources of stress. The 
external sources are untouched by efficiency savings. Moreover, cost reductions are dispersed 
throughout the organization, are difficult to harvest, and are likely to be hoarded by middle 
managers in the face of tight resources. Savings in current-year budgets are likely to be 
redirected to under-funded current requirements.  
Good management does not attract resources. There is little evidence to suggest that 
good management is rewarded with larger budgets. Resource-allocation decisions are policy 
choices among competing demands. Good management reduces the demand and may lead to 
reduced marginal future resource bases. Even the movement toward performance budgeting in 
the federal government leaves unclear the link between performance and resource allocation 
(Miller, Hildreth, & Rabin, 2001).  Budgets simply do not grow because an agency gets a clean 
audit opinion or reengineers business practices. 
If efficiency-seeking business-management reform cannot be viewed as a solution to 
declining defense budgets, how should the DoD view the rationale for sustaining management 
reform initiatives?  There are three strong imperatives for sustaining an effective management 
reform agenda: 
Continuous efficiency-seeking management improvement in the DoD should be 
understood as driven by stewardship concerns and the requirements of the operating forces. 
The DoD has the responsibility to the President, the Congress and the public to be a good 
steward of the highly material portion of the federal budget it manages. There is a justified 
expectation that the DoD will manage its resources well. The DoD also has a responsibility to 
support efficiently the varied requirements of the operating forces: people, systems, weapons, 
materiel. The policies and processes of management reform must align with operational 
requirements, especially as force transformation increases pressure on the business side of the 
department. 
Large budget reductions can only be met by truly transformational responses.  Despite 
the rhetoric of “transformation,” the history of management reform in the DoD has been a model 
of incremental continuous change.  A large decline in the defense top-line can only be met by 
transformational changes that take functions AND costs out of the department permanently.  
Major productivity improvements through consolidations, divestiture of both functions as well as 
assets, cancelled programs, and sharply reduced personnel would have to be achieved. 
The acquisition community must view itself as a participant in cost-focused management 
reform rather than as a beneficiary.  Rising acquisition costs are a major source of internal fiscal 
stress for the DoD. It is unlikely that cost reductions in other internal areas (such as personnel 
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or operations and maintenance) can possibly generate savings that will match the current 
growth in capital costs, let alone provide funds for additional reinvestment.  The acquisition 
community must focus on its own cost-reduction initiatives to help generate the funding needed 
for recapitalization. 
Thus, the matter of sustaining management reform in a time of uncertain budgets can be 
approached as two questions, not one: What are the best budget-policy decisions regarding 
resource levels and allocation considering the salient internal and external factors? And how 
much and what type of management reform is needed to meet the standards of stewardship 
and to support the requirements of the operating forces? 
Conclusion 
We have both investigated business management reform in the Department of Defense 
as well as examined the question of uncertain defense budgets. It is evident that pressure on 
the defense top-line comes from both external sources and internal factors. We have argued 
that efficiency-seeking management reforms can only address the internal pressures on the 
defense top-line.  We have identified specific threats to the sustainment of defense 
management reform in a time of declining budgets and have offered strategic propositions to 
consider when addressing management reform in a time of uncertain budgets. 
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The Cultural Revolution 
Presenter: Dean T. Kashiwagi, is a professor at Arizona State University’s Del E Web School of 
Construction and the Director of the Performance Based Studies Research (PBSRG) since 1992.  
PBSRG is the worldwide leader in improving construction performance and efficiency.  Kashiwagi has 
developed a “hands off” approach to managing contractors/vendors in the construction industry or in any 
industry.   His concept is contrary to traditional price-driven construction procurement. It forces the 
contractor/vendor to be accountable—in other words, minimizes risk for the facility owner.  The 
technology has been tested over 450 times totally, using $521M in construction projects with a 98% 
success rate (on time, on budget, and high quality).  This is one of the few documented processes that 
brings better value for the owner and maximizes the profit of the contractor.  It is currently being tested in 
other professional areas outside of construction.    
Presenter: Nathan B. N. Chong, Chief, Facility Life Cycle Management Division, US Army Medical, has 
been involved with over $1Billion worth of Army medical and research renovation and new construction 
projects around the world for the past 22 years. He has a MS in Environmental/Civil Engineering from 
George Washington University and a BSCE in Civil Engineering, Purdue University.  Nathan is a license 
Professional Engineer in the State of Hawaii, Project Management Professional (PMP) Certified, and 
Acquisition Level II Certified—Facilities Engineering with the US Department of Defense. He facilitated 
the implementation of Performance Information Procurement System (PIPS) within the Army Medical 
Facility acquisition system. His career objective is to improve the Army medical design and construction 
processes. 
Author: Kenneth Sullivan 
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Dean Kashiwagi, PhD, PE 
Performance Based Studies Research Group 
Arizona State University 
PO Box 870204 
Tempe, AZ 85287-0204 
Phone: (480) 965-4273 
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US Army Medical Command 
2050 Worth Road, Suite 22, MCFA  
Ft Sam Houston, TX 78234-6022  
Phone: (210) 221-7938 
E-mail: nathan.chong@us.army.mil  
Abstract 
The culture within the Federal Government Acquisitions is based on the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and its interpretation, often placing organizations/agencies in the 
cultural environment of the price-based environment.   In the healthcare system, clients depend 
on the qualifications and expertise of the design and construction team to meet their specific 
needs and requirements.  The hiring criteria of these experts have been primarily based on low 
bid or relationships, and have continuously resulted in poor performance.   The US Army 
Medical Command (MEDCOM) (contracting approximately $100M in medical renovation awards 
per year) partnered with the Performance Based Studies Research Group (PBSRG) at Arizona 
State University to create and test an information environment to assist in alleviating some of its 
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cultural inefficiencies.  The developed information environment minimized the flow of 
information, forced the contractors to concentrate on value and the assumption of risk, and 
stimulated an atmosphere of accountability.  Through the system, the client’s internal 
bureaucratic resistance was minimized; and, without controlling the various 
contract/procurement processes, MEDCOM leadership has gained control of the performance of 
their infrastructure revitalization program by implementing a cultural environment of information.      
Keywords:  Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), US Army Medical Command 
(MEDCOM), information environment, cultural inefficiencies 
Introduction 
The Performance Based Studies Research Group (PBSRG), experts in the area of 
performance information, has used the Construction Industry Structure (CIS) diagram to define 
and compare the characteristics of the high-competition environments: Price Based and Value 
Based (Figure 1).  The best-value environment focuses on securing the best-value vendor for 
the owner and on transferring all project risk to the outsourced expert.  It considers the vendor’s 
past performance, ability to identify and minimize risk, preplanning foresight, and project 
knowledge.  It requires the contractors to use their expertise to complete a project that fulfills the 
intent of the owner, and minimize controlled project risk at the beginning of the project.  It forces 
accountability between all parties, and benefits vendors with foresight, experience, skill, and 
efficiency.  It provides an environment that maximizes contractor profit, while minimizing owner 
resources.   
In contrast, the price-based environment focuses on using minimum standards to define 
the requirement of the contract, in order to ensure that the minimal requirement is met.  Due to 
its concentration on price, it encourages the contractors and vendors to translate the minimum 
requirement to a maximum in attempts to lower the quality of the delivered product to gain the 
competitive advantage. This penalizes the high performers who can see the prospective project 
from a visionary view, from beginning to end, and seeks to minimize change orders by pricing in 
items which will need to be done that are missing from the specifications.  It discourages the 
use of expertise, and asks the contractor/vendor to price only what is written—ignoring the 
owner’s intent.  It promotes project dependency on change orders when the unspecified or client 
“unexpected” events occur during project execution.   The price-based environment gives 
inexperienced contractors the competitive advantage over experienced contractors, thus driving 
the experienced contractors to move from a position of minimizing risk to a position of ignoring 
project risk.  This culture results in the contractor relying on the client to manage, direct, control, 
and inspect, and become reactive instead of proactive.  This trend, which is clearly 
demonstrated in Figure 2, has the following ramifications: 
1. Penalizes contractors who carefully preplan, understand the scope of the project, and 
price-out the project. 
2. Motivates contractors to take the low price at the last minute, not knowing whether they 
are meeting the specifications, and when receiving the award, further price shopping to 
ensure that they can meet the specifications for the lowest possible price. 
3. Encourages all manufacturers to ensure that their products meet only the lowest 
possible quality to get the largest possible volume sales of contractors trying to get the 
lowest price. 
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4. Promotes the bypass of education and personnel training in the industry, leading to a 
critical shortage of trained personnel. 
5. Leads to poor construction performance (not on time, not on budget, and not meeting 
the client’s expectations). 
 
Figure 1. Construction Industry Structure (CIS)  
(Kashiwagi, 2004) 
 
Figure 2. Impact of Price-based Bidding: Increase of Risk  
(Kashiwagi, 2004) 
 
Relative Analysis of the Two Environments 
A relative analysis of the two environments (price based and best value) leads to the 
following deductive conclusions.  Performance can only occur when risk is transferred to an 
entity that has the capabilities of minimizing the risk.  The best-value environment ensures high 
performance by transferring risk to the best-value contractor who can verify past performance, 
send their best personnel, identify risk that they control and do not control, and develop a plan 
to minimize the risk that they do not control.  The owner’s resulting risk in this environment 
(assuming that the client did pick the best value—highest performer for the lowest price), is the 
interface or the seam between the client and the contractor, or in other words the risk that the 
contractor does not control (Figure 3).  Alternatively, the price-based environment passes risk to 
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the contractor with the lowest price without ensuring that they can minimize the risk, hence: the 
poor performance of the construction industry.   
When risk is transferred to a party unable to minimize the risk, the party must be 
managed, inspected, and controlled.  In consequence, the owner’s risk in the low-price 
environment is the potential that the minimally trained, managed, and directed contractor/vendor 
may not do what they are directed to do (Figure 3).  The price-based environment has reflected 
this, in a heavy overhead for transaction costs relating to management, direction, control, 
inspection, and communications that would be eliminated if the client’s process were more 
efficient.  This has also translated to a higher requirement of people needed to maintain the 
system (due to the inefficiency of the process).  Accordingly, there is more confusion in the 
price-based environment due to the management, decision-making, unrealistic expectations, 
attempts to control others, use of leverage (making a party do free work or work that they are 
incapable of doing), and the lack of performance information of key individuals, contractors, and 
the client’s personnel.  Without simple, easy-to-understand measurements that consider the 
vendor’s capabilities, the price-based environment is adversarial: where every participant, 
regardless of whom they work for, protects themselves before they protect the company they 
work for, or the client/user for whom the construction is being built.      
 
Figure 3. Difference in Risk Between Price-based and Best-value Environments 
 
The above characteristics are supported by documentation of construction delivered by 
the price based environment (AGC, 2005; Butler, 2002; CII, 2005; Doree, 2004; Fitz-Gibbon et 
al., 2006; Guo, 2006; Markus, 1997; NDU, 2005; Post, 1998; State of Hawaii, 2002).  The 
characteristics identify management as the key component to the price-based environment; and 
leadership, or the alignment of resources that can minimize risk as the key component to the 
best-value environment.  The understanding of the Construction Industry Structure (CIS) and 
the impact of the price-based bidding identifies the following leadership/management 
characteristics as well as the projected goal of personnel who are trying to move from the price-
based environment (management and control) to the best-value environment (leadership): 
Management 
1. Focus on relationships 
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2. Lack of performance information on critical elements of the contractor’s team (relative 
ability to finish on time, on budget, and meet the client’s expectations) 
3. Direction/Control by client’s personnel 
4. Decision-making performed by client’s personnel instead of contractor personnel 
5. Maximum communication/documentation passed between client and contractors 
6. Duplication of cost estimates quantities and approvals 
7. Passing of risk without regard to relative ability to minimize risk 
8. The most important person in the process becomes the client’s procurement agent—
although they have no technical expertise and take no responsibility for cost or time 
overruns 
Leadership 
1. Performance information used to minimize decision-making 
2. Transfer of risk to those that can minimize risk 
3. Replacement of the client management, direction, and inspection with contractor/vendor 
self- documentation/regulation 
4. Minimization of client decision-making, documentation, and flow of information 
5. Process installed to ensure that the best-value contractors/vendors know how they will 
minimize risk 
6. Contractors/vendors address performance and risk in terms of value chain, supply chain, 
and overall transaction costs 
 Information Measurement Theory and Best Value Test Results 
PBSRG has been testing best-value procurement using an information based 
Performance Information Procurement System (PIPS).  PIPS is built on a foundation of 
principles outlined by the Information Measurement Theory (IMT).  IMT is a set of deductive 
logic models which predict future results based on relative measurements.  The following are 
the major concepts or models (Kashiwagi, 2004): 
1. Decision-making requires individuals to use their subjective bias and experience to solve 
a situation in which they have insufficient information to predict an outcome. 
2. Decision-making brings risk. 
3. Decision-making is minimized when the decision-maker has accurate information. 
4. Dominant information is information that will minimize the need for decision-making. 
5. It is difficult for one organization/person to control the actions of another individual. 
6. People and organizations are predictable with enough information. 
7. Past performance and future capability to perform on unique events can be predicted. 
8. Experienced personnel can identify future activities in an event before it happens.  They 
can identify and prioritize risk, and they will have a plan to minimize the risk before it 
happens. 
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The following test results and measurements of PIPS have validated the above 
concepts: 
1. Duration of testing: 13 years. 
2. Research Funding: $6.2M 
3. Number of tests: 480 
4. Construction volume/scope of tests: $500M 
5. Largest projects: $100M City of Peoria Wastewater Treatment DB project (2007) and the 
$53M Olympic Village/University of Utah Housing Project (2001) 
6. Performance of contractors in tests (on time, on budget with no contractor-generated 
cost change orders, meeting client’s expectations): 98% 
7. Surprise factor of nonperformance: Less than 1% 
8. Management effort of client’s construction managers: minimized by 80 to 90% 
(University of Hawaii (2000) and University of Minnesota (2006), and the ability of project 
managers to deliver 10 times the amount of projects (State of Hawaii (1997-2001) 
9. Awards:  2005 Corenet Global  Innovation of the Year Award for testing at Harvard 
University, and the 2000 Tech Pono Award for the testing at the State of Hawaii 
10. Clients in the Public Sector: FAA, US Army Medical Command, USCG, States of 
Washington, Wyoming, Utah, Georgia, Hawaii, and Missouri, City of Peoria, AZ, City of 
Miami Beach, and Universities (University of Hawaii, Arizona State University and 
University of Minnesota) 
11. Clients in the Private Sector: General Dynamics, Raytheon, Schering Plough, United 
Airlines, Motorola, Honeywell, IBM, Boeing, Intel, and International Rectifier 
12. Risks and Reason for Stopping PIPS: the champion/expert of Best Value/PIPS moves or 
retires, political change, someone in the organization feels threatened and stops 
process, organization is too inefficient, ineffective, and bureaucratic to make process 
work 
 Theoretical Concepts of Best Value 
The Best Value/PIPS process (shown in Figure 4) is composed of three primary steps: 
1. Selection Phase (Filter 1-4):  Identification of the Best Value 
2. Preplanning /Quality Control Phase (Filter 5):  Forcing the best value to preplan and 
minimize risk that they control and do not control through a PIPS Quality Control Plan or 
Risk Plan and schedule 
3. Risk Management Phase (Filter 6):  Management of the construction project through risk 
minimization 
The selection phase attempts to differentiate the performance and expertise of 
competing vendors.  This is done through the collection of each contractor’s past performance 
information (from key individuals as well as the general contractor and critical subcontractors), 
risk-assessment/value-added plan, and interview ratings.  It is important to note that if the 
contractors cannot differentiate themselves through their past performance, identification of 
project risk out of their control, plans to minimize uncontrolled risks, value added options, and 
interview, there is nothing wrong with awarding the project based on the best price (as the 
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contractors proved they are all the same).  The client should not make decisions to assist any 
contractor to become competitive.  No contractor should be assisted by being given a second 
chance, redoing their cost estimate, or given information from other contractors that could 
possibly make them more competitive.  In best value, every contractor is competitive, and every 
contractor has a chance to differentiate themselves without biased assistance from the client’s 
representative.   
 
Figure 4. Best Value Natural Selection  
(Kashiwagi, 2004) 
The Best Value/PIPS process forces the best-value contractor to take its price, risk-
assessment/value-added plan and interview statements into the second phase of 
Preplanning/Quality Control.  In the preplanning/PIPS Quality Control Phase, the contractor 
concentrates on minimizing the project risks.  A schedule listing the major milestones in the 
project is developed.  A QC plan is also compiled by the contractor which includes a list of risks 
out of the contractor’s immediate control in conjunction with a detailed plan to minimize each 
risk.  Technical risks are not included, as the contractor minimizes risks that it controls by 
meeting the requirements of the specification.  Only after the owner is satisfied with the pre-
planning performed by the contractor will the contract be awarded. 
Once the project has been initialized, the contractor enters the Risk Management Phase.  
Every week during project execution, the contractor is required to submit a Quality Assurance 
(QA) plan and Weekly Report to the owner.  The QA plan is a checklist of the risks identified in 
the previous phase that ensures that each risk is being monitored and minimized according to 
the directives included in the QC plan.  If the risk cannot be minimized according to client pre-
approved QC efforts, the risk is reported on the weekly report along with unforeseen risks 
adversely impacting the schedule or budget.  The client is then obliged to pay for additional time 
and effort (Figure 5).  This process transfers the risk to the contractor, who then uses the 
mechanism of the QC plan to make all parties accountable thorough communication, 
coordination, and preplanning.  
 =




Figure 5. Information Environment 
The selection process ensures the procurement of the best-value contractor and the 
transfer of all project risk to the contractor.  The QC plan and the weekly risk report then defend 
the high-performing contractor by identifying risks out of the contractor’s control and the 
contractor’s limited abilities to impact the risk.  Because it is reviewed by the client’s 
representative, the information is usually very accurate.  The QC plan, QA checklist, weekly 
report, and schedule, also help to regulate the contractor’s work.  All the elements are 
incorporated into the contractor’s contract on award.  At the end of the project, the contractor is 
rated by the owner, and the rating modifies the past performance rating of the contractor by 
50% (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Best Value DMAIC Closed Loop  
(Kashiwagi, 2004) 
Information System 
The owner is able to compile a group of individual contractor weekly reports 
(spreadsheets submitted to the client weekly) into a Director’s Report (Figure 7) which can give 
a Facility/Construction director valuable measurements of risk/performance for the organization 
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as a whole, as well as a prioritization of the risks.  The Director’s Report also allows for the 
comparison of contractors, project managers, project integrators, inspectors or design 
professionals involved in the projects.  The report provides accurate, timely risk/performance 
information that disables bureaucracy and identifies where risk is being created.  For the first 
time, it gives a director a simplistic information system with minimal maintenance that deters 
nonperformance by highlighting nonperformance quickly and accurately.   
  
7.1 Individual project performance 7.2 Overall organization performance 
  
7.3 Risk ranking of projects 7.4 Comparing vendor performance 
 
Figure 7. Director’s Report 
Implementation of Best Value/PIPS in the US Medical Command 
(MEDCOM) 
In order to implement Best Value/PIPS into the US Medical Command (MEDCOM), the 
system was adjusted in order to assure compatibility with the FAR and AFARS.  As a result, the 
following changes were made: 
1. The preplanning/quality control period is performed during a preconstruction period after 
the award of the contract. 
2. The technical and non-technical concerns of the client/user are given to all contractors.   
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The Best Value/PIPS process can be implemented on Design-Build, CM@Risk, Design-
Bid-Build, IDIQ contracts, or on designers.  The US Army Medical Command has implemented it 
on IDIQ contracts, and directed the contractors to use a best value process that includes 
preplanning, Quality Control that minimizes risk that the contractor does not control, weekly risk 
reporting, and client identification of contractor performance.   
Once the IDIQ contractors had been educated in the Best Value process, they began to 
realize that it would assist them to be more efficient, make the client’s/user’s representatives 
accountable, and maximize their profits without charging more (win-win).  The contractors 
began to realize that the process was a very successful enterprise model that used best 
business practices, motivated their personnel to improve, and measured their own performance.  
The majority of the contractors began requesting their personal performance measurements.   
The US Army Medical Command effort has grown in stages: 
1. First stage: MEDCOM officials supported the system, instituted training sessions for their 
own personnel, and introduced the contractors to the process (duration of 1 year). 
2. Second stage: MEDCOM instituted the system into their specifications, making it a 
requirement to select on best value, preplan the minimization of risk, implement a 
contractor generated QC plan, and measure performance.  Five out of a potential seven 
IDIQ contractors attended the annual Best Value conference, which included detailed 
training of the system, at their own expense.  The contractors viewed it as a process 
required when working with MEDCOM (duration of 1 year).   
3. Third stage: The information environment and Director’s Report were instituted.  
Performance information was returned to the IDIQ contractors on both project 
performance and ongoing risk minimization.  The contractors noted that the Best 
Value/PIPS structure allowed them to perform, differentiate themselves based on value, 
and increase efficiency.  Irresolvable project problems which previously have migrated to 
the director of the MEDCOM, have now been minimized to problems with easily 
identifiable solutions.  Four of the seven contractors generated their own training and 
measurement systems.  Six of the seven contractors attended the annual Best 
Value/PIPS training education at their own expense.  One of the contractors began using 
their performance information to educate other owners on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Best Value/PIPS structure.  Contractors now view the Best Value 
process as a process to measure themselves, minimize their risk, and improve their 
companies (duration of 1 year).  
4. Fourth stage (current stage): Continuous education of the concepts of supply chain 
optimization, preplanning, quality control, and risk minimization are being facilitated.  
Both the client’s personnel (MEDCOM representatives, the Corps of Engineers (COE) 
procurement personnel, and users) and the contractor’s personnel are learning how to 
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Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
The intent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (2002) is to bring the government 
the “best value.”  In the delivery of construction, the FAR recommends sealed bids.  However, in 
FAR 36.103b and 6.04(b)(1), it states that if the use of sealed bids cannot effectively deliver the 
best value, the request for proposal process using criteria other than price can be used.  There 
is ample evidence that implies the delivery of construction cannot be treated as a commodity.   
The term “best value” is mentioned 34 times, and the term “low bid” is mentioned 19 
times in the FAR.  Best Value means: the “expected outcome of an acquisition that, in the 
estimation of the Government, provides the greatest possible benefit to the requirement” (FAR 
2.1).  The benefits include (FAR 102.2(b)):   
1. Satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or 
service by, for example— 
 Maximizing the use of commercial products and services; 
 Using contractors who have a track record of successful past performance or who 
demonstrate a current superior ability to perform; and 
 Promoting competition; 
2. Minimize administrative operating costs; 
3. Conduct business with integrity, fairness, and openness  
FAR 1.102.2-1 (b) states: 
(b) Vision. All participants in the System are responsible for making acquisition 
decisions that deliver the best value product or service to the customer. Best value must be 
viewed from a broad perspective and is achieved by balancing the many competing 
interests in the System. The result is a system which works better and costs less. 
FAR 1.102-2(b)(2)  states: 
(2) The System must provide uniformity where it contributes to efficiency or where 
fairness or predictability is essential. The System should also, however, encourage 
innovation, and local adaptation where uniformity is not essential. 
FAR 1.102-4 (e) further states that: 
(e) The FAR outlines procurement policies and procedures that are used by 
members of the Acquisition Team. If a policy or procedure, or a particular strategy or 
practice, is in the best interest of the Government and is not specifically addressed in the 
FAR, nor prohibited by law (statute or case law), Executive order or other regulation, 
Government members of the Team should not assume it is prohibited. Rather, absence of 
direction should be interpreted as permitting the Team to innovate and use sound business 
judgment that is otherwise consistent with law and within the limits of their authority.  
Contracting officers should take the lead in encouraging business process innovations and 
ensuring that business decisions are sound. 
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The FAR addresses the use of the PIPS filters of past performance (FAR 15.305(a)(2)), 
the risk-assessment plan/value-added plan (FAR 15-305(a)(3)(i)), and the interview (FAR 
15.102).  The FAR addresses prioritization of alternatives in 15.305 Proposal evaluation: 
Proposal evaluation is an assessment of the proposal and the offeror’s ability to perform 
the prospective contract successfully. An agency shall evaluate competitive proposals 
and then assess their relative qualities solely on the factors and subfactors specified in 
the solicitation. Evaluations may be conducted using any rating method or combination 
of methods, including color or adjectival ratings, numerical weights and ordinal rankings. 
The relative strengths, deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and risks supporting 
proposal evaluation shall be documented in the contract file. 
However, the Army FARS has the following: 
5115.304—Evaluation Factors and Significant Subfactors 
(iv) Must be qualitative.  Numerical weighting (i.e., assigning points or percentages to 
evaluation factors and subfactors) is not an authorized method of expressing the relative 
importance of these factors and subfactors.  Evaluation factors and subfactors must be 
definable in readily understood qualitative terms (i.e., adjectival, colors, or other indicators, 
but not numbers) and represent the key areas of importance to be considered in the source 
selection process.  The direction of this subparagraph is not waivable, either on an individual 
or class basis, as an AFARS deviation.  
Therefore, when selecting a contractor, AFARS Best Value process must not use either 
weights or the ratings on any of the evaluation factors must have qualitative ratings.  The impact 
of this policy is the lack of transparency but also prevents protests due to the inability or difficulty 
to challenge a subjective, nontransparent system.  The downside to this type of system is that it 
motivates owner representatives to make decisions instead of allowing the contractors to 
determine who gets the project based on a preset system that is very predictable.  However, 
Best Value/PIPS can still be run using qualitative ratings on past performance, risk 
assessment/value added submittal, and interviews. 
The major contribution of Best Value/ PIPS is in the Preplanning/QC phase and the Risk 
Management phase.  These two phases can be written into the IDIQ specification.  The phases 
provide the user with relevant information related to the contractor’s performance.  These 
components are not a procurement issue, but a client’s requirement to ensure wise usage of 
their funding.  This responsibility must be fulfilled and is periodically checked by auditors to 
ensure the funds are receiving the best value for the government.   
Resistance to Change 
The movement to Best Value is threatening to the status quo due to the following: 
1. The contractor becomes the expert, the center of the universe, the most important 
component of the value chain, replacing the perch the procurement officer has in the 
low-bid environment. 
2. Best Value/ PIPS forces the government to release control to the outsourced vendor.  It 
is difficult for procurement agents to release control.   
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3. If services are outsourced, and the process becomes more efficient and effective, the 
government will need less personnel to make it work.  This threatens the procurement 
community, whose members may feel that their jobs are being eradicated. 
4. A change in culture brings fear to the government community.  This fear is exhibited in 
many ways: resistance to change, not being open to logic/best practices, using the FAR 
and AFARS and interpreting new concepts as illegal, increasing transaction costs of 
other participants in the delivery chain, and not acting in the best interest of the 
government.    
Resistance to using the Best Value/PIPS process has included: 
1. Stating that Arizona State University could not be used to replace the COE procurement 
process.  This is a fear that is totally unjustified.  ASU is a research/education group.  
ASU does not participate in the procurement selection. 
2. Best Value/PIPS will only quantify contractors with past performance.  This is incorrect.  
If a contractor has no past performance ratings, the client is instructed to rate them an 
average rating.  This rating is called “I don’t know.”  The contractor could be a very high 
performer based on the owner’s past experience; however, the client should not bias the 
system by making a decision and helping a contractor get in. 
3. The past performance is only good past performance.  In order to win a true best-value 
RFP, the contractor must send their best people, and, therefore, their best past 
performance.  In this case, the best past performance is indicative in the way the best 
value will operate.  This minimizes client decision-making, forces the competition among 
performers, and allows the transfer of risk to the best performer. 
4. Risk-assessment plans are general and ambiguous.  As contractors get grounded into 
the system of identifying the risks that they do not control, the risk plans will get better.  
However, they can only add to the contractor’s preplanning and thinking and do not act 
as a detriment.   
5. Interviews should focus on technical matters.  In order to rate contractors on technical 
matters, the government has to be the expert, make decisions, and, therefore, absorb 
the risk.  This system has proved to be unsuccessful.  Contractors who can answer 
concerns simply, in non-technical language, are high performers.  Poor performers 
cannot simplify.   
6. There is a lack of competitive range and discussions.  The competitive range should be 
identified by the best values. 
7. The scope of the project should not be published in terms of budgets.  Best Value/PIPS 
encourages giving the budget to the contractors so they may determine risk.  However, 
giving the budget is not mandatory.  Not giving the budget often helps the low bidders 
who gain the advantage with low price.  High performers always minimize risk, and if any 
information is withheld, the risk increases, and the high performers increase their prices.   








Best Value/PIPS is a cultural revolution for the government.  The process/structure has 
been well tested over an extended period of time.  Best Value/PIPS requires the procurement 
agents to release control, minimize decision-making, minimize the creation of transaction costs, 
and change their thinking.  Education is the key.  The government needs to become more 
efficient and effective.   
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Abstract 
Incentive contracts have been in place for many years.  They represent just one of 
many contractual tools the Department of Defense has at its disposal to drive certain 
performance behaviors. Lately, the usefulness of incentive contracts has come into question.  
The dividends have not been readily apparent.  This research study set out to determine what 
generally afforded strong correlations between incentive-type contracts and expected 
performance outcomes.  Twenty-five weapon system acquisition programs offices were 
interviewed in various stages of their acquisition lifecycles.  A standardized questionnaire-
survey was used to capture the data. This presentation prepared for the Fourth Annual 
Acquisition Research Symposium will address the findings and include a few key 
recommendations intended to better arm the acquisition workforce on the use of incentive 
contracts. 
Discussion 
In the past several years, major weapon system development programs have drawn 
significant attention.  The reasons are varied.  In some cases, costs have skyrocketed; 
schedules have experienced significant delays; and performance levels have failed to meet 
government expectations despite the employment of management tools designed to control 
costs, preserve schedules and influence performance outcomes.  Some of these management 
tools (including contractual measures, as originally conceived and specified by the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FARs)) can give tremendous flexibility to the implementation of 
government contracts.  The use of such contractual measures is one of many handy tools in a 
program manager’s toolkit to help drive performance behavior.  However, the GAO recently 
identified an apparent disconnect between the use of certain measures like incentives and 
expected outcomes in weapon system acquisitions.  In short, it appeared that incentives were 
not driving performance outcomes as originally envisioned. 
So, what about incentives?  Are they still a good tool to drive performance behaviors 
despite the recent criticism and doubt?  Have organizations found a way to effectively apply 
incentives and demonstrate the usefulness of incentives?  The answer to all of these questions 
is, “yes.”  There is no “one size fits all,” but the incentive attributes that seemed to matter the 
most in influencing performance outcomes for the 25 programs, and generally afforded strong 
correlations between incentives and desired performance were indicated by the findings. 
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Strongly Communicated Expectations and Feedback:  Frequent and unambiguous 
communication/feedback made a noticeable difference for incentive contracts. Even 
though incentive contracts require some additional administrative burden, the outcome justified 
the increased workload of feedback for most programs under this research review.  Continuous 
and open dialogue at both junior and senior levels led to early discovery and timely 
reconciliation of many known issues and helped keep a program on track. 
Metrics: The selection of key and enduring measures within an evaluation period 
and of measures that could be connected to subsequent evaluation periods made a 
noticeable difference for incentive contracts. Key measures can validate whether or not a 
program achieved certain necessary intermediate milestones along a program’s critical glide 
path.  They confirm program momentum.  They served as an early warning system—a bell 
weather—and answer the age old question, “Are we on track”?  They also fill a huge role as 
performance benchmarks.  Those interviewed under this research project said when they 
effectively employed key measures, such tools also helped them navigate their program 
pathway despite the unavoidable programmatic turbulence.  Their measures surfaced either as 
two types: objective and/or subjective.  Without question, selecting the correct type of measures 
presented the biggest challenge.  The ability to hard-wire them to achievable outcomes makes 
objective measures like Technical Performance Measures (TPMs), Cost Performance Indices 
(CPIs), Schedule Performance Indices (SPIs), etc., invaluable gauges.  They served as 
tremendous forecasting devices when they were carefully connected to outcomes.   
Base Fee:  The incorporation of base fee in award-fee contracts made a noticeable 
difference.  Of the 25 organizational interviews, many used some form of base fee on cost-
plus-award-fee contracts.  Numerous organizations implementing cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) 
valued base fees as a leverage tool.  Even though the Federal Acquisition Supplement 
(DFARS) 216.405-2(c)(iii) allows up to 3% of the estimated cost of the contract exclusive of fee, 
a contractor could provide “best efforts” for the award-fee term and still receive no award.  As a 
result, there was some pressure on the government to provide a portion of the award fee for 
“best efforts.”  Further, our research team found that senior defense industry personnel 
welcomed the use of base fee to better delineate the difference between “best efforts” (e.g., fee) 
and “excellence” (e.g., award). 
Trained and Experienced Personnel: Training and experience made a noticeable 
difference for incentive contracts.  Nothing seems to have a more dramatic impact in DoD 
like training and experience.  Training draws it roots from practical experience.  It’s systematic.  
We learn from our successes and failures in the field and make adjustments accordingly in the 
way we train.  The mantra, “we train like we fight and fight like we train” is pervasive within the 
warfighter arena and, ultimately, leads to advantages on the battlefield.  Without question, 
practical experience helps build better training programs.  It can overcome unforeseen shortfalls 
and the inevitable prevailing uncertainty even within proven systems.  It’s no different for 
incentive-type contracts.  Organizations that had formalized instruction and/or coached their 
personnel on the use of incentives indicated such training more favorably influenced outcomes. 
The exploitation of an increasingly popular collaborative medium called Communities of 
Practices (CoPs) on the DAU Acquisition Community Connection offers access to these 
particular techniques and an even wider array of current experiences and lessons learned 
regarding incentives ranging from the general to the specific. The DAU has already established 
a site on the ACC, Award and Incentive Fee Contracts. See  
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(https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=105550).  These and other collaborative 
training aids are critical because once an incentive strategy is in place, its maximum value truly 
depends on its ability to implement techniques that drive favorable outcomes.  There’s no better 
source of experts who face contract incentive challenges every day than the acquisition 
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While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and 
beyond the ordinary rules.    -Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to begin a discussion on the need and complexity of 
managing the material acquisition process from a capability focused perspective.  As 
warfighters develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the current and future fight, 
they do so from a joint and combined arms perspective. Battlespace success is viewed from the 
combined effects of multiple systems providing a synchronized force multiplier for the 
Commander.  Conversely, our acquisition process remains trapped in a historical paradigm 
designed to meet Cold War requirements.  This paper does not intend on offering the solution.  
This is merely a thought piece on perspectives from someone who is challenged daily with the 
opportunity of developing a capability management process for integrating future capability into 
the current force organizational construct.    
The Department of Defense is challenged with balancing weapon system modernization 
and maintaining an operational force ready to fight and win the Global War on Terrorism.  As the 
Department seeks to transform itself into a twenty-first century force, the acquisition process is 
stuck in a Cold War mentality focused on preserving the existing platform-centric approach to 
acquisition.  Tomorrow’s battlespace will be a network-centric environment derived from system-
of-systems within which the sum of the parts generates an interdependent capability much more 
effective than the stand-alone, platform-centric environment of the past.  Our DoD acquisition 
process is still oriented on building platforms that come to the fight as appliqué solutions, rather 
than seamlessly integrated warfighting systems designed to enhance the total capability.  This 
dichotomy is straining the DoD budget by focusing our limited resources on an ever-decreasing 
number of platforms that are hugely expensive and fall short of meeting the ever-increasing 
number of capability gaps being endured by our warfighter.   
This paper will examine the need to shape the DoD Acquisition Process and create an 
acquisition management system that is capability centered rather than platform centered.   A 
knowledge-based process that synchronizes and optimizes capability solutions across the force 
is needed to ensure the warfighter needs are met within the fiscal constraints of the budgetary 
process.  The acquisition process needs to be viewed in a more holistic manner.  The various 
aspects of acquisition management can be viewed as layers in a system of systems acquisition 
architecture. A Capability Manager must be established to address all the layers of the 
acquisition process—not just the traditional cost, schedule and performance metrics typically 
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addressed by a platform Project Manager.  The layers include:  Standards, Requirements, 
Acquisition Organization, Material Solution, Material Subsystem, Operational Organization, and 
Battlespace. 
 
Figure 1.  Material Acquisition Process Model, “Capability Engine” 
These layers are interconnected in such a way that a perturbation on any layer evokes a 
response in all layers.  By addressing capability management in a system-of-systems way, we 
can better align our management processes with the requirements generation process.  
Additionally, by inculcating a mindset that views acquisition management in a system-of-
systems way that is synchronized with the capabilities-based approach to developing needs, 
one is better able to determine where our limited resources need to be applied—mitigating our 
current management approach which typically over-resources some capability at the expense of 
other warfighter needs.     
Platform Centric Perspective 
As the Department of Defense plans to invest over a trillion dollars into the acquisition 
process in support of new, more capable weapon systems, it is failing to address the root cause 
that has resulted in ever-increasing cost over runs: performance disappointments and program 
failures. Since 1970, the percentage of cost overrun has increased to as much as 40% or $15 
billion dollars—even though there have been as many as eleven policy changes attempting to 
reform the DoD acquisition process.  According to the GAO report, Major Weapon Systems 
Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DoD Revised Policy (2006, April), 
the following table illustrates the problem facing the DoD. 
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45% 24 85% 
Joint Strike Fighter 48% 48 78% 
Expeditionary Fighting 
Vehicle 




122% N/A N/A 
Global Hawk 166% N/A N/A 
Future Combat 
System 
48% 48 78% 
Source: GAO. (2006, April).  Major weapon systems continue to experience cost and schedule problems under DoD revised policy. 
Washington, DC: author. 
As we invest more resources into fewer, more resource-intensive programs, we need to 
examine the root cause of the Acquisition Process’s failure to gain control of its cost, schedule 
and performance challenges.  The principle reasons often cited for cost overruns are the 
budgeting and requirements process; yet, this does not account for the ever-increasing dollars 
flowing into programs with less-than-impressive results.  Additionally, the problem is not a lack 
of available policy and statutory guidance.  Perhaps we are organized for inefficiency in that 
program offices are hardwired to solve material solution challenges from a singular system 
perspective and are not trained, organized, or resourced to leverage opportunities around them 
in other program offices with similar challenges.   
Requirements 
The battlespace, which our material solutions are supposed to support, is a highly 
complex, integrated environment; yet, our acquisition system continues to manage programs 
from a singular platform perspective without considering the relationships between all layers of 
the acquisition process.  We often have multiple programs born from a single requirement that 
compete for the same scarce resources, even though these programs fundamentally provide 
the same capability.     
We assume that the requirements process has accounted for the synchronization of 
capabilities, and we manage our programs from the platform perspective.  No where are the 
total force requirements mapped against all the program of record material solutions to inform 
the process from a capabilities perspective.  Indirectly, we create an environment that does not 
consider the whole more important than the subordinate parts.  In an environment like this, it is 
impossible to manage from a capabilities perspective, since each of the Program Managers 
considers his/her system the ideal solution for the relatively ambiguous requirements being 
generated out of the DoD requirements process.  
Leadership 
To address the volatile, complex, uncertain, and ambiguous (VUCA) acquisition 
environment, the services choose the best of the best to manage our programs.  We provide 
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them with an endless set of policies, statues, and directives and ask them to develop the best 
warfighting platform money can buy.   Program managers are selected for their leadership and 
management skills to manage specific platforms or systems.  Our process of selecting Program 
Managers reaches into our organizations and looks for individuals that are focused on getting 
the mission done.  When we give them the mission of managing a specific platform, these same 
managers are programmed to succeed regardless of the program issues to their left and right 
boundaries.  As long as their program succeeds, they are accomplishing their mission.  
Although our doctrine emphasizes system-of-system-level integration, we organize our program 
offices to look myopically at a system model rather than at system-of-systems.   
Funding 
Perhaps the most challenging aspect to this problem is the funding allocation.  Budgets 
are allocated to align with specific material solutions.  There is no specified Program Element in 
the budgeting process that recognizes the need to optimize material solutions.  Consequently, 
Program Managers report their successes based upon a budget activity that views cost as an 
independent variable against schedule.  Funding objectives need to support the capabilities 
model—which is less tangible than a hardware-focused model.  The challenge is to determine 
the metrics by which success should be measured and how to place a dollar value on that 
metric.  
In order to address this disconnectedness, we must change the very nature of our 
organizational processes and develop an acquisition process that considers the whole more 
important that the individual parts.  Additionally, we must recognize that material acquisition is 
more than managing cost schedule and performance.  System Program Management is a 
subset of capability management, which requires managing toward a collective capability and 
synchronizing all the relevant stakeholders from the foundation of standards to battlespace 
integration.  It includes multiple layers that need to be synchronized for every program and 
balanced across the needs of the soldier and the needs of the nation as a whole. 
 Capability-centered Acquisition 
Managing to a capability does not specify any unique material solution.  Capability 
management strives to achieve the optimal solution across the organization—in which there 
may be many material solutions for a unique requirement or a single material solution for 
multiple platforms.  The objective is to optimize the potential solution candidates that are 
designed to meet a requirement, ensuring the best-value solution set for the warfighter and the 
taxpayer.   
The combined effect of multiple material or operational solutions might provide the 
relevant capability for the force and, subsequently, for the individual systems within the force.  
Figure 2 shows how multiple solutions are generated from a single requirement and blossom 
into multiple potential solutions based upon the individual Platform Manager’s perspective.  As 
the specified operational requirement is translated into material options, Program Managers 
each begin individual solution sets or material solutions with regard to their specific program.  
From the material solution is generated an expansive set of subsystem and software options.  In 
today’s environment, the Project Manager spends little time looking toward other Project 
Managers for material options, resulting in a plethora of programs designed to meet a single 
requirement.  Ultimately, the Service has a suboptimal capability solution requiring ever-
increasing time and money to support the individual material approaches derived in each 
program. 
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Figure 2.  Acquisition Process Model “Capability Engine” Reflecting a Non-optimized 
Material Development Strategy 
Conversely, Figure 3 depicts the same requirement being satisfied in a more optimized 
approach.  All layers of what I refer to as the “Capabilities Management Engine” are 
addressed to ensure continuity in the requirement and the solution set.  In order to “qualify” as 
an acceptable solution for a specified requirement, all layers of the “engine” must be considered 
and linked.  The path through the engine must be optimized with the fewest number of 
subordinate connections.  Minimizing these links requires a Capabilities Manager with the 
authority to influence systems horizontally across each layer of the engine with the intent on 
leveraging solutions sets across multiple programs.   
 
Figure 3.  Acquisition Process Model “Capability Engine” Showing an Optimized Material 
Development Strategy Solution 
 Capabilities Engine: 
The synchronizing process is the key to being able to ensure success in the capabilities-
centered acquisition environment.  The “Capabilities Engine” needs to consider all aspects of 
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the requirement, material, organizational, and policy environment and be able to synchronize 
this across multiple programs. 
• Capability Layer 1 (CL1): Standards. The standards layer is the foundation upon which 
all acquisition programs are based.  Standards encompass policy, statute, regulations, 
treaties, etc.  All programs must be tied back to firm standards foundations lest they be 
developed in contravention to the authoritative documents upon which our institutions 
are formed.  This may seem obvious, but it is a critical step that is often not well 
understood by Program Managers.  
• Capability Layer 2 (CL2): Requirements. The requirements process is the beginning of 
all programs.  The warfighter determines a unique need and validates the need must be 
satisfied with a material solution.  Simply levying a requirement, however, is insufficient.  
All of the intended and unintended impacts of requirements must be completely vetted 
with regard to the systems that are already fielded and those in the development 
process.  The Capability Manager will link the requirement to the appropriate program 
offices, the material solution and its subsequent subsystem contributors and ultimately 
back to the warfighter.  The intent is to establish a clear path with an optimized solution 
from requirement inception to retirement. 
• Capability Layer 3 (CL3):  Acquisition Organization. This is simply the acquisition 
organization that is most appropriate to develop a specific material solution for a 
requirement.  Often, a single requirement will be levied upon multiple program offices.  
Without a Capability Manager to synchronize the respective program offices, the risk 
remain that singular solutions will be developed for individual platforms.   
• Capability Layer 4 (CL4):  Material Solution.  As material solutions are developed, the 
Capability Manager will match similar solutions and optimize the set to minimize the total 
capital outlay necessary to meet the specific requirement.  This is the point at which the 
Program Managers must share resources in order to minimize the total cost and ensure 
a synchronized capability is maintained to meet the common requirement.  Throughout 
this synchronization process, however, each Program Manager must develop a solution 
that is consistent with his/her platform-strategic plans.  This, in fact, is how the Program 
Manager is chartered and funded.  It is the Capability Manager’s mission to ensure the 
overall solution is optimized across the organizations. 
• Capability Layer 5 (CL5):  Material Subsystem. CL5 is similar to CL4 with the exception 
that the total number of potential solutions is orders of magnitude greater.  Here is where 
the “good idea” cost driver is most apparent.  The multitude of subcomponents for a 
system are ripe picking; any vendor, government organization, or anyone with a good 
idea to solve an engineering problem will use whatever means necessary to convince a 
Program Manager to resource their project.  Left unchecked, this is where programs run 
the greatest risk of being desynchronized with each other.  Additionally, this is where 
programs tend to allow “requirements creep” and contribute to increasing program costs.  
The Capabilities Manager must synchronize subsystems between program offices and 
ensure they are consistent with each of the subordinate layers.  Failure in this area 
manifests itself as inefficient, redundant, or worse: incompatible systems on the 
battlefield.   
• Capability Layer 6 (CL6):  Operational Organization.  The operational test community 
and the user must look at the combined nature of the material solutions and assess 
whether or not the material solution is simply a slightly better appliqué of what already 
exists.  The user must hold the acquisition community accountable for developing 
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system-of-system solutions that are mutually supporting and as common between 
systems as possible. 
• Capability Layer 7 (CL7):  Battlespace.  The battlespace is the future state at which a 
particular service views its warfighting posture.  All systems must support this objective.  
Lack of a clear link to the future state might reveal program flaws or non relevance to the 
objectives of the National Military Strategy and subordinate service objectives. 
As a requirement is developed, a clear link from CL1 through CL7 must be established 
and managed.  The Capability Manager can synchronize the seven layers for specific platform 
solutions across multiple program offices.  Platform Program Managers manage their programs 
horizontally, with respect to time and program milestones.  The Capability Manager manages 
“vertically” within each phase of the spectrum of Programs attempting to optimize the material 
solution across multiple platforms and through the seven layers of the capability engine. 
 Knowledge-based Decisions 
Managing from a capability-centered perspective is significantly more complex than the 
traditional platform-focused approach.  One must account for all aspects of the organization and 
be willing to accept being dependent upon the success of other organizations and managers.  
This is inherently counterintuitive for the “traditional” Project Manager, in that the “success at all 
cost” approach to doing business is significantly dependent on others outside of the Program 
Manager’s sphere of influence.  Consequently, managing toward an optimized capability is 
highly dependent on having a well-established knowledge-based process, a clearly defined 
execution strategy, and well-defined roles and responsibilities.  Additionally, leadership at least 
two levels up must emphasize and support an organizational structure that facilitates the 
seamless execution of the capabilities model. 
A knowledge-based capability model will enable developers to be reasonably certain at 
critical junctures, or “knowledge points” in the acquisition lifecycle, that their products are more 
likely to meet the cost, schedule, and performance baselines of the individual contributions of 
each project office and provide an optimized solution set which meets both the warfighter 
requirement and mitigates redundancy and excessive resource demand. 
Knowledge-based capabilities management requires that someone manages the 
knowledge process and has the authority to influence the platform-centered processes.  As the 
operational commander’s weakest point on the battlefield is at the seams (the boundaries 
between units), the acquisition Project Manager’s weakest point is the relationship between his 
program and that of another Project manager.  This is the where the Capabilities Manager, 
using a knowledge-based process will strengthen the overall capability solution.  Figure 4 
represents key points at which the Capabilities Manager should influence the processes of the 
platform-centered Project Manager.   
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Figure 4.  Knowledge Points at Which Capability Manager Validates Optimization of 
Material Solution for a Specified Program 
The Capabilities Manager will synchronize all seven layers of the “Capabilities Engine” at 
each of the three knowledge points of the Platform Project Manager.  The platform-centered 
Project Manager manages across time with regard to the five phases of the acquisition lifecycle.  
Those phases include the: Concept Refinement, Technology Development, System 
Development and Demonstration, Production and Deployment, and Operations and Support 
phases.  At each phase, the Project Manager strives to attain the best-value solution for a 
specific requirement for his/her platform.  If multiple Platform Managers have similar 
requirements, these Platform Managers will focus on obtaining best value for their platforms 
within the constraints of their resources and where they are in their respective lifecycle phases. 
By managing the seven layers of the Capabilities Engine, the Capability Manager looks 
vertically at specific knowledge points in time to ensure that all potential solution sets are 
considered across multiple platforms.  Formal synchronization points at which the Capability 
Manager reports success against a specified set of metrics (cost, schedule, and performance 
perspective) can be achieved across multiple programs.   The Knowledge Points suggested in 
this paper are consistent with those recommended by the GAO study that reviewed the NASA 
process with which it made its investment decisions (GAO. (2005, December). Implementing a 
knowledge-based acquisition framework could lead to better investment decisions and project 
outcomes. Report to Congress. Washington, DC: author).    
• Knowledge point 1 (KP1):  Resources and needs match.  Knowledge point 1 occurs 
when a sound business case is made for the product.  According to the GAO, this 
requires a match between the customer’s requirements and the product developer’s 
available resources in terms of knowledge, time, workforce, and money.  By 
synchronizing all seven layers of the Capabilities Engine at this point, the Capabilities 
manager not only matches requirements with resources and time, but ensures the 
requirement is consistent with standards, an optimized material solution, is appropriate 
for the specific organization receiving the system, and, most importantly, is consistent 
with the battle space within which the material solution will be integrated. 
• Knowledge Point 2 (KP2):  Product design is stable.  Design stability is critical to 
reducing risk.  At this point, the Capability Manager continues to validate that all the 
layers of the Capability Engine are synchronized and that no perturbations from any of 
the layers has caused a break in the connection from the Standards layer to the 
Battlespace layer.  Additionally, the Capabilities Manager ensures that the solution(s) for 
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the initiating requirement are still consistent with the warfighter’s intent and that the 
Platform Managers have not introduced potential dissimilarities within their platform-
strategic plans than might manifest in subsequent phases.   
• Knowledge Point 3 (KP3):  Production Processes are mature.  This is effectively the 
Platform Manager’s milestone C point at which the risk must be low enough to precede 
into production contracting.  The Capabilities Manager has less of a role at this point—
with the exception of continuing to monitor the capability effects across the layers of the 
Capability Engine.  Configuration management of the platform solution is critical to 
maintaining a consistent capability across the force.  At this point, if the Platform 
Manager introduces changes to the production architecture, the potential exists for the 
synchronized solution to “stovepipe” into a unique platform solution.  The Capability 
Manager must monitor the configuration control of all systems across multiple Program 
Offices, with regard to each other, while the Program Manager must continue to sustain 
and improve the capability on the unique platform. 
Conclusion 
Viewing material acquisition in a more holistic manner and striving to optimize solutions 
for specified requirements should be the goal for all the Services.  Although the defense budget 
is low with regard to the GDP compared to past points in history, current-year dollar value is the 
highest it’s ever been.  The acquisition process, however, continues to develop fewer systems 
at greater expense.  As the warfighter views the battlespace as an interconnected environment 
of mutually supporting systems, our Program Management process must also adapt to this 
environment.  We must begin to view systems as contributors of capability in which systems are 
mutually supporting, in which the combined effect is greater that the individual parts.  A 
Capability Management Process that supports the “traditional” Program Management process 
needs to be developed to inculcate a standardized approach to managing capability. 
The thoughts presented in this paper look at the need to change the current paradigm 
and how one might approach a capability management model.  The problem is complex, but the 
need for a solution is imperative.  Developing an execution strategy to capability management is 
even more complex.  Understanding the need to optimize and synchronize material solutions is 
merely the beginning.  Developing an organizational construct to execute this mission is worthy 
of continued study and, ultimately, of implementation.  It is important in this study to heed the 
words of Sun Tzu: “avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the 
ordinary rules”; for as in War, the systems we provide the warfighter will shape the outcome of 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 473 - 
=
=
Lessons from Army System Developments 
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This paper documents the results of a multi-year Army Materiel Command-sponsored 
research project which employed a structured case study approach to examine the history and 
processes that had resulted in the introduction of a number of technology-based Army systems 
in time to make a positive contribution to the outcome of Desert Storm. In addition to the fifteen 
case studies documenting these programs, a common set of data was obtained for each system 
studied. These data were analyzed to identify factors contributing to successful systems 
development; this paper contains the results of this analysis. 
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Several of the statistically significant relationships found involve factors that are related 
to the stability of the program.  When key members of the project team left the program too 
early, project outcome suffered. Further, both project funding cutbacks and project team turn-
over negatively correlated with the quality of the testing program and the timeliness of key test 
events. These two attributes of the testing program also had the strongest correlation with 
project outcomes. In addition, changes in systems requirements during development correlated 
with poor project cost performance. Finally, turn-over in key user-representative personnel 
correlated negatively with system performance in the field. A central conclusion from this study 
is that shorter development cycle-times favorably correlate with key project outcome variables, 
largely by minimizing the exposure of the project to destabilizing influences which were also 
shown to correlate negatively with these same outcome variables. 
Keywords: technology-based Army systems, project outcome, system requirements, 
development cycle-time 
Introduction 
This paper documents the results of a research project of several years’ duration which 
employed a structured case study approach to examine the history and processes that had 
resulted in the introduction of a number of technology-based Army systems in time to make a 
positive contribution to the outcome of Desert Storm.  The 15 case studies that resulted were 
developed on systems ranging from the M829A1 “silver bullet” to the GUARDRAIL Common 
Sensor and the APACHE attack helicopter. 
Research Project Information
• Principal Sponsor: Army Material Command
• Principal Investigators: Bill Lucas (MIT) and Dick 
Rhoades (UAH)
• Research Period: September 1999 to May 2004 (data 
analysis and report preparation continued into 2005)
• Funding: ~$200,000 
• Research Purpose: Examine the history and processes 
used in the development of a number of Army systems 
which made a positive contribution on the battlefield 
during Desert Storm
--determine factors which influence success
--prepare case studies  
Figure 1. Project Overview 
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System Researcher Commodity category 
APACHE  attack helicopter Ference Aviation 
TADS/PNVS (target acquisition and 
designation/pilot’s night vision systems) 
Oelrich Aviation 
MLRS rocket system Sherman Missiles 
ATACMS missile system Romanczuk Missiles 
M40 chemical protective mask Ruocco Soldier support 
Dismounted microclimate cooler 
Note: Did not enter production 
Ruocco Soldier support 
Mounted microclimate cooler Ruocco Soldier support 
M829-A1 armor–piercing kinetic energy 
tank ammunition 
Mitchell Ammunition 
FOG-M (fiber optic guided missile) 
Note: Did not enter production 
Sherman Missiles 
TOW-2A (Tube-launched missile) Vessels Missiles 
AN/TAS 4  infrared night sight Granone Target acquisition 
Joint Stars Ground Station Sherman Intelligence 
Guardrail common sensor Sherman Intelligence 
PAC-2 (PATRIOT anti-missile system) Sherman Missiles 
HELLFIRE missile system Johansen Missiles 
 
Figure 2. Systems Studied 
The case studies were developed through the use of structured interviews with key 
participants from the government/contractor team that developed each system. In addition to the 
case studies, this process resulted in collection of a common set of data for the systems studied 
which could then be analyzed to identify factors contributing to successful system development.  
The results of this analysis are contained in this paper. Two of the 15 case studies examined 
systems which might have been useful on the battlefield (based on the views of Army technical 
leaders), but that failed to successfully complete development. The intent of including failures in 
the research was to provide a basis for distinguishing factors which contributed to both 
successful and unsuccessful system developments.  While they are useful for the qualitative 
lessons they offer, two cases are inadequate for quantitative analysis; most analysis focuses on 
the 13 successful cases.  The study is, therefore, primarily an assessment of contributors to the 
relative degree of success.5 
                                                
5 The LeanTEC project was a four-year study of the development and transition of technology-dependent 
systems in the aerospace industry, supported by a cooperative research agreement between the US Air 
Force Manufacturing Technology Office and The Boeing Company.   
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• Army RDEC and PM leadership nominated systems 
which either did or could have impacted Desert Storm
• Researchers (intended to be “free” Army student labor) 
selected a system from list of candidates
• “Structured thesis” approach used to gather comparable 
data on each system studied, but allow researcher to 
document areas of particular interest in each case study
• Modified version of questionnaire used on LeanTEC* 
was administered to Army and contractor development 
team members; researcher integrated responses
---produced composite “best answer” questionnaire
---produced case study on system development
15 systems, 13 produced dictated a focus on relative success factors
 
Figure 3. Methodology Employed 
The heart of any systematic study is the definition of a common outcome measure that 
allows comparison.  The obvious path was to compare the projects and systems based on their 
performance relative to their agreed-upon goals and requirements.  Each project had a budget, 
a systems procurement cost goal, a set of technical requirements, and completion dates. In 
addition, three questions of performance are immediately observable and easily remembered by 
project managers:  Did the system go into production?  Once production was started, were 
problems found that required that further engineering changes be made?  And did the system 
perform well in its use in Desert Storm?  Structured questions were used to ask the key 
government and industry interviewees about how well their projects performed in these areas, 
with a range of answers that characterized how badly the projects had missed meeting their 
objectives if they had not been completely successful. Each of these outcomes is shown 
graphically in the histograms which follow. 
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Figure 5. System Unit Cost  
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Achievement of Technical Goals
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Figure 6. Technical Performance  
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Figure 7. Delay in Transitioning to Production 
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Figure 8. Changes in Production 
 
Six of the outcome measures mentioned above were used to create a scale that scores 
the (system) projects from zero to six according to the number of key outcomes a project 
achieved.  If a project was (1) transitioned to production on time, (2) developed within budget, 
(3) had no late engineering changes, met both (4) the goals for system unit costs and (5) its 
technical requirements, and encountered (6) no difficulties when it was deployed in the field, it 


























MLRS, M829 A1 and ATACMS
Scale: Sum of number of preferred outcomes using six outcome metrics
 
Figure 9. Integrated Scale 
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Table 1 (next page) contains summary information on the 15 systems studied. For each 
system, this table also contains information on the duration of the development phase of the 
program and a summary of the project manager’s description of the most difficult problem 
encountered. It is interesting to note that lack of sustained user support for the requirement the 
system was intended to satisfy was mentioned as the most difficult problem for the two failures, 
but user-related issues were not identified for any of the successful development cases.  
System/case Development 
duration (months) 








108 Control of production 
costs; influenced by 







~36 Cost growth in 
development 
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ATACMS missile system 37 Key vendor went out of 
business 
6 
M40 chemical protective 
mask 





Note: Did not enter full 
development 
Not applicable Lack of stable user 
requirements due to 
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48 Stability of threat armor 
requirements 
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AN/TAS 4  infrared night 
sight 
~24 Selection of unqualified 
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Joint Stars Ground 
Station 




Guardrail common sensor ~24 Complexity of integration 




~52 Early fielding to meet 




~84 Adversarial relationship 
between key vendor and 
prime 
3 
Table 1. Summary Case Information 
Standard statistical analysis procedures appropriate for this number of cases and type of 
data were used to identify and evaluate correlations between the factors studied and the several 
outcome variables, and, in some cases, among the factors. The results of these analyses are 
summarized in Table 2.  The testing/simulation and technological maturity factors were included 
because of their identification in recent Government Accounting Office studies as key 
determinants of success.  
Factor Relationships Found/Comments 
1. Project team characteristics 
and practices: 
 
   —leadership 
    
Team leader’s perceived ability to obtain resources, his/her 
breadth of experience and ability to resolve technical issues all 
are positively related to reduced engineering changes during 
production and to completing development within budget. 
  —staffing Low turnover in key project team members relates positively to 
completing development within budget, to meeting system unit 
cost targets and to achieving system performance objectives. 
2. Role of government S&T 
organizations 
Army labs/centers were typically actively involved in both pre-
development and development phases, actively involved in 
both successes and failures, and actively involved in both short 
and long developments. 
3. Testing and simulation 
approach 
Validating component and system maturity at the right time in 
the program relates positively to completing development within 
budget, to meeting system unit cost targets and to successful 
performance in the field. The quality of the testing and 
simulation conducted relates positively to reduced engineering 
changes during production and to meeting system unit cost 
targets. 
4. Importance of stability:  
    —funding Funding uncertainty was related to increased turnover in key 
project team members and the need to deal with changes in 
testing plans and other project structure issues. 
    —system requirements Changes in system requirements, particularly during the middle 
of development, relate to an increase in late engineering 
changes and negatively to project success in meeting its goals 
for systems costs.  
    —key user (TRADOC)  Changes in key TRADOC personnel during development 
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       personnel relates to   less successful performance in the field. 
5. Timely communication of 
problems 
Nearly all cases described timely communication of problems 
from contractor to government PM and from government PM to 
Army leadership. 
6. Importance of technology 
maturity (TRLs) 
Maturity of critical technologies used in systems studied, as 
measured by TRLs, was similar to that found in previous 
LeanTec study of small electronics projects. No positive 
correlation found between higher TRLs at the start of 
development and most outcome variables. 
Table 2. Summary of significant relationships 
Several of the statistically significant relationships involve factors that are related to the 
stability of the program.  When key members of the project team left the program too early, 
project outcome suffered. Further, both project funding cutbacks and project team turn-over 
negatively correlated with the quality of the testing program and the timeliness of key test 
events. These two attributes of the testing program also had the strongest correlation with 
project outcomes. In addition, changes in systems requirements during development correlated 
with poor project cost performance. Finally, turn-over in key user-representative personnel 
correlated negatively with system performance in the field. 
Destabilizing Influences
Variable Timing Implications 
1. Reductions in project 
funding 
Potential for change in administration every 48 months; typical 
turn-over in key military leaders occurs every 24-36 months. 
Potential change in key Congress positions every 24 months; 
likelihood increases with development duration 
2. Uncertainty in project 
funding 
Potential for change in administration every 48 months; typical 
turn-over in key military leaders occurs every 24-36 months. . 
Potential change in key Congress positions every 24 months; 
likelihood increases with development duration. 
3. Change in system 
requirements 
 Changes in the threat environment occur unpredictably, but 
become more likely with longer development durations. 
Changes in doctrine and system requirements follow a similar 
pattern.  
4. Change in key user 
representatives 
Typical turn-over in such key military positions occurs every 
~36 months 
5. Change in key project team 
members 
Typical turn-over in military acquisition positions occurs every 
~36 months. Longer development durations present more 
opportunities for career moves on the part of key civilian team 
members  
Figure 10. Destabilizing Influences 
Taken together, these several relationships strongly suggest that stability of program 
resources and objectives is a very powerful influence on the relative success of the project.  In 
reflecting on this array of instabilities that could impact a system development, it became clear 
that they had at least one thing in common: The longer a system stayed in development, the 
greater chance it had to experience one or more of these program destabilizing events. Or, 
stated another way, shorter system development cycles should result in better project 
outcomes. When this hypothesis was tested by examining the correlation between the system 
development durations and the aggregate outcome scale (See the data in Table 1), a strong 
correlation was found.  A central conclusion from this study is, therefore, that shorter 
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development cycle-times favorably correlate with key project outcome variables—largely by 
minimizing the exposure of the project to destabilizing influences which have also been shown 
to correlate negatively with these same outcome variables. 
Central Conclusion
Shorter development cycle times favorably 
correlate with key project outcome variables, 
largely by minimizing the exposure of the project 
to destabilizing influences
Length of Project Development and Project Performance  
(Average number of successful outcomes) 
                                                                             Three years 
                                                                                     Over 3 years         or less           Sig. at  
    Length of development  2.00  4.71 .002 
 
Figure 11. Conclusion 
Whether or not a change to selecting projects with shorter development times is made, 
the Army could do more to stabilize the guidance and resources given to both shorter and 
longer development projects.  Acting alone, the Army could do more to map rotating personnel 
assignments and other sources of TRADOC change to project development cycles. Since it 
appears, as is widely believed, that changes in systems requirements made once projects move 
beyond early development will almost certainly hurt project performance, the Army could 
eliminate all but the most critically important of such changes. Both through contract language 
and informal management practices, the Army could work with its contractors to provide better 
continuity of development project staffing. 
The defense acquisition community has long recognized that lengthy systems 
development times are disadvantageous.  Sometimes the associated negatives have been 
phrased in program instability terms; this study certainly provides strong empirical  support for 
those who hold these beliefs. Over the years, a number of initiatives have been attempted to 
shorten development cycles, with limited success where complex systems were involved. The 
current approach is referred to as “spiral development”; its basic concept is to get a useful, if 
limited, capability in the field quickly and then introduce additional technology-based capabilities 
through further “spirals” of development. This approach appears to be in keeping with the 
implications of this study’s central conclusion.  
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Too Little Too Soon? Modeling the Risks of Spiral Development 
 
Presenter: John Dillard, Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Business & 
Public Policy. Dillard joined the NPS faculty in the fall of 2000 with extensive experience in the field of 
systems acquisition management. His research focuses on defense acquisition policy changes and their 
implications. Dillard began his career in program and contract management after attaining a MS in 
Systems Management from the University of Southern California in 1985.  He has been involved with 
myriad technologies and system concepts that have evolved into fielded products: such as the M-4 
Carbine, 120mm Mortar, and M-24 Sniper Weapon.  He was the Assistant Project Manager for Research 
& Development of both the Army Tactical Missile System and the JAVELIN Anti-tank Weapon System at 
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He was the Product Manager for the Joint Advanced Special Operations 
Radio System, and in 1998 was appointed to head Defense Department contract administration in the 
New York metropolitan area.  As an adjunct professor for the University of California at Santa Cruz, he 
teaches courses in project management and leadership to Silicon Valley public- and private-industry 
professionals. 
Author: David Ford, Department of civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, received his BS and MS 
from Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, and his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge. He is a Professor in the Construction Engineering and Management Program, Zachry 
Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station. Prior this position, he was on 
the Faculty of the Department of Information Science, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, where he 
researched and taught in the System Dynamics Program. For over 14 years, he designed and managed 
the development of constructed facilities in industry and government. His current research interests 
include the dynamics of development projects and supply chains, strategic managerial flexibility, and 
resource-allocation policies. Dr. Ford is a member of INFORMS, ASCE, and other professional 
organizations. 
John T. Dillard 
Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5197 
(831) 656-2650 
jdillard@nps.edu  
David N. Ford, PhD, PE 
Zachry Department of Civil Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
College Station, TX 77843-3136  
Voice: (979) 845-3759 
Fax: (979) 845-6554 
davidford@tamu.edu 
Abstract 
The DoD’s evolutionary acquisition policy is directed against project risk, but bears 
inherent risks of its own. The DoD policy for evolutionary acquisition mandates multiple product 
releases via spiral (i.e., amorphous & unplanned) or incremental (i.e., defined & deferred) 
development methodologies for all programs. All amorphous spirals eventually become 
definitive increments. Incremental development entails the deliberate deferral of work to a 
subsequent phase. Computational organizational modeling using systems dynamics reveals 
that this methodology introduces more concurrency during development, and more variety in 
production. The result is earlier delivery of the first increment, but with later and more costly 
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delivery of subsequent increments than if conducted via a single-step methodology. 
Curtailments of scope by the exclusive use of mature technology enable more effective delivery 
of the first increment, further illustrated by two case studies. Duplication, rework, transaction 
costs, decision backlog and error are causes of inefficiency in the successive increments. 
Production variety and mixed configurations produce obvious implications for logistical 
supportability, training, failure causality, compatibility and interoperability, etc. Further, certain 
attributes of hardware products might help determine the suitability of this development 
methodology. Products that are nearly immutable, which have binary requirements for key 
capabilities, require man-rating, or are maintenance-intensive may not be good candidates for 
incremental development. Mutable products with costless production, continuous requirements, 
low maintenance, or time criticality are more likely to reap advantages from this development 
approach. While modular open systems architecture facilitates system adaptation, modularity 
itself does not necessarily create evolutionary advantages due to relative modular 
interdependency. Program managers must be aware of the inherent risks of these agile 
acquisition methods and take additional steps to balance them with appropriate planning and 
resources, disciplined change-control measures, organizational accommodations and 
accountability for configuration management. 
Keywords: Evolutionary acquisition, spiral development, incremental product 
development, Javelin, ATACMS, agile development methodologies, computational 
organizational modeling, modularity. 
Introduction—The Inevitability of Change 
We are told in Diogenes Laertius's Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (early 
3rd century) that the Greek philosopher Heraclitus (c.535 - 475 BC) was the first to observe and 
say, “Everything flows; nothing stands still,”—the popular derivation of which is, “The only 
constant is change.”  Indeed, everything does seem to change, evolve and give rise to variety in 
the world.  Since his work in the 1830s, Charles Darwin receives much of the credit for 
furthering a theory of biological evolution.  While not the first to have the idea, he associated 
observations of species variety on the island of Galapagos with species environment, and 
suggested that nature selected the variations that were the fittest (Darwin, 1859). In its time 
(and even since), the idea was considered radical and a threat to the religious and social order 
of things. Mere variety itself can be controversial, since, paradoxically, variety is appreciated in 
some domains (see the writings of William Cowper, 1731-1800)6 and abhorred in others (Neave, 
2000, March 2).7 At the core of the subject of evolutionary acquisition are ideas and phenomena 
about variety and change. As a policy for system development, it is controversial too. As with 
Darwinian concepts, product evolution involves information transfer, interaction with the 
environment and unpredictability of change outcomes. But unlike evolutionary biology, product 
variations and selections occur frequently and are non-random. Program managers typically 
seek stability—in program requirements, in funding, in system design, and in production 
configuration. But it seems the only constant is change. Everything changes and evolves over 
                                                
6 See also: Kerr (1979, p. 65) about the basic human need for variety and complexity. Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety states that the internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as diverse as its 
environment in order to cope with the variety of challenges imposed by it (Ashby, 1960).  
2 “Variation is nasty: it makes things difficult, unpredictable, untrustworthy: bad quality.” “In a big way, bad 
quality means too much variation, good quality means little variation.” 
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time. Much of what the authors have found in their following research on spiral development and 
project management is about how managers must cope with product variety and change. Using 
case study analyses, review of current subject literature, and computational modeling, the focus 
of our research was to ascertain the acquisition management implications of spiral 
development, obtain lessons learned in past programs as applicable to future development 
efforts, model and simulate projects using different acquisition approaches, derive predictions 
and make recommendations to project managers for the effective and efficient harnessing and 
implementation of spiral development. 
Background 
Projects have long been defined as unique and temporary enterprises, as opposed to 
common and ongoing operations. The latest (2004) version of the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK) increased its emphasis upon the term “progressive elaboration” to 
describe a third fundamental characteristic of all projects. It means, “developing in steps and 
continuing by increments; worked out with care and detail; developed thoroughly” (PMBOK, 
2000; PMBOK, 2004, p. 6). This term relates to project uncertainty and describes the eventual 
realization of project scope only after multiple iterations of planning. The PMBOK asserts that 
progressive elaboration is both a necessary characteristic of projects (occurring throughout their 
lifecycles), as well as a technique for development of product specifications. It is accomplished 
via the learning that takes place over time as project ambiguity resolves, so that project scope 
becomes more explicit and detailed (as opposed to “requirements creep,” which is considered 
uncontrolled change). The PMBOK later asserts that change in the course of projects and 
products is inevitable, and mandates the need for a disciplined change-control process to 
control its impacts—from inception to completion (PMBOK, 2004, p. 119). 
There are many new DoD terms for project management and product development 
methods. DoD promulgated evolutionary acquisition (EA) as policy in 2000, and soon after, 
spiral development for the preferred acquisition strategy of all materiel. EA’s goal is to phase 
requirements and provide capability sooner. But there has been confusion over terms, despite 
further elaboration and even codification in statute, and it still persists today, along with a lack of 
full understanding of many policy implications—especially some inherent risks. EA operationally 
means there will always be multiple product releases of an item. 
The policy thrust is primarily about the reduction of product cycle-time within an 
uncertain environment, by exclusively using mature technology. The DoD’s requirements 
process has also followed with “evolutionary” requirements documents—a new idea. 
Uncertainty is the usual realm of program managers, especially in defense systems, and is 
usually dealt with by seeking best information. Earlier reform initiatives were aimed at 
overcoming information gaps and technology lag. The 1990’s Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) initiative was about gaining collective wisdom for early and complete 
requirements realization. As concerns over DoD acquisition program costs and cycle-times 
continue in the current mid-2000s era, the DoD has not abandoned the use of IPPD.  But by 
embracing evolutionary requirements and acquisition, it has acknowledged that information will 
never be complete, either from stakeholders or with regard to ever-changing technology. It now 
implicitly concedes that developers will learn about their design over time (“requirements 
realization”), and users will accretively gain knowledge about how they can better use the new 
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capability (“product discovery”).8 Thus, a major paradigm shift for product development has 
occurred in the DoD: from a collaborative quest to capture and address all requirements early 
on, to an allowance of eventual requirements discovery with full attainment only after 
visualization, feedback and environmental changes occur along the way.  
The Enabler: Mature Technology Reduces Risk  
This is not to say, however, that the DoD has in its policy embraced technological 
uncertainty for the commencement of advanced development. Quite the contrary—for at the 
very heart of the evolutionary acquisition strategy is the requirement for the exclusive use of 
mature technology to reduce technology risk. The impetus for this undoubtedly lies in the body 
of work by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) over the last ten years,9 which has 
obviously and greatly influenced the DoD 5000 series. The GAO encourages the use of 
knowledge-based processes and specifically separates technology development from product 
development. It argues that shorter product cycle-times are the hallmark of program success 
and, therefore, should be limited to five years for more frequent introduction of new technologies 
into weapon systems, speeding them to the warfighter. We note that this is not much longer 
than the average development time for a new model of automobile—typically 3-4 years—which 
occurs in a very mature and cyclical industry (Kim, 2002, June). The GAO’s target may ignore 
the significantly greater amount of technology development required in many DoD projects 
compared with most automobile development projects. 
Most emphasized by the GAO (in the many reports reviewed by these authors) is the 
aspect of technology maturity before commencement of advanced development. The Office 
applies a 1-through-9 rating scale of technology readiness levels (TRL) that was developed by 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, adopted by Army and Air Force research 
laboratories, and recently implemented in the DoD 5000 series (in particular, the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook—formerly DoD 5000.2R). Until recently, the DoD had no specific 
requirements for use of TRLs, but levels 6 and 7 now satisfy its guidelines for technology 
maturity at Milestone B. TRL 6 states that the technology has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment (simulating the key aspects of the operational environment), and TRL 7 is its 
demonstration in an operational environment (that which addresses all operational requirements 
and specifications required of the final system, to include platform/packaging). The GAO clearly 
prefers TRL 7 as the level of technology maturity that will represent a low and satisfactory risk 
for starting product development (GAO, 2005, November 15). The Office acknowledges that 
users may not initially receive the ultimate capability under this approach, but that the initial 
capability will arrive predictably sooner and cheaper (GAO, 2005, November 15). 
In some respects, developing only mature technology as a fundamental program 
requirement is similar to an earlier attempt to constrain project scope. Cost as an Independent 
                                                
8 The authors’ terminology for what has so often been observed from their experiences. Most of us have 
long known that full realization of requirements and visualization of the product often takes multiple 
iterations of design, with feedback loops from modeling and testing activities.  And sometimes the 
customer doesn’t fully realize what can be done with the product until it is in hand. We call that product 
discovery, and the authors can cite several examples of this in both commercial and defense applications 
(i.e., cell phones as improvised explosive device triggers, etc.). 
9 See in particular: GAO/NSIAD-98-56; GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123; GAO/NSIAD-99-162; GAO/T-NSIAD-99-
116; GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137; GAO-01-288; GAO-02-701; GAO-03-57; GAO-04-53. 
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Variable (CAIV) was an acquisition reform initiative that emerged in 1995 as a means of trading 
scope, or system performance, to achieve cost objectives. It was one of very few initiatives that 
were oriented on what, not how (i.e., processes) the DoD acquires its materiel.10 To date, its 
actual savings benefit has been difficult to quantify, and qualitative measures have shown mixed 
results (RAND, 2005). Requirement attainment objectives and thresholds were another way to 
facilitate performance trades for cost. 
When fully realized, it is the exclusive use of mature technology in system development 
programs that is the key enabler of evolutionary acquisition strategy, facilitating the rapid 
transformation of applied technology to end-item capability. Thus, it is the third of three principal 
observations, all of which are paradigm shifts, that we have recently observed: (1) that the DoD 
would now mandate program strategies for all programs to have multiple product releases of the 
same item, (2) that requirements would be deferred or allowed to evolve over time, and (3) that 
high levels of technological maturity would be requisite for commencement of advanced 
development, with an intended reduction of technical risk (and thus, project schedule) 
(USD(AT&L), 2003a, May 12, Enclosure—Additional Policy E1.14). 
Policy and Implementation Concerns 
But there are questions and concerns about these major shifts that several authors have 
raised. Still a relatively new policy, observations and realizations about the outcomes of 
evolutionary acquisition and spiral development are only just beginning to emerge, and will 
continue to surface until at least several major programs go through their entire lifecycle in this 
way. Sylvester and Ferrera (2003) provided some insight into the challenges and obstacles of 
evolutionary acquisition implementation—not from program-office level—but from the 
perspective of strategic policy-makers and subscribers at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD)-level during their struggle to adopt the policy. In short, the authors explained the 
aforementioned confusion and ambiguity of the policy as it evolved from 1983 toward final 
promulgation in 2000, and then described the conflict areas caused by shifts in power among 
the organizational fiefdoms in the OSD and other affected institutions (i.e., Congress and the 
defense industry). In particular, they exposed the following major stakeholder communities and 
their respective areas of concern about evolutionary acquisition: 
• Congress—loss of control over DoD programs via specific and informed authorization 
and approval; the inability to keep the DoD accountable; unknown implications of 
requirements and budget flexibility required for evolutionary acquisition. 
• Military Departments—need to protect own acquisition programs and share of the DoD 
budget; retention of funding for follow-on capability increments; increased oversight; 
downstream logistics of multi-configuration products. 
• Defense Industry—disruptions to commercial processes and traditional approaches to 
business; competition for follow-on increments; lower-rate production runs after shorter 
R&D efforts. 
                                                
10 Some may also assert that the moratorium against MILSPECS was similar in its thrust to reduce 
unnecessary work scope, but we believe specifications to be as much prescriptive (i.e., “how”) as they are 
descriptive.  
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• Comptroller—controlling programs and holding them accountable; unknown implications 
of requirements and budget flexibility required for EA (program and budget “gaming” by 
services); “full funding” policy11 versus open-ended requirements and fund streams. 
• Requirements/Users—sub-optimum capability; priority of what is needed versus what is 
currently attainable; loss of follow-on increments.  
• Test and Evaluation—loss of discipline and assurance of operational effectiveness & 
suitability; lack of comprehensive testing before several low-rate production 
configurations are released. 
We have also had tactical (implementation) concerns about excessive decision 
bureaucracy (number of DAB reviews—see Figure 1), organizational challenges from multiple 
and concurrent development efforts, outdated technology at release, funds forecasting, 
transaction costs, and maintenance of subsequent increment priority. It is these phenomena 
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Figure 1. Comparison of 1996 and 2003 Acquisition Framework Models 
 
                                                
11 The authors explain the dual meanings of this term later in this discussion. 
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The Costs and Benefits of Variety—and the Need for Control 
Evolutionary acquisition methodologies, in addition to potentially adding more 
concurrency during development, increase variety in production. Both concurrency and variety 
are elements of complexity and program risk. Variety adds complexity in production and is 
costly for hardware owners and manufacturers alike. Traditional views about late design 
changes are negative, except for producibility enhancements and savings or correction of 
design flaws. But market consumers often need items in rapid cycle-times and appreciate 
product differentiation. In support of EA policy, the GAO has used product examples such as 
commercial vehicles. For the most part, we regard these commercial products as relatively “low-
tech” on a comparative scale of DoD system complexity and capability.  Moreover, we feel the 
GAO may ignore some very important aspects of ownership, since the DoD is unique as an 
outsourcer of capitol projects for internal use, and has unique requirements against competitive 
threats in combat environments.  
Control measures are used to manage risk. One way of coping with the complexities of 
variety in ownership is via organizational and individual accountability. A recent example of 
successful control of rapid change lies in the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion/Advanced 
Processing Build (A-RCI/PB) program. In this vital program for sustainment of submarine 
acoustic sensing superiority, a series of hardware and software upgrades were planned and 
executed in rapid succession. Each emerged with advancement in capability, keeping pace with 
technology and competitive threats, facilitated by rigorous control of interfaces, standards and 
protocols (Boudreau, 2006). 
Many other useful theorems on systems complexity, change and control exist that may 
be helpful for practitioners to consider, but are beyond the general scope of our research.  
Do Product Attributes Affect Spiral Applicability and Outcomes? 
Spiral development as a universal, “one-size-fits-all” strategy may not always be 
appropriate.  Perhaps the foremost reservation is the appropriateness of the spiral development 
process for all project sizes and product commodities in toto, and the application of the spiral 
process to hardware products versus Boehm’s original and most relevant application of this 
development approach toward software.12 We speculate whether certain product characteristics 
might determine spiral development method applicability, and, thus, may offer important 
considerations for project planners.  
• Mutability simplifies change, and spiral development was conceived for the most 
malleable of products: “soft” ware, which is virtually costless in production. Multiple 
product increments do not often appear in large, static, singular projects such as 
bridges, highways, skyscrapers, or in other project areas that have typically long lead 
times or product cycles, such as feature-length films, pharmaceuticals, etc. These are 
what we call nearly immutable products and are much different than smaller projects 
(like small application software development) with much shorter development periods.  
                                                
12 And the authors will be quick to acknowledge that software is indeed a huge and growing part of 
hardware systems large and small. Still, the spiral development framework in current literature applies 
overwhelmingly to the realm of software, not hardware. 
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• Cycle-time and Phase Concurrency. Akin to relatively mutable or immutable products, 
we have observed the successive product upgrades visible in long-running aircraft 
programs (UH-60 Blackhawk and C-130 Hercules as examples) in which there are 
periods of production configuration stability, followed by improvement efforts, followed by 
another stable use period. Cycle-time for the development of each increment, and the 
relatively successive or concurrent phasing of the follow-on increments, will have a 
definite impact on program structure, budgeting, project complexity, and organizational 
issues, etc. For reasons that we will bring forth in our section on the computational 
modeling of spiral development, we have concerns about the conceptualization of spiral 
development programs with continuous and highly concurrent phasing of development 
increments. We suggest that, though concurrency is a necessary ingredient for efficient 
project management, it has also long been correlated with risk (because of activity 
interdependency), and might vary significantly with the types of activities underway (See 
Figure 2)—the inference being that periods of stable production configuration between 
development increments reduce complexity in program structure and attendant risks. 
Similarly, shorter cycle-times have less opportunity for knock-on effects or secondary 
consequences. Particularly in matrix organization structures, as often the case with 
projects, there can be a tendency to staff multiple projects with a single specialist. The 
more projects a specialist supports, the less they are proportionately available to the 
projects due to “queuing inefficiencies.”Availability decreases because of the need 
for transition between projects (physical, mental, learning curve, etc.).  
 The end result has sometimes been shown to be large delays in project completion 
(Smith & Reinhartsen, 1998).  
 Similarly, Ibrahim (2005) has shown that discontinuous enterprise membership is a 
contributing factor toward knowledge loss in organizations involved in large, complex 
product development processes. Examining knowledge flows across product 
lifecycles, members often are not engaged in all phases. Whether from rotation of 
duties or multi-tasking, a discontinuous member’s inaccurate knowledge could cause 
a functional error at the individual level which is not obvious at the enterprise’s 
overall project level. These findings support observations of knowledge loss 
continuing despite investments in information technology and knowledge 
management. 
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Figure 2. Concurrency Relative to Types of Activity 
• User Risk (Safety and Time Criticality). Time criticality and life-saving dependency, as 
opposed to user hazard levels (safety & man-rating), might seem to also have influence 
over design approaches. We have discussed above the area of technological risk and 
the DoD’s use of incremental or spiral approaches to resolve it (along with a compulsory 
policy for the advanced development of only relatively mature technology). But DoD 
products have expanded risk considerations beyond Boehm’s models of commercial 
software. Extending the idea of project risk-as-a-driver down to the level of the end-user, 
it might seem logical to assume that time criticality of the need or mission, where risk of 
not achieving project success actually endangers customer lives, might be a significant 
factor in the appropriate application of the spiral process for reduced initial product cycle-
time. Perhaps defensive systems are a good example. The immediate needs for a 
Rocket-Propelled Grenade (RPG) defeater or an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
neutralizer for currently deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, clearly 
dictate that lives will be lost if a near-term capability is not achieved. We also cite as an 
example the National Missile Defense (NMD) initiative, in which, in view of near-term 
threats, early deployment of even rudimentary capability has been deemed preferable to 
waiting for full capability. Such urgency likely precludes full and certain requirements 
specificity. 
 Non-man-rated Systems: In an almost opposite vein, non-man-rated systems, such 
as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or cave-exploring robots—capabilities in which 
operator lives are not at risk if the product fails—may also lend themselves readily to 
rapid innovation and risk-less experimentation cycles. However, user hazard levels 
for man-rated systems may be a different matter.  
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 Man-rated Systems: Configuration variety adds technical complexity with 
unpredictable interactions. In such projects as pharmaceuticals, aviation, vehicular 
transportation, etc., producers mitigate safety risks with thorough analyses, 
documentation reviews, testing and other control and verification processes.  By their 
very nature—with lethal hazards for the end-user, and typically lengthy approval 
requirements—these may not be good candidates for a spiral approach. We believe 
this is why space experts say they’ll not use spiral development with NASA’s new 
Crew Exploration Vehicle (Roy, 2006).  
• Production Quantity. As to product size or production quantity, we find no evidence that 
either precludes use of spiral—as with space vehicles and large ships—though support 
considerations do arise with variety that could greatly affect total costs of ownership.  
• Logistical Support planned during Service/Shelf Life. Our observations warn that multiple 
configurations of hardware products do come at a cost for ownership. Veterans of new 
system deployments across the force/fleet, or throughout any large using organization, 
know the difficulties of rolling out a configuration change. Benefits of standardization 
have long been offered via production economies of scale, commonality of parts across 
platforms, and interoperability. If the ultimate goal is to have standardization across the 
DoD’s force, owning multiple configurations of a system (variety) equates to added 
complexity in training and supply support of the item. Neither can the logistical 
maintenance strategy be ignored: whether the end-item is maintenance-intensive (such 
as tactical vehicles) or maintenance-free—such as with many electronics items and 
munitions, and situations in which physical changes are completely transparent to the 
user. For multiple product configurations, the answer could have a huge effect on the 
total costs of ownership, as shown by RAND on the proliferation of UAVs (Shaver & 
Amouzegar, 2005).  
• Range of Requirement Attainment. Certain requirements are binary rather than 
continuous. Examples are soft launch, network security, physical fit, leak-proof, 
shock/vibration/drop proof, survivability, horizontal-to-vertical flight transition, etc. If one 
of these more binary-type requirements happens to be a key performance parameter, its 
attainment will be on the project’s critical path and highly dependent upon technical 
maturity. As such, it may practically dictate the length of the entire advanced 
development effort and make division into capability increments less beneficial as a 
development strategy.  
• Amount of Change—and the Lure of Modularity. These authors subscribe to the current 
theorists’ view that system complexity is comprised of numbers (of components), 
connections (interdependencies) and distinctions (variety). Distinction corresponds to 
variety, to heterogeneity, and to the fact that different parts of complex systems behave 
differently (Heylighen, 1997). Variety is a component of Nobel Prize winner Herbert 
Simon’s explanation of complexity—many different parts with many interactions. Simon 
argues, from his observation of complexity in things both natural and artificial, that 
complex systems evolve from simple systems. And they do so more rapidly when there 
are stable, intermediate forms or sub-systems (like modules or “units of action”) (Simon, 
1981). While the concept of modularity suggests approximately independent subsystems 
may be modified or adapted as such, it has been shown that, in the aggregate, there is 
yet quantifiable modular interdependency that affects evolvability (Watson & Pollack, 
2005). In other words, how changes in the state of one module affect the state of 
another is relative and measurable. Thus, we suggest it is not only the focus upon 
structural modularity as such, and, standard interfaces, that enable systems evolution. 
Rather, it is the relative interdependency of the modules. In short, PMs need to be 
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mindful of the degree of change in subsequent spirals. One subsystem is likely to affect 
another in the short- or long-run. And that can make product evolution problematic. As 
Norman Augustine once said, “No change is a small change”; independent subsystems, 
even redundant ones, aren’t always independent (Augustine, 1997, June). 
 Development Case Studies 
One of the most recent monographs we have found on emerging results of evolutionary 
acquisition is by RAND—on five immature, non-man-rated space systems. Space systems are 
somewhat different (in quantities, space environment, front-end investment, and extended 
technology development periods) than other DoD sytsems. RAND also found that policy 
confusion persists, and that EA added program complexity and uncertainty, especially with 
regard to budgeting. Extending their findings to non-space DoD programs, RAND highlighted 
the EA challenges of programmatic flux. They feel, and we agree, that EA presents the 
opportunity for typical PM challenges to be even more formidable.  
Two missile programs were used as case studies for analysis and to illustrate planned 
and unplanned change. ATACMS used incremental and spiral strategies for product 
development. The program skipped its technology development phase by employing mature 
technologies for a leap-ahead capability in range. It arrived on budget and schedule, with 
several successive variants, pre-planned and unplanned. One instance of production change 
caused missile failure and costly refit of already produced missiles—underscoring the need for 
more thorough design specification and configuration management accountability.  
Javelin used the single-step-to-full-capability approach to product development. The 
program embarked upon advanced development with immature technologies in several critical 
areas, causing significant cost and schedule overruns. It also has had subsequent design 
changes and product variety, more so as running production changes than as product variants.  
Synthesis of these cases conveys that as an approach oriented primarily for reduction of 
product cycle-time, incremental or spiral development can successfully be used when 
developing mature technologies first. But a system’s physical properties like mutability, along 
with other factors such as time criticality (user risk) and modular interdependency, will drive 
spiral development applicability. And key capabilities may in fact depend upon the least mature 
technologies or even binary requirements. An “open,” or at least elegant, architecture is key to 
forming a basis for independent modular variety; and thorough design specification and 
configuration management accountability is essential for managing the complexity of multiple 
product releases. All amorphous spirals eventually become defined increments. Other well-
known programs have used a spiral approach over their long product life spans, but often have 
successive phasing of their development increments.  
Computational Modeling of Spiral Development 
A computational experimentation approach to investigating evolutionary acquisition 
projects is explored below. This approach integrates theory and practice in a computational tool 
that allows controlled experimentation through simulation. The current work reflects project 
theory (e.g., the theory of constraints and work flows), product development theory (e.g., rework 
impacts and work dependencies), and management (e.g., resource management and 
information theory). Practice is reflected in the model through the use of case studies to build 
and validate the model structures (as described in the literature cited) and the calibration and 
testing using the acquisition projects described above. A computational experimentation 
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approach provides many advantages over pure and benefits from several of the strengths of 
both laboratory and field research. Nissen and Buettner (2004) describe and discuss the 
computational experimentation approach, and Dillard and Nissen (2007) describe its application 
to investigating acquisition projects.  
The system dynamics methodology was applied. System dynamics uses a 
computational experimentation approach to understanding and improving dynamically complex 
systems. The system dynamics perspective focuses on the roles of accumulations and flows, 
feedback, and nonlinear relationships in managerial control. The methodology’s ability to model 
many diverse system components (e.g., work, people, money), processes (e.g., design, 
technology development, quality assurance), and managerial decision-making and actions (e.g., 
forecasting, resource allocation) make it useful for investigating acquisition projects. Forrester 
(1961) develops the methodology's philosophy, and Sterman (2000) specifies the modeling 
process with examples and describes numerous applications. 
Modeling Incremental Development with Multiple Development 
Blocks 
Figure 3 depicts an acquisition project with multiple increments or blocks. Subsequent 
blocks have the same basic information flow, but can also be delayed by the completion of 
phases in previous blocks or constrained by the progress in their own blocks. Importantly, in 
addition to the flow of information downstream through phases (black arrows in Figure 3), 
multiple iteration acquisition also provides opportunities for information to flow upstream, such 
as from User Product Testing in an earlier iteration to Develop Requirements or Advanced 
Development in a subsequent iteration (red vertical arrows in Figure 3).  






Milestones, Iter #1 A1 B1 DRR1 C1 FRP1
Milestones, Iter #2 A2 B2 DRR2 C2 FRP2
Milestones, Iter #3 A3 B3 DRR3 C3 FRP3
Time Periods 
 
Figure 3. Information Flows in an Incremental Acquisition Project 
In the model, the structure of each block is the same, although parameter values are 
varied to reflect different acquisition projects and strategies. For example, all phases include 
start-up work that is not directly applied to generating development products (requirements, 
technologies, component designs, or products). Each phase also includes the requisite review 
work that also does not directly generate product. This is consistent with GAO 
recommendations to manage each development block like an individual project. One impact of 
this loading of each phase with start-up and review work that we suspect has only been 
recognized informally is a significant increase in the total amount of work required to provide a 
given set of requirements to warfighters when multiple development blocks are used. As was 
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shown with our modeling results, this work has a significant impact on project performance that 
may impact the types of projects in which spiral development can be effective.   
Computational modeling of incremental/spiral versus a single-step methodology yields 
results that illustrate our implementation concerns. Spiral development can provide the initial 
increment delivery with some (but not all) requirements satisfied earlier than in single-block 
development. However, spiral development takes more time and costs more to satisfy all 
requirements than single-block development. Spiral development has a high risk of not 
satisfying all requirements by the time single-block development can satisfy all requirements 











Table 1. Performance Comparison of Three Simulated Acquisition Projects 
The causal paths that drive and constrain project performance in spiral development 
pass through multiple types of resources, development processes, and move across both 
development phases and development blocks. They also vary widely for different performance 
measures. This makes the drivers of and constraints on spiral acquisition project performance 
more difficult to identify than those in single-block development projects. Our modeling results 
indicate that spiral development is a significantly different approach to acquisition than single-
block development, and requires different planning, resourcing, and management.  
The concurrent use of multiple development blocks in spiral development significantly 
increases the number of development phases and activities that must be managed and 
coordinated at any given time compared to single-block development. This increases the project 
management needs for successful acquisition in spiral development projects compared to 
single-block projects.  
As in single-block development, progress in spiral development requires the 
identification and understanding of progress bottlenecks. The concurrence and resulting 
complexity of development in spiral projects causes the types and locations of bottlenecks to 
vary widely and be more difficult to identify and address than in single-block development. 
Units of 
Measure Javelin
Base Case - 
traditional
Base Case - 
spiral
Duration to first 
requirement satisfied weeks 471 470 397
Duration to max. 
requirements satisfied weeks 520 518 762
Total development cost $1,000,000 722 719 1,555
Requirements satisfied 
by deadline % 100 91 18
Final requirements 
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Causal paths of the drivers and constraints on project performance and progress 
bottlenecks move from one feature of a project to another as projects evolve. The increased 
dynamics of development in spiral development projects, as compared to single-block 
development, make identifying and addressing causal paths and progress bottlenecks more 
difficult. Progress bottlenecks can cause counterintuitive behavior, such as reductions in project 
cost, by adding resources at a bottleneck. Understanding and exploiting the opportunities 
provided by these behaviors requires a deep understanding of the project structures and 
dynamic interactions that drive and constrain progress. 
Discussion—Recent Views on Balancing Risk and Control 
Boehm’s latest book on software development advocates balancing disciplined and agile 
methods to capitalize on the benefits of both. Discipline is needed as a control mechanism to 
avoid risk, but agility is needed to respond quickly to customer needs. Saying, “One size fits all 
is a myth”; he advocates a balanced approach based upon risk. He also advocates the more 
disciplined, risk-averse approaches for projects that are mission/safety critical, larger in size, 
and have more stable requirements (Boehm, 2004).  
It could be summarized that spiral development was at its inception and is at its 
extension all about risk. Paradoxically, it is an agile method envisioned to reduce risk and, yet, 
can potentially add its own. On the one hand, a spiral or incremental approach allays risk by 
reducing scope to render only the highest priority capabilities with the exclusive use of mature 
technology, and obtains early and continuous feedback from the environment for follow-on 
developments. On the other hand, it introduces concurrency during advanced development and 
adds variety in production, with all their attendant management challenges.  
Observations and Assessments 
Although today’s policy of evolutionary acquisition is prescribed as a development 
methodology, it is actually focused more upon what—not how—we develop. As such, it is about 
doable scope, reducing risk via exclusive use of mature technology.  The Cost As an 
Independent Variable and other requirement-limiting initiatives were earlier attempts to 
accomplish this, by encouraging product performance trades to keep cost estimates fixed. As 
with CAIV, this likely means trading performance requirements for earliest-deploying 
increments. 
Spiral development also seeks to spread out the technical risk over more development 
and process time via incrementing. We have shown with simulation that this can potentially 
improve risk management performance initially, but with higher overall costs and longer 
subsequent development durations, if deliberately deferring known, estimable work.  As such, 
our computational modeling indicates that incremental development costs more and requires 
more time to provide the same requirements than single-step development. With regard to 
project risk, the increased complexity in a project using an incremental or spiral approach 
makes the isolation and effective management of progress bottlenecks more difficult than in 
single-step development. 
The policy change is that spiral development now includes undefinitized increments and 
prescribes incremental development instead of single step development. All amorphous spirals 
will eventually become defined increments—mini-programs. In years past, they have often been 
implemented as sequential, separate, and successive product upgrades (such as the CH-47, 
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UH-60, C-130, B-52 program examples). But current policy expresses these as more 
concurrent, frequent and continuous. Such concurrency adds complexity to development 
models, with attendant risks of over allocation of work, noise, error, duplication, and other 
inefficiencies from work deferral and divided effort in project management organizations. 
Additional oversight, reviews, contracting, testing, etc., will also likely affect transaction costs. If 
all requirements are known and an incremental approach is used, then there is a deliberate 
deferral of work to later increments, and there will be a resultant increase in total development 
costs and durations for these same reasons. 
Recommendations for Practice 
1. Project managers need to be aware of the inherent risks of spiral development and take 
necessary precautions to balance those risks. Many tools and control measures are 
currently developed and available to assist project managers in balancing the risks of 
spiral development, such as technology readiness levels, configuration management, 
technology performance management, real options, project phasing, risk management, 
earned value management and organizational design. 
2. Incremental and spiral development projects provide additional opportunities for 
managing development risk in the project design. These include project-planning 
decisions about the number of development blocks, the requirements and associated 
technologies and design components to be included in specific blocks. This planning 
provides opportunities to anticipate where critical progress bottlenecks may occur and 
design how to best monitor potential bottlenecks and respond to them.  
3. Product attributes may help determine the suitability of spiral development as the best 
methodology. PMs may wish to consider such characteristics as: mutability, time 
criticality, man-rating, modular interdependency, key parameters of capability versus 
range of requirement attainment (i.e., binary vs continuous), and the relative amount of 
concurrency among increments.  
4. Progress bottlenecks in iterative and spiral development often oscillate between process 
constraints (e.g., availability of work due to upstream progress) and resource constraints 
(developer or project management quantities or productivities). Successfully addressing 
a constraining progress bottleneck often shifts the limit on progress to a different location 
in the project. Therefore, a structured and interdisciplinary practice of identifying and 
addressing bottlenecks can improve performance.  
5. Configuration management accountability must be assigned or kept to maintain 
supportability and failure-mode identification and causality and prevent the variety 
generated by spiral development from reducing total product performance. 
Conclusions 
We’ve suggested that a one-size-fits-all methodology for DoD system development may 
not be appropriate, and have offered for consideration several product attributes that might help 
determine the efficacy of the spiral approach. We further suggest that spiral development may 
serve better than single-step development for initial capability when products are mutable, time-
critical, non-maintenance intensive, and have continuous (vs. binary) or uncertain requirements, 
short cycle-times (less knock-on effects), sequentially phased development, and modular 
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independence. In contrast, spiral development may not be appropriate when there are safety or 
man-rating concerns and have attributes opposite to those above.  In particular, PMs should 
understand the nature of their product requirements with regard to their range of attainment and 
relative to key parameters of capability, and vis-à-vis the readiness level of their enabling 
technologies. Some key features may indeed be binary, and others may have significant 
ramifications of partial attainment—such as propagated change across the entire product 
componentry (as in weight reduction), versus a more independent, modular modification. 
Open design standards will not always be incorporable. And product variety will emerge, 
with and without backward compatibility, interoperability, etc. Variety is both an asset (for end-
users) and a liability (for manufacturers, owners and supporters). As such, to compensate for 
product variety, “owners” must “own” the design and emphasize configuration management, 
keeping or assigning responsibility for that function, and maintaining accountability for it. 
Both product specifications as well as risk realization in spiral development move from 
being amorphous to defined. Spiral development has inherent challenges, both strategic and 
tactical, of which PMs must be aware. We’ve highlighted and illustrated them here, as well as 
showing (in our case studies) that spiral development can indeed work—especially for 
technically mature and mutable products with open or elegant architecture. Program Managers 
must be aware of these inherent risks, and take necessary precautions to balance them with 
increased use of tools, such as technology readiness levels, configuration management, 
technical performance measurement, contract incentives, options and phasing, organizational 
design, etc.  
Stability is the quest in all things programmatic—for funding, requirements, design, 
configuration, etc. But in an unstable world, and with the future being necessarily uncertain, the 
tension between control and change is probably unending. PMs do have some tools for coping, 
and being forewarned is being forearmed. PMs are used to concurrency and change, as they 
are largely what make project management what it is—a balancing act. Mechanisms for control 
of risk include project management tools such as configuration management, technical 
performance measurement, earned value management, risk management, etc. Organizational 
and cultural factors such as leadership, trust and accountability play a significant role as well. 
Successful use of these tools to balance control and risk in projects with a high rate of change 
and concurrency is an area for our further study. 
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I. Introduction 
There is mounting evidence of a systematic bias in initial cost estimates of new weapon 
systems. A comprehensive 2006 RAND report on major weapons programs concludes: “[The] 
analysis indicates a systematic bias toward underestimating the costs […] of a weapon system.” 
(Arena 2006, p.1). This bias could threaten our national security. Unrealistically low cost 
estimates result in cost overruns. Fixing cost overruns can impact military readiness. 
Two factors are usually blamed for unrealistically low cost forecasts: bad incentives 
(psychological and political-economic explanations) and bad estimates (methodological 
explanations). The focus of this study is on cost methodology. Our goal is to contribute some 
new ideas to the current literature on cost estimating. This paper applies Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Dillard, Franck & Melese, 2006) to help characterize, 
explain, and ultimately reduce the cost growth that plagues many of today’s major investments 
in military capabilities.  
In business, two costs are typically factored into the “make-or-buy” decision: production 
costs and the costs of managing transactions—“transaction costs” (Coase 1937). Conventional 
estimation techniques tend to focus on production costs (input costs, learning curves, 
economies of scale and scope, etc.). TCE emphasizes another set of costs—primarily the costs 
of coordination and motivation (e.g., search and information costs, decision and contracting 
costs, monitoring and enforcement costs). The primary insight drawn from TCE is that correctly 
estimating the economic production costs of an acquisition is necessary, but not sufficient. The 
choice of contract, organization, and incentives, along with key characteristics of markets and 
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transactions (uncertainty, complexity, asset specificity, frequency, and contestability), must be 
included to obtain reliable cost estimates.  
II. Background 
A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study cites multiple examples of 
weapon systems cost increases. The GAO reports significant unit procurement cost increases 
for several familiar programs. The Joint Strike Fighter saw unit procurement costs increase over 
25%, the Army’s Future Combat Systems over 50%, while the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor 
experienced almost 200% procurement cost overruns (GAO April 2006, p.5).  According to 
another GAO report, “[p]rograms consistently move forward with unrealistic cost […] estimates” 
(GAO Mar 2006, p.1). 
Traditional cost estimating relies on a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). Similar to an 
economist’s production function, a WBS captures the mix of inputs and activities required to 
produce a specific weapon system. Cost estimates developed for each component of the WBS 
are rolled up into an overall estimate for the project. Also, simulation methods can be used to 
capture uncertainty and provide a distribution of possible weapon system costs. Confidence 
intervals applied to this distribution allow cost estimators to report probabilities associated with 
specific ranges of costs for a particular weapon system. However, the confidence in these cost 
estimates depends inter alia on the completeness of the model. TCE offers complementary 
considerations that can impact the costs of major weapon systems, many of which are known 
but not explicitly factored into traditional cost estimates. 
In its recent review of the literature, a RAND study reports, “our analysis […] shows that, 
by and large, the DoD and military departments have underestimated the cost of buying new 
weapon systems” (Arena, 2006).  Virtually all the studies that RAND examined found a 
systematic downward bias in cost estimates. The average cost growth over initial forecasts of 
weapon systems in the development phase ranged from 16 to 26%. Estimates of procurement 
cost growth averaged between 16% and 65%, while total weapon program cost overruns 
averaged between 20 to 54%.  
Cost estimates serve two main functions. First, they serve as an integral part of the 
decision process (cost-benefit or “analysis of alternatives”) used to evaluate military 
investments. Second, they provide the foundation for future defense budgets.   
In the first case, underestimating costs can result in overestimates of the affordable 
quantity of those weapons. It can, therefore, result in too many new weapon program starts and 
excessive investments in those systems. In the second and related case, unrealistically low cost 
estimates result in overly optimistic budgets. Budgets planned on the basis of optimistic cost 
estimates create the illusion of more resources available than actually exist. Since acquisition 
budgets are, in essence, a contract for major weapon systems between the DoD and Congress, 
unrealistic cost estimates can lead to a breach of trust and can poison relations between the 
branches of government. 
One method used to cope with cost overruns is to stretch out programs and cut 
quantities that reach the force. But this sacrifices both current and future operational capability. 
Moreover, spreading fixed costs over fewer units increases unit production costs. The end result 
can be to get less (quantity) for more (money). Another method to pay for cost overruns is 
finding savings in training, operations, and maintenance budgets. But this also risks sacrificing 
current and future operational capability. Reprogramming money from other programs to 
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accommodate cost increases is another approach. But this is a limited remedy (constrained to 
no more than $10M in RDT&E and $20M in Procurement within a program element) and can 
have a negative and cascading effect on other programs’ costs, schedules, and performance. 
The net effect of cost overruns is clear. Short of a bailout from Congress, systematically 
underestimating costs reduces the overall readiness and availability of military forces and 
equipment.  
III. Alternative Explanations of Unrealistic Cost Estimates 
The two factors commonly used to explain “unrealistic cost estimates” are bad incentives 
[due to optimism bias (psychological explanation), or perverse bureaucratic incentives and 
strategic misrepresentation of budgets (political-economic explanation)], and bad estimates 
[imperfect forecasting techniques such as an omitted variable bias (methodological 
explanation)]. It is helpful to examine these factors in the context of the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process used by the DoD to build the nation’s defense 
budget.  
In theory, “Programming” involves a constrained optimization in which investment and 
operating decisions are made to maximize national security subject to fiscal constraints. The 
Secretary of Defense (including OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the DoD 
Comptroller) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have good reasons to prefer accurate 
cost estimates given their global optimization perspective. 
In contrast, given their sub-optimizing perspectives, Combatant Commanders and the 
Military Services (for instance) may be more subject to a bias toward optimism and to perverse 
bureaucratic incentives. Since their primary focus is on performance and military capability, they 
have reason to be less critical (and realistic) in their cost estimates.  
According to McNicol (2005, p. S-4), “statistical analysis is consistent with the well-
established presumption that the military services tend to prefer […] optimistic procurement cost 
estimates.” Program Element Monitors (PEMs), for example, act as advocates for the funding of 
their programs and are responsible for defending those programs throughout the PPBE cycle. 
Since all programs compete for the DoD’s limited resources in a particular funding categories, 
PEMs are well aware that resource allocation is a competitive, constant-sum game. Given their 
job descriptions, PEMs are drawn to lower cost estimates that fit their advocacy agendas, rather 
than to higher cost estimates which make defending their programs more difficult. Moreover, 
since they do not always posses a higher-level perspective, they may not fully appreciate how 
underestimating costs can impact other programs.  
Also, defense companies have good reasons to strategically underestimate costs since 
this makes their programs more attractive to the DoD and the Congress. Here, the logic can be 
interpreted by leveraging one of the hallmarks of TCE, the “fundamental transformation” 
(Williamson, 1996).  The standard example is when ex ante competitive bidding leads to an ex 
post bilateral monopoly situation. The risk is that the winning supplier can lock in the 
Government by making investments in productive assets that are specific to the relationship 
(and that have little value outside the relationship). Once the DoD “buys in,” defense firms can 
lock in their customer by investing in specific assets (e.g., production facilities) that act as 
barriers to entry. While initially advantageous, such investments in specific assets can make it 
prohibitively costly for other companies to compete in subsequent re-bidding of the contract.  
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Given the complexity and uncertainty of many major, technologically advanced weapon 
systems, contracts are necessarily incomplete; i.e., they cannot cover all possible 
contingencies. As a consequence, the incumbent company can be confident it will recoup 
overruns from multiple change-orders (generally for added scope) anticipated over the life of the 
contract. In fact, firms have an incentive to anticipate, but strategically omit, some of these 
elements in the original contract negotiation. Moreover, by strategically hiring workers in key 
Congressional districts, the company can pressure Congress to retain the contract and approve 
compensation for cost overruns to preserve jobs. This combination of strategic behaviors could 
explain some of the systematic bias in initial cost estimates.  
Therefore, cost-estimating techniques must properly anticipate transaction costs such as 
measurement, monitoring, management and re-negotiation costs that can quickly overwhelm 
initial production cost estimates, and which vary according to the nature of the transaction. If 
TCE considerations are not properly anticipated, the result will be that cost-estimators will 
continue their downward bias, and programs will continue to suffer cost overruns. One possible 
means to improve DoD cost estimation is to add transaction cost considerations to the current 
production cost focus in cost-estimating methods.  
In an early attempt to address the factors that lead to biased cost estimates, Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird directed that independent parametric cost estimating be made a part of 
the DoD acquisition process. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) launched an 
independent Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) that began operations in the Spring of 
1972. Eventually, the CAIG was assigned the statutory responsibility of providing independent 
lifecycle cost estimates for all major weapon acquisition programs. According to McNicol (2005), 
“the introduction of independent parametric costing […] had a major, continuing effect on 
reducing procurement cost growth” (p.44).  
Whereas independent cost estimation is an important step that clearly attenuates the 
impact of psychological and political-economic factors, the challenge of developing a more 
comprehensive cost estimating/forecasting methodology remains. Hence, the primary focus of 
this study is to leverage insights from TCE to improve the DoD’s cost estimating/forecasting 
methodology—while recognizing those other causes of bias in cost estimates. 
The next section (IV) reviews traditional cost estimating.  The following section (V) 
reviews some key contributions of Transaction Cost Economics.  Section VI introduces two sets 
of hypotheses relating to DoD cost estimating and describes how insights from TCE might be 
leveraged to improve DoD cost estimation.  The following section (VII) of the paper offers two 
case studies interpreted in the context of TCE.  Section VIII reports our search for evidence of 
transaction costs found within program office budgets and its results.  The concluding section 
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IV. A Brief Review of Cost Estimating in the Department of 
Defense  
In the defense acquisition process, a cost estimate is a prediction or forecast of the cost 
of a program or weapon system.  DoD Instruction 5000.2 requires that both a program office 
estimate and a DoD component cost-analysis estimate be prepared in support of acquisition 
milestone reviews.  For major defense acquisition programs, these estimates are subject to 
review by the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG).  In addition, the CAIG performs 
an independent lifecycle cost estimate for all ACAT ID programs and for certain ACAT IC 
programs.13  
The first step in any cost estimate is to understand the attributes of the program or 
weapon system whose cost is to be estimated. Traditionally, this requires understanding and 
describing the weapon system in terms of physical and technical parameters, operational and 
support concepts, mission requirements, and interfaces with other systems.  Understanding the 
program’s schedule and acquisition profile is also important in developing a cost estimate. The 
goal is to understand the relationship between key weapon system attributes and cost.  For 
programs reviewed by the CAIG, this first step is documented in the Cost Analysis 
Requirements Description (CARD), according to the guidelines in DoD 5000.4-M. 
The second step is to develop an explicit framework for the cost estimate.  The Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) is a hierarchy of weapon system components (hardware, software, 
data, facilities, and services) that attempts to capture economic production cost elements of the 
estimate.  A WBS is developed by subdividing a product, process or service into its major work 
elements and sub-elements.  The highest level, the system WBS, can be organized according 
to the lifecycle phases of a system:  Research & Development, Investment, Operating and 
Support and Disposal.   
Under each phase, a hierarchical structure documents the activities and resources 
required to complete the work associated with that phase. Under the Investment phase, for 
example, the Program WBS encompasses the entire acquisition program, including production 
costs derived from the Contract WBS.  This defines at an aggregated level what is to be 
procured and consists of at least three program levels with associated definitions.  
The Program WBS is used by the Government program manager and contractor to 
develop and extend a Contract WBS.  It contains uniform terminology, definitions, and 
placement in the input-oriented family tree structure.  The contract WBS provides the structure 
for information contained in the Contractor Cost Data Reporting System and other cost 
performance reports and is defined by Military Handbook 881A.  Operating and Support costs 
are organized in a Cost Element Structure in accordance with CAIG guidance, similar to the way 
the WBS is used to organize development or production costs.  An example of a program WBS 
is shown in Figure 1. 
                                                
13 Acquisition Category (ACAT) I is defined by DODI 5000.2 as a major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) that either has a dollar value estimated by the USD(AT&L) to require an eventual total 
expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million in fiscal 
year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant 
dollars, or has been designated of special interest by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).  (DODI 
5000.2, enclosure 2) 
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The level of detail in the WBS evolves as the system is defined and developed 
throughout its lifecycle.   After the program WBS has been approved, the contractor will then 
extend the contract WBS to the appropriate lower levels to better define the complete scope of 
the contract. When integrated with the program WBS, the extended contract provides a 
complete WBS for the acquisition program. Similar to the economists’ production function, the 
WBS reveals all the key inputs required to generate the ultimate output/product. 
 
Figure 1. Program WBS  
(DoD, 2005) 
The next step is to develop a cost estimate.  From the WBS perspective, the total cost of 
the system is obtained by adding up the cost of the individual elements (inputs) in the hierarchy 
across the levels of the WBS.  In order to do this, a cost estimate must be generated for each 
element of the WBS.  The level of detail of the cost estimate depends on the amount of 
information available about the system.  In the early stages of development, there are only 
rough estimates of the system parameters/attributes; therefore, only the highest levels of the 
WBS cost can be estimated using “rough order of magnitude” or “top-down” techniques such as 
analogy and parametric or cost estimating relationships (Blanchard, p. 595).  For example, the 
estimated cost of a new aircraft may be modeled as a function of the weapon system’s key 
inputs/attributes like empty weight, speed, useful load, wing area, power, and landing speed.  
This model estimates the total cost of the aircraft based on a set of parameters independent of 
the WBS structure. 
As more information about the system becomes available, more detailed estimates can 
be developed for lower levels of the WBS using a variety of techniques.  A cost estimate is now 
developed for each element at a given level of the WBS.  For example, the cost of the aircraft 
wing may be estimated using historical data for weight, area, and materials.  While this estimate 
is still based on the parametric technique, the level of detail (a wing) corresponds to a WBS 
element.  As the system matures, the work and resource requirements are sufficiently well 
defined to use ”bottoms up” techniques such as engineering estimates and actual costs 
obtained from prototypes and early production models.  An engineering (production function) 
estimate would be based on the labor, material and overhead required to complete a particular 
element of the WBS.  Obviously, this sort of estimation requires a great deal of information 
about how the system is built—data that is usually not available until the early phases of 
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Figure 2. Cost Estimating Techniques as a Function of Acquisition Phases 
While the WBS framework provides an excellent accounting system for cost estimates, it 
does have a few drawbacks.  First, although it does capture the functional relationship between 
inputs/elements, it does not explicitly show the correlation between cost elements. If there is a 
correlation between cost elements that are assumed independent, this can significantly increase 
the variability of the cost estimate.  Second, the program WBS, as defined by Military Handbook 
881A , is input-oriented, not relationship-oriented; it, therefore, largely overlooks transaction 
costs such as search and information costs, decision and contracting costs, monitoring and 
enforcement costs.  While it might be argued these costs are implicitly considered in the cost 
estimates of the various WBS components, it is likely that most are either underestimated or 
ignored, resulting in overly optimistic cost estimates.  
V. A Brief Review of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
Transaction costs are typically faced by organizations dealing with outside suppliers. 
These include costs associated with: source selection, periodic competition and renegotiation, 
contract management, market structure, and measuring and monitoring performance. TCE 
emphasizes four key characteristics of transactions: complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and 
asset specificity.  Transaction Cost Economics offers an attractive theoretical foundation for 
competitive sourcing decisions in the private sector  (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971; 
1979; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  However, TCE has been less often applied in a government 
setting  (e.g., Pint & Baldwin, 1997; Williamson, 1999; Franck & Melese, 2005; Dillard, Franck & 
Melese, 2006). An underlying objective of TCE (as a field of inquiry) is to improve the design of 
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contracts, organizations, and other governance structures that reduce transaction costs and 
improve the gains from exchange between buyers and sellers.  
TCE predicts parties involved in a defense transaction can benefit from cooperation in 
the buyer-seller relationship and, thereby, generate a surplus that can be shared. For example, 
specific investments14 made by either party that are of real value in the relationship (but perhaps 
of lesser value outside the relationship), can improve efficiency and effectiveness—yielding a 
surplus to be shared between the two parties. However, those parties often have conflicting 
interests; the DoD wants to maximize defense capabilities subject to budget constraints while 
Industry must concern itself with profits. Therefore, both sides have incentives to behave 
opportunistically, and may not necessarily have sufficient motivation to make investments that 
increase the parties’ total gains.  This is particularly true when specific assets are involved and 
information is imperfect and asymmetric. While defense acquisition focuses on production costs, 
it also exposes the organization to costs of managing the outsourcing relationship and to the 
risks of bad (opportunistic) behavior on the part of contracting partners.  
Relationship-specific investments are potentially valuable, but can increase risks to both 
parties in a transaction. Having made a specialized investment, the supplier becomes the most 
efficient provider, and thus has an incentive to look for opportunities to extract more of the 
surplus (perhaps by demanding large increases in contract price to execute change orders). If a 
customer is “locked in,” they may have little recourse. At some point, the relationship is 
transformed from a customer having the choice of a number of competing suppliers to a bi-
lateral monopoly relationship between a single buyer and single seller. At this point, close-in 
bilateral bargaining replaces the impersonal (arms’-length) arrangements of the competitive 
marketplace.   
This entails a basic transformation of the supplier from competitive bidder (prior to 
source selection) to monopoly supplier (after source selection), especially if there are no close 
substitutes for this particular contractor’s products.  Accordingly, the customer is now vulnerable 
to “opportunistic behavior”15 from the contractor. Unforeseen circumstances combined with 
newly inelastic demand may prompt the supplier to extract more of the surplus created in the 
relationship.16 The supplier can exploit its power in the relationship to renegotiate the basic 
agreement to its advantage, otherwise threatening to dissolve the agreement.  The TCE 
literature refers to this as a “hold up.”17  This is one of the key insights TCE can offer to improve 
initial cost estimating. 
If the supplier makes specific investments in assets that are only valuable in the context 
of the relationship with a specific customer, it is vulnerable to any changes in demand from that 
customer. Whereas relation-specific investments can increase the total gains from the defense 
                                                
14 Asset specificity comes in a variety of forms, such as human, location and physical.  These are 
specialized assets that generate high returns within a specific relationship, but offer little value outside it. 
15 Williamson, 1996, defines “opportunism” as “self-interest seeking with guile” 
16 Besanko, Williamson and others have labeled the transition from one prospective buyer and many 
sellers to one buyer and one seller, from competitive market to a one-on-one relationship, as the 
“fundamental transformation.”  This transformation occurs, at least to a certain extent, after the completion 
of every source-selection process. 
17 According to Besanko, “a hold up problem arises when a party in a contractual arrangement exploits 
the other party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets.” 
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acquisition, they also increase risks of opportunistic behavior, through which either party can 
hold up the other. For example, either party can hold up the other by threatening to change the 
terms of the contract (relationship). The danger is that if neither party feels like it can recover the 
full costs of its investment in the relationship/transaction (say through a continuation or renewal 
of the contract), then efficiency-generating specific investments will not be made, resulting in 
higher (unanticipated) costs.18  
A crucial insight of TCE is that different ex ante contracts offer different incentives for 
unproductive ex post bargaining and influence activities. As in game theory, it helps to look 
forward and reason back. If it appears managing the contract (including future competitions 
and/or renegotiations), and evaluating and monitoring performance, are likely to be costly (in 
terms of dollars or disputes, see Pigeon, 2006), then this should be taken into account in the 
original cost estimate, as well as in negotiating the optimal contract type. Table 1 provides a 
simple illustration of the spectrum of contract types that were awarded to the top 10 defense 
contractors over a six-year period. 
Category Cost-Plus (C+) Fixed-Price (FP) Time & Materials 
1. Lockheed Martin 50% 47% 2% 
2. Boeing Co. 27% 70% 2% 
3. Raytheon Co. 38% 58% 3% 
4. Northrop Grumman 42% 50% 2% 
5. General Dynamics 39% 60% 0% 
6. SAIC 52% 21% 15% 
7. Carlyle Group 44% 46% 9% 
8. Newport News Ship 78% 22% 0% 
9. TRW 71% 23% 2% 
10. Computer 
Sciences 
41% 26% 24% 
Table 1. Unclassified Details on the Type of Contracts Won by the Top 10 Contractors on 
Items Outsourced from 1998 to 2003  (Percent of Contracts Awarded that Were Cost-plus, 





                                                
18 Scope for opportunistic behavior may lead to adverse selection, choice of an (ex ante) inferior option 
(or technology), or moral hazard.  Such scope increases risk that if a relationship-specific investment is 
made, the other party will exploit the terms of the contract to “hold them up.” For example, changes in 
specifications are frequently used by contractors as a reason to raise prices and profits under government 
contracts, especially when those investments by the contractor create barriers to the entry of competitors. 
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The more complex and uncertain the transaction, the less complete the statement of 
work (performance work statement (PWS)), then the greater the cost in using FP, and the more 
attractive other contracting options become.19 If the statement of work (PWS) describing the 
desired product, service or project can be specified precisely (IFB), and there are no 
transaction-specific assets involved, then FP type contracts have the benefit of creating cost-
reducing incentives that reward the buyer through ex ante competition between potential 
suppliers. In this case, FP contracting increases contractor incentives to invest in cost reduction, 
and ex ante competition can transfer these cost-savings directly to the buyer.  
In contrast, if the statement of work (PWS) cannot be specified precisely (RFP) or if 
there are significant specific assets involved in the transaction, then some surplus will be eroded 
by the frictions of ex post re-negotiation. This loss from unproductive bargaining activity is part 
of the cost of using a FP contract in this case. Initial cost estimates must take this into account. 
Evidence uncovered by Bajari and Tadelis (1999) reveals that in cases in which a 
transaction is easy to define and measure (i.e., there is little complexity), and only a few minor 
changes are expected (i.e., there is little uncertainty), FP-type contracts tend to dominate. 
However, the more complex the transaction—the more difficult/costly it is to define and measure 
performance, and the more uncertain—the more likely it is a change in the contract will be 
required, the more severe the adversarial relationships experienced ex post when FP contracts 
are chosen. In the latter case, FP-type construction contracts often ended in costly 
renegotiations in which any surplus generated was dissipated in the course of those 
negotiations through unproductive bargaining and influence activities. Thus, complexity and 
uncertainty can force parties to turn away from FP type contracts and towards C+ type 
contracts, and to rely heavily on reputation and other enforcement mechanisms to avoid ex post 
opportunistic behavior that threatens to dissipate the surplus generated by a transaction.  
FP (C+)-type contracts are usually prescribed in later (earlier) stages of product 
development when complexity and uncertainty have (have not) been resolved, and the 
performance work statement is well (not well) defined. Note that while these prescribed 
contracts focus on the characteristics of complexity and uncertainty, apparently overlooked are 
the vital roles of frequency and asset specificity—two key components of TCE.  
In the case of frequency, recurrent transactions often justify the setup costs of 
specialized assets and special governance requirements. They also offer the opportunity to 
apply learning curves (cumulative cost-quantity relationships) to lower production costs, and for 
gradual reductions in uncertainty as both parties learn more about costs. Recurring transactions 
also offer the possibility for the accumulation of goodwill and to build reputations. Strategic 
partnerships and relation-specific investments can increase the benefits to both parties, but they 
                                                
19 An example of the latter is Performance-based Logistics (PBL). The DoD defines PBL as: “an 
integrated acquisition and sustainment strategy for enhancing weapon system capability and readiness, 
where the contractual mechanisms […] include long-term relationships and appropriately structured 
incentives with service providers, both organic and non-organic [to] support the end user’s (warfighter’s) 
objectives.”  Any future investments in PBL could benefit from the multiple insights generated by TCE. 
The decision to outsource weapon system support or to bundle that support with an acquisition and to 
outsource the resulting bundle should weigh production cost savings against the costs and risks 
associated with a critical source of supply being outside the DoD’s control. Those costs and risks are part 
of the transaction costs of outsourcing. TCE indicates outsourcing should only occur if there are positive 
net savings from the external supply relationship. 
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also leave them vulnerable to opportunistic behavior, or a hold up, by the other party.  These 
vulnerabilities can be overcome with well-crafted contracts.  However, contracting (a) involves 
an expenditure of resources, and (b) cannot eliminate all risks associated with opportunistic 
behavior from partners in the transaction.20 
The interaction of opportunism with imperfect and asymmetric information raises the 
possibility of unproductive bargaining/influence or rent-seeking activities.21 The ultimate 
outcome—a balance of productive efforts and unproductive bargaining—depends on the 
characteristics of the transaction, and the incentive structures that govern the parties involved, 
both of which should be factored into initial cost estimates.22  
Where a transaction requires little in the way of specific assets (no hold up problem), 
and involves a product or service that is a) well-defined and homogeneous (IFB), b) easy to 
measure (limited complexity and mild information asymmetry), c) routinely used 
(recurring/frequent purchases), d) not subject to change (limited demand uncertainty), and e) is 
offered by competing suppliers, then there is little room for negotiation (price and performance 
are market-driven), and the marginal benefit of unproductive bargaining is near zero. With little 
room for bargaining over such routine and uncomplicated transactions, substantial production 
and transaction cost stability can be expected in the defense acquisition. Moreover, since 
administrative, incentive, and enforcement costs tend to be low for acquisitions in more 
contestable (competitive) markets, the marginal cost of engaging in the transaction is smaller for 
the DoD, and there exists an incentive for the supplier to invest in the transaction which 
generates opportunities for cost savings.  
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, the easier it is to write an 
explicit contract that covers all relevant contingencies. Moreover, the lower the administrative 
and enforcement costs of that contract, the lower the transaction costs associated with the 
contract. These favorable characteristics should encourage greater productive effort in the 
transaction relationship that, in turn, should contribute to lower costs and better products that 
                                                
20 Costs associated with contracting and the holdup risks remaining are major components of 
“transactions costs.” The process of contracting includes drafting the relevant documents, negotiating a 
version of the contract that is signed, taking actions to enforce that contract, and renegotiating when 
needed. These tasks entail, at minimum, the services of skilled people who develop local knowledge of 
the specific business relationship. There may also be costs associated with litigation, to include both 
direct (e.g., monetary) and indirect (e.g., time delay) components. Furthermore, the basic contract may 
well need considerable administrative and management attention throughout its life, even if full-scale 
renegotiation is not undertaken. Accomplishing these tasks satisfactorily involves expenditure of 
resources and management attention.  Transaction costs (source selection, contract management and 
performance monitoring) can negate a significant portion of the production cost savings involved with 
outsourcing. 
21 The concept of unproductive bargaining and rent-seeking is usually attributed to Tullock (1971; 1993), 
Krueger (1974), and Bhagwati (1980).  A key insight of this literature is that costly bilateral bargaining by 
two parties for a bigger share of the surplus they jointly create can dissipate or even eliminate that surplus 
(Tullock, 1971).  
22 There are other factors as well. For example, Wolff and Reed (2000) find significant evidence that, inter 
alia, the nature of, and access to, assets in a joint venture are important in predicting the balance of 
positive sum (productive) and zero sum (unproductive) outcomes for the participants. 
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benefit both parties. Identifying and understanding the characteristics of the transaction could 
result in more accurate initial cost estimates. 
Alternatively, transactions that involve a non-standard (less homogeneous or highly 
differentiated) product often take place in a bilateral monopoly contractual setting. In this case, 
assuming no specific assets are required, the results depend on the degree of contractual 
ambiguity governing the transaction, as well as on any administrative and enforcement costs 
involved. However, as complexity, uncertainty, and opportunism due to specific investments 
increase, so does the marginal benefit of bargaining or ex post renegotiation. This results in 
both higher transaction costs to measure, monitor, and govern the relationship, as well as an 
increased risk of holdup.  
Productive investment (or effort) involves two types of assets: general and specific. The 
greater the ratio of specific assets to total investments required in the relationship, the greater 
the risk of “holdup.” Moreover, as the threat of bilateral dependency increases, the more 
incomplete the contract (and the lower the penalty for reneging or renegotiation), the lower the 
marginal cost to each party of engaging in unproductive bargaining or renegotiation.  
In the face of incomplete contracting, the holdup problem poses a hazard called 
“maladaptation.” The risk of maladaptation is captured here as an increase in the return to 
unproductive bargaining (for example, charging high prices for any change orders) or strategic 
renegotiation, both of which will increase costs from initial estimates.  Any time ex ante 
competition among suppliers is transformed into an ex post, bilaterally dependent relationship, 
additional governance structures may be required to induce cooperative adaptation.23 The 
challenge is to write a contract with enough precision to encourage desired performance, but 
enough flexibility to allow productive adaptation (adjustments), as circumstances require. But in 
the case of complex transactions and uncertain outcomes, “bounded rationality” precludes 
comprehensive ex ante contracting (contracts are inherently incomplete) which raises the 
possibility of gains from (unproductive) ex post opportunistic renegotiation (e.g., the “holdup” 
problem). Ideally, contracts can be written that specify measures of performance, conflict 
resolution procedures, and conditions under which the contract can be modified, as well as 
provisions for sharing gains from transaction-specific investments.24  
In reality, contracting offers an imperfect solution to opportunism. Additional governance 
mechanisms to settle disputes and adapt to new conditions, ex ante efforts to screen for 
reliability, and provisions to protect transaction-specific investments may well ameliorate these 
problems. However, governance isn’t costless, and such agreements often increase external 
transaction costs; and factoring those considerations into initial cost estimates may well improve 
their accuracy. 
                                                
23 According to Williamson & Masten (1999), the “central problem of economic organization is adaptation” 
(p.xi). The challenge of adaptation is especially acute when ex ante competition leads to ex-post 
monopoly power. Whenever products, services or projects cannot be well specified in advance (due to 
complexity, uncertainty about future conditions, measurement difficulties, etc.), and they involve 
transaction-specific assets, then ex ante competition (e.g. competitive bidding) can lead to ex-post 
monopoly/monopsony power. In turn, this leads to costly adaptation through bilateral bargaining and 
renegotiation.  
24 The implications of this paper suggest that in the case of out-sourcing a transaction in which 
complexity, uncertainty and asset specificity can lead to renegotiation, the choice of governance structure 
will drive productive effort and unproductive bargaining.  
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Ashley & Workman (1986) caution that providing cost incentives in a contract can lead to 
disagreements and spoiled relationships and ex post friction in interpreting the outcomes. In 
fact, avoiding these frictions and reducing the advantages to renegotiation can be accomplished 
by investing in a more complete PWS, and by adopting alternative mechanisms (e.g., reputation 
effects, GOCO25) to reduce the return from opportunistic behavior. TCE suggests that the 
degree of completeness of the PWS and the contract is an optimizing decision by both parties 
that reflects their trade-offs between an ex ante investment in the PWS and contract design, and 
the potential ex post cost of opportunistic renegotiation.  
A principal insight of TCE is that the choice of optimal governance structure depends on 
the characteristics of the transaction. Understanding these characteristics can improve initial 
cost estimates by: a) sorting transactions into categories based on their principal characteristics 
(uncertainty, complexity, asset specificity, contestability and frequency), and b) recognizing the 
costs and consequences of alternative contracts, organizational structures and mechanisms 
that are used to govern those transactions.  
VI. Hypotheses: Possible Contributions of TCE  
Our basic hypothesis is that including TCE considerations (currently an omitted variable) 
can improve cost-estimation methodology by (a) helping to explain the systematic bias observed 
in initial cost estimates, and (b) increasing the general explanatory power of cost estimations. 
That is, we assert the traditional WBS approach may overlook some important variables, 
resulting in initial cost estimates that are (a) not accurate and (b) biased toward being 
unrealistically low. More specifically, the TCE perspective suggests the traditional WBS 
approach indeed overlooks two important variables: Coordination Costs and Motivation Costs. 
Unlike the production function approach of WBS, the TCE approach focuses on these and other 
key components of major weapon system acquisitions.  
However, once production starts, the contractor acquires specialized information and 
assets. Production is often subject to economies of scale and learning curves. The ability to 
shop around becomes restricted. Even though there may be contestability in the original 
design/development stage, bi-lateral monopoly arrangements emerge.  
The system program office’s functions/activities related to monitoring, controlling, 
information-gathering, reporting, decision reviews, enforcement, etc., grow as 
oversight/governance increases with anticipated scale and risk of investments. Though program 
cost data may exist, it does not tell us the whole story on transaction costs. Ideally, we would 
want to find total program costs and contract costs. The difference consists of transaction costs 
(whose main components are coordination and motivation costs). 
Coordination Costs include: i) Search and Information Costs—to identify options and 
acquire timely, accurate and relevant information to evaluate alternatives; ii) Bargaining and 
Decision Costs—to choose an alternative and negotiate and write a contract; and iii) Policing 
and Enforcement Costs—to make payments and measure, monitor, and evaluate performance.  
Motivation Costs include: i) Costs to promote productive effort and incentives to 
encourage investment (better, faster, cheaper) and ii) Costs to deter unproductive bargaining, 
                                                
25 GOCO means “Government Owned, Contractor Operated” production assets. 
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and opportunistic behavior (renegotiation). Factoring TCE cost considerations into cost-
estimating efforts could help the DoD anticipate cost increases in four key areas the GAO 
suggests help explain cost overruns: 
a) constantly changing missions (uncertain demand/quantity/characteristics, bi-lateral 
monopoly, asset specificity, holdup, incomplete contracting);  
b) yearly incremental funding vs. multi-year appropriations (uncertainty, frequency, asset 
specificity, holdup); program instability tends to discourage the investments that play a 
predominant role in moving costs down the learning curve (McNicol, 2005, p.26).  
c) incentive problems (incomplete contracting, asset specificity, holdup); and  
d) insufficient oversight (measurement, monitoring costs). (GAO, 1997)  
A.  Our Hypotheses in More Detail 
The primary focus of this study is to see if insights from TCE can improve DoD cost-
estimation/forecasting techniques. Our inquiry can conceptually be divided into three questions: 
1. Is cost growth a problem?  
Ho: C = Mean Cost Growth Factor = Actual Cost/Forecast Cost = 1 
H1: C > 1 
2. Can cost-estimating models which include TCE insights improve estimated/forecast 
costs?  
Ho: TCE Factors (Complexity, Uncertainty, Asset Specificity, Frequency, etc.) do not 
matter—not significant in explaining cost growth.  
Ha: Alternatively, Forecast Cost = f (Production Costs; Transaction Costs), where 
Production Costs = g (WBS + systems integration), 
Transaction Costs = Coordination Costs + Motivation Costs, 
Coordination Costs = g (Market Contestability Structure; Asset Specificity; 
Frequency; Search & Information tasks, Contracting & 
Enforcement functions, needed Management & Monitoring) 
Motivation Costs = h (Complexity; Uncertainty [of various kinds], Contract Type ...)   
There is a fair amount of evidence about these hypotheses extant. In a sample of 52 
systems, the GAO found that RDT&E costs for programs that started development with mature 
technologies (low complexity/uncertainty) increased by a modest average of around 5%, while 
those with immature technologies (high complexity/uncertainty) experience cost growth on 
average of almost 35%. Similarly, unit costs of procurement rose by less than 1% for programs 
with mature technology, whereas programs that started with immature technologies saw 
increases in unit costs of nearly 27% over initial estimates. As predicted by TCE, Complexity 
and Uncertainty combine to increase contractual hazards. If this is not adequately addressed in 
the contracting phase, then there is a greater likelihood of cost overruns.  
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B.  The Case for the Null Hypotheses  
Broadly stated, the null hypotheses state that incorporating TCE considerations into cost 
estimates will not significantly improve cost-estimating methodology.  In the course of our 
research, we found a surprisingly persuasive case in favor of that proposition.  There are, in 
fact, a number of reasons to be skeptical about our claim that transactions cost factors are 
important in determining costs of major acquisition programs.  A number of plausible assertions 
(some related, some mutually exclusive) underlay such skepticism.  While we find these 
assertions unpersuasive on balance, we cannot dismiss them out of hand. 
1. Asymetric Scope for Opportunistic Behavior in Defense Transactions:  It is more difficult 
to behave opportunistically when involved in a business relationship with a sovereign 
entity.  In that case, the government has more scope for opportunistic behavior, with 
more of the attendant costs falling on the contractors.  And, since the cost estimates 
we’re considering refer primarily to the government’s cost, adding TCE considerations 
considers only minor factors in those costs. 
2. Constancy of TCE factors: Transactions costs are pretty much constant for all major 
acquisition programs. 
a. If (as asserted above) the government has more scope for opportunistic behavior, 
then prospective business partners will take that factor into account when 
considering whether to compete for government business—and build compensation 
for those risks into their bids.  Furthermore, such risk premiums may be fairly 
constant across various types of projects, such as major acquisition programs. 
b. Every program includes an allowance for managing the contractual relationship 
(even though it’s difficult to assign program management overhead completely to 
individual programs.)  Possibly every program has enough of a management 
allowance to manage the program reasonably well.  Put another way, the rule-of-
thumb standard for program management permits individual program managers to 
deal with transactions difficulties well into the range of diminishing returns.  Thus, 
even though transactions costs vary among programs, the standard program 
management allocation is sufficient to obscure those differences. 
c. Continuing with this line of reasoning, a variant of Parkinson’s Law might apply.  That 
is, for some programs the standard budget for program management is too much.  
However, program managers—perceiving (probably accurately)—that more program 
management activity has some marginal return, are strongly inclined to spend all 
their management budgets. 
3. Transactions Cost factors are already accounted for in current cost-estimation methods.  
Measures of risk and complexity (such as technical-readiness indicators) indeed indicate 
the risk and complexity of the project.  Also, however, the presence of those factors also 
offers increased scope for opportunistic behavior, and with it an increase in transactions 
cost.  That is, the transactions cost elements in major program costs are highly 
correlated with variables already considered in standard cost-estimating methods. 
4. It all evens out.  Scope for opportunistic behavior cuts both ways.  Scope for government 
opportunism increases (decreases) contractors’ (government) costs while contractor 
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opportunism increases (decreases) government (contractors’) costs.  On average, it 
might well balance out. 
5. While the effects of TCE considerations are important and a very significant factor in 
program costs, they’re very hard to find (and quantify).  By definition, opportunistic 
behavior involves guile (Williamson, 1996), and those who behave opportunistically have 
already taken pains to conceal their behavior (or assign other motives to it). 
Therefore, while there is a persuasive case of the importance of TCE considerations in 
defense acquisition processes, it’s not clear that one would be immediately led to conclude that 
incorporating TCE principles into cost-estimating models either (a) improves their explanatory 
power or (b) ameliorates the low-ball biases we observe in current practice.  It comes down to a 
matter of resolving competing hypotheses with empirical data.   
C. Testing Our Hypotheses 
As shown in the sections above, our research has uncovered reasons to believe that 
TCE factors are important in DoD acquisition costs, but also that TCE insights may, in fact, not 
improve cost-estimation methodology.  What’s left is to sort out the competing claims using the 
available empirical evidence.   
Our hypothesized set of relationships is depicted in Figure 3 below.  To reject our null 
hypothesis, we need to do empirical tests, and have accordingly sought data on major DoD 
acquisition programs.  For Indicators of High Transactions Costs, we apply the Powell (2002) 
stoplight scheme, with special emphasis on asset specificity.  For observable manifestations of 
cost problems and governance issues during the program, we can consult histories of actual 
programs.  In this report, we use case studies of actual Army acquisition programs compiled by 



















Figure 3.  TCE Issues in Acquisition Projects and Hypothesized Cost 
Manifestations 
We’ve also tracked Program Management Office costs as an indicator of actual 
transactions costs present within any given program.  These are reported in Section VIII. 
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VII. TCE Applied to Two Defense Acquisition Case Studies  
In the some of these authors’ previous work (Dillard, Franck and Melese, 2006), 
fundamentals of transaction cost economics (TCE) were explained and insights from it were 
applied to defense acquisition. TCE asserts that “make-or-buy” decisions for the needs of a firm 
ultimately define its own vertical boundaries. And though much of the body of knowledge thus 
far consists of studies from the private sector, many public concerns engage in outsourcing as 
well. Defense acquisition is one such very large public enterprise and extends from R&D and 
procurement of materiel to purchasing services and sustaining support for its military forces. It is 
unique because, for the most part, the Department of Defense outsources much of what we 
consider to be “acquisition,” commissioning external suppliers to develop products for its internal 
use, unlike many private and public organizations that conduct internal product development for 
themselves and others (or external products/services for others).  TCE acknowledges that 
outsourcing relationships can vary widely in their transactional characteristics and can involve 
extra transaction costs such as measurement, monitoring, and negotiation costs that could 
negate the initially perceived advantages of the buy-versus-make decision. 
TCE is descriptive of economic behavior and recognizes the issue of motivation. It 
assumes that economic actors, such as government acquiring “principals” and defense industry 
supplying “agents,” are motivated to forecast potential outcomes and factor these into contracts. 
The DoD’s general motivation (among, no doubt, other agendas) in its acquisition transactions 
is the seeking of better products, delivered quickly, and with fewest resources (i.e., 
performance, schedule, and cost). But such outsourcing is complicated by other phenomena. 
TCE characteristics of complexity (such as technology) and uncertainty (such as duration of 
work) apply clearly to many Defense acquisition transactions and lead to “incomplete 
contracting,” termed as such from imperfect information and our inability to predict the future.  
These endanger a firm’s ability to protect its own interest throughout the transaction, but 
hopefully are mitigated via governance mechanisms that positively influence a supplier’s 
motivation to comply with the terms of an incomplete contract.  These might be via contract 
incentives, enforcement mechanisms, monitoring methods, etc. 
Another often encountered but heretofore largely unrecognized TCE characteristic (at 
least in Defense acquisition literature) is that of asset specificity—a situation in which a supplier 
“locks-in” the government by making investments in productive assets that are specific to the 
transaction and have little value elsewhere. Asset specificity can be related to physical capital 
equipment, human skills, facility location, and even brand equity (reputation). While needed to 
accomplish the work at hand, the result of these investments form barriers to competitive entry 
and can also result in a “holdup.” A holdup is a problem that occurs when, for example, the 
agent in a contract has a specific asset with concerns that, after its investment, may have to 
accept worse terms than anticipated. Conversely, the principal has become increasingly 
dependent on the agent during his investment in the specific assets. It has become fairly typical 
in the DoD acquisition experience: with development contracts that are necessarily incomplete, 
sometimes won by low bids, and changes in contract scope later arise. The contractor can 
anticipate higher returns from “holding up” the government for such contract modifications. And 
while the government might have the sovereign right to terminate the contract for convenience, 
it will still be left with the demand for the product or service that was sought. Such has been the 
case in several programs observed by these authors, along with excursions into contract type 
and structure as options for obtaining desired outcomes.  
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Acquisition Case Examples 
One of the authors was fortunate to have served as the Assistant Project Manager for 
Research & Development in two separate major defense acquisition programs that were 
offspring of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiatives. These programs 
are described below to illustrate TCE challenges and uses of governance mechanisms. 
The Javelin Project 
The Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System—Medium (AAWS-M), later to become the 
Javelin, began in 1982 as the DARPA program “Tank Breaker.”26  This was a one-year 
technology demonstration to explore various missile-guidance solutions for a medium range 
(i.e., 1-2000 meters) man-portable, anti-tank weapon. It was spawned as a result of deficiencies 
that were immediately apparent in the recently fielded DRAGON weapon system, which had 
replaced the M67 90mm recoilless rifle in the late 1970s.  The DRAGON was a wire-guided, 
line-of-sight missile that was developed in response to the 1960s appearance of the Soviet AT-3 
SAGGER, a manpack missile carried in a fiberglass "suitcase." In 1978, a Mission Need 
Statement highlighted deficiencies of the DRAGON, such as its poor reliability, limited 
range/lethality, and the difficulty for gunners to aim and track targets. The envisioned 
replacement was to satisfy a substantial increase in requirements—namely: range, lethality, 
reduced weight, and the ability to launch from enclosures (such as buildings or field-fortified 
bunkers). Several years were spent finalizing these requirements until the joint Army and Marine 
Corps operational requirements document was formally approved in 1986-88. A competitive fly-
off program, which would now be called the “Technology Development phase,” was conducted 
in 1987-1989 to select from three teams of contractors and critical technologies: a laser-beam 
rider led by Ford Aerospace, a fiber-optic guidance effort led by Hughes, and a forward-looking 
infrared (FLIR) thermal imaging sensor effort from Texas Instruments and Martin-Marietta. 
Clearly, the down-selection to one team was of great incentive to the participants, for it meant 
the likely follow-on award of the advanced development phase as well as production 
opportunities.  Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contracts were used with each of the three teams. 
Such is typical for “proof-of-principle” type R&D efforts in which knowledge work is risky for the 
contractor, and there are few discrete parameters to incentivize. All three teams were 
successful in flying missiles to their targets, but the only technology that enabled a true fire-and-
forget capability (which was not a specified requirement) was the FLIR approach. Though this 
approach was recognized to be the most technically immature and risky, the desire for fire-and-
forget survivability resulted in the FLIR team being awarded a contract for a three-year 
advanced-development phase.   
In June of 1989, a full-scale development (now called System Development and 
Demonstration) contract was awarded for the Javelin program. The program was structured to 
encourage competition and give incentives for the accomplishment of all of the system 
objectives of the Department of Defense. First of all, the contract would be awarded to a team of 
two partnering firms that would combine their efforts for development of the system and split 
apart to compete during the production phase. The initial low-rate production was envisioned to 
be a competitive split awarded annually with a fifty/fifty or sixty/forty split between partners, via 
the use of fixed-price contracts. Such contracts are also typical for production efforts in which 
the design (uncertainty and complexity) is presumed to have evolved to a point of stability. At 
                                                
26 DTIC reports summarizing this DARPA effort are available at 
http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA122234. 
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the macro level, the office of the Secretary of Defense viewed the program as acceptable with 
regard to risk because of its 27-month technology development phase and subsequent 36-
month plan for full-scale development.  
During the technology-development phase, all three contractor teams had scored over 
62% hits with at least ten missile shots each in a variety of environments and operational 
settings. The full-scale development contract request for proposal was written for a cost-plus-
incentive-fee type of contract, but the winning proposal was presented with a “no-fee” bid. This 
surprised the Government, which nevertheless awarded a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, 
giving incentives for key performance parameters such as weight and warhead performance 
that it considered technically risky. The total value of the contract was $169.7 million, the 
amount bid by the winning team of Texas Instruments and Martin-Marietta. Meanwhile, the 
Government privately conducted its own should-cost estimate and budgeted $263 million for the 
36-month long development effort. In addition, the Government ran its own alternate warhead 
technology development program with CMS acting as the contractor.  
The two-partner Joint Venture in full-scale development was also free to maximize 
competition at the subcontractor level. In their make-versus-buy decision, Texas Instruments 
elected to make the focal plane array for both of its uses in the command launch unit and in the 
missile. They had made these devises for other programs but not in these two distinct 
configurations. Their physical-specific assets were located at the manufacturing facility in 
Lewisville, Texas, largely for the promise of the Javelin system’s later production. They had 
expanded that facility for the Javelin program in anticipation of producing some 58,000 to 
70,000 missiles and 5,000 command launch units (the thermal imaging sighting device).  
Each missile focal plane array was forecasted to be approximately 15% of the missile's 
cost (or about $12,000 for each of the focal plane arrays) based upon a $90,000 “cost per kill” 
program objective. Focal plane array technology was still immature and would be gauged today 
at approximately technology readiness level five (on a 1-9 scale), despite its successful 
technology development phase results. It was always recognized as technologically risky, so the 
Government partially funded other companies that could produce these devices. In 1991, the 
only five known FPA makers in the world were Rockwell International, Loral, Santa Barbara 
Research Corporation, Sofradir (a French firm), and Texas Instruments.  
As an additional gauge of technological maturity, a baseline test was mandated at the 
second milestone upon the decision to launch the Javelin program into full-scale development. 
That test would pit the immature focal plane array technology against existing TOW and 
DRAGON (legacy systems) missile optics. Results of this test showed the Javelin's immature 
focal plane arrays to be substantially better in performance than the DRAGON and almost as 
good or as good as the larger TOW anti-tank missile system.  
Approximately 18 months after the full-scale development phase contract award, the 
Javelin project manager called for Defense Acquisition Board, forecasting a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach of cost and scheduling thresholds in this ACAT 1-D program. Several reasons were 
cited, not the least of which was that the focal plane array production yield was not as 
predicted—and all of the devices were below specification. The cost growth was found 
throughout the various elements of the project, as illustrated in Table 2 below. 
Over the next year, the program was given a new baseline with many different revised 
program estimates climbing from 36 months duration and $298 million in cost, to 48 months 
duration and $372 million in cost, and then to 54 months and $420 million for the total cost and 
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duration of this phase. In addition to the rebaselining, the Government renegotiated its cost-
plus-incentive-fee contract with the joint venture and established cost sharing for any 
expenditure above $372 million, all the way to the contract ceiling of $420 million.  
This was a very unique move, to re-establish governance mechanisms in the middle of a 
transaction.  But the contractor’s “failure to perform,” although in an uncertain R&D environment, 
justified the new relationship. At 30 months after contract award, the program was finally 
formally re-baselined to be 54 months and $443 million, with 50/50 JV and Government cost-
sharing ratio above that amount. 
In October of 1991 at a meeting in the Lewisville, Texas, focal plane array manufacturing 
facility, the “divorce” finally came for TI as prime vendor of the missile focal plane array. Texas 
Instruments had failed to achieve specification for the item by the target date, but they still had a 
stake in the program as one of the principal players on the joint venture team.  
About this same time, the Government discovered a focal plane array “holding account” 
that had been proposed and was awarded in scope of the contract. Essentially, this holding 
account accrued charges to the Government for every non-specification compliant focal plane 
array that TI had produced. The cumulative total was to be billed all at once, when they 
achieved the first specification-compliant focal plane array.  
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Table 2. Early 1991 Summary of Javelin Program Component Cost Growth 
Since the contract was cost-reimbursable in form, the Government was likely to have to 
pay for all costs of development regardless of spec compliance, but the way the billing 
transpired took the Government by surprise.  Fortunately, dual sourcing of critical components is 
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a fundamental element in acquisition strategy development and risk mitigation. And the 
selection of Hughes’s Santa Barbara Research Corporation as a sub-contractor to the other 
Joint Venture partner, Martin-Marietta, saved the Javelin program. That small company had 
discovered a process to produce near-perfect focal plane arrays repeatably, and they were 
accelerated to provide these for the program. The investment was, in hindsight, a “real option” 
that was exercised mid-project with great return on investment. 
Within that year, the program was restructured, given the new baseline, and finished 
largely within its new parameters. The additional 18 months added to the 36-month phase 
helped resolve the uncertainties and complexities of system development without additional 
schedule slippage. Later, production quantities were slashed in half as the Defense Department 
drew down its forces from 1991-2000, and the acquisition strategy to split apart the joint venture 
and compete them in production was not fulfilled. Benefits of a split production no longer able to 
be realized, the JV remained intact as the producing entity. Today Javelin is seen as a 
successful weapon system, is being used in Iraq and Afghanistan and has been through several 
full-rate production contract periods.  
The Army Tactical Missile System Project 
The Army Tactical Missile System also started out as a DARPA program, called Assault 
Breaker, in the 1970s. The system's prime contractor for the vehicle, the Multiple Launch Rocket 
System, or MLRS, was LTV Corporation. With significant asset specificity from their platform 
efforts (and physical & knowledge capital), they bid upon and won two separate contracts for the 
Army Tactical Missile System. These were both firm-fixed-price: one for the invention of the 
missile and one for its integration into the platform. The program was a 48-month full-scale 
development effort that was begun in 1986 and ended in 1990.  In stark contrast to the Javelin 
program, fixed-price contracts were deemed appropriate to this transaction because of the 
technology maturity in the ATACMS project, relative to most others, where CPIF contracts are 
common—as depicted in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Programs Using Different Contract Types and 
Technology Readiness Levels 
Also, this program was structured to have production options, should the full-scale 
development phase be successful. Thus, there were incentives for “performance” on both the 
Government and the contractor side: LTV was given an incentive to succeed in the development 
of the missile and its integration in order to win the follow-on low- and full-rate production 
contracts. And likewise, the Government had an “incentive” to conduct reviews and make 
decisions to award production by November of 1990. This was to preserve production-pricing 
options that the contractor had been asked to provide in his proposal for advanced 
development. The price reduction from these options, if exercised before expiration, was on the 
order of 40%. As it turned out, the production options were exercised within a week of their 
expiration, saving the Government several hundred thousand dollars per missile on the eve of 
the first Persian Gulf War.  
These cases may only serve to illustrate several recognized economic behaviors within 
the context of large acquisition transactions. As an adjunct to our earlier work (Dillard, Franck & 
Melese, 2006), they show how complexity and uncertainty of development projects relate to 
contract type and governance mechanisms. Importantly, they also convey the need to constrain 
scope in order to control cost and schedule. In and of themselves, they cannot necessarily 
prove cause and effect, but rather reveal the importance of understanding key characteristics of 
a transaction early in the cost-estimation process in order to capture relevant transaction cost 
elements that can impact the ultimate price paid for major weapon systems. 
TCE Assessment of the Case Studies 
As indicated in Section VI above, we looked for observable effects of TCE factors in 
actual DoD acquisition programs.  This section analyzes the two cases (Javelin and ATACMS) 
described above in terms of: (1) ex ante indicators of transactions costs, (2) manifestations of 
motivation and coordination problems in the course of the program, and (3) cost overruns 
observable at program completion. 
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The ex ante indicators come from a scheme proposed by Powell (2002) and augmented 
by Franck (2004).  The indicators of transaction costs considered here are asset specificity, 
complexity, length of the relationship (or transaction), time sensitivity of performance, and 
operational significance of performance.   
TCE Indicator Assessment Comments 
Asset Specificity YELLOW TI’s insourcing of FPA production.  
Mitigated by planned dual-source 
production, and steps to diversify FPA 
sources. 
Complexity RED Fire-and-forget feature added  
significantly to complexity. 
Length of 
Relationship 
YELLOW Technical immaturity necessitated a 
lengthy development program. 
Time Sensitivity YELLOW Green after end of Cold War. 
Operational 
Significance 
YELLOW Green after end of Cold War  
Table 4.  Ex Ante Assessment of Javelin Development Program 
TCE Indicator Assessment Comments 
Asset Specificity RED Pre-existing condition.  Contractor’s 
previous experience with launch 
vehicle.  Production option proved a 
hedge for the contractor. 
Complexity GREEN Technology generally mature 
Length of 
Relationship 
GREEN Advanced Development Phase 
only. 
Time Sensitivity YELLOW Green after end of Cold War 
Operational 
Significance 
YELLOW Green after end of Cold War 
Table 5. Ex Ante Assessment of ATACMS Development Program 
(Powell (2002), Franck (2004) and authors’ assessments) 
The relative immaturity of Javelin technologies necessitated a long and complex 
transaction.  Worth noting is that a government decision, in favor of the fire-and-forget feature, 
increased these difficulties.27  By contrast, the ATACMS development program was based 
largely on proven technologies.  For both development programs, Time Sensitivity and 
Operational Significance decreased considerably with the end of the Cold War.  Both ATACMS 
and Javelin were designed to counter massive Warsaw Pact mechanized offensives, at the 
                                                
27 We have no basis to question (from an ex ante perspective) the Army’s decision to opt for a less 
mature technology in pursuit of significantly higher performance.  However, we believe consideration of 
the increase in scope for opportunistic behavior in the program should be considered when making such 
decisions. 
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operational and tactical levels respectively.  With the end of the Cold War, both priority 
(operational significance) and urgency (time sensitivity) lessened accordingly.  Arguably, this 
development significantly strengthened the government’s position in the negotiations associated 
with governance of both programs. 
Observable manifestations of motivation and coordination difficulties during the course of 
the project are gleaned from the narratives above.  For Javelin, there were a number of 
difficulties apparent throughout the problem, predictable from a TCE perspective.  These 
included the following. 
 The winning bid clearly seems to have been a buy-in.  The contracting team’s initial 
estimate was significantly below the government’s estimate of most likely program cost.  
From a TCE perspective, this can be interpreted as setting the stage for opportunistic 
behavior on behalf of the contractors. 
 One member (Texas Instruments) of the development team (the Joint Venture) chose to 
make the Focal Plane Arrays (FPAs) within firm boundaries.  The FPAs were arguably 
the critical, and pacing, element of the Javelin development program.  Whether this 
indicates opportunistic behavior by TI, or simply a miscalculation, is difficult to assess.  
Worth noting, however, is that the Army took steps toward developing an alternate 
source.  A TCE perspective would indicate the government perceived some scope for 
opportunistic behavior; a risk-management perspective would interpret this as a risk 
reduction measure.  
 There was steady, and cumulatively very significant, cost growth throughout the 
program.  As a result, the Program Manager reported breaches of criteria for both cost 
and schedule—relatively early during the program.   
 Other cost-growth problems appeared.  For example, the bill for FPA’s not meeting 
specifications was presented to the government without previous notice.  This turned out 
to be an unpleasant surprise.  Whether this was simply a communications difficulty or 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the Joint Venture is not clear. 
 Consequently, governance of the transaction became significantly more complicated.  
Major changes to program structure were negotiated as part of a “re-baselining.”  
Additionally, the contract’s incentive structure was changed— from a cost-plus to a risk-
sharing form. 
Overall, there was significant cost growth (over 150%) in the Javelin development 
program. 
For ATACMS, the only major indicator of transactions cost-related difficulties was asset 
specificity.  LTV’s previous experience with the launch vehicle (the MLRS) gave it a substantial 
advantage over alternate vendors—making this an excellent example of what can happen with 
asset specificity.  However, the program was executed on schedule and within the original cost 
estimate.  It’s possible that LTV had no incentive to low-ball its original estimate with its already 
significant advantages over potential competitors based on asset specificity.   
There was arguably evidence of opportunistic behavior on the part of the government.   
 A program based on a fixed-price contract was extended by three months (from 48 to 
51) simply because of governmental convenience—without compensation to the 
contractor.   
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 Also, the government was slow to exercise its option to order the start of production, and 
would likely have delayed its decision further were it not for the imminent expiration of a 
favorable price option in the contract.  It’s reasonable to suppose that this part of the 
contract served to head off opportunistic behavior on the part of the government. 
Some observations are useful at this point.  First, the indicators of high transactions 
costs should be considered in toto.  As we’ve stated above, there are excellent reasons to 
believe that asset specificity is particularly important in creating conditions for opportunistic 
behavior in a transaction.  However, in the case of ATACMS, there appears to have been no 
bad behavior that added significantly to program outcomes (cost, schedule or performance), 
despite the RED assessment for asset specificity. 
Second, opportunistic behavior in transactions is a question of motives, and it’s difficult 
to sort out motives in case narratives.  For example, was the contractors’ original estimate for 
Javelin development a buy-in or a manifestation of the Winner’s Curse?  Was the unexpected 
presentation of the bill for substandard Javelin FPAs a matter of opportunistic behavior (self-
interest seeking with guile) or simply an administrative failure to communicate?  Without 
considerably more information that’s available in the public record, it’s difficult to sort out such 
matters.28 
However, finally, there is good evidence that TCE perspectives offer significant 
explanatory power in analyzing program outcomes—including cost.  Based on this sample of 
two, however, it’s explanation of the qualitative sort.  Our next section (VIII) explores 
quantitative evidence of transactions costs at a macro level. 
VIII. Program Office Costs and TCE 
In order to test our hypothesis that the traditional WBS approach may overlook some 
important variables resulting in unrealistically low initial cost estimates, we would have to 
compare cost estimates for systems that included significant transaction costs with those of 
systems that did not include significant transaction costs.  The first problem, then, was to find a 
way to measure transaction costs in acquisition programs.  We proposed using Program 
Management Office (PMO) costs as a proxy measure of the amount of transaction costs present 
in an acquisition program. 
We started by examining information from the Consolidated Acquisition Reporting 
System (CARS) to find evidence of transaction costs.  The information is contained in the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Business Information Laboratory (BIL) database managed 
by OUSD(AT&L) Acquisition Resources and Analysis.  It includes information on contract 
performance and program cost from a variety of reports, such as Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SAR) and Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES), as well as other reports.  
Unfortunately, these reports do not contain the level of detail necessary to identify transaction 
costs.  Specifically, there was no information on the amount of resources estimated or used for 
the PMO. 
Instead, we looked at the Budget Item Justification sheets in the OSD budget 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budgetindex.html).  While there is some information on 
PMO costs in these documents, it is reported inconsistently or not at all (depending on the 
                                                
28 The obvious incentives to conceal the motives underlying self-seeking behavior add to this difficulty. 
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program and year).  For example, the Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV)29 reported Program Office costs in exhibit R-3 under “Support and Management 
Organizations” for FY97 and FY98, but discontinued reporting that line-item in subsequent 
years.  Note also that what is included in PMO costs is not a complete picture of the resources 
used, since military salaries are excluded and civilian salaries may or may not be included 
depending on how they are funded. 
The AAAV reported costs for the more general category “Support and Management” for 
FY97 – FY06, but the line-items included in this category varied from year to year.  If we expand 
our proxy measure to the “Support and Management” category, we are including, in addition to 
Program Office costs, other support contracts, miscellaneous contracts and government labs, 
as well as modeling and simulation.  As the program developed, this category grew to include 
integrated logistics support, training devices and simulators, tech data and publications 
development and support equipment development.  Clearly, this category includes costs that 
should not be considered transaction costs, such as training devices and simulators and tech 
data and publications.  More importantly, what is and is not included in the category varies over 
time, making the identification of transaction costs difficult on a case-by-case basis and nearly 
impossible on a large scale. 
A more significant problem we encountered is that the information reported in CARS 
does not necessarily track to the information reported for the same program in the OSD budget.  
This problem was confirmed by OUSD(AT&L) Acquisition Resources and Analysis and is an 
issue they have been working on for over 3 years and have documented in a Comparison 
Report that identifies potential FY07 funding disconnects between the OUSD(Comptroller) 
Budget Justification Materials and the OUSD(AT&L) Draft Selected Acquisition Reports.   
Contributing to the difficulty of identifying program transaction costs is the fact that 
program managers only report information on a program's major contracts for RDT&E, 
procurement, military construction, and acquisition-related operation and maintenance.  
According to the CARS Users’ Guide, SAR Section 15 (Contract Information) only includes the 
six largest, currently active contracts (excludes subcontracts) that exceed $40 million in then-
year dollars.  For a given reporting quarter, these are generally the same contracts reporting in 
Section 6 (Program Background Data) of the DAES.  If a previously reported contract is over 
90% complete, it will no longer be reported.  So, tracking Budget at Completion (BAC) and 
Estimate at Completion (EAC) at the program level involves moving targets as the individual 
contracts are completed and drop out of the CARS.  Also, the total amount shown for the 
program in the OSD budget may include other contracts not reported in CARS. 
Due to the data difficulties described above, we were unable to test our first hypothesis 
using our selected proxy measure for transaction costs.  In fact, it seems measuring transaction 
costs directly or by proxy from the existing data bases may not be possible.   
As an alternative, we could always infer that differences due to complexity or technology 
maturity imply higher transaction costs and use this categorization to compare programs with 
assumed high transaction costs to programs with assumed low transaction costs.  For example, 
Brown, Flowe and Hamel define transaction costs as costs associated with interdependent 
activities, and they suggest that joint programs (involving two or more services) would have 
higher transaction costs than single-service programs.  Certainly, the coordination costs could 
                                                
29 The name of this program changed to Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) in FY03. 
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be assumed to be higher for joint programs.  When they examined 84 DoD weapon system 
programs (45 joint and 39 single) in terms of number and type of programmatic breaches, they 
found that joint programs were statistically more likely to experience breaches in schedule, 
research development testing and evaluation costs and unit costs.  If we assume joint programs 
have higher transactions costs, then their findings may suggest that programs with higher 
transactions costs require distinct measures and metrics to improve cost and schedule 
estimates. 
IX. Summary and Policy Recommendations  
Developing accurate cost forecasts is essential for future budgeting and to improving 
defense decision-making. This paper has documented a growing body of evidence of a 
systematic downward bias in initial cost estimates for major weapon systems. An important 
consequence of these forecasting difficulties is that “major weapon systems […] are 
experiencing recurring problems with cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance 
shortfalls”  (GAO, 2006, March, p.1). Runaway costs threaten to weaken the armed forces. 
Cash-flow shortfalls lead to quantity reductions, reprogramming, and funding reductions for 
other programs. These cost increases mean that the DoD cannot produce as many weapons as 
intended nor deliver those weapons to the warfighter when promised. Cost overruns squeeze 
existing and competing programs. Higher price tags mean that fewer of those weapons end up 
in the hands of soldiers, and that options on new weapons cannot be exercised without breaking 
the budget.  
Two factors are usually blamed for unrealistically low cost forecasts: bad incentives 
(psychological and political-economic explanations) and bad estimates (methodological 
explanations). The focus of this paper is on cost methodology. The case studies suggest that 
inclusion of transaction costs as a recognized component of total cost adds to explanatory and 
forecasting power of cost-estimation methods.  However, we also found that current data bases 
are not well structured for identifying the transaction costs of major acquisition programs—for a 
number of reasons. 
What can be done to reduce actual costs/expenditures?  TCE suggests identifying 
strategies to cut coordination and motivation costs. Specific recommendations to cut 
Coordination and Motivation Costs would include the following: 
a. Reducing Complexity: Investing in a more complete contract (increasing search and 
information costs) and the use of more mature technologies. 
b. Reducing Uncertainty through multi-year contracts (demand uncertainty); investing in 
more complete contracts (relationship uncertainty).  
c. Increasing measurement and monitoring to reduce information asymmetries (and 
associated risks).  
d. Putting credible deterrents to bad behavior in place—such as penalty clauses, 
warranties and bonding; using multi-year contracts to gather information and reward 
good reputations.  
e. Mitigating the uncertainties introduced by asset specificity through careful use of 
incentives, proper bundling of goods and services and GOCO assets. 
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f. Increasing contestability of government contracts through government-controlled 
standby capacity (threat of vertical integration), second sourcing, and preservation of 
real options (threat of entry of competing suppliers).  
That said, however, the primary insight drawn from TCE is that correctly estimating 
production costs is necessary, but not sufficient. The choice of contract, organization, and 
incentives—along with key characteristics of markets and transactions (uncertainty, complexity, 
asset specificity, frequency, and contestability)—must be included to obtain reliable cost 
estimates. Leveraging TCE in this way could help characterize, explain, forecast, and ultimately 
reduce the cost growth that plagues many of today’s major investments in military capabilities. 
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Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has an annual budget approaching a half trillion 
dollars. A significant portion of that budget is either directly or indirectly affected by 
Information Technology (IT) Infrastructure modernization initiatives. Nationally, investment in 
IT infrastructure modernization is about $250 Billion a year, spanning approximately 175,000 
projects. Unfortunately, various studies indicate that only 28% are completed on time and on 
budget—with the number dropping to around 9% for larger companies in 1994, including 
government programs. By 1998, these numbers had improved, with success rates for larger 
companies, for example, up to 24%. But, only small organizations have managed to 
implement more than half of their applications into one integrated system (Smith, 2000; 
Johnson, 1999, December; Keller, 2006, May 29). 
The factors driving these numbers are myriad—and include the sheer scope and 
complexity of infrastructure modernization programs, unstable/undefined requirements, 
unstable funding, moving target objectives, and evolving threats. As a result, the costs of 
integration complexity increase exponentially, but yet are almost invariably under estimated. 
These challenges notwithstanding, one Gartner study asserts that IT asset productivity will 
drive market capitalization (Gartner, 2002, July).  
Given the scope, importance and complexity of these projects, reliable, cost-
effective, early warning indicators of problems are essential. Yet, classical investment theory 
provides little guidance for dealing with public-sector investment. The result is a general 
absence of computationally efficient, predictive models applicable to the analysis of those 
investments.  
However, there is progress on several fronts. At the micro level, Earned Value 
Management is gaining acceptance.  But, more comprehensive, flexible methods can be 
developed by viewing a Firm as an engineered artifact whose responses to a range of inputs 
can be characterized in terms of duration, mass, time, stability, and location. (By way of 
terminology, a “Firm” refers to both public and private organizations with investment 
responsibilities.)  
How well a Firm executes an investment depends largely on how well it acquires and 
uses information.  The efficiency of that use provides a basis for pricing the value of a Firm, 
independent of valuations derived from equity markets.  
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For the private sector, Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM) models provide 
valuation tools, of which the Black-Scholes equation is the most well known and successful 
example. These models are based on the observation that equity markets have properties 
that can be analyzed using models based on the “Law of Large Numbers.”  
Unfortunately, the conditions enabling the quantitative analysis of private-sector 
investments do not apply in the public sector because there is no market for public-sector 
goods. Nonetheless, all Firms, regardless of whether they are in the private or public sector, 
must respond to a range of random (external and internal) perturbations. The responses can 
be accurately modeled using mathematical processes based on the “Law of Large 
Numbers.” In particular, the operation of a Firm can be modeled as a stochastic feedback 
system using algorithms from Information Theory and System Control Theory.  
IT Infrastructure Investments—in the Public Sector 
Private equity markets provide a profit incentive to resolve uncertainty, which has as 
one of its effects the rapid aggregation of information from large numbers of participants.  In 
general, the larger and more diverse the number of sources, the more accurate is a Firm’s 
valuation. (With the Web and the Internet dramatically lowering the cost of information, 
similar aggregation effects are occurring in the news media, entertainment, and politics, as 
evidenced by the impact of Napster, U-Tube, Google, etc.) 
Unfortunately, the Public Sector lacks an incentive mechanism and usually consists 
of a few service/product providers, and generally only one customer—the government. 
(Markets with few sellers and buyers are more suited to analysis by Game Theory.) 
Despite these differences, private and public sectors share a range of common 
concerns, especially for large scale IT modernization projects. Among these is a compelling 
need to answer questions such as: 
 What level of uncertainty surrounds cost/schedule estimates, especially at the onset 
of a major investment in IT infra-structure? 
 Under what conditions will risk/uncertainty decline or rise? And at what rate? 
 How can risk/uncertainty concerning cost, schedule, and scope be identified in a 
timely manner, quantified, and mitigated? 
 How can a Firm best respond to disruptions to supply, budget and schedule or to the 
introduction of new technologies by competitors? 
 At what point in a project-development cycle will estimates of cost, schedule, and 
scope become both stable and credible? 
 How can confidence levels in cost and schedule estimates be measured?  
 Are project requirements under active management sufficiently stable to ensure 
project completion on time and within budget? 
 What (quantitative) models can be used to determine the maximum effective rate of 
investment for public-sector projects? 
 How can an optimal investment portfolio be constructed? 
 And, how is such a portfolio optimality measured? 
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 How do the performance measures such as requirements stability, work package 
completion, rework rates and resolution rates for major and minor issues correlate 
with each other? 
 Is there a level of disruption or tipping point to the schedule, cost, and resource 
allocations beyond which a project cannot recover? 
Developing a quantitative framework capable of answering these questions is the 
objective of the paper. The strategy is to employ key parameters governing the efficiency of 
a Firm’s operation in terms of observable, easy-to-compute variables in mathematical 
models of the underlying process dynamics.  
Portfolio Investment Management—An Overview 
Large-scale Defense infrastructure modernization programs such as Global Combat 
Support have complex inter-dependencies and long-time horizons that render fully informed 
investment decisions difficult to achieve before substantial, and unrecoverable, resources 
are committed. However complex these decisions, they, nonetheless, can be decomposed 




These primary parameters define the value of investment options available to a Firm, 
regardless of whether it is in the public or private sector. Unfortunately, algorithms capable 
of modeling the effects of these variables are relatively few, especially for the uncertainty 
and irreversibility of investment decisions (Dixit & Pyndik, 1994, p. 211).  For large-scale 
Information Technology (IT) modernization programs, there are at least three sources of 
uncertainty—and, thus, risk  
 The technical complexity  
 The programmatic complexity of integrating software intensive systems 
 The absence of accurate cost information at the onset of major systems/ software 
programs  
Software-intensive systems are particularly sensitive to the systematic under-
estimation of risk, primarily because the level of complexity is hard to manage, let alone 
comprehend. Investment in software-intensive systems tends to be irreversible because it is 
spent on the labor required to develop the intellectual capital embedded in software.  
The outcome of software development is almost invariably unique, a one-of-a-kind 
artifact—despite the numerous efforts to develop reusable software. Unlike physical assets, 
the salvage value of software is zero because no benefit is realized until the system is 
deployed; and that labor, once invested, is unrecoverable. One result is an (implicit) 
incentive to continue projects that have little chance of success, despite significant cost 
overruns, schedule delays.  
Indeed, an analysis of several hundred NASA projects indicates that accurate 
estimates at project onset are virtually impossible to achieve, which raises concern for the 
validity of initial Planned Value estimates since they are the basis of Earned Value 
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calculations (Suter, 2005, p. 261). Thus, measures of uncertainty for cost/schedule 
estimates and the rate at which that uncertainty declines are a key concern—because, they 
govern whether and to what extent confidence can be placed in cost and schedule 
estimates. The key to overcoming initial estimate uncertainty is the capability to harness and 
to apply information as it becomes available, thus, enabling a Firm to capture the time value 
of that information. 
Indeed, where IT infrastructure modernization projects are supported by a strong 
quality-assurance, systems-engineering culture (e.g., have institutionalized best-practice 
regimes such as the CMMI, 6-Sigma, Agile Methods) are likely to quickly reduce estimate 
errors incurred at project start-up. Firms without that culture tend to have limited information 
efficiency. (Drawing an analogy to thermo-dynamic systems, such Firms constitute highly 
dissipative systems in that they exhibit a high degree of entropy, which takes the form of 
information disorganization). 
Unfortunately, traditional methods of discounting investment risk such as Net Present 
Value (NPV) do not account for irreversibility and uncertainty. In part, this is due to the fact 
that NPV computes the value of a portfolio of investments as the maximized mean of 
discounted cash flows on the assumption that the risk to underlying investment options can 
be replicated by assets in a financial market.  
NPV also implicitly assumes that the value of the underlying asset is known and 
accurate at the time the investment decision is made.  
These assumptions seldom apply for large-scale infra-modernization programs, in 
either the public or the private sector.  In addition, NPV investment is undertaken when the 
value of a unit of capital is at least as large as its purchase and installation costs. But, this 
can be error prone since opportunity costs are highly sensitive to the uncertainty 
surrounding the future value of the project due to factors such as the riskiness of future cash 
flows. These considerations also extend to econometric models, which exclude 
irreversibility, the incorporation of which transforms investment models into non-linear 
equations (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 421). Nonetheless, irreversibility constitutes both a 
negative opportunity cost and a lost-option value that must be included in the cost of 
investment.  
In addition, the competitive equilibrium of a market is virtually never stationary, even 
in the long run. Rather, it is a dynamic process in which prices can fluctuate widely, and, 
thus, contribute to uncertainty. Neither classical investment theory nor discounting methods 
such as NPV take these factors into account. Yet, for long-term, capital-intensive 
investments such as oil exploration and IT infrastructure modernization, price fluctuation 
constitutes significant risk—which must be factored into investment decisions (1994, p. 396). 
These difficulties are due to an underlying limitation common to both classical 
investment theory and valuation methods such as NPV: their reliance on simple equilibrium 
relationships between rates of investment and risk, which has the practical effect of 
precluding the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility on investment.  The factors that 
adversely impact NPV also impact the accuracy of Planned Value benchmarks that are the 
basis of Earned Value Calculations (Suter, 2006, p. 406). For these reasons, ”classical” 
methods have met with little success in providing accurate valuations of Public investments 
and qualified success for those in the Private Sector.  
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Capital Asset Pricing models such as Black-Scholes, however, sidestep these 
problems by transforming the analysis from a deterministic formulation to one based on 
probability. To handle uncertainty and risk driven by price fluctuations, it uses the Ito Lemma 
to compute valuations.  Black-Scholes proceeds from the assumption that there is a true 
value for a stock that corresponds to its risk, and that value can be used to decide whether 
the market price for a stock is too high or too low. That is, an option’s value equals the value 
of the information concerning that risk.  
Black-Scholes models the price of a stock option as a Market-driven process defined 
by Eqn [3.1], the fundamental condition of equilibrium (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 115; Cover 
& Thomas, 1991, p. 28): 
[3.1]  μ = r + θ∗σ * pxm 
Where: 
μ = the risk adjusted return 
θ = market price of risk  
r = riskless rate of return 
pxm = coefficient of correlation between returns on the particular asset (“x” subscript) 
and the entire market portfolio of stocks (denoted by the “m” subscript). 
σ = the proportional variance parameter  
dz = the increment of the standard Wiener process 
The computational efficiency of Black-Scholes model enables Floor Traders (and 
computer-programmed trading algorithms) to exploit small, short-term price fluctuations in 
real time and to use new pricing information to continually rebalance portfolios. Investors (as 
distinguished from Floor Traders by virtue of their longer-term time horizon) find Black-
Scholes no less useful because of its ability to link risk to valuation over timeframes ranging 
into years.  More recent refinements such as Levy processes introduce more realism by 
generalizing Brownian motion processes to include discrete state jumps. (The jumps can be 
local, global, simultaneous, independent or correlated.) 
The significance of Black-Scholes is its computational efficiency for modeling price, 
interest, and discount rates—using a few readily observable parameters that provide 
reasonable approximations to the underlying physical processes using methods based on 
the Law of Large Numbers. In particular, it specifically eschews unobservable/hard-to-
measure parameters such as “investor psychology.” The Black-Scholes strategy is at 
variance with efforts to improve the analysis by increasing the dimensionality of the problem 
via the addition of more parameters (as is often done with econometric models, and on 
occasion with Balance Scorecard methods). The addition of extra parameters may well 
provide a more detailed picture of performance, but at additional cost and without 
necessarily improving the accuracy needed for decision-making (McShea, 2006, November, 
p. 31). As a result, these refinements have added relatively minimal value and can be 
relatively expensive to implement.  
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The key is to recognize that decision-making is not necessarily dependent on a 
detailed understanding of causality to be effective. Thus, Capital Asset Pricing models focus 
on those few variables with the most explanatory power. The objective is not to predict 
which firms are most likely to succeed, but only what they are “worth” as measured against 
various combinations of risk, uncertainty, interest rates, and competing investment 
opportunities.  The task of this paper is to provide equivalent, computationally efficient 
methods for estimating valuations in public-sector investments, using the fewest parameters 
with the most predictive power. 
There are, of course, methods other than market-based Capital Asset Pricing for 
determining asset valuations. But, these also suffer from various limitations. For example, 
Dynamic Programming (DP) could be applied to public-sector investments and is useful in 
solving multi-stage optimization problems, but only if a small number of possible choices 
exist at each stage. Indeed, a small increase in the number of possible choices leads to a 
combinatorial explosion, thus curtailing overall efficiency of DP. 
Another method is the Discrete Binomial Model, which uses a risk-adjusted 
stochastic process for modeling the underlying asset. The strategy is to approximate 
uncorrelated investment dynamics using two basic ideas: a change of time scale and a 
change of the basis of the asset span to approximate uncorrelated geometric Brownian 
motion. Yet another variant, the Lattice Binomial model, has proved useful for valuing 
complex option problems when payoff depends on multiple state variables that follow 
correlated geometric Brownian processes. In this case, the strategy is to approximate a 
multi-dimensional geometric Brownian motion with a binomial lattice by choosing the size 
and the probabilities of the jumps so that the characteristic function of the discrete 
distribution converges to the characteristic function of the continuous distribution.  
But, both methods require knowledge of the underlying probability distributions—a 
requirement that can be difficult to satisfy—and will converge to a solution only in the limit. 
For practical applications, the time required to acquire sufficient data to identify a convergent 
solution can preclude widespread application, especially if the time value of information 
rapidly declines, thus forcing the decision-maker to decide on acting with incomplete 
information, or on risking being overtaken by events. 
Information Theory and “Synthetic Prices” 
In competitive markets, a single number—the price of a Firm’s stock—represents 
risk. Under ideal conditions that price fully captures the Firm’s internal efficiencies, Return-
on-Investment (ROI) and earning potential. Those efficiencies determine the Firm’s 
capability to harness new information as it becomes available. For private-sector firms, 
prices provide two important types of information: 
1. The rate at which information becomes known. 
The rate is analogous to the diffusion problem in heat transfer, which means that 
information diffusion can be modeled as a Brownian motion processes. 
2. How information is aggregated.  
In the private sector, the efficiency of aggregation indicates market efficiency; yet, 
while no such aggregation occurs in public-sector markets because there is no incentive.  
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Hayek was the first to identify these effects and to provide the rationale for defining 
markets in terms of their information value. The definition, in highly abbreviated form, is as 
follows:  
Competitive markets provide for the efficient coordination of decisions involving time 
and uncertainty. The process can be modeled as a Random Walk (in which the limit 
is approximated by a Brownian motion process). The rationale derives from the fact 
that where information flows without impediments, stock prices immediately reflect 
the latest information—so that a price change today will reflect only today’s news and 
is independent of any prior price change (such processes are a weak form of market 
efficiency and have been modeled with some success using Markov models) (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1994, p. 63). And, since news often is unpredictable, price changes are also 
unpredictable, but fully reflect all known information—thus, justifying the Random 
Walk interpretation.  
However, competitive markets are not the only mechanism for determining 
investment valuations. A Firm’s internal (information) processing efficiencies enable it to 
reallocate resources based on new information—and, thus, to manage risk. The efficiency of 
that process can be measured independently of market-based valuation. In this way, it can 
be applied to public-sector Firms to construct “synthetic prices”—thus linking valuations of its 
investments to its asset of a Firm: the ability to process information efficiently.  
For the private sector, perturbation-based measures should converge in the limit to 
the market-based valuation, thus providing a basis for testing the validity of using the 
internal efficiencies to derive a “synthetic price” for the value of a Firm (Hayek, 945, 
September, p. 35).  
In fact, the latter should reflect more accurately the “true” value of a Firm, which is 
what “Value Investors” and Hedge Funds are constantly trying to identify. Indeed, 
perturbation-response models offer a means to quantitatively link micro, Firm-level models 
to macro, policy-level models. 
Pricing Public-sector Investments  
Measures of investment efficiency for the public sector enable a portfolio manager to 
keep investments allocated to the most profitable outcomes—despite shocks and 
perturbations to operations. But, effective Portfolio Management depends on accurate 
pricing information. When information is limited or uncertain, risk is not efficiently priced. As 
a result, the marginal social utility of an investment will not equate to its price—thus, leaving 
no means to identify a “socially optimal” level of investment in either the private or the public 
sector. The net effect is analogous to Nash Equilibrium: a sup-optimal investment 
equilibrium condition that occurs when no player has incentive to unilaterally change 
strategy—because a change by any one of them would lead that player to earn less than 
would be obtained by remaining with the current strategy (Cover & Thomas, 1991, p. 460, 
475; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 147, 283). 
Sub-optimality can be driven by limited information, by a lack of incentives to change 
(as is the case for the Nash Equilibrium), as well as by uncertainty driven by factors such as 
market volatility. Higher volatility estimates reflect greater-than-expected fluctuations in 
underlying price levels and result in higher-option premiums for both puts and calls. With 
respect to the internal processing efficiencies of a Firm, the Taguchi’s common and special 
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sources of variability drive the perturbations of a Firm’s workflow (León, Shoemaker, & 
Kacker, 1987). The efficiency of response determines whether and to what extent a Firm 
can synthesize information into actionable decisions in a timely manner. The often 
inconclusive, interwoven, and ambiguous nature of available information can result in time 
consumed to assess its value, which depreciates the time value of information. The resulting 
delay propagates uncertainty, which equates to opportunities lost.  How much time is 
required to resolve the ambiguity is a function of a Firm’s ability to manage that variability, 
which depends on its ability to synthesize information.  
The impact of information efficiency can be measured in terms of response to 
random perturbations. The parameters characterizing the perturbations include the 
amplitude and time lag for changes in valuation and resource allocations, the amount of 
work/rework completed, requirements churn, the ratio of assets invested to return on those 
assets, output price/cost, fluctuations in labor, resource availability, the time to close major 
issues, the time to identify and to minimize both special and common causes of variability, 
schedule, and price, etc.  Note that while these parameters indicate a Firm’s internal 
information processing efficiencies with respect to work progress, much as Earned Value 
does, they say nothing of business value—i.e., whether the product provides anything useful 
to a customer.  
The perturbation-responses are governed by structure of a Firm, which can be 
represented as a quasi-deterministic State Variable model. The combination of these 
techniques also can be used to identify the boundaries beyond which the magnitude of the 
perturbations would result in unstable responses and project failure (Ford & Taylor, 2006, 
pp. 337-369).30  Information Theory benefits the analysis through the provision of algorithms 
that reduce the number of (perturbation-response) states to be considered in evaluating a 
process. The larger the number of states, the greater the lack of specificity or uncertainty 
(entropy) of the system. The following, highly over-simplified example illustrates the point. 
The number of states that a single dice can assume is 6. But, if we know that the 
dice is in some sense biased toward either even or odd numbers (i.e., we have additional or 
“side” information), then the number of states that need to be considered is effectively 
reduced to 3, thus changing the outcome probabilities but not the probability distribution 
model. Alternatively stated, the entropy (disorganization) of a system does not depend on 
the actual values taken by the random variables describing it, but only on the associated 
probabilities.  
Changes in the probability space, driven by changes to the efficiency of information 
flows within a Firm, provide a quantitative basis for linking the efficiency of 
information/knowledge management to well-defined mathematical processes, thus providing 
quantitative measures of risk that correspond to the underlying physical processes.  
Information Theory can enable decision-makers to reduce risk, often drastically, by 
providing a quantitative framework to address issues such as: 
1. The quantitative determination of changes in the uncertainty levels associated with 
cost/schedule/resource estimates as a project proceeds through its lifecycle. 
                                                
30 Ford and Taylor’s text provides detailed discussion of project/program stability. 
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2. Discounting the anticipated benefits from a project—by measuring risk as a function 
of the time lags and amplitude of a Firm’s response to various types of perturbations. 
3. Identifying and reducing (both normal and special) sources of variability that 
adversely impact work progress and service/product quality  
4. Constructing rules to achieve optimal investments—in terms of ensuring that a Firm’s 
decision-making/information is efficient  
5. The use-state variable models to estimate whether, and at what rate, investment 
management is improving 
Models capable of answering these questions we consider next. 
Computational Models 
The Firm’s responses to the perturbations provide the raw data from which (indirect) 
measures of that efficiency can be expressed in terms of factors such as the time lag and 
amplitude of responses, and the variability of both. The perturbation/response processes are 
modeled using state variable regulator/ controller design methods. One of the best known 
and widely applied is the Kalman Filter, which can be used to measure how uncertainty 
propagates over time, and, thus, calculate the information-carrying capacity of a Firm.  
The output of the Kalman Filter model is the amount and rate of information gain 
produced by various organizational structures. The magnitude and rate of correction serve 
as measures of a Firm’s information processing capability, and (by implication) its level of 
entropy or level of internal-information organizational efficiency. The more efficient the Firm, 
the more quickly it will respond to perturbations (random shocks) regardless of source, 
internal or external. (The situation is analogous to determining the bandwidth of a 
communications system).  
Schematically, the Kalman Filter information flow/computation cycle is illustrated in 
Figure 1, below.  
 =




Figure 1. Kalman Filter 
Kalman Filter Computation Steps 
Legend: 
x is the vector of variables comprising the system, whose state is to be estimated over 
the successive time (e.g., multi-stage investment) periods k =0,1,2,… 
x ^ (k+1|k) is the predicted estimate of x for time “k+1” based on measures taken at time 
“k.” 
z is the actual, uncorrected measurement of x.  
z ~ is estimate of x when corrected errors are introduced by the measurement process. 
z ^ is the estimate of x ^ as filtered by H. 
H is the measurement transformation matrix that relates the system state vector, x, to its 
measure, z. 
Delay is the lag in system response to a stimulus. Delay is inherent to an 
organization because information cannot be gathered, analyzed, or transmitted 
instantaneously. Thus, changes in the environment or slips in schedule may or may not be 
recognized when they occur. For example, decreases in data quality typically generate 
increased disruption in operation. As more resources are shifted to fixing and correcting 
data records, the rate at which information is processed decreases. The resulting 
inefficiency generates increased correction and rework rates, along with increase delays in 
task completion. 
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F is the coefficient matrix of the state variable vector x. It describes the input/output 
efficiencies of a Firm and its investments. If these change overtime, then F (k) =/= F 
(k+1), k=0, 1, 2… and the system described by Eqn (1), (2), below, would be non-linear 
in time “t.” 
The steps presented in Figure 1 are as follows: 
1. Begin with x^(0 |0) =0, for k = 0, 1, 2… Use x^(k | k) to iteratively compute  
x^ (k +1,k +1) given z(k+1). 
Where: 
x^ ( k | k) Is the estimate propagated forward by pre-multiplying it by F(k+1, k) to 
give the predicted estimate x^(k+1 |k).  
2. Pre-multiply x^(k+1 | k) by H (m +1) to compute is z^(k+1 | k), which is then 
subtracted from the actual measurement z (k+1).  
 The result is z~(k+1 | k), which is the measurement residual—that is, the 
difference between actual and predicted estimates at time (k+1).  
3. The residual, z ~, is pre-multiplied by K (k+1), the Kalman Filter coefficient matrix, 
which is added to x^(k+1 | k).  
 The result is x^(k+1 | k +1), which is the estimate of x at time (k+1), given the 
measures updated at time (k+1). 
4. x^ (k+1 | k +1), the optimal filtered estimate, is stored until the next measurement is 
made—at which time the cycle is repeated. (This is the only data that needs to be 
stored between measures, thus saving considerable computer storage and memory.) 
Note that the product K (k+1)*z~(k+1 | k) is the correction that is added to the 
predicted estimate x^(k+1 |k) to determine the filtered estimate. 
The optimal filter consists of the model of the dynamic process which performs the 
function of a prediction and feedback correction scheme in which the gain-times-residual, K 
(k+1) *z~(k+1 |k], per Eqn [3] below enters the model as the forcing function u( k) (Meditch, 
1969, p. 182). 
How all this works is illustrated by the following state-variable model for which the 
following assumptions are made.  
 Time delay decreases the volume of work accomplished per unit of time.  
 Time delay is driven by unstable/poorly managed requirements, funding 
instability, etc., thus acting to increase the amount of rework. 
 In this example, model parameters are assumed to be Gaussian (Normally) 
Distributed, with side information (e.g., feedback) entering into the system as a 
sequence of predict-correct actions. 
x(t) is the vector of state variables, which consists of the two elements: 
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x1 (t) =Volume of work/unit of time, 
x2 (t) = Volume of rework/unit of time. 
The state variable model is: 
[ 1 ] x’ = F* x (t) + u(t)  
(where x’ = dx (t)/dt) = [x1’, x2’] = [dx1 (t)/dt, x2’ = dx2 (t)/dt] 
[ 2 ]  [x1’] =  [1  1]  [ x1(t)]      + [1    0 ] [ u1 (t)] 
        [x2’]     [0  1]  [ x2(t)]         [0    1 ] [ u2 (t)] 
Verbally, Eqn [2] states that the rate of change in work package completion is the 
sum of the current workload (x1) + rework (x2) + the arrival of new work (u1). The rework 
rate (x2’) is equal to the sum of current rework (x2) + new rework (u2), where the vector u(t) 
is governed by the corrections provided by Eqn [3]. 
The control vector u(t) = [u1(t), u2(t) ] is defined in terms of predictor/corrector 
parameters as: 
[3] u(t) = K(t)*[z – H* x^] 
Eqn [3] computes the correction, given x^ from the Kalman Filter Eqn [9], below. 
[4] e(t) = K (t)*[ v – H *( x – x P)]  
Eqn [4] computes the error estimate prior to measurement. 
Eqns [3], [4] derive from the linear measurement Model: 
[5] z = H* x + B * v 
To keep the computation simple, H, B are defined as identity matrices: 
H  = [1   0] 
        [0   1] 
B = [1   0] 
       [0   1] 
v is a vector of random measurement errors which are independent of the state x. (v 
is implemented with Monte Carlo simulation input.) 
Eqn [1] and Eqn [2] can be cast into Kalman Filter format by defining the following 
parameters: 
X P is the Estimate of the system state prior to measurement, as defined in [7-P], 
below. 
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P P is Covariance of the system state prior to measurement, as defined in [7-P], 
below. 
x A is the Estimate of the system state after measurement, as defined in [7-A]. 
P A is Covariance of the system state after measurement, as defined in [7-A]. 
[6] R = E[v*v’] Is the mean of the measurement error vector. 
[7-P]  P P = E[(x P – x)*( x P – x) T] Is the error covariance matrix prior to 
measurement. 
[7-A] P A = E [(x A - x)*(x A - x)T] Is the error covariance matrix after measurement. 
[8] x A = x P + P P *H P T*R P -1(z – H* x P) is the optimal estimate. 
Eqn [8] is a model of Eqn [1] with a correction term that is proportional to the 
difference between the actual measurement zi and the predicted measurement Hi*xi  
To minimize the subscript clutter used to denote the before and after calculations, PA 
is changed to P, for after, and Pp to M, for prior. Thus, indexing Eqn [8] for measures over 
successive discrete time periods becomes Eqn [8’].  
[8’] x^i  = x--i +K i (z i -  H * x i-),  where i =m, m+1 …. 
for multi-stage investments. 
The Gain Matrix for the Kalman Filter, for time periods i = 1, 2… is  
[9] K i = P i * H i  T *R i -1 
Eqn [9] can be interpreted as the proportionality matrix or the ratio between 
uncertainty in the covariance matrix P i , after measurement at time “i” and uncertainty in the 
measurements R i Eqn [6] (which can be interpreted as the effectiveness of a management 
reporting system).  
The propagation of uncertainty in the discrete time system, Eqn [11], below, is based 
on the computation of: 
[10] P i = (M i -1 +H i T*R i -1*H i ) -1 
[10’] P i = M i – M i * H i T *(H i * M i * H i T + R i)-1 H i * M i 
[11] M i +1 = F i *P i *F i Τ +  G i *Q i *G i Τ 
Eqn [11] reflects the balance between the new information-forcing function,  
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G i *Q i *G i Τ ; and, information processing efficiency, F i *P i *F i Τ. (In a traditional 
physical system, F i would represent the damping efficiency of the system. 
Collectively, Eqn [10], [10’], and [11] describe the propagation of the covariance of 
the error estimate, which are independent of the measurements z i.   
Eqn [9]-[11] Is the Kalman Filter for a multi-stage process. 
Prediction beyond the last measurement for states indexed as i = m +1, m+2, … is 
given by Eqn [12].  
[12] x  (i+1) = F (i) * x(i) + G  (i) *U (i) 
Figure 2, below, provides a heuristic illustration (via the use of “canned” data) of the 
damping out effects of the Kalman Filter (illustrated by the magenta colored line), the 
retardation of that effect induced by response delay (as denoted by the green dashed line), 
with the black line illustrating the impact of a special cause of variability, such as the failure 
of an integration test, a reduction in funding, a major equipment failure, etc.  The blue 
dashed line (highly exaggerated) illustrates “normal” variability causes, which might include 
ambiguous governance, the impact on products and services due to aging equipment, but 
which shows gradual improvement overtime.  
 
Figure 2. Perturbation-response Output from Kalman Filter 
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Summary/Next Research Steps 
The strategy and models outlined in this brief paper indicate how Information Theory can 
be used to quantify the value of information and translate that value into a “price” for public-
sector investments that, in principle, is comparable in a competitive market.  
The next steps include: 
 Fully defining the conditions under which the synthetic prices for public-sector goods are 
comparable in competitive markets. 
 Developing methods to normalize comparisons across portfolios of diverse investment 
projects.  
 Applying and evaluating the models using “real” data from public- and private-sector IT 
infrastructure investment projects.  
 Using the model output to evaluate “synthetic prices” based on information gains defined 
using Kalman Filters.  
 Comparing model results across a range of scenarios. 






A mathematical model used to calculate the value of a project 
or an investment as derived from market-place dynamics, 
based on approximations to Brownian motion processes 
Brownian Motion  
 
 
The random motion of particles in a liquid. The mathematical 
model of describing this motion is the Wiener process. A 
continuous time process that forms the basis of many 
important mathematical models in thermodynamics and 
Finance 
Binomial Lattice Methods An algorithm for valuing complex option problems whose 
payoff depends on multiple state variables following correlated 
geometric Brownian processes 
Capital Asset Pricing (CAP) 
 
The concept that there is a true value for a stock 
corresponding to its risk, for which various computational 
models can be used to determine risk-adjusted discount rates 
for investments, and to decide whether a stock price is too 
high or too low. 
Complexity There are at least two basic types of complexity: 
Descriptive complexity of an object—Kolmogorov complexity. 
While not directly computable, it can be bound between 
computable measures to describe the complexity of a 
sequence of symbols; Computational complexity—measures 
the time or space required for a computation 
Derivative 
 
A financial instrument that derives its value from the value of 
some other financial instrument or variable. For example, a 
stock option is a derivative because it derives its value from 
the value of a stock. An interest-rate swap is a derivative 
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The purchasing/selling of financial instruments to reduce or 
cancel out the risk in another investment as required by 
changing market conditions 
Earned Value 
 
Measures the dollar-value work completed per unit of time. It 
is a measure of progress against an objective, from which 
schedule (SC) and cost variances (CV) can be computed 
using Planned Value (PV) and Actual Cost (AC).  
SV = EV – PV 
CV = EV – AC.  
But, realistic estimates of Planned Value are seldom 
available—especially at the on-set of a large, complex project. 
Hence, the value of Information Theory lies in determining 
when and to what extent confidence can be placed in a 
benchmark such as Planned Value 
Efficient Frontier A concept that there is a true value for a stock corresponding 
to its risk; this theory of stock price is called Capital Assets 
Pricing Model and is used to decide whether a stock price is 
too high or too low. 
Entropy 
 
A measure of the disorganization of a physical system/The 
uncertainty of a single random variable/The minimum 
descriptive complexity of a random variable. An irreducible 




A (competitive) stock market that efficiently coordinates 
decisions involving time and uncertainty 
Exogenous 
 
Refers to variables whose values are driven by factors 
external to the firm, or processes, of interest  
Firm In this paper, the “Firm” refers to an organization in either the 
private or public sector tasked with investing in and developing 
new products and services 
Game Theory 
 
The branch of applied mathematics and economics that 
studies situations where players choose different actions in an 
attempt to maximize their returns. It provides a formal, 




A discipline spanning mathematics, economics, physics, 
communication theory, statistics, involving the quantification of 
data. For communications, the goal is to enable as much data 




Is used to integrate and differentiate stochastic processes. An 
Ito process can represent the dynamics of the value of a 
project which does not have a time derivative in the 
conventional sense- because its fluctuations over (short) 
periods of time do not have derivatives 
Kalman Filter 
 
A mathematical algorithm that operates in a predict-correct 
fashion that uses feedback to maintain a system (e.g., a 
rocket, or an investment portfolio) on a desired trajectory 
Levy Process A generalization of Brownian Motion processes to include 
discrete state jumps. The jumps can be local, global, 
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simultaneous, independent or correlated 
Law of Large Numbers 
 
The sum of independent, identically distributed random 
variables that can be approximated arbitrarily closely to the 
expected value of the random variables 
Markov Property The property of a process that current information is useful for 
forecasting the future path of a process. Applied to Stock 
processes on the premise that public information is quickly 
incorporated into the current price /D-63/ 
Mutual information The communication rate (efficiency) in the presence of noise. 
It is a measure of the amount of information that one random 
variable contains about another random variable. It is the 
reduction in the uncertainty of one random variable induced by 
knowledge of the other 
Nash Equilibrium A condition in Game Theory in which no player has incentive 
to unilaterally change her action. Players are in equilibrium if a 
change in strategies by any one of them would lead that 
player to earn less than if she remained with her current 
strategy 
Net Present Value (NPV) 
 
NPV is a standard method for the financial evaluation of a 
long-term project. Used for capital budgeting, and widely 
throughout economics, it measures the excess or shortfall of 
cash flows (in present value (PV) terms) once financing 




Is a contract between a buyer and a seller, or a provision of a 
contract, that gives one party (the option holder) the right, but 
not the obligation, to perform a specified transaction with 
another party (the option issuer or option writer) according to 





The discipline of managing a portfolio of investments with the 
objective of maximizing the value of the entire portfolio by 
reallocating resources among the investments comprising the 
portfolio 
Public-sector Firms  Firms such as public health or security tasked with providing 
goods and services whose valuations are not saleable in 
private equity (i.e., stock) markets, but which benefit society  
Random Walk 
 
A process that takes a discrete move in a specific direction 
according to a specified probability distribution. The Brownian 
Motion (Weiner process) is the limit for the discrete random 
walk process 
Rate Distortion Theory  
 
A major branch of information theory; it addresses the problem 
of determining the minimal amount of entropy (or information) 
that can be communicated over a channel, so that the source 
(input signal) can be approximately reconstructed at the 




“Risk" is randomness with knowable probabilities; 
"uncertainty" is randomness with unknowable probabilities. 
Frank Knight (1921): An engineering definition of risk is “the 
(probability of an adverse event) x (loss per event)” 
ROI—Return on Investment 
 
A measure of the net income a firm is able to earn with its total 
assets. Return on investment is calculated by dividing net 
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profits after taxes by total assets. The Rate of Return (ROR) 
or Return on Investment (ROI), or sometimes just return, is the 
ratio of money gained or lost on an investment relative to the 
amount of money invested. The amount of money gained or 
lost may be referred to as interest, profit/loss, gain/loss, or net 
income/loss. The money invested may be referred to as the 
asset, capital, principal, or the cost basis of the investment. 
Side information 
 
Information that is relevant to the outcome of an event such as 
a coin toss, or a horse race  
System Control Theory 
 
The discipline of controlling complex machines such as 




A characteristic of a random variable that is measured as 
Entropy. It is the number of bits required to describe a 
Random Variable. The larger the number of values that the 
random variable can take, the larger the uncertainty. 
Variability: 
Special and common sources  
 
A common source of variability: The quality level of an item 
created by a machine tool that is wearing out. 
A special source: an unlikely event such as the breaking of an 
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Abstract 
In the real world, “Money Allocated is Money Spent" (MAIMS).  As a consequence, cost 
underruns are rarely available to protect against cost overruns, while task overruns are passed 
on to the total project cost.  The combination of the probabilistic aspects of project costs and the 
MAIMS principle have important implications for budget allocation and the management of 
contingencies.  Project costs depend not only on the desired probability of success but also on 
budget allocation and contingency management.  This is in contrast with both deterministic 
practices that allocate a percentage of the project baseline cost for contingency as well as 
today's de-facto probabilistic cost analyses that provide a cost contingency independent of the 
budget-allocation strategy.  The realistic modeling of cost uncertainties and the MAIMS principle 
provide a framework for developing a viable cost-management strategy for allocating baseline 
budgets and contingencies.  Based on this analysis, the project manager can maintain a 
realistic project-wide contingency and dynamically distribute it to the individual risks on an as-
needed basis.  Projects that implement dynamic cost-contingency management based on these 
principles are likely to achieve a higher probability of success and cost less. 
Introduction 
Real-world experience and intuition both suggest that project costs depend on many 
factors, including technical, organizational, and behavioral considerations.  Thucydides got to 
the very root of the cost-overrun problem over 2000 years ago when he stated, “Their judgment 
was based more on wishful thinking than on sound calculation of probabilities” (Augustine, 
1997, p. 255). 
In the 1990's, the Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. carried out a study which concluded 
that the following deficiencies in cost modeling and contingency management have been major 
contributors to both project high costs and overruns (Gordon, 1997):  
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 Hidden incentives in procurement  
 Hidden incentives in management styles 
 Failure to coordinate cost analysis and cost management 
 Use of invalid mathematics such as arithmetically summing uncertain cost elements 
instead of using statistical methods 
 Overlooking the "Money Allocated Is Money Spent" (MAIMS) principle 
The MAIMS principle accounts for the fact that projects rarely underrun their allocated 
budgets.  It is the money analog of Parkinson’s Law, “Work expands to fill the time allotted.”  
The principle is also in concordance with Goldratt’s observation that negative human behavior is 
a major cause of the project-scheduling problem.  Goldratt (1997) developed the Critical Chain 
Project Management (CCPM) as a management philosophy and solution that simultaneously 
reduces project duration and protects against schedule risk.  A key principle of CCPM is to 
aggregate task buffers at the project-level for use where and when needed.  But it also 
proposed the following guidelines for sizing buffers: (1) cut task duration estimates in half, and 
(2) add approximately 25% of the original estimate to the project buffer.  These guidelines 
appear to be rather arbitrary, and many technical managers are uncomfortable with them.  A 
number of simple alternatives to estimate and sum buffers have been proposed (Newbold, 
1998; Schuyler, 2001).  We think that their use is no longer justified because of the availability of 
simple Monte Carlo simulation tools such as @Risk® and Crystal Ball®.   
The premise of this paper is that a credible Probabilistic Cost Analysis (PCA) needs to 
integrate findings on human behavior with mathematically valid models and sound management 
techniques to obtain realistic cost estimates and achieve project success.  A key 
recommendation is that in order to deliver successful projects at an optimal cost project, 
management needs to allocate "reasonable" budgets to the cost-account managers and 
dynamically manage the cost-contingency funds as a risk portfolio at the program/project level.   
Proposed Modifications to Today’s Typical PCA 
 Assessing Uncertain Cost Elements 
R&D and complex engineering projects rely heavily on engineering/expert judgment for 
the assessment of uncertain cost elements.  Unfortunately, these subjective assessments are 
often performed in a rather ad-hoc manner, and they have been identified as a critical source of 
error in probabilistic risk analyses (Keeney & von Winterfeld, 1991).  The Direct Fractile 
Assessment (DFA) method has been investigated in numerous psychological experiments and 
found to provide one of the most reliable and least bias-prone procedures for eliciting uncertain 
quantities (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982).  We recommend that experienced analysts and domain 
experts determine the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for uncertain cost elements.  While other 
percentiles may be used, these seem to be highly practical (Dillon, John, & von Winterfeld, 
2002).   
 Fitting Cost Elements with Realistic Probability Density Functions (PDF) 
Uncertain cost elements are more appropriately modeled as continuous than discrete 
random variables.  We favor the use of the three-parameter Weibull distribution because it is an 
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open-ended function that can assume a wide variety of shapes (Kujawski, Alvaro, & Edwards, 
2004).  It is also more flexible than the three-parameter lognormal even though both are 
characterized by three independent parameters.  The use of more complex PDFs seemed 
unwarranted for fitting three subjectively assessed percentiles.  Analysts and assessors should 
always validate that they feel comfortable with the shape of the fitted distribution. 
 Incorporating the MAIMS Principle 
The MAIMS principle plays a significant role in PCA.  Once a cost element is allocated a 
budget, x* it becomes a random variable with minimum value x* rather than the lower range of 
the original PDF.  The cost element is then given by a PDF with a delta-like function31 (or spike) 
at x* that accounts for all random values less than or equal to x* and the original distribution for 
values greater than x*.  The associated Complementary Distribution Function (CDF) has a step-
function behavior at x* and is identical to the original CDF above x*.  The effect on the cost 
element is that its mean increases and its standard deviation decreases with increasing values 
of x*.  As a result, the MAIMS principle plays a significant role in budget management.   
 Modeling Specific Risks 
The above PDFs provide a macroscopic rather than a microscopic view of the project 
cost risk.  They effectively model those factors or project characteristics that are ever present 
and contribute to cost uncertainties.  But complex projects often involve a number of critical 
decisions and high-impact risks which call for explicit risk-mitigation actions.  A detailed PCA 
should incorporate both the macroscopic and microscopic views to ensure that all risks and cost 
uncertainties are addressed and that the risk-reduction activities are transparent (Chapman & 
Ward, 1997).  The analysis of specific risks and risk-response actions requires a microscopic 
view and is best carried out using tools such as decision trees, influence diagrams, or other 
discrete representations (Kujawski, 2002a).   
 Modeling Correlations 
Cost elements are correlated because project characteristics (such as complexity, 
criticality, management, staff, and processes) are likely to impact multiple cost elements at the 
subsystem and system levels.  Also, the realization of any one risk is likely to influence other 
risks and to increase their probabilities and/or consequences.  Kujawski, Alvaro, and Edwards 
(2004) have developed a Two-Level Correlation Model (TLCM) which greatly reduces the 
number of parameters needed to specify a mathematically valid and physically realistic 
correlation matrix.  In its simplest form, it models correlations among cost elements of the same 
and different subsystems with only two parameters, ρint and ρext.   
Application to a Representative Design and Engineering Project 
To investigate the concepts and issues discussed in the previous sections, we consider 
a hypothetical project with three level-2 cost elements (project/system-level and two 
                                                
31 Caution: The MAIMS-modified PDFs are not the same as the Crystal Ball® and @Risk® 
truncated PDFs.   
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subsystems) each with three level-3 cost elements.  Figure 1 depicts different budget-allocation 
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Figure 1.  Illustrative Impact of Different Budget Allocation Strategies on Project Cost 
Note: The cost elements are modeled with Weibull distributions fitted to the 10th, 50th, and 90th 
fractiles.  The cost correlations are modeled using the two-level correlation model with parameters of 0.6 
and 0.4.   
The “ideal curve” corresponds to the model where the project staff rationally spends 
money only as necessary to satisfy the project requirements.  In this ideal world, the actual 
costs may be less than the budgeted costs, and the savings are available to support other 
project elements on an as-needed basis.  In the MAIMS_@_X50 and MAIMS_@_X75 curves, 
all cost elements are allocated equal percentiles of 50% and 75%, respectively.  The 
MAIMS_@_mean curve corresponds to the case in which each cost element is allocated its 
mean or expected value.  Each cost element is then budgeted at a percentile that depends on 
the shape of the assessed PDF.  The MAIMS effects increase with higher allocated budgets and 
are substantial over a wide range of Probability of Success (PoS) values of interest to PCA.   
Budget Allocation, Contingency, and Project Cost 
Our objective is to integrate the presented concepts into a sound methodology for 
determining an optimal as well as realistic Total Estimated Cost (TEC) and budget-
allocation/management strategy for a given PoS.  The combination of cost uncertainties and the 
MAIMS principle complicates the situation.  As we have shown, the TEC depends not only on 
                                                
32 The calculations were performed using Crystal Ball® and 10,000 trials.   
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the desired PoS but also the budget allocation and the management of contingencies.  The 
project cost cannot be estimated until the cost management strategy—including budget 
allocation—is specified.  We like to think that this contains a flavor of the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle. 
Much has been written on cost contingency; but there is still much confusion (Baccarini, 
1999; INCOSE, 2003).  To shed additional light on the subject, we express the Management 
Cost Contingency (MCC) in a form that exhibits its dependence on the PoS and the cost 
management strategy: 
MCC(PoS, PBC1,…, PBCn) ≡  TEC(PoS, PBC1,…, PBCn) – PBC. 
PBCi is the baseline budget for cost element Ci, and PBC is the probabilistic sum of all 
the project cost elements.  The above relationship contrasts with both (1) the deterministic 
practice that allocates a percentage of the PBC as MCC, and (2) today's typical PCA that 
provides a MCC that is independent of the budget-allocation strategy.  Figure 2 depicts the 












0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


































TEC MAIMS_@_mean TEC MAIMS_@_75 TEC MAIMS_@_50 TEC Ideal
MCC MAIMS_@_mean MCC MAIMS_@_75 MCC MAIMS_@_50
 
Figure 2.  Impact of Different Cost Management Strategies on the Cost and Contingency 
for the Project in Figure 1 
Figure 2 contains valuable information for both the procuring activity and the contractor.  
The budget management strategy has a significant impact on the TEC for a given PoS.  The 
effects of the MAIMS principle increase with increasing budget allocations and are substantial 
for all but the very highest PoS values.  The MAIMS principle has little impact at the very high 
confidence levels (CL > 95%) because each contributing cost element must then be near its 
maximum or 100th percentile value.  These results have important implications for cost 
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management.  For example, sizeable cost reductions are achieved by allocating budgets to the 
cost elements at the 50% CL rather than the 75% CL.  The standard PCA that assumes an 
“ideal” project provides a false sense of confidence; it may be a major source of cost overruns 
even for projects with high contingencies.   
Why Projects Even with High Cost-Contingencies Often Fail 
Consider a hypothetical request for proposal for the project33 depicted in Table 1.  To 
level the playing field, the procuring activity specifies that all bids should provide the 50% CL 
cost.  Contractor A has a certain level of sophistication.  He34 prepares a typical PCA with every 
bid; but he is not cognizant of the MAIMS principle.  He performs today's typical PCA and 
obtains the CDF in Fig. 2 labeled “TEC Ideal” and a P50 TEC of 7,348 K$.  Based on this 
analysis, Contractor A submits a bid of 7,348 K$ and rationalizes that the proposal is 
conservative given that the P50 value is 30% above the low estimate of 5,633 K$.  But because 
of the MAIMS principle, Contractor A's risks are significantly greater than he thinks.  Once the 
contract is awarded, management proceeds to baseline and allocate budgets to the cost 
elements at their mean values.  Given that the cost elements are budgeted at their mean 
values, the TEC is really given by the CDF in Fig. 2 labeled “PEC MAIMS_@_mean,” the P50 
TEC is 8,071 K$, and the PBC of 7,665 K$ is the lowest achievable cost.  To management’s 
surprise, this value is 317 K$ less than the proposal bid of 7,348 K$.  Because of the MAIMS 
principle, there is a negligible likelihood that Contractor A, given his practices, can deliver the 
project for the submitted bid of 7,348 K$.  Table 1 summarizes this and several other scenarios.    
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  20% 7,673 0 0% 20% 6,445 -1,220 -16% 0% 
Mean 50% 8,071 406 5% 50% 7,348 -317 -4% 0% 
  80% 8,987 1,322 17% 80% 8,626 961 13% 73% 
  20% 7,111 0 0% 20% 6,445 -557 -8% 0% 
50% CL 50% 7,692 690 10% 50% 7,348 346 5% 37% 
  80% 8,771 1,769 25% 80% 8,626 1,624 23% 77% 
  20% 8,466 0 0% 20% 6,445 -2,021 -24% 0% 
75% CL 50% 8,613 147 2% 50% 7,348 -1,118 -13% 0% 
  80% 9,330 864 10% 80% 8,626 160 2% 52% 
Table 1.  Some Summary Data for the Different Cost Management Strategies Depicted in 
Figure 2 
Similarly, when considering specific technical risks, the common-sense and 
mathematically valid solution for efficient-cost risk management is to maintain a project-wide 
contingency and to distribute it to the individual risks on an as-needed basis.  This approach to 
                                                
33 This is the same illustrative project used for Figures 1 and 2. 
34 Gender neutral 
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managing project technical risks may be thought of as a variant of modern portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1991).  The implication to managing project is that less attention should be given to 
the individual risks (substituted for stocks) and more to the project (substituted for portfolio) as a 
whole (Kujawski, 2002b).  CCPM formalizes analogous concepts and their implementation for 
project schedule planning and management. 
Concluding Remarks  
This paper develops a practical and sound framework for quantifying the influence of 
human behavior on project cost and efficiently managing project risks and cost contingencies.  
The key elements include: 
 The incorporation of the “Money Allocated Is Money Spent” (MAIMS) principle.  The 
probability distribution of each cost element is modified by setting all cost values less 
than the allocated budget to the allocated budget in the MCS. 
 The realistic assessment of cost uncertainties and technical risks using proven methods 
such as the Direct Fractile Assessment method, event trees and/or influence diagrams. 
 The realistic treatment of correlations among cost elements. 
 The probabilistic treatment of the cost elements and explicit representation of technical 
risks.  The analysis is readily performed using commercially available Monte Carlo 
simulation Excel add-ins. 
 The implementation of a project-wide cost contingency to ensure the contractually 
agreed-to or acceptable probability of success. 
 Contingencies held and managed at the project-wide level.  They should not be 
allocated at the task-level and held by individual subsystem managers.   
 A dynamic allocation algorithm with system-level oversight for managing project risks.  
However, individual technical risks are still managed by the responsible technical 
performers.  A database for tracking risks would provide a powerful tool for accurately 
watching and forecasting contingency allocations and for controlling adverse behaviors. 
All seven principles are necessary to ensure that adequate contingencies are available 
to mitigate all project risks and not just selected ones.  Projects that implement all seven 
principles are more likely to succeed and cost less.   
The author acknowledges that it takes effort to develop these more realistic models and 
that all models are only approximations to reality.  The single greatest challenge to the 
development and use of improved probabilistic cost analysis and dynamic budget allocation is 
the implementation of systems thinking at the personnel, organizational, and institutional levels.    
But given the magnitude of the cost overrun problem, there is no excuse for accepting the status 
quo; the benefits are likely to be significant.   
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Since the end of the Cold War, the perceived need for Navy ships has dropped, and so 
the shipbuilding budget has dropped.  Seemingly coincidental with this budgetary pressure, and 
perversely aggravating the problem, ship costs began to rise steeply.  We will set aside that 
ships have grown in weight by about three percent per year since World War II and that ever-
more weapon systems are being put into them, and confine ourselves to discussions of costs 
rising for ships beyond the increase in “content.”  We will also set aside rises due to commodity 
prices and inflation and that fewer ships, divided among a fixed industrial base, reduce the base 
for overhead and reduce opportunity for the effects of quantity-driven learning; these effects are 
well understood, and yet cost growth in ships exceeds that which they explain. This paper will 
show two additional effects, each of which causes ship direct labor to rise in a way that has 
never been adequately modeled.  The paper will demonstrate, via a statistically significant 
model, cost growth both from loss of learning due to increased time between ship starts as well 
as from the lessening of efficiency due to inexperienced labor caused by fluctuating demand. 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, the perceived need for Navy ships has dropped; 
therefore, the shipbuilding budget has dropped, as has most of the Defense Department’s 
budget.  The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has further stretched budgets.  Seemingly 
coincidental with this budgetary pressure, and perversely aggravating the problem, ship costs 
began to rise steeply.  This paper will demonstrate that a significant portion of the increase in 
ship costs is not a coincidence at all but is a direct result of decreased budgets in an 
unavoidable way.  We will set aside that ships have grown in weight by about three percent per 
year since World War II and that ever-more weapon systems are being put into them, and 
confine ourselves to discussions of costs rising for ships beyond the increase in “content.”  
Conventional wisdom holds that fewer ships, divided among a fixed industrial base, causes 
reduced base for overhead and reduced opportunity for the effects of quantity-driven learning; 
these effects are fairly well understood, and yet cost growth in ships exceeds the cost growth 
explained by conventional effects. This paper will show that two additional effects are at play, 
each of which causes individual ship direct labor to rise in a way that existing models and cost 
estimating tools do not predict.  The paper will explain these two effects and conclusively show 
their impact.   
The analysis that follows will demonstrate, via a statistically significant model, two 
effects: the effect of less demand and the effect of less-steady demand. The former causes 
stretched-out ship-class acquisitions, increasing time between ship starts; the latter causes 
workforce instability.  The analysis was conducted first on the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Aegis-
guided missile destroyer program and demonstrated to be statistically significant (25 data 
points).  In order to be absolutely certain of the analysis, as is the custom on important studies, 
it was conducted a second, independent time, on a wholly different ship type, the Wasp (LHD 1) 
class of amphibious assault ships (7 data points).  These ships are nearly four times as big as a 
DDG, have a different mission, and were built in the same era, but on a significantly different 
schedule.  The analysis revealed the same result and was again statistically significant.  The 
import of this second trial cannot be overstated; it results in dramatic increase in the significance 
of the results, from the customary 95% significance level to a 99.75% level.  The resultant 
model is called the Advanced Learning Model.  (The three progressively more comprehensive 
versions, ALM 1, ALM 2, and ALM 3, are summarized in this paper.) 
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Graphics would greatly simplify and clarify this summary, but the necessity of removing 
values and avoiding the compromise of proprietary data are delaying this process.  The paper 
as presented will show these very illuminating graphics.  The authors apologize for the lack of 
graphics herein and hope the reader will attend the briefing! 
ALM 1 Analysis: The DDG Class 
The analysis begins with an examination of Vessel Labor (VL), recurring direct labor, in 
manhours (MH), by ship.  The problem that presents itself, in ship class after ship class, is that 
there is a fairly obvious learning curve for the beginning of the ship class, but at some point this 
curve fails to predict future ships, and VL begins to rise seemingly without cause.  If we simply 
run a learning curve through the initial ships, and then run subsequent curves as the number of 
ships rises, we will get an answer that seems to show an ever-flattening learning curve.  (As we 
note later, some parties even claim that learning ceases at some point in a ship class; this is a 
misinterpretation of the perturbing—and, as we will show, perturbed—data.) 
This is a learning curve only in a manner of speaking, because, at some point, the 
“learning curve” does not pass through the data points in any satisfactory way.  There is no 
“learning curve” other than in the sense that any set of points can have a best-fit line run 
through them.  What is going on here? 
One of the problems is that traditional learning curve theory requires a steady work force 
building the same product multiple times with no significant interruptions or pauses.  Modern 
ship programs aren’t like that.  If these conditions are not fulfilled, there is discussion in the 
literature of loss of learning, but no closed-form, statistically-based method to predict how much 
learning is lost.  One model, the Anderlohr Break-in-Production Model, quantifies the effects of 
production breaks, but requires expert opinion and is, therefore, not defensible—it is only useful 
when mutually agreed to by, e.g., the contractor and the contracting officer.  In practice, this 
agreement is rare.  In competition, or in cases of outside scrutiny, for example by the OSD 
CAIG, this method will almost certainly not stand up. 
This problem seemed intractable, with no defensible methodology, until one graph 
changed everything; that single graph, one of many scatter plots, led to the breakthrough that 
started the ALM.  In that graph, Vessel Labor and Time between Ship Deliveries (in the final 
version, start fabrication was used as the marker for ship construction interval) were jointly 
plotted by ship (this necessitated use of a dual-axis graph).  From this one “Rosetta Stone” 
graphic, it became clear that MH rise and fall as time between ship starts rises and falls.  We 
were not yet ready to assert a closed-form learning model, but we began to suspect that 
learning was continuing throughout the ship class, and perhaps being lost as well.  The driving 
variable was ultimately expressed in terms of percent of build duration instead of days, as will 
be explained later. Many painstaking analytic steps remained, but the basic answer had begun 
to emerge. 
The analysis took a number of steps, as we have said.  It should be noted that nothing 
was easy in this analysis, since the data went back many years and, more often than not, was 
not available in the form in which it was needed.  Accordingly, practically every step required 
data normalization using analytical constructs or some form of “decoding” or deconstructing.  
These steps were all done after careful consultation with people who were present and in 
responsible positions at the time of production, and are in accord with conventional wisdom.  
Most significantly, in the end the analysis works, so the steps are, to a point, justified.  We say 
this knowing that, “the end does not justify the means”; nevertheless, when steps that make 
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sense are taken, and the result is both in accord with our ideas as to how it should be, and 
statistically verifiable, the result acts to shore up our confidence in the steps.  With that warning, 
we will proceed with the description of the analysis.  
1. First, we subtracted Type I change orders as listed in the contracts for each ship.  These 
are changes requested by the Navy for new “content” on the ship. 
2. Second, we removed change orders that were unseen originally because they were 
embedded in the base work of later ships.  These change orders were no longer tracked 
in the tracking system, as the work they contained was “rolled into” the base contract.   
3. Third, we took into account “Green Labor,” adjusting the MH to what they would have 
been had the labor mix been a nominal mix of experienced and inexperienced labor.  
This third step removes ship-by-ship variability of the labor force mix. 
4. Fourth, we adjusted for time between ship starts, as represented by the Start Fabrication 
step.  This fourth step is the keystone to the analysis.  The statistics for this step will be 
shown. 
The first three steps were difficult to judge on a one-at-a-time basis since they were not 
statistically testable.  As we have said, however, we assert that the final step, having been 
performed after the first three and tested as valid, acts to indicate (and we use this word 
advisedly) that the first three steps were valid.  Had the fourth step failed, we would not know 
which step(s) to blame, but since it worked, and since all four steps conform with conventional 
wisdom on how these effects should work, we feel justified in claiming they all were valid.  We 
did not rest on this claim, however, but conducted analysis on a second ship class and 
ascertained that our findings were neither a coincidence nor a result of “wishful analysis.” 
These steps as described result in a “peeled onion”—by “backing out” the various 
compounding effects to arrive at what turns out to be the smooth and continuous underlying 
learning curve.  It should be noted that all steps can be reversed to constitute a cost-estimation 
model that relies on accurate plans for change orders, yard manning, and ship intervals, at least 
the last two of which can be derived from shipbuilding plans. 
Analytical Details 
Analysis for Step 1—Change Orders 
Change orders were available for all ships, but only at the aggregate level.  When these 
aggregated changes were removed, it was clear further analysis was needed. We knew from 
testimony that, at a certain point in the life of any class, change orders from prior ship contracts 
are “rolled into” the base contract; from this point forward, these change orders are not tracked 
separately from the base work. This led us directly to Step 2, embedded change orders. 
Before we depart from step 1, however, we should note that actual VL MH for change 
orders are not tracked separately; so, only estimated change orders are available. There is 
considerable doubt among analysts as to the value of change orders, some believing that 
change orders are significantly overestimated (and, hence, a great source of revenue), others 
believing they are a significantly underestimated (and, hence, a loss).  When this analysis was 
done, we emerged with the conviction that change orders are estimated quite well, else the 
analysis would never have held up; we urge analysts and decision-makers to consider change 
order estimates to be more accurate than they have in the past. 
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Analysis for Step 2—Embedded Change Orders 
The removal of embedded changes required a great deal of decryption. Using the 
aggregate changes as a base, we segregated out one-time allowances for rip-out (removing 
completed or in-progress work that the change order replaces), disruption, and one-time change 
orders.  We also had to apply learning to the change orders, because like any work, as units 
progress, MH decrease.  Applying the normal percentage for each of these one-time effects, 
and applying learning, we “reverse engineered” to decode the change orders for follow-on ships.  
With the ship-by-ship deconstructed change orders in hand, we were able to “see” what 
the change orders looked like and, thus, could see when the change orders were rolled into the 
basic contract. We were able to spot a distinct rise in base work and an offsetting drop in 
change orders on the same ship; we matched this detective work with the memories of senior 
shipyard personnel and with the contractual picture (changes in the base work could only 
happen at the start of a contract of multiple ships).  The resulting embedded change orders 
were then subtracted from the appropriate ships; total changes were now removed.   
Analysis for Step 3—Green Labor 
“Green Labor” is defined as workers with less than 5 years experience; after 5 years, 
Green Labor becomes “Dry” or “Seasoned” Labor.  Green Labor is less effective than Seasoned 
Labor, based upon a study conducted at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems at their Ingalls 
Operations, and as indicated by a percentage.  (For example, if a worker is 80% effective, then 
it will take him or her 25% more hours to complete a task, since 1.0/0.8 = 1.25.)  This old study 
was not much in use, because it was perceived to be less than defensible since it was based 
upon expert (inside-yard) opinion.  One of the benefits of our analysis was that we revitalized 
this model and gave it credibility, as we will discuss.  The percentages by year probably differ 
with type of ship, yard, training programs, etc., as we know that the percentages are different at 
Northrop Grumman Newport News, based upon a study conducted there.  For this analysis, we 
used a weighted average of effectiveness for workers in the first 5 years. 
As in earlier steps, however, it wasn’t just that easy.  Data did not exist, for any unit, 
tracking the portion of the labor force that was green vs. the portion of the labor force that was 
dry.  Again, we needed a construct.  By interviewing managers and HR personnel, we 
ascertained the key variables in the experience-level problem, and built a Markov Chain model 
for labor experience.  We know, for example, that layoffs were LIFO (last-in-first-out); we know 
the attrition rates for Seasoned and Green labor, and we know that most hired labor was Green.  
We built a Markov Chain model, and it produced the then-current labor mix within about 2 
percentage points; the model was seeded with a reasonable start point, so we were confident 
that the Markov Chain labor mix estimates were close.  This model gave us the year-by-year 
labor mix, and we used this mix to adjust to a notional (most common) labor mix, thereby nearly 
(because this is an approximation, we can only say “nearly”) eliminating the effects of labor 
force mix. 
As a side note, in past briefings we often said that the effects of labor mix are not 
dominant in this problem, because labor mix is fairly stable; after Hurricane Katrina, however, 
when we looked at reconstituting the labor force with this model, we saw that when labor swings 
considerably, the effect becomes quite big.  In a small-business-base case, considerable cost 
impact is, in fact, caused by labor swings.  While average Green Labor is less efficient than 
Seasoned Labor, first-year labor is quite a bit less efficient, so an unstable work force that is 
constantly ramping up and down will result in considerable loss of efficiency.  This all said, 
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however, our model demonstrates that the potential for cost impacts are greatest in the last 
variable: loss of learning due to interval effect.   
Analysis for Step 4—Loss of Learning due to Interval Effect 
The final step is the most important step, both because the prior steps were either 
understood or in practice, and because this step acts to verify, in the way we have described, 
the earlier steps.  In this step, we conducted a linear regression of the difference between 
learning as observed and learning as expected.  Though this was difficult in derivation, and had 
many false steps, the result is intuitive. 
Two major assumptions underlie our method.  These two assumptions are in accord with 
current learning curve theory but deserve mention.  First, we assumed that learning is constant 
and incremental and proceeds from one ship to the next.  This means that as other effects 
occur, the learning curve factor is still at play.  We have been surprised that others have 
asserted that learning stops after nine or ten ships35.  This is not in consonance with anything in 
the literature of learning, and we believe that the results of this analysis bear out our belief that 
learning continues through all units.  Getting ahead of ourselves for a moment, we believe that 
at some point in a ship class there is surely a considerable change-order effect and the 
attendant slow-down in production as the changes are engineered, which causes loss of 
learning.  This is not to say learning stopped, but rather to say that other effects are causing a 
rise in ship costs.  Some of these effects are controllable; and all are, to some degree, 
predictable.  Second, we believe that should there be a loss of learning, (1) the learning begins 
anew, arguably at the same rate; and (2) it continues from the new point with later ships.  Both 
things occurred in the two classes we analyzed.  Said another way, loss of learning acts as a 
reset of the curve; later units will never revert to the old curve, but rather proceed from the reset 
unit following a new curve with the old slope.  This last belief means that we must measure loss 
of learning from the effective unit of the prior ship, moved ahead one unit.  Thus, we must 
correct out all other effects since those effects (or at least those we encountered) are either 
transient or fade on their own timescale.  Green labor appears to be one such effect; as the 
labor force matures, workers approach a basic efficiency. 
This discussion should by now have alerted the reader as to how complex this analysis 
is and how dependent it is on each step.  Get one step wrong—we know, we did it many times 
as we groped through it—and the whole thing will not work.  One can “see” the effects; to prove 
them analytically, however, requires considerable precision and care.  It was particularly 
confounding that for many of the ships in the DDG class, the Green Labor and interval effects 
tended to counteract each other.  This was because when time between ships stretched out—
causing loss of learning due to interval effect, which tended to drive VL MH up—there was less 
work in the yard, so manning was reduced (largely via the firing of Green Labor), resulting in a 
more efficient labor force, which tended to drive VL MH down.  At other times, such as at the 
onset of major changes in a class, the effects can reinforce each other because there has been 
a gap, but work then suddenly builds up in the yard.  It was not until both effects were quantified 
that this complex interaction could be fully understood.  This interplay has doubtless been a 
major complication in understanding these effects. 
                                                
35 Arena, M.V., Blickstein, I., Younossi, O., Grammich., C.A. (2006). Why has the cost of Navy ships 
risen?  A macroscopic examination of the trends in US Naval ship costs over the past several decades. 
RAND.  
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When conducting our analysis, we first determined to what point on the learning curve 
each ship should have progressed based on the previous ship.  This was conducted iteratively 
from the second ship to the final ship.  We then regressed the difference between the 
expectation and the realization, expressed as numbers of units (or fractions thereof) lost, 
against days between ships.  The regression was significant at the 95% significance level (the 
“p-value” was 0.0106).  The coefficient of determination (called r2) was 0.4324.  While this is not 
an overwhelming r2, it is a respectable one, and in any event, the determinant of validity is 
significance, not r2.   
This regression shows that loss of learning is linear with days between ship starts.  As 
ships are built less and less frequently, learning seems to “flatten.”  The underlying learning 
curve slope, however, continues to remain in force.  The ships do not cease to learn, they lose 
learning.  This is an important distinction.  If the interval shortens, as it occasionally does, the 
MH drop faster, reverting to the original learning curve slope if they are close enough together.   
There is much to discuss about this finding, but first we should observe one very 
important fact.  The underlying learning that emerged for a ship class of 25 ships was the same 
learning realized by the first nine undisturbed ships.  After the ninth ship, cost began to rise, so 
much so that the cost of the thirteenth ship was nearly equal to the cost of the fourth ship.   This 
may not be surprising after all our descriptions of the effects that change costs.  The point is that 
most of these effects do not happen in the early ships because they tend to be produced at 
steady, close, intervals; this proved true for both DDGs and LHDs.   The rise that began in 
DDGs after nine ships (and in LHDs after four ships, though, like DDG, about five years into the 
program) was caused by the combined effects of change orders, embedded change orders, 
labor inefficiencies caused by the coincidence of a new class of large ship in the shipyard, and 
loss of learning due to the delays caused by the incorporation of a major change (DDG 51 Flight 
IIA).  We are confident that this is why so many analysts in shipbuilding cite cessation of 
learning; but we wish to say this again for emphasis: learning continued in this ship class, as far 
as we had data, out past the 25th ship.  The reader will see that this was true in LHDs as well.  
Costs rose due to predictable (or at least expected) effects, and, though learning was lost due to 
slowdowns, it continued on from each point “as regular as sunrise.”  To say learning stopped is 
to miss the point and to forsake the opportunity of prediction.  
We also found that there appeared to be an “ideal” interval between ships that causes 
consistent learning.  But as our understanding deepened, we began to appreciate that a ship 
class can seem to take any learning curve, depending on the predominant interval between 
ships.  We will also show the days between ships was a poor way to display the interval, and we 
later changed to percent of construction duration; this change promises to open a whole new 
possibility.  We will we discuss both things further below. 
The Need for Confirmation: The LHD Class 
The DDG model has been laid out.  In many important analyses, it is customary to do 
second trials (e.g., in medical studies).  The second test guards against spurious results.  We 
will describe the meta-analysis later.  In this case, though, a confirming analysis was needed 
more than in usual cost analysis cases because of the many data normalization steps that 
preceded the regression.  We have asserted that the ultimate regression sustains the earlier 
steps, but we cannot escape being nervous that we may have driven towards a conclusion, 
inadvertently forcing the conclusion.  This is natural and must be guarded against.  Accordingly, 
we immediately set about repeating the analysis for a second ship class.  
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We did exactly the same analytical steps on the LHD as described for the DDG and 
arrived at exactly the same conclusions; we found the LHD class had done just what the DDGs 
did.   The LHD step 4 regression for the Interval Effect was significant at the 95% significance 
level (the “p-value” was 0.017).  The coefficient of determination (called r2) was 0.887.  This r2 
was higher, due simply to the fact that the LHDs fell into two groups; 3 units lost no learning and 
two lost all learning. Once again, the determinant of validity is significance, not r2.   The only 
difference was that the rate at which the LHDs lost learning was slower (the slope of the line 
was flatter); and the “cross-over” point, the interval at which there was no loss of learning at all, 
was longer in days (the x-intercept was greater).  In a manner of speaking, the “time constants” 
were longer.  What was more interesting, however, was that LHDs had on two occasions lost 
learning very dramatically; the class had reverted to a first unit (lost all learning) twice, at LHD 5 
and LHD 7.  The underlying learning for the LHD class was quite similar to the DDGs, only a few 
percentage points flatter.  As a last caution, we know that two LHDs lost all learning and 
reverted to the first unit.  We, thus, cannot know whether the interval effect might be stronger 
than we have evidence for because these two ships were capped at the first-unit level.  
Accordingly, we know that the LHD interval effect is at least as strong as we found, and quite 
likely stronger.   
This brings us to an important point: learning due to interval, according to our model, 
occurs in units with time. For mature classes (say after nine ships, like the DDG), the loss of a 
few units is not a large number of MH, because the curve has flattened out by this point to a few 
percentage points per unit.  For less mature classes, like the LHD, however, learning is still 
occurring at a steep rate, and the loss of a unit may be more on the order of 10% or more.  In 
either case, if the Navy or the Coast Guard have negotiated an FPI contract, because “follow 
ship costs should be well known,” and there is a delay due to negotiations, design activity, or 
lessened SCN budgets, the rise can erase all profit.  This can be even more of a problem if the 
method of EAC computation does not catch an insidious rise in preceding ships, perhaps also 
due to factors that do not lie at the feet of the builder and which will cause the next ship to rise 
for additional (additive) reasons. 
Meta-analysis and Mutual Confirmation 
To summarize, the DDG model is, as far as statistics can take us, valid.  The LHD model 
is also valid, and we can use either.  The significance of the entire analysis is one minus the 
square of the significance of each: 1 - 0.052 = 1 - 0.0025 (significance is 99.75%.)  This well-
known technique is called meta-analysis.  Most importantly though, the LHD model represents a 
second ship class and was undertaken to confirm the DDG model.  Taken together, the LHD 
and DDG models are much stronger than either is alone because the models are mutually 
confirming.  Taken alone, the DDG analysis has the weaknesses that “first models” commonly 
have: although reasonable, the adjustments were taken to drive towards a smooth learning 
curve.  Statistically, this amounts to an uncredited loss of “degrees of freedom.”  Alternatively, a 
hostile view can arise that the data was “cooked.”  The LHD model alleviates this concern.  
Since the steps taken with DDG were replicated in LHD and the same result was obtained, our 
analysis was neither dumb luck nor manipulation.  Further, the LHD class had only 7 ships 
completed, so taken alone, the LHD analysis lacks data across the full spectrum of interval 
length.  The DDG model alleviates this concern with 25 ships and a wide range of intervals. 
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ALM 2: The Enterprise Model 
We built an enterprise-level model that instantiates the Advanced Learning Model for an 
entire shipyard complex, namely Northrop Grumman Ship Systems.  We call this a forward-
looking model because it projects effects given the results of the prior analysis, which we call 
ALM 1.  This model, called ALM 2, brought about three significant new capabilities.  First, the 
model allows for the quick determination of the impacts of the effects described above on either 
a future ship class or the remainder of a class.  It also allows the input of all ships in the 
enterprise.  Second, it computes the labor profile, at the gross level, for the yard—a capability 
which formerly took weeks.  The detailed trade-by-trade labor profiles are still done by hand, 
and much mischief can arise at the trade level that the enterprise model is blind to; but, large 
what-ifs can nevertheless be done quickly as a first-order approximation.  Third, this enterprise 
model has the ability to model cross-ship effects and, since it is in closed form, feedback effects 
on labor. 
When a ship cost estimate is done, the apparent labor needs are determined for a 
notional labor profile—the profile that was in effect at the time of the historical data.  The model 
first needs to compute the efficiency of the labor force in the yard where it is being built based 
on the mix of Green Labor.  The model then will compute interval effects based on the 
preceding ship and the interval before the ship in question.  At this point, the model will adjust 
the need for labor.  This adjustment changes the labor mix in the yard because new labor must 
be hired above (or below) what was expected, due to the effects of these two variables.  This 
produces a feedback loop which happily converges fairly quickly.  Likewise, the model, having 
all ships in the yard loaded in, quickly computes the effects of the new labor on all the other 
ships in the yard as the labor force, and the associated feedback loops, swells or shrinks and 
does so quickly. 
The enterprise model brought out an understanding that is worthy of some discussion.  
As we began to use the model to predict ships, we needed to develop a good prediction for 
change orders.  When we did the analysis using the carefully deconstructed change order data 
for these two ship classes, we were taken aback by the size and the implications of what we 
found.  We found that change orders were large on the first ship, which we had known, and 
averaged 12.30% of base costs (with a wide variability). We knew that by definition change 
orders would be large at Flight change or at major modifications, so when we found that 
changes were 8.62% of cost it was sobering but not surprising.  What surprised us was that 
change orders on the rest of the ships, ships that were neither first ships nor major 
modifications, was 2.97%, with a fairly clear pattern of rising over the class but virtually always 
exceeding 1.2%.  This change-order pattern meant that by the 25th ship, with two major 
modifications, the labor cost of the DDG change orders had have become equal to about half 
that of the base ship.  On the LHD, change orders have risen to be about one-quarter of the 
cost of the base work by the 7th ship.  This finding showed us that change orders are a much 
larger part of the cost of follow ships than we had realized, even though we knew the 
conventional wisdom that changes are a big factor in ship costs.   
It should not be concluded that change orders are inherently bad.  Change orders are at 
least partly a response to lessons learned, changes in technology and in the threat.  That said, 
they bear careful monitoring due to their size, which begins to rival initial cost in their claim on 
scarce SCN. Change orders also have a second, hitherto-less-well-understood effect on ship 
costs.  It is quite likely that change orders act both as chicken and egg in the ship-cost scenario.  
As budgets drop, interval increases, allowing an ever-increasing pressure for change—be it due 
to an industrious engineering community, technology changes, or requirements changes.  
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Conversely, changes cause design delay, increasing intervals, sometimes considerably, as they 
do in major modifications. Thus, changes are already a considerable factor and have the ability 
to become more of a factor in tight budget years, as well as to drive the other effects to become 
larger as they delay ships and contribute to cost rises—which destabilize labor costs. 
Implications 
At the outset of this paper, we described how ship costs have suddenly seemed to go 
out of control just as budgets have dropped, exacerbating the problem.  There are no doubt 
many reasons for such a problem, some of which are outlined in the RAND study already 
referenced.  Many of the reasons cited in the RAND paper, such as inflation and commodity 
volatility, have conventional means of prediction, however flawed the results may be.  Our 
paper, on the other hand, puts forward three new effects that were hitherto generally ignored 
analytically or discounted by decision-makers.  As we have already said, change-order 
estimates in general turned out to be quite accurate; without this accuracy, the analysis would 
have been impossible.  The “lost” change orders are unarguable in principle, and although the 
exact values estimated could be quibbled with, they are certainly “generally right.”  The 
illumination we have brought to this issue will help explain past cost increases. And closer 
attention to tracking change orders going forward should be a big help to future cost estimation. 
The Green Labor model we described was in use at one Northrop Grumman shipyard and is 
now in use at them all, although its impact is debated and occasionally somewhat discounted.  
We believe that Green Labor’s part in this analysis will go far to bolster the basis for the 
computation of this effect.  The interval effect has always been part of shipyard lore, but has 
never been quantified.  Even now, shipyards are struggling to understand the model and to 
overcome past “explanations” for rising costs, such as: labor inefficiencies (true, but overstated 
for the lack of an agreed-upon model), one-time events (again, true, but arguably overstated for 
lack of sufficiently reliable discrete cost tracking), and disruption effects such as were alleged to 
have happened twice on DDG and once on LHD (we found no significant differences that 
needed explanation, so the supposed disruption, although appealing intellectually, was absent if 
you believe our analysis).   
The net of the effects in this paper is extremely large, and almost all was cost growth.  
The newly explained cost growth in labor, resulting from embedded change orders, Green Labor 
and loss of learning due to interval for all ships from 12 through 25 of the DDG is a total of 21%, 
and for all ships from 3 through 7 of the LHD is a total of 19%.    This is a staggering amount of 
cost to have been hitherto unexplained.  Of the newly explained cost growth in labor, 8.8% 
(almost half) of the growth in DDGs was from loss of learning due to the interval effect; for the 
LHD class, 14% (almost ¾) was from loss of learning due to the interval effect. Most of the rest 
of the unexplained cost growth was due to “lost” change orders.  The DDG interval effect was 
less of the total partly because the class was more mature and further down the learning curve; 
thus, units lost were smaller in MH than for LHDs. Conversely, for LHDs, change orders were 
less of the total because there had been fewer units for them to have accumulated.  Green labor 
was the least of the effects, and tended to be pluses or minuses as labor waxed and waned.  
We thus believe that a large mystery has been solved, and that we have provided the ability to 
avoid similar large errors in the future.  As with any cost-estimating technique, of course, the 
ability to project will depend upon how well we can determine the inputs. 
This model has the capability to account for many large and unpleasant cost-growth 
effects, especially for modified ships that are characterized by long intervals, large change-order 
packages, and large swings in labor as the class goes back into production.  Hence, we believe 
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that the model will be invaluable in better predicting costs.   We hope it will be helpful in 
reducing mistrust and tension between the Navy and the Coast Guard on the one hand, and the 
shipyards on the other—as well as between the Congress and the services.  We believe the 
model goes a long way towards explaining cost rises in terms the various parties can better 
understand as unavoidable in the past and more predictable in the future. 
There are policy implications to these findings as well.  We believe costs can be better 
estimated now; but beyond that, they can be better controlled as well.  One simple exercise 
involved changing the acquisition profile for Large Deck Amphibious ships.  By optimizing the 
timing of ship acquisitions, we found that labor costs could be reduced by almost 6% in constant 
dollars—and this was with only a single ship class to work with.  In addition, in order to be 
successful, the Navy’s current cost reduction strategy of re-using existing hull forms for new 
classes of ships must obey the constraints illuminated here.  Change orders must be 
suppressed to the degree that they can, intervals between ships must be thoughtfully timed, and 
demand variance that results in workforce instability must be avoided.   We note that this is 
consistent with an enterprise view of shipbuilding: the Navy making acquisition decisions that 
support its private-industry partners in their efforts to contain costs.  On the other hand, for the 
Navy to pursue acquisition strategies that ignore the demonstrated effects of change orders, 
loss of learning due to interval, and Green Labor—and at the same time to press for cost 
reduction—is inherently problematic.  It is further setting the enterprise up for failure. 
Next Steps 
We hope to take this analysis to other ship classes.  We further hope to take it beyond 
ships to other commodities.  As strange as it may sound, application to satellites is quite 
promising, as they are, like ships, complex objects with long development spans involving 
integration of many components, operated in demanding environments, and procured in small 
“batches” (usually one or two).  There is no clear reason why this methodology should not work 
for other sorts of production.  Indeed, the problem may be considerably easier since labor force 
changes should be less of an effect in items of shorter duration and higher production rate.  
Change orders may also be easier, because data will not be so old in calendar terms and since 
the shorter times lend themselves to fewer changes.   
We would like to point out that so-called “rate effects” in learning have been elusive.  We 
know of no demonstration of a statistically significant rate effect.  We suggest that perhaps the 
“rate effect,” which is commonly introduced as a second term in the learning equation, may 
simply be an incorrect portrayal of the interval effect we have demonstrated.  Rate effect uses 
the number of units to be produced in a given year and lowers costs as the quantity rises and 
raises costs as it drops.  This acts to reduce cost when units are built closer together (more 
production units per unit time), thus mirroring the sense of the interval effect we found but using 
different mathematical expressions to model it.  Statistics have the unfortunate limitation that a 
hypothesis must be formulated for the test.  If the hypothesis is structured in an incorrect form, 
the model is unlikely to be significant; thus, the hypothesis that the model is invalid cannot be 
rejected.  Many good ideas founder on this shoal, and this failure of an “almost right model” or a 
model that acts in a sensible way, but is formulated a bit incorrectly, frustrates the analyst and 
leads to unreasonable distrust of statistics.  We look forward to investigating the rate effect 
relative to the interval effect and believe that the interval effect will replace it in practice. 
As we have alluded to, we have already begun a re-formulation of the model.  We have 
changed the expression of the model for loss of learning from days to percent of construction 
duration.  This is merely a change in scale, and the results do not change for either model.  
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What does change, however, is that when the model is expressed in the new way, we discover 
that the LHD and DDG graphs of loss of learning overlay each other.  In the “days form,” we had 
no way to move to another class, because we had no way to interpolate save linearly, and we 
were wary of this assumption.  Worse yet, when applied to a much smaller ship, like a frigate, or 
a much larger ship, like an aircraft carrier, the extrapolation became irrational.  This amounted 
to reductio ad absurdum of linear extrapolation and so cast doubt upon interpolation.  When 
expressed as percent of interval, however, the result, although not yet tested, is appealing and 
intuitive.  This version of the model is called ALM 3.   
We are not shipbuilders, and further, we are always reluctant to speculate beyond what 
we can prove.  Nonetheless, one of the reasons we are inclined to believe this “percent form” is 
that the nature of work on a large ship changes less quickly during production than for small 
ships.  For example, shell plating and other large-object welding lasts a similar percentage of 
construction time on large ships as it does for smaller ships; hence, we speculate that the 
opportunity to “learn” lasts longer, and time to lose it takes longer in days but not in percent. 
This change in scale has taken us to another point.  We are in the midst of trying to 
determine whether the percent model will lead us to a long-sought capability: the capability to 
predict the underlying learning curve for any ship knowing only the expected construction 
duration and the planned schedule for the class.  We anticipate having a preliminary version of 
this in time for the symposium, or to have learned that this is un-doable.  If we can achieve this, 
we feel the results will be every bit as important as the loss-of-learning model.  It would also 
increase the importance of both accurate schedule estimating and stable program schedules, as 
these are key inputs to the learning-curve determination, which in turn is the single biggest 
driver of labor cost.  It is premature to make a claim of broader application, especially since the 
ship portion is as yet undone, but we cannot stop our minds from racing ahead.  We hold out 
hope for this model being useful in other commodities.  We have, on an informal basis, noted 
that the interval for Global Hawk is similar to that for DDGs in percent, and that the learning 
curve is similar.  We raise this point in order to excite the reader’s interest and to indicate that 
the possibility of further application is real.      
Conclusions 
This paper is short, and so our conclusions should be short as well.  We have shown 
that a careful treatment of change orders, labor force mix, and time between ship starts has 
enabled us to demonstrate—we believe for the first time—a closed-form and statistically 
rigorous treatment of loss of learning.  The analysis has validated an old labor mix model and 
shown it to have considerably credibility, and has unified change orders, labor profiles, and loss 
of learning in a way that substantially changes ship-cost estimation.  We have already created 
an enterprise model and have hopes of being able to extend the model to other commodities. 
We will, perhaps, even be able to predict learning curves for ship classes—a capability that 
does not yet exist. 
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Panel 18 - Modeling & Simulation in Support of Acquisition 
 
Thursday, 
May 17, 2007 
Panel 18 - Modeling & Simulation in Support of Acquisition 
1:45 p.m. – 
3:15 p.m. 
Chair:  
Daniel A. Nussbaum, Professor, Naval Postgraduate School 
Papers: 
Simulation Based Acquisition Revisited 
Michael F. McGrath, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation 
An Innovative Approach for Training Acquisitions—Part II 
Fred Hartman, Deputy Director, Readiness and Training, and Director of 
the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability, Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
An Open Strategy for the Acquisition of Models and Simulations  
Rudy Darken, Naval Postgraduate School  
Application of Systmes Engineering Principles in Curricular Design 
David H. Olwell, Jarema M. Didoszak, Jean M. Catalano, Naval 
Postgraduate School, and LCDR Joseph Cohn, USN, Medical Service 
Corps 
 
Chair: Daniel A. Nussbaum, PhD is a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, in the Operations 
Research department, in Monterey, California. His expertise is in cost/benefit analyses, life cycle cost 
estimating and modeling, budget preparation and justification, performance measurement and earned 
value management (EVM), activity based costing (ABC) and Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) analyses. 
From December 1999 through June 2004 he was a Principal with Booz Allen Hamilton, providing 
estimating and analysis services to senior levels of the US Federal government. He has been the chief 
advisor to the Secretary of Navy on all aspects of cost estimating and analysis throughout the Navy, and 
has held other management and analysis positions with the US Army and Navy, in this country and in 
Europe. 
In a prior life, he was a tenured university faculty member. 
Dr. Nussbaum has a BA, in Mathematics and Economics from Columbia University, and a Ph.D., in 
Mathematics from Michigan State University.  He has held post doctoral positions in Econometrics and 
Operations Research, and in National Security Studies at Washington State University and Harvard 
University. 
He is active in professional societies, currently serving as the President of the Society of Cost Estimating 
and Analysis.  He has previously been the VP of the Washington chapter of INFORMS, and he has 
served on the Board of the Military Operations Research Society. 
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He publishes and speaks regularly before professional audiences. 
Finally, he is married, has two children and four grandchildren. He is a lap swimmer and a dedicated herb 
and vegetable gardener. 
Daniel A. Nussbaum, Professor 
Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: 831-656-2387 
Email: dnussbaum@nps.edu  
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Simulation Based Acquisition Revisited 
Presenter: Michael F. McGrath, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation. Dr. Michael McGrath is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation.  His role is to develop programs to bridge the gap in transitioning from 
Science and Technology to Acquisition, and to improve processes for integrating T&E across acquisition 
programs. Prior to his appointment to this position in 2003, Dr. McGrath spent five years as Vice 
President for Government Business at the Sarnoff Corporation, a leading R&D company with both 
commercial and government clients. Dr. McGrath has 28 years of prior government experience, including 
logistics at NAVAIR in the 1970s, acquisition in OSD in the 1980s, and technology development at 
DARPA in the 1990s. Dr. McGrath holds a BS in Space Science and Applied Physics, a MS in Aerospace 
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An Innovative Approach for Training Acquisitions—Part II 
 
Presenter:  Fred Hartman, Deputy Director, Readiness and Training, and Director of the Joint 
Assessment and Enabling Capability, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness. Hartman is a distinguished member of the DoD M&S Community, and has served for many 
years in various government and industry positions. He is currently the Deputy Director of Readiness and 
Training Policy and Programs (RTPP) for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, (Personnel and 
Readiness) and the Director of Training Transformation Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability 
(JAEC). Mr. Hartman also serves as a tri-chair and Training Community member for the DoD M&S 
Steering Committee.  
Mr. Hartman was commissioned in Field Artillery on graduation from the United States Military Academy 
and later earned a Master of Science degree in Operations Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School.  
In addition to FA and Aviation assignments, he served as: military operations analyst, procurement 
programs analyst, executive assistant and analyst for the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for 
Operations Research.  
After his Army career, Mr. Hartman was an Executive Vice President for CACI. He also served as Chief 
Operating Officer, co-founder and board member for Applied Solutions International, Inc. In 1995, Mr. 
Hartman joined the Institute for Defense Analyses as a modeling and simulation consultant to the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. In 2004, he assumed duties as Director of the Joint 
Assessment and Enabling Capability and, in 2005, took on the additional responsibilities as Deputy 
Director of RTPP. Mr. Hartman has served as a member of the Army Science Board, led a study panel for 
the National Academy of Sciences Board on Army Science and Technology and is a past president and 
fellow of the Military Operations Research Society. 
 
Abstract 
The Training Capabilities Analysis of Alternatives (TC AoA) published in 2004 examined 
a host of issues related to training transformation and the future of training to meet joint 
operational needs. During the conduct of the TC AoA, the industry partners participating in a 
business game indicated the DoD should improve their approach for buying training simulations 
and tools as well training support services.   The AoA recommended a limited acquisition 
prototype (known as Alternative #4) to explore the many issues for procurement of training, 
including privatization of both training-support and training-tool development efforts with 
competitive market forces.  The RAND Corporation conducted a follow-on research effort in 
2005 to produce and implement an evaluation plan for the prototype of this alternative.  The 
current prototype is being executed this year to include the Defense and Inter-agency 
Coordination for Homeland Defense training issues.  
This presentation should be of interest to those participating in, or charged with carrying 
out, innovative approaches for Defense Acquisitions, including Modeling and Simulation.  After a 
short update on the training community progress on the Alternative #4 business process, the 
common and cross-cutting aspects of this prototype from training to other functional DoD 
applications will be discussed. 
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An Open Strategy for the Acquisition of Models and Simulations 
Presenter: Rudolph Darken, Director, the MOVES Institute, Naval Postgraduate School. Darken is the 
Director of the Defense Modeling and Simulation Institute (MOVES) and Professor of Computer Science 
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is also the Associate Director for Research 
for the Center for Homeland Defense and Security and serves on the Academic Committees for Modeling 
and Simulation (MOVES) as well as Human Systems Integration (HSI). His personal research has been 
primarily focused on human factors and training using virtual environments and computer gaming media 
with emphasis on navigation and wayfinding in large-scale virtual worlds. He is a Senior Editor of 
PRESENCE Journal, the MIT Press journal of teleoperators and virtual environments. He received his BS 
in Computer Science Engineering from the University of Illinois at Chicago in 1990 and his MS and DSc 
degrees in Computer Science from The George Washington University in 1993 and 1995, respectively. 
Rudolph P. Darken 
Director, The MOVES Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School 
darken@nps.edu 
Abstract 
It remains unknown exactly how much the Department of Defense spends on Modeling 
and Simulation annually. Estimates range from $9B to $15B, but precise numbers are 
unavailable because it’s hard to say where M&S starts and ends in a training, analysis, or 
acquisition program. But if these estimates are anywhere near accurate, a discussion of how we 
acquire M&S capabilities and how we can get more done with less is warranted. The DoD has 
recently approved the equal consideration of open source for supplying software for DoD 
functions. M&S, being largely a software-based technology, should fall under this policy. 
However, M&S remains an almost exclusively proprietary domain for software development—
even though the commonalities between M&S products are vast. The simple fact is that the 
current model for the acquisition of M&S products requires that the government pay for the 
same capabilities over and over because reusability is not considered, or at least not considered 
to be possible or practical. This is a myth. There are good examples in which this is changing—
for example, reusable terrain databases in aviation simulation. The saving here are enormous. 
But more M&S products are bought and paid for as complete products, where the supplier is 
virtually guaranteed downstream revenue due to “vendor  lock-in” common in software products. 
There is a way out. An open source and standards framework to simulation that modularizes 
M&S software so that the government buys only what it needs is possible. In fact, we have an 
excellent example of such a framework from enterprise computing called the Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA). This presentation will introduce concepts of open source and standards for 
the Defense M&S community and will show how a SOA approach (but not a literal SOA 
implementation) is possible and can result in extremely large efficiency gains due to reusable 
software, content, and source code.
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Application of Systems Engineering Principles in Curricular Design  
Presenter: David H. Olwell is the Chairman of the Department of Systems Engineering at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Dr. Olwell previously taught at the United States Military Academy in the 
Department of Mathematical Sciences and in the Operations Research Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.    His specific research interests focus on the analysis of systems, with emphasis 
on reliability, quality, and warranty issues.    
Author: Jarema M. Didoszak is a Research Assistant Professor in the Mechanical and Astronautical 
Engineering Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Mr. Didoszak is also an 
engineering duty officer in the Navy Reserve.  Over the last four years, he has been conducting NAVSEA-
funded modeling and simulation research in support of the DDG 81, LPD 17, DDG 1000 and LCS ship 
shock trial programs.  He is currently pursuing a PhD in Mechanical Engineering. 
Author: Jean M. Catalano is a Research Assistant in the Systems Engineering Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.  After serving on active duty in the US Navy, she supported 
the NAVSEA Warfare Systems Engineering Directorate (NAVSEA06) before coming to Naval 
Postgraduate School, where she is currently pursuing a PhD in Software Engineering. 
Authors: LCDR Joseph Cohn, USN, Medical Service Corps, is an Aerospace Experimental Psychologist 
in the US Navy’s Medical Service Corps. He has served as the Lead Scientist on a range of training 
programs, overseeing the design, development, validation and transition of numerous Virtual Environment 
training systems across the DoN. He is currently serving as the Lead Scientist as part of the Chief of 
Naval Personnel’s Strategic Concepts group, focusing on defining future challenges and solutions to 
Navy Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education. 
Abstract 
The Defense Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office presented the Naval 
Postgraduate School with an enormous challenge in 2006: design and deliver an educational 
program by 2008, for 20,000 or more acquisition professionals, focusing on the effective use of 
modeling and simulation in acquisition.  The acquisition workforce is central to force 
transformation, and education is the key to transforming that workforce.  This paper describes 
the processes, lessons learned to date, and assessment plan for this project. 
We applied a systems-engineering approach to the problem of curricular design.  The 
resulting solution consists of four spirals. The first spiral focused on defining the problem.  We 
developed our analysis based on factors such as the market segmentation of the acquisition 
workforce, the current resources available, the state of the modeling and simulation body of 
knowledge, the desired educational outcomes for each market segment, and the gaps that 
existed between those outcomes and the existing resources.  At each step in the process, we 
involved key stakeholders from the acquisition, test and evaluation and training communities.  
We describe the results of this process. 
In the second spiral, our goal is to construct a learning architecture to cover the gaps 
identified in the first spiral. We describe the course content, scope, and delivery methods that 
are proposed based on those needs from the first spiral.   
The results of the first spiral, initiation of spiral two and subsequent lessons learned, will 
be the focus of our discussion herein.  We will also briefly summarize the third and fourth 
spirals, which involve course design and testing in spiral three and delivery and assessment of 
the curriculum for spiral four.   
Keywords: Modeling & Simulation, Education, Acquisition, Systems Engineering. 
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Panel 19 - Acquisition of Services 
 
Thursday, 
May 17, 2007 
Panel 19 - Modeling & Simulation in Support of Acquisition 
1:45 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: 
Stuart A. Hazlett, Deputy Director for Strategic Sourcing, Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 
Papers:  
Enterprise Challenges Facing the Strategic Sourcing of Services 
Stuart Hazlett, Deputy Director, Strategic Sourcing, Defense Procurement 
and Acquisition Policy 
The Commander of Naval Installations and the Acquisition of Services 
Thomas Trump, Assistant Deputy Commander for Contracting 
Management, Naval Supply Systems Command 
Performing Quality Assurance and Effectively Administering the Strategic 
Sourcing of Services 
COL Anthony Incorvati, Chief, BTA Division and Strategic Sourcing, 
ITEC4, Army Contracting Agency 
Essential Elements to Successful Execution of Strategically Sourced 
Services  
Randall McFadden, Director, Acquisition Management and Integration 
Center 
Delivering to the Warfighter 
Dale Huegen, Deputy Chief, Command Acquisition, USTRANSCOM 
Managing the Service Supply Chain in DoD: Implications for the Program 
Management Infrastructure 
Rene Rendon and Uday Apte, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Chair: Stuart A. Hazlett, Deputy Director for Strategic Sourcing, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, serves as an advisor to the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) and his 
staff on matters relating to the Acquisition and Sourcing Processes and initiatives across the Department 
of Defense.  Mr. Hazlett provides advice and counsel regarding the formulation and development of policy 
on various strategic sourcing programs associated with transformation, and leads a focused team that 
oversees critical Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (AT&L) transformation initiatives that accelerate 
delivery of effective and efficient business mission functions. 
Before taking his current position, Mr. Hazlett was the Chief of Procurement Transformation, Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, where he was charged with improving agile sourcing in the Air Force. His 
office maintained a contracting strategic management framework to identify, develop, and field strategic 
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initiatives to support a contracting enterprise responsible for executing $61B annually. Mr. Hazlett entered 
federal service in 1984 as a Pacer Produce assigned to the San Antonio Air Logistics Center at Kelly Air 
Force Base, Texas, and has held contracting offer warrants in the areas of research and development, 
systems, and sustainment acquisitions in support of numerous major weapons systems. During his 
career, he has served in direct support of congressionally mandated panels dealing with acquisition 
issues facing the federal government.  
Mr. Hazlett holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Ohio Northern University and a master’s degree from 
Central Michigan University. He is also a 1998 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 
where he earned a second masters degree in national resource management. In addition, he is a 
graduate of the Defense Systems Management College at Fort Belvoir, Senior Executive Fellows 
Program from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Leadership for a 
Democratic Society from the Federal Executive Institute. 
Mr. Hazlett was recently honored with the Department of the Air Force’s Award for Meritorious Civilian 
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Enterprise Challenges Facing the Strategic Sourcing of Services 
Presenter: Stuart Hazlett, Deputy Director for Strategic Sourcing, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy 
The Commander of Naval Installations and the Acquisition of 
Services 
Presenter: Thomas Trump, Assistant Deputy Commander for Contracting Management, Naval Supply 
Systems Command   
Performing Quality Assurance and Effectively Administering the 
Strategic Sourcing of Services 
Presenter:  COL Anthony Incorvati, Chief, BTA Division and Strategic Sourcing, ITEC4, Army 
Contracting Agency  
Essential Elements to Successful Execution of Strategically 
Sourced Services 
Presenter: Randall McFadden, Director, Acquisition Management and Integration Center  
Delivering to the Warfighter  
Presenter: Dale Huegen, Deputy Chief, Command Acquisition, USTRANSCOM 
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Managing the Service Supply Chain in Department of Defense: 
Implications for the Program Management Infrastructure 
Presenter: Rene G. Rendon is on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School where he teaches 
graduate acquisition and contract management courses.  Prior to his appointment at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, he served for more than 22 years as an acquisition and contracting officer in the 
United States Air Force.  His Air Force career included assignments as a contracting officer for major 
space launch systems and satellite programs, as well as the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter and the 
Peacekeeper ICBM.  Rendon also served as a contracting squadron commander, and as a contracts 
manager for the NCR Corporation.  He has earned Bachelor, Master’s, and Doctorate degrees in 
business administration and has taught for the UCLA Government Contracts program and was also a 
senior faculty member for the Keller Graduate School of Management.  
Author: Uday Apte, is Professor of Operations Management, Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and Associate Professor, Cox School of Business, 
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX.  He teaches operations management courses in the Executive 
and Full-time MBA programs.  His areas of expertise and research interests are in service operations, 
supply chain management and globalization of information-intensive services.  
Prior to joining the Cox School, he worked for over ten years in managing information technology and 
operations functions in the financial services and utility industries.  Since then he has consulted with 
several major US corporations and international organizations including IBM, Texas Instruments, Nokia, 
Kinko’s, Nationwide Insurance, Nations Bank and The World Bank. 
He holds a PhD in Decision Sciences from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, where he 
taught in the MBA and undergraduate business programs for over ten years. His earlier academic 
background includes a MBA from the Asian Institute of Management, Manila, Philippines, and Bachelor of 
Technology from the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India. 
Dr. Apte has published over 30 articles, five of which have won awards from professional societies.  His 
research articles have been published in prestigious journals including, Management Science, Journal of 
Operations Management, Decision Sciences, IIE Transactions, Interfaces, and MIS Quarterly.  He has co-
authored one book, Manufacturing Automation and has completed work on another co-authored book, 
Managing in the Information Economy. 
Rene G. Rendon  
Lecturer  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93945-5197  
Tel: (831) 656-3464  
E-mail: rgrendon@nps.edu 
Uday Apte, Professor 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Street 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: 831.656.3598 








The services acquisition volume in the US Department of Defense (DoD) has continued 
to increase in scope and dollars in the past decade.  In fact, in recent years, the DoD has spent 
more on services than on supplies, equipment and goods, even considering the high value of 
weapon systems and large military items (Camm, Blickstein & Venzor, 2004).  Between FY 
1999 to FY 2003, the DoD’s spending on services increased by 66%; and in FY 2003, the DoD 
spent over $118 billion (or approximately 57% of total DoD procurement dollars) on services 
(GAO, 2005a).  The acquired services presently cover a very broad set of service activities, 
including: professional, administrative, and management support; construction, repair, and 
maintenance of facilities and equipment; information technology; research and development, 
and medical care. 
As the DoD’s services acquisition volume continues to increase in scope and dollars, the 
agency must give greater attention to proper acquisition planning, adequate requirements 
definition, sufficient price evaluation, and proper contractor oversight (GAO, 2002).    
In our previous exploratory research on the challenges and opportunities in service 
supply chains in the DoD (Apte, Ferrer, Lewis & Rendon, 2006), we reached the following 
preliminary, yet significant conclusions: 
 A continued growth in the volume and scope of service acquisition in the DoD in the 
future 
 As observed at the Presidio of Monterey, innovative supply-chain arrangement involving 
synergistic contractual relations with cities adjacent to bases for the management of 
routine municipal services can result in significant cost savings. 
 As observed at Travis AFB, settings conducive to successful service contracts include: 
(1) proactive and frequent communications among cross-functional teams composed of 
contracting personnel and personnel from the functional organizations involved as 
customers in the services contracts, and (2) co-location of contracting professional with 
the customers of services. 
 Acquisition of services is more challenging in comparison with product/system 
acquisition since it is generally more difficult to establish service specifications and 
measure and monitor service output and quality. Hence, having onboard the right 
number of skilled acquisition personnel is highly critical. However, the observed 
downsizing of contracting workforce does not appear to be in line with this need. 
 Although the DoD spends more on acquiring services than goods, the program 
management infrastructure for the acquisition of services is less developed than that for 
the acquisition of products and systems.  In many service acquisition programs, a 
trained and dedicated program manager and programs management team does not 
exist, and the services contracting officer becomes the de-facto program manager. 
The lack of a developed program management infrastructure for the acquisition of 
services is a critical research finding that warrants further study.  Review of the current literature 
shows that the use of a well-defined, disciplined approach and infrastructure for the 
management of projects is critical for a project’s success in meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives (Kerzner, 2006). In the absence of a well-defined management 
infrastructure, project teams are left to create an ad hoc approach to managing the project.   
Based on our exploratory research, we believe that this is the current situation in many DoD 
services acquisition programs.  The lack of a well-defined program management infrastructure 
and the lack of a lifecycle approach to the management of services acquisition projects is 
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putting the success of these critical services at risk.  The risks for not meeting cost, schedule, 
and performance objectives are consequently higher in the DoD services acquisition sector.  As 
the DoD increases its acquisition of services, particularly in light of anticipated budget cuts and 
dwindling resources, the DoD must ensure that its service acquisition projects are effectively 
and efficiently managed. 
The purpose of this research is to continue our exploration in the area of services 
contracts while focusing on the implications of applying a program management structure to 
services acquisition.    We will first discuss some continuing issues in services acquisition based 
on our initial research and recent GAO reports.  We will also discuss the uniqueness of services 
and how they affect the services acquisition process.  Next, we will discuss some basic 
concepts of program management and then discuss how these concepts are currently being 
used in the acquisition of systems and products, specifically defense weapon systems. We will 
then discuss the application of program management and project management concepts to 
services acquisition; and finally, we will illustrate how program management concepts can be 
effectively applied at the various levels of the DoD to successfully manage service acquisition 
programs. 
Continuing Issues in Services Acquisition 
a. Conclusions from the Prior Research 
As mentioned before, last year we conducted an exploratory research in Service Supply 
Chain in the Department of Defense.  The conclusions of that research are stated below.  We 
want to clarify that given the exploratory nature of that research, the observations and 
conclusions listed below are somewhat preliminary in nature, and should be viewed as such. 
1. The Department of Defense’s services acquisition volume has continued to increase in 
scope and dollars in the past decade. The GAO (2005) found that since FY 1999, the 
DoD’s spending on services has increased by 66%; and in FY 2003, the DoD spent over 
$118 billion (or approximately 57% of total DoD’s procurement dollars) on services.  DoD 
procures a variety of services, including both the traditional commercial service and 
services unique to defense.  In terms of amount spent, four service categories represent 
over 50% of total spending on services: (a) professional, administrative, and 
management support services, (b) construction, repair and maintenance of structure and 
facilities, (c) equipment maintenance, and (d) information technology services. 
2. Presidio of Monterey (POM) has contracted maintenance of about 155 buildings and 
structures to Presidio Municipal Services Agency (PMSA), a consortium of the cities of 
Monterey and Seaside.  The PMSA agreement has allowed the two cities to apply their 
expertise to routine municipal services and the Army to focus on its military mission. 
Through this partnership and contract with PMSA, the POM has realized a 41% 
reduction in expenses when compared with previous base operation costs and private 
contracts.  We recommend the DoD explore and evaluate the possibility of establishing 
such synergistic contractual relations with cities adjacent to other bases for support of 
their respective operations. 
3. Proactive and frequent communications are essential for a successful services contract.  
We found a successful example of this at Travis AFB, where 60th CONS uses BRAGs as 
the mechanism for conducting such communications. Business Requirement Advisory 
Groups (BRAGs) are teams made up of cross-functional personnel that represent the 
functional organizations involved as customers in the services contracts.  These cross-
functional teams plan and manage the service contracts throughout the service’s 
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lifecycle.  As the DoD increases the use of centralized contracting organizations and 
regional contracts, the use of proactive and frequent communications will be even more 
essential for the successful management and performance of these contracts.   
4. Our visits and interviews at Travis AFB, Presidio of Monterey (POM), Naval Air Station 
Whidbey Island (NAS WI), and the Naval Support Detachment Monterey (NSDM) 
confirmed the GAO’s finding that, “while the Army’s and Navy’s creation of centralized 
installation management agencies can potentially create efficiencies and improve the 
management of the facilities through streamlining and consolidation, implementation of 
these plans has so far met with mixed results in quality and level of support provided to 
activities and installations” (GAO, 2005b). 
5. The centralization of contracting offices and use of regional contracts will result in 
additional dynamics to the DoD’s acquisition of services.  The use of centralized 
contracting organizations and regional contracts will require even more proactive and 
frequent communications between the contracting organization and the customer.  
Although it is still too early to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of centralized 
contracting organizations and regional contracts, this research has indicated that 
centralization and regionalization of services contracts are growing trends in the DoD 
and will significantly change how services contracts are managed. 
6. Given the unique characteristics of services (such as intangibility, co-production, 
diversity and complexity), establishing service specifications and measuring and 
monitoring the quality of delivered service is inherently more complex than when dealing 
with manufactured goods.  Hence, it is critical to have onboard a “knowledgeable client” 
and the necessary number of skilled contracting personnel to define the requirements 
and to supervise outsourced services. The DoD has been aggressively complying with 
OMB’s Circular A-76, which directs all federal government agencies “to rely on the 
private sector for needed commercial activities.”  This has resulted in dramatic growth in 
the DoD’s spending and in the downsizing of the DoD civilian and military acquisition 
workforce.  Although this exploratory study is not yet completed, we believe that the 
above two trends contradict the critical need to have onboard a necessary number of 
skilled contracting personnel.  This could mean that in the DoD’s outsourced services, 
either the needs are not being fully satisfied, or the value for the money spent is not 
being realized. 
7. Although the DoD acquires more services than goods, and the acquisition of services 
and the use of service contractors are becoming an increasingly critical aspect of the 
DoD mission, the management infrastructure for the acquisition of services is less 
developed than for the acquisition of products and systems.  There is a less formal 
program management approach and lifecycle methodology for the acquisition of 
services, which is confirmed by the lack of standardization in the business practices 
associated with the services acquisition process.  This results from the fact that the 
functional personnel currently managing the services programs are not considered 
members of the DoD acquisition workforce, and are typically not provided acquisition 
training under Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) requirements.  
b. Service Characteristics and Their Implications to Contracting 
Intangibility of service outcomes makes it difficult to clearly describe and quantify services, 
and, therefore, to contract for services. Consider, for example, the difficulty in writing a contact for 
an educational service involving academic lectures.  How does one define a “pound of education,” 
and how can one be sure when the contract is fulfilled satisfactorily.  As Karmarkar and Pitbladdo 
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(1993) explain, this is the reason why in such cases we do not contract around quantities at all; 
rather, we contract around process delivery.  In general, the more information intensive the 
service is, the more difficult it is to develop clear and meaningful contracts.   This difficulty is 
somewhat reduced in services in which physical objects play a dominant role. 
Intangibility of outputs also makes it difficult to define and measure quality.  For example, 
even for a simple custodial service such as cleaning, it is not easy to define the desired level of 
cleanliness. The levels of cleaning needed for an office is certainly different than for a hospital 
operating room.  The desired time duration for maintaining a clean status can also be an 
important matter in writing a contract for cleaning service.  As research in service quality has 
found, customers typically evaluate the quality of service based on the outcome of a service as well 
as the customer’s experience with the process of service delivery.  For example, in a dining facility, 
not only must the food be tasty, but the manner in which the food is served must also be courteous, 
prompt and friendly.  This means that the contracts for many services should not be based solely 
on outcomes but should include specifications on both the outcome and the customer’s experience 
with the process.   
Co-production requiring presence and participation of customers in the creation of many 
services is an important characteristic of services.  For example, in an IT services such as software 
development, a customer’s input in terms of desired specifications of a software system is critically 
important.  For example, however competent the software developer may be, the developed 
software will not be satisfactory if the specifications do not accurately reflect the true needs of the 
customer.  Hence, the contracts for services should ideally specify not only what the service 
provider should do but also what the customer should do.  Otherwise, a satisfactory service 
outcome may not be realized. 
Diversity of Services also makes it difficult and undesirable to use the same contract 
vehicles or procedures for different services. For example, given the differences in medical 
services versus custodial services, it is important that the contracts for these services are 
customized to suit the lifecycle needs of individual services. 
Finally, services are complex and may involve multi-stage processes.  This makes it 
important, yet challenging, to write contracts that are flexible enough to cover all relevant 
scenarios and eventualities.  Moreover, if such contracts cannot be satisfactorily defined, it may 
be more desirable to deliver certain services using internal resources than to outsource them. 
c. Service Markets and Contracts 
The above-discussed special features of services lead to significant differences in the 
process of production, sale and consumption of services.  These, in turn, have implications for 
market structure, pricing, and contracting for services. While the operational implications of service 
characteristics have received some attention, there have been very few attempts to capture the 
implications for markets.  The large majority of papers dealing with service competition have 
addressed issues like queues and congestion, and their consequences for customer waiting time. 
While queuing is certainly an issue central to services—customers must access service 
systems because of the lack of portability of services—the difference relative to manufacturing is 
primarily one of degree.  There are, on the other hand, several important characteristics of services 
which remain untreated in terms of market models.  For example, there is little to be found on the 
subject of models with joint production.  Similarly, the inability to measure and meter service output 
renders standard price-quantity mechanisms untenable.  The result is that prices must be set on a 
case basis, by specific bilateral contracting based on inputs rather than outputs, or by repeated 
renegotiation and contracting.  While these are not individually all new issues, there does not seem 
to be an integrated treatment of service markets from this viewpoint. 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 587 - 
=
=
Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1993) present some key features regarding service contracting 
that are relevant to the development of a service quality model.  First and foremost, service 
operations are always post-contractual (with the possible exception of New York City automotive 
window washing).  Fixed-price contracts centered on output specifications can fail on two accounts.  
First is the difficulty of conceiving or verifying meaningful output specifications, and second is the 
variability of customer inputs and joint production which makes fixed-price contracts risky for the 
firm even when the output specifications can be well defined.  Alternatively, contracts based on 
process specifications, such as time and materials, can turn out to be unsuitable since these can 
be risky for customers.  These dual risks for firms and for customers can be addressed via stage-
wise or contingent contracting, in which the process is broken into stages, and the price for a given 
stage is made dependent on the outputs of previous stages.  For example, there may be a fixed 
fee for a diagnosis, and a fixed fee for treatment which, however, depends on the outcome of the 
diagnosis.  The uncertainty in customer inputs is resolved by the diagnosis before it materializes in 
terms of treatment cost. 
d. Stage-wise Decomposition of Services 
The presence of a tangible, portable output which can be quantified by both vendor and buyer 
allows, perhaps forces, considerable simplification in the market-forming process of manufactured 
goods.  Contracts for manufactured goods are centered around a clearly defined junction between 
production and use, at which point responsibility is transferred from producer to customer.  While 
the value of a product to a customer may actually depend on the customer-specific uses to which 
the product is put, such information is not needed at the market interface, where customers can 
reveal their preferences through price-quantity negotiations.  Similarly, specifications of the 
production process have no relevance at the market interface apart from their impact on the 
specifications of the product. 
For services, the transaction between customer and provider must be represented in 
greater detail.  Figure 1 shows the sequence of steps involved in a service transaction as seen by 
a customer.  At the end of each step is the state that is reached, observed by either the buyer or 
the vendor of the service.  Karmarkar and Pitbladdo discuss why, 1) contract terms for the next 
stage are typically contingent on the states reached in the previous stages, and 2) switching to 
competing providers is an option at the end of each stage.  We hasten to note that not all services 
necessarily involve all these steps.  
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Figure 1. A Conceptual Model of a Service Lifecycle 
The first step is access to the service; this may involve bringing a customer to the service 
system, or the reverse.  The second stage is diagnosis.  For our purposes, diagnosis is defined as 
the mapping of customer requirements of a service into a technical or process specification.  For 
example, a customer at a car repair facility may describe certain problems that he or she has 
experienced based on which repair needs can be assessed.  The process of diagnosis identifies 
the underlying technical problem, perhaps as a syndrome (collection of symptoms) or perhaps in 
terms of the underlying mechanism.  The medical analogy is obvious.  Similarly, a client of a 
financial planning service may describe problems in terms of college payments and retirement.  
The planner may convert the statement to needed cash flows, risk attitudes and state preferences.  
Diagnosis is likely to be an interactive or joint process.  In some cases, the diagnosis step is 
performed by the customer alone. 
The third stage, process planning, is the generation of alternative service processes or 
treatments to meet the output requirements defined by the diagnosis.  This may be a joint 
production process.  In some cases, the alternatives available are already stated and fixed.  A 
menu at a restaurant is an example.  In others, processes or alternatives can be highly specialized 
to the customer's needs.  It is conceptually useful to note that diagnosis, coupled with process 
planning, is the dynamic equivalent of Quality Function Deployment (QFD) (Hauser & Clausing, 
1988).  In manufacturing, QFD consists of mapping generic customer needs into clearly defined 
product specifications.  Diagnosis and process-plan generation consist of mapping specific 
customer needs and desires into clearly defined process specifications, particular to the customer.  
The fourth stage is the execution of the service process itself.  Once again, this may or may 
not involve joint production.  Finally we add a fifth stage, continuation, which represents the 
continuing consumption or consequences of service outputs (the provider's role in this stage can 
be characterized as long-term service support).  The reason for this is that the outputs or 
consequences of many services (e.g., health care, financial planning, consulting) cannot be 
completely evaluated immediately.  It is instructive to note here that, in the manufacturing case, the 
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counterpart of this fifth stage constitutes the entirety of the customer involvement with the product.  
The service provider may continue to have a role in this stage in the form of direct interaction and 
consultation or a set of instructions along the lines of a "user's manual."  Surgery provides a clear 
example, involving a schedule of required and proscribed activities, along with follow-up checkups 
and telephone consultations. 
In the next section, we build on some concepts discussed above to propose a program 
management approach for services acquisition. 
Towards a Program Management Approach to Services 
Acquisition 
This research on the acquisition of services will focus on the application of a program-
management approach and project-management concepts to services acquisition.  This section 
will first discuss some basic concepts of program management and then discuss how these 
concepts are currently being used in the acquisition of systems and products, specifically 
defense weapon systems.  The next section will discuss the application of a program-
management approach and project-management concepts to services acquisition. 
a.  An Overview of the Program Management Approach  
Review of the current literature shows that the use of a well-defined, disciplined 
methodology and infrastructure for the management of complex projects is critical for a project’s 
success in meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives (PMI, 2004, Kerzner, 2006). We 
use the term “program management” to describe the approach and methodology needed for the 
management of complex projects.  A program management approach includes the infrastructure 
that facilitates the successful attainment of cost, schedule, and performance objectives.   A 
program management approach refers to the centralized, coordinated management of a group 
of projects to achieve the program’s strategic objectives and benefits (PMI, 2004).  In addition, 
programs themselves consist of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain 
benefits and control (PMI, 2004).  Thus, a disciplined program management approach includes 
the following project management concepts: project lifecycle, integrated project processes, an 
assigned and dedicated project manager, empowered cross-functional project teams, and an 
appropriate project organizational structure.  These project management concepts will be briefly 
discussed. 
1.  Project Lifecycle 
An effective way of managing projects is to divide the project into phases to provide 
better management and control.  These phases make up the project lifecycle.  The phases of 
the project lifecycle can be used to manage and control the activities that are conducted within 
each project phase.  By using the phases of the project lifecycle and establishing control gates 
or milestones between project phases, the project manager can control the progression of the 
project.  Although project lifecycles are different for each specific type of project, many 
organizations will establish a standardized lifecycle for their projects.  Typically, the project 
lifecycle of a system consist of the following phases: conceptual, planning, testing, 
implementation, and closure (Kerzner, 2006).  Later in this report, we will discuss how the 
project lifecycle is used in defense weapon system projects.  We will also discuss the 
development of a project lifecycle for service acquisition projects.   
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2.  Integrated Processes 
A disciplined program management approach includes the integration of various project 
management processes used throughout the project.  These various project processes typically 
include such processes as requirements development, scheduling, cost management, quality 
management, risk management, and contracts management (PMI, 2004).  Although each of 
these specific project processes reflects different functional areas, a disciplined program 
management methodology would integrate these various processes to ensure that each of 
these areas are coordinated and integrated within the total project effort.  In addition to 
integrated processes, the PMI project management body of knowledge establishes five project 
management process groups.  These project management process groups include initiating 
processes, planning processes, monitoring and controlling processes, and closing processes 
(PMI, 2004).  Each of these project management process groups includes various functional 
processes that are part of that specific process group.  For example, the planning-process 
group would include such processes as scope planning, quality planning, risk-management 
planning, procurement planning and solicitation planning.  In order to effectively and 
successfully manage projects, these various functional processes need to be coordinated and 
integrated throughout the total project effort.  Having integrated project processes are key to 
successful project management. 
3.  Project Teams 
Just as integrated processes are an essential for effective project management, 
integrated project teams are also essential.  A disciplined program management methodology 
includes the establishment of integrated project teams consisting of project team members 
representing each of the different functional areas that are part of the project effort.  For 
example, a project team may include functional experts representing the various processes that 
are used in the project such as risk management, requirements management, and contracts 
management.  These functional experts on the project team are responsible for providing their 
expertise in support of the project objective.  Although the project team consists of these various 
functional experts, the activities of these project team members must be coordinated and 
integrated to ensure accomplishment of the project object.  The coordination and integration 
responsibility belongs to the project manager. 
4.  Project Manager 
A critical aspect of a disciplined project management methodology includes the 
assignment of a dedicated project manager to oversee the activities of the project.  We have 
already stated that the project effort includes various functional processes conducted by 
functional experts on the project team.  We also stated that there are project management 
process groups that are used to help integrate these various functional processes.  The role of 
the project manager, therefore, is to coordinate and integrate the various project activities to 
ensure successful completion of the project (Kerzner, 2006).  The project manager is 
responsible for ensuring that all members of the project team support the projects objectives.  
Thus, having a dedicated project manager, who is responsible for managing the project 
activities and ensuring the achievement of the project objectives, is an essential part of a 
disciplined project management methodology.   
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5.  Organizational Structure 
An appropriate organizational structure is also an essential element of a disciplined 
project management methodology.  An organizational structure that supports the integrated 
project management processes, integrated project teams, and the roles and responsibilities of 
the project manager will significantly contribute to the success of the project.  One of the three 
main types of organizational structures—functional, matrix, and pure project—is typically used in 
organizations that perform projects (PMI, 2004).  The degree of project manager authority, 
resource availability and budget control will be affected by the type of organizational structure 
(PMI, 2004).  Some of the factors to consider in selecting the appropriate type of organizational 
structure include:  the number of functional areas involved in the project, the level of integration 
needed within the functional areas and between the organization and the customer, the nature 
of the technology used in the project work, and the organization’s previous experience in 
performing the work required by the project.  
b.  Application of Program Management Concepts to Weapon Systems Acquisition 
The previous section discussed the basic project management concepts such as the 
project lifecycle, integrated processes, project teams, project manager, and organizational 
structure.  These program management concepts are well established in the Department of 
Defense weapon systems acquisition environment.  In fact, many of today's modern project 
management tools and techniques were developed during the Cold War.  Weapon system 
programs such as the land-based ICBM and sea-based ballistic missile programs became the 
proving grounds for some of today's modern program management processes (Kerzner, 2006).  
In today's DoD weapon systems acquisition environment, program management concepts 
continue to be integral to the successful management of these critical and high-technology 
projects. 
The Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 establishes the defense acquisition system 
as the management process by which the DoD provides effective, affordable, and timely 
systems to the users (DoD, 2003).  This directive establishes the role of the program manager 
as the designated individual authorized and responsible for accomplishing the program 
objectives.  The program manager is the designated individual that is accountable for costs 
schedule and performance reporting to the milestone decision authority (MDA) (DoD, 2003). 
The Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 establishes the defense acquisition 
management framework as the project lifecycle for major defense acquisition programs 
(USD(AT&L), 2003, May 12).  This lifecycle consists of the various phases, decision points, and 
project review points that are part of the project lifecycle.  See Figure 2 for an illustration of the 
DoD Acquisition Management Framework. 
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Figure 2. The Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
In addition, the DoD 5000 regulations also established the use of integrated product 
teams (IPTs) and integrated processes throughout the weapon systems acquisition 
management lifecycle.  Through the use of effective collaboration, program managers are 
responsible for making project decisions and leading project execution by maintaining 
continuous and effective communication through use of integrated project processes. 
Finally, for weapon systems acquisition management, the DoD relies heavily on unique 
organizational structures such as the matrix organizational structure and, in some instances, 
project-type structures for the management of defense acquisition programs.  Figure 3 is an 
example of an organizational structure for a weapon system acquisition program.   
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Figure 3. Organization Structure of a Weapon System Acquisition Program 
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Thus, the basic concepts reflective of a program management approach are well 
established in DoD weapon systems acquisition management.  The use of project lifecycles and 
control gates, integrated processes, established project manager and project teams, and an 
effective organizational structure have been successfully used in this specific sector of the 
Department of Defense.  The next section of this research will discuss how this program 
management approach (consisting of these basic project management concepts) can be used 
by the DoD in the acquisition of services. 
Applications of Program Management Concepts to Services 
Acquisition 
Our previous discussion focused on the use of a program management approach and its 
related project management concepts found in the current literature.  These project 
management concepts included the use of a project lifecycle and control gates, integrated 
processes, a dedicated program manager and integrated project teams, and an organizational 
structure conducive to the integration of project activities.  We also discussed how this program 
management approach and these project management concepts have been well established in 
the weapon systems acquisition management environment.  We identified Department of 
Defense directives and instructions that support, even mandate the use of some of these project 
management concepts. This section will now focus on the acquisition of services within the 
Department of Defense.  We will look at the acquisition of services at the installation level, 
command level, and service level.  The purpose here is to illustrate how a program 
management approach and project management concepts can be effectively applied at each of 
these levels to successfully manage service acquisition programs. 
In exploring DoD services acquisition, our research included basic installation-level types 
of services that are commonly acquired in support of the installation mission.  The installations 
researched included Travis Air Force Base California, Randolph Air Force Base Texas, Presidio 
of Monterey California, and the Naval Postgraduate School, California.  At the installations 
visited, personnel were interviewed for this research; we determined that although some project 
management concepts were applied, they were not applied in a consistent manner, or were not 
institutionalized throughout the organization.  In addition, at many of these locations, although 
project management tools and concepts were being applied, this utilization did not necessarily 
result in a program management approach to acquiring services.   
Typically, at the installation level, the acquisition of services is managed using more of 
an ad hoc approach as opposed to a program management approach.   
1.  Project Lifecycle 
In terms of using a project lifecycle, our research indicated that the contracting process 
was typically used as the project lifecycle.  Although the contracting process is an integral part 
of the acquisition lifecycle for DoD weapon systems acquisition, the project lifecycle is separate 
from the contracting process lifecycle. 
2.  Integrated Processes  
In addition, our research indicated that although various project management processes 
were used at the installation level, these processes were not necessarily integrated in the 
management of the services contracts.  Although we did find the various project management 
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processes (such as contracting process, risk-management process, quality-assurance process, 
and contract-funding process), we did not see the integration of these processes.   
3.  Project Teams 
Furthermore, the use of informal project teams was in existence at these installation-
level organizations.  Although these project teams were in existence, the structures of these 
project teams were created more on an ad hoc basis than established as formal project teams.   
4.  Project Manager 
Closely related to the above was the ad hoc approach to the establishment of a project 
manager for services acquisition.  In many cases, the project manager, or program manager, as 
sometimes called, existed at the major command headquarters level as opposed to the 
installation level.  As we will discuss in the next section on Major Command level management 
of services acquisition, we found that many service acquisitions were centrally planned at the 
headquarters and then de-centrally executed at the installation level.  If there is an assigned 
program manager, that individual is typically assigned at the Major Command level, with 
oversight responsibility for the installation-level activity.  In these instances, although the 
program manager was located at the headquarters level, there was no program manager at the 
installation level.  In this case, although the quality assurance evaluators (QAE) represented the 
program manager, the QAE does not perform program management responsibilities.  In 
addition, the contracting officer at the installation typically functioned as the de-facto program 
manager due to the lack of any program manager at the site.  It should be noted that the 
procuring contracting officer (PCO) at the Major Command headquarters where the services 
acquisition was centrally planned and executed delegated the contract to the administrative 
contracting officer at the installation where the contract was administered.  Thus, the PCO, 
responsible for proving contracting support for the centrally planned and executed services 
acquisition, would delegate the administration tasks to the ACO for the decentralized 
administration of the services contract.  However, the program manager retained the program 
management functions of the services acquisition. 
5.  Organizational Structure 
Finally, in terms of organizational structures, at the installation level our research did not 
identify any specific or unique organizational structures specifically established for the 
acquisition of services.  The installations we researched reflected the traditional organizational 
structures and organizational mission of the Defense Department.  We did not see any 
projectized or matrix organizational structures used in the management of services contracts at 
the installation level. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
Our preliminary conclusion in this ongoing exploratory research has identified some 
unique aspects of services and how they affect the services acquisition process.  We developed 
a conceptual model of a service lifecycle that can be used in analyzing the DoD’s services 
acquisition process.  We also discussed the program management approach and identified 
basic project management concepts and discussed how these concepts are being used in the 
acquisition of defense weapon systems. Our current research has observed that the program 
management approach is applicable to the acquisition of services within the DoD.  We have 
also initially concluded that the basic project management concepts (such as project lifecycle, 
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integrated processes, project team, project manager, and organizational structure) can be 
applied to the acquisition of services.  Our currents research leads us to believe that the 
application of a program management approach and the adoption of basic project management 
concepts to the acquisition of services will improve the management and oversight of these 
services contracts.  Our further research will explore in more detail how this program 
management approach and project management concepts can be used to improve the DoD’s 
services acquisition management.  
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In general, during the lifecycle of a weapon system, a significantly larger amount of 
money gets spent on operating and maintaining the system than on acquiring it.  Hence, 
efficient logistics systems, including transportation, inventory management, modifications and 
maintenance activities, are critically important for containing the lifecycle costs of weapon 
systems and for maintaining the highest level of military readiness given the extant fiscal 
constraints. This paper describes Lean Six Sigma (LSS), a strategically important and proven 
logistics initiative for both reduced lifecycle costs and improved readiness. 
With aging weapon systems, the US Department of Defense is facing ever-increasing 
military expenses to maintain military readiness.  Hence, the Department of Defense is keenly 
interested in implementing Lean Six Sigma in all the services.  We begin this paper by providing 
an overview of military logistics and discussing the critical concepts of readiness and cycle-time.  
Thereafter, we present an overview of Lean Six Sigma methodologies—including Lean 
production and Six Sigma, and describe the experience in implementing Lean Six Sigma in the 
Army, Navy and Air force. The paper ends with a discussion of the managerial guidelines for 
successfully implementing Lean Six Sigma. 
Keywords: Lean Six Sigma, Lean Production, Six Sigma, Military Logistics, Readiness, 
Lifecycle Costs 
Introduction 
Three essential factors to maintaining strong military power and readiness are well-
trained troops/ well-educated officers, reliable high-tech weapon systems, and well-designed 
logistics systems to support troops and improve the readiness of the weapon systems.  In 
purchasing weapon systems, program managers widely use acquisition costs as the primary, 
and at times the only, criteria for decision-making.  However, in general, during the lifecycle of a 
weapon system, a significantly larger amount of money gets spent on operating and maintaining 
the system than on acquiring it.  Hence, efficient logistics systems—including transportation, 
inventory management, modifications and maintenance activities—are critically important for 
containing the lifecycle costs (LCC) of weapon systems and for maintaining the highest level of 
military readiness given the extant fiscal constraints. This paper will describe Lean Six Sigma 
(LSS), a strategically important and proven logistics initiative for both reduced lifecycle costs 
and improved readiness. 
Two major components of LCC are Acquisition costs and Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) costs.  Acquisition costs include such items as research, development, test and 
evaluation, program management, engineering design, initial spare parts, manufacturing and 
production, facilities and construction, and initial training.  O&M costs, on the other hand, 
include such cost categories as labor, materials, and overhead, operations, scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance, training, replacement and renewal, transportation, 
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system/equipment modification, technical data collection, documentation and database 
management, energy and facility usage, and disposal costs.  Without question, the logistics 
systems have a great deal of influence on the size of O&M costs. 
It is difficult to generalize the percentage of money spent on operations and 
maintenance of a typical weapon system. Some literature points out that the O&M costs 
contribute to 60% of the total lifecycle cost on average (DAU, 2006), while other sources 
estimate these costs to be as high as 80% of the total (Cost Analysis Improvement Group, 
1992).  In any event, with the Service Extension Program (SEP) that many weapon systems are 
experiencing these days, the percentage of the total lifecycle cost spent on O&M is simply 
becoming larger.  Most weapon systems were originally designed for a lifecycle of 20+ years, 
but some have been stretched to last as long as 50 years.  In the case of B-52 aircraft, for 
example, the lifecycle is expected to extend to 80 years, in which case the O&M costs expect to 
form as much as 90% of its lifecycle cost (Parker, 1999).  
With aging weapon systems, the US Department of Defense (DoD) is facing ever-
increasing O&M costs.  The DoD is, therefore, keenly interested in applying Lean Six Sigma 
methodologies to cut down O&M costs.  Experiences of the private sector in implementing Lean 
Six Sigma illustrate that the methodology is as effective in improving business processes as it is 
in improving the manufacturing processes.  Thus, successful implementation of LSS 
methodologies would also reduce acquisition costs by improving acquisition and contracting 
processes. Hence, in this paper we will discuss Lean Six Sigma and its application in the 
military.  This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide an overview of military 
logistics and discuss the critical concepts of readiness and cycle-time.  In Section 3, we 
describe background material for LSS methodologies.  Section 4 includes examples of LSS 
implementation in the US Army, the US Navy and the US Air Force.  In Section 5, we conclude 
the paper by presenting managerial guidelines and by discussing the challenges present in 
implementing LSS in the military. 
Military Logistics 
Military Logistics support deals with everything required to provide warfighters with the 
right stuff at the right time at the right place at the right cost. The goal of military logistics support 
is to maintain the highest possible level of readiness, commonly expressed as operational 




MTBMAo +=+= , where MTBM is the mean time 
between maintenance, and MDT is the maintenance down time—which includes repair time and 
administrative and logistics delay times.  Intuitively, operational availability is the fraction of time 
a weapon system is operational or mission capable. Clearly, operational availability can be 
improved by increasing MTBM (i.e., increasing reliability) and/or decreasing MDT (i.e., reducing 
repair or cycle-time).  Thus, the two key issues to improve weapon systems readiness are 
reliability improvement and cycle-time reduction.  
From Little's Law (Little, 1961), reducing repair or cycle-time reduces pipeline inventory 
directly, and leads to significant savings in inventory costs. The relationship between repair or 
cycle-time and inventory levels is critically important (yet, troublesome) in the military because it 
crosses physical, organizational, and financial barriers.  Inventory managers strive to 
consolidate and minimize stocks of piece-parts to free-up resources for other priorities.  They 
also seek to get quick turnaround on repairable components in order to minimize pipeline 
inventory.  However, stockout of spare parts or consumable components results in delays in 
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repair processes and, eventually, serious readiness degradation.  Cycle-time reduction in a 
military logistics channel (repair depots, intermediate-level maintenance, inventory control 
points, and supply centers) also means that more weapon systems are available in the field or 
fleet.  On the other hand, increased cycle-time causes a vicious cycle of deteriorating military 
readiness.  For instance, poor logistics support (e.g., lack of spare parts, personnel, and/or 
training) increases the cycle-time, which in turn decreases readiness, Ao. Therefore, the 
warfighters are forced to satisfy mission requirements with a fewer number of mission-capable 
weapon systems, resulting in stress on those fewer mission-capable systems.  Due to this 
stress, more system failures occur, which in turn generate more workload at repair facilities.  
Thus, the repair turnaround time can become even longer.  And the vicious cycle can go on. 
The following simple example explains the importance of cycle-time reduction in military 
logistics. Suppose that the US Navy has 800 F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, each of which costs $50 
million, and that the Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) is done every 4 years.  If the 
MDT is one year, the readiness, Ao, will be 4/(4+1) = 0.8.  Thus, only 80% of 800, or 640, 
aircraft will be mission-capable on average since an aircraft would be available for mission for 
four years (and at the depot for one year) out of every five years. This also means 160 aircraft 
will be non-mission capable at any given time. If the MDT can be reduced to 6 months, Ao will 
be 0.889; or, only 89 instead of 160 aircraft will be at the depot for maintenance at any given 
time.  It is equivalent of having 71 additional aircraft (worth more than $3.5 billion) in the fleet.  
On the other hand, if having 640 mission-capable aircraft available is adequate, it would mean 
reducing the fleet size by 80 aircraft and freeing up $4 billion expenditure for other purposes. 
See Kang, Gue and Eaton (1998) for a cycle-time reduction case study at a Navy depot. 
The Department of Defense and its services have many on-going initiatives to cut down 
maintenance cycle-time to improve military readiness.  The Navy has been working on the Sea 
Based Logistics to cut down distribution time by supporting “customers” on shore directly from 
the sea by eliminating “Iron Mountains” (middlemen) in the supply-chain management context.  
Likewise, since 1995, the US Army has implemented Velocity Management (Dumond et al., 
2001) which focuses on improving the speed and accuracy with which materials and information 
flow from factories to fox holes. The US Air Force has implemented Agile Logistics, and the US 
Marine Corps, Precision Logistics for cycle-time reduction. 
More recently, all branches of the US military, Army, Navy and the Air Force, are actively 
applying Lean Six Sigma methodology to their various activities to reduce cycle-time and to 
reduce maintenance expenses. We will describe the details of current initiatives of Lean Six 
Sigma in the military services in Section 4. 
Levels of Maintenance 
We can use the US Navy’s aviation maintenance system to understand how military 
maintenance logistics are typically conducted.  The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
divides maintenance into three levels: organizational level (O-level), intermediate level (I-level), 
and depot level (D-level), which are similar in structure to multi-echelon logistics support 
systems of commercial firms (e.g., Blanchard, 2004) or other services.  To achieve economies 
of scale in maintenance equipment and personnel, levels of maintenance are made 
progressively more capable, with D-level being the most capable.  However, the longer 
turnaround time at D-level also increases the work-in-process and requires more spare parts to 
maintain the desired readiness level.  
O-level maintenance is performed at the site and typically involves simple repairs or the 
replacement of modular components.  I-level maintenance involves more difficult repairs and 
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maintenance, including the repair and testing of modules that have failed at the O-level. I-level 
maintenance for Navy aircraft is done at Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments 
(AIMDs) ashore in naval air stations or afloat in aircraft carriers.  D-level maintenance activities, 
called Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs), ensure the continued flight integrity and safety of 
airframes and related flight systems throughout their service lives.  This involves performing 
maintenance beyond the capabilities of the lower levels, usually on equipment requiring major 
overhaul or rebuilding of end-items, subassemblies, and parts. The Navy operates three 
NADEPs in the US (North Island, CA; Cherry Point, NC; and Jacksonville, FL) and fleet repair 
facility sites in Italy and Japan. 
The repair cycle begins when an unserviceable repairable is turned for maintenance, 
and it ends when the item is recorded on the inventory control point records as being ready-for-
issue (RFI).  Repair cycle-time includes shipping and processing time, accumulation time, repair 
time, time awaiting parts, and delivery time.  Unserviceable items may remain in storage for 
extended times for various reasons.   
Readiness and Inventory Management 
Aviation readiness is measured by computing fully mission-capable (FMC) rates.  The 
FMC rate indicates the operational availability of the aircraft in a unit—that is, the fraction of 
aircraft that are mission capable at any arbitrary time.  When aircraft are partially mission 
capable or not mission capable, it is because of either maintenance or supply problems. 
Aviation items, especially repairables, are very expensive to maintain.  For example, 
each aircraft carrier carries onboard an Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL) 
consisting of consumable and repairable items and subassemblies required to support the Air 
Wing for 90 days of wartime operations.  A typical AVCAL consists of tens of millions of line 
items valued at hundreds of millions of dollars.  Repairable items represent only 10% of the total 
line items, but 90% of the total value of the AVCAL (USS Independence Shipboard Uniform 
Automatic Data Processing System Report 008, 1991, July 26). 
Material readiness demands spare parts, but fiscal constraints have put pressure on the 
Navy to reduce inventory levels at AIMDs and stock points. The two-part solution is easier said 
than done: select a “better” mix of spares and reduce repair cycle-time.  Both tend to improve 
readiness for a given cost or achieve the same readiness for lower cost. 
The relationship between spares/inventory levels and cycle-time is a key to 
understanding how to achieve higher readiness at lower cost.  Kang (1993) shows the 
diminishing marginal utility of spare parts, implying that additional spare parts beyond a certain 
threshold level will not improve readiness.  Those additional spare parts, once they are turned in 
after failure, will simply increase the work-in-process or inventory at repair facilities.  Spares 
levels and repair cycle-time must be considered together when attempting to improve material 
readiness (see Kang & Gue, 1997). 
During the past 30 years, the military has been implementing spares methodologies 
based on the readiness-based METRIC models such as those described in Sherbrooke (1992).  
Rather than the traditional approach to inventory problems that minimize holding and ordering 
costs for individual items subject to a service level, readiness-based models seek to maximize 
Ao for multiple items directly and simultaneously, subject to a budget constraint. It is possible to 
measure Ao for a specific component, such as an aircraft engine, as opposed to measuring Ao 
for the aircraft itself. An improvement in Ao for the engine will provide some marginal 
improvement in Ao for the aircraft.  But this improvement will not be one-to-one: large 
 =
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb====- 604 - 
=
=
improvements in engine availability may yield only trivial improvements in aircraft availability, 
depending not only on the failure rate of the engines, but on the performance and availability of 
all the other critical components of the aircraft.  The readiness-based models are important to 
military systems because they treat all of the critical components in a weapon system together 
in order to achieve the singular objective of maximizing the Ao of the weapon system.  
Implementation of these models requires detailed, accurate information about the reliability of 
components, but the rewards have been worth the effort in many systems. For example, 
Sherbrooke (1992) reports inventory investment being cut nearly in half, with no degradation in 
readiness, during a test for the Air Force.  Hale (1994) also shows significant inventory savings 
in the Navy after implementing readiness-based models.  
Lean Six Sigma 
Penchant for process improvement is inherent in human nature; even our distant 
ancestors discovered a better way to start fire, make arrowheads and spears, or build shelters 
(Dershin, 2004). Early improvements probably came about through trial and error and took 
hundreds (if not thousands) of years to become part of the human skill set. Almost up to the 
modern times, such improvements were the carefully guarded secrets of the select few.  
However, the fast pace of modern commercial/industrial economy has given rise to the 
structured problem-solving methodologies for process improvement that are well understood by 
and available to all. 
Two major approaches for structured problem solving emerged separately in the 20th 
century and have come to be known as “Lean” and “Six Sigma” methodologies. Lean 
improvements focus on process speed and waste removal, while Six Sigma, like its predecessor 
Total Quality Management (TQM), focuses on the removal of process defects and the reduction 
of process variability.  Ironically, Six Sigma and Lean have often been regarded as rival 
initiatives. Lean enthusiasts note that Six Sigma pays little attention to anything related to speed 
and flow, while Six Sigma supporters point out that Lean fails to address key concepts like 
customer needs and process variation. To some extent, these are valid arguments. Yet, they 
have been more often used by the practitioners to promote the choice of one versus the other 
approach. However, today’s need for an even higher level of competitiveness than that 
achieved through implementing either methodology has now convinced practitioners that these 
two approaches are synergistic, and there is benefit to be realized by blending the two. 
Therefore, in the new millennium, we are witnessing the emergence of Lean Six Sigma 
(George, 2002; Nash, Poling & Ward, 2006). 
Lean and Six Sigma are two different bodies of knowledge. The Six Sigma is all about 
locating and eliminating root causes of process problems. The Six Sigma tools, such as the “the 
five whys,” are designed to find the root cause/s of the problems and build models of cause and 
effect. The process is then redesigned with the root cause/s eliminated.   
Lean is different. As popularized by Womack and Jones (2003), the Lean roadmap is one of 
successive refinements to improve the overall process through the following steps (Apte & Goh, 
2004):  
 Specify value in the eyes of the customer  
 Identify the value stream and eliminate waste  
 Make value flow at the pull of the customer  
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 Involve and empower employees  
 Continuously improve in the pursuit of perfection.  
Since Lean Six Sigma is a synergistic blending of Lean Production and Six Sigma 
methodologies, we will present a brief overview of these two methodologies. 
Lean Production 
Lean can be defined as a set of principles and tools that helps us eliminate process 
activities that don't add value, and create "flow" in a process (Dennis, 2002).  A Lean process is 
defined as one that uses only the absolute minimum of resources to add value to the service or 
product. Lean manufacturing can also be viewed as a management philosophy focusing on 
reduction of the eight types of wastes (Human Talent, Over-production, Waiting time, 
Transportation, Processing, Inventory, Motion and Scrap) in manufacturing or service processes 
(“Lean Manufacturing,” 2006). By eliminating waste (muda), quality is improved, production time 
is reduced, and cost is reduced. Lean "tools" include continuous process improvement (kaizen), 
"pull" production process (by means of kanban) and mistake-proofing (poka-yoke).    Lean, as a 
management philosophy, is also very focused on creating a better workplace through the 
Toyota principle of "respect for humanity."   
Origins of Lean Production can be traced to the Scientific Management principles of 
Frederic Taylor (1911) and to the practical genius of Henry Ford (Levinson, 2002).  But the 
principles of Lean Production were more fully embodied in its recent incarnations: Just in Time 
Systems and Toyota Production System (Ohno, 1988).  The term Lean Production was coined 
by Womack, Jones and Roos (1991) in their best seller, The Machine that Changed the World. 
The book chronicles the transitions of automobile manufacturing from craft production to mass 
production to lean production.  “Theory of Constraints (TOC)” popularized by Goldratt and Cox 
(1992) in their novel The Goal is also typically used in implementing Lean production.  Simply 
put, TOC involves identification and use of the bottleneck (i.e., the constraint) of the system to 
set the operational pace of the system’s components and to achieve a synchronous flow so as 
to maximize the throughput (i.e., the money-making potential) of the system. 
At the heart of Lean is the determination of value. Value is defined as form, feature or 
function for which a customer is willing to pay. The processes that do not add value are deemed 
waste. The Lean framework is used as a tool to focus resources and energies on producing the 
value-added features while identifying and eliminating non-value added activities. Processes in 
Lean are thought of as value streams. Lead-time reduction and the flow of the value streams 
are the major areas of focus in Lean. Value-stream mapping helps teams understand the flow of 
material and information in creating and delivering the product or services being offered to the 
customer by the organization. 
In summary, in its current implementation, the Lean methodology: 
 Provides tools for analyzing process flow and delay times at each activity in a process, 
 Emphasizes Value-stream Mapping, which centers on the separation of "value-added" 
from "non-value-added" work with tools to eliminate the root causes of non-valued 
activities and their cost,  
 Uses Theory of Constraints as its integral element to identify bottlenecks and achieve a 
synchronous flow in the system, 
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 Recognizes and attempts to eliminate 8 types of waste/non-value-added work: defects, 
inventory, over-production, waiting time, motion, transportation, processing, and human 
talent, and 
 Creates workplace organization through Five S methodology consisting of sort, 
straighten, sustain, sweep, and standardize. 
Six Sigma 
Six Sigma is a management technique that aims to develop and deliver near-perfect 
products and services.  The primary goal of Six Sigma is to improve customer satisfaction (and, 
thereby, profitability) by reducing and eliminating defects. In this case, the defects may be 
related to any aspect of customer satisfaction: product quality, delivery performance, and 
product cost.  Six Sigma is targeted at reducing variation in a business processes. It can also be 
a great way to permeate the culture of continuous improvement in an organization.  
The term "Six Sigma" refers to a statistical construct that measures how far a given 
process deviates from perfection. A level of Six Sigma (about 3.4 defects per every million 
items) represents the highest level of quality: virtually all products and business processes are 
defect-free. It should be noted that most companies today function at only a three or four sigma 
level and lose 10-15% of their total revenue due to defects.  Thus, a typical company stands to 
benefit significantly from implementing Six Sigma.   
Six Sigma originated in 1986 with the efforts of Bill Smith, a senior engineer and scientist 
at Motorola (McCarty, 2004).  It was originally used to improve manufacturing processes at 
Motorola.  While Six Sigma has its roots in the total quality management (TQM) approach of the 
1980s, today it is much more than that. It is now being used across a wide range of industries, 
including banking, insurance, telecommunications, construction, healthcare, and software.  
Interestingly, the methodology gained industry-wide acceptance in the mid-90s when Jack 
Welch, CEO of GE, successfully launched it within the entire company (General Electric, 2006) 
and began vouching for the billion-dollar benefits realized by GE through the use of Six Sigma 
methodology. For instance, in 1999 alone, GE reported that it saved $2 billion using Six Sigma 
principles. 
In Six Sigma applications in service-sector industries, the program implies going beyond 
the highest quality level targeted in the manufacturing process.  For example, an average of 3.4 
errors in every one million financial transactions would not be acceptable to a financial 
institution.  Six Sigma now has much broader meaning.  Simply put, Six Sigma: 
 Emphasizes the need to recognize opportunities and eliminate defects as defined by 
customers,  
 Recognizes that process variation hinders our ability to reliably deliver high-quality 
services,  
 Requires data-driven decisions and incorporates a comprehensive set of quality tools 
under a powerful framework for effective problem solving, and  
 Provides a highly prescriptive cultural infrastructure effective in obtaining sustainable 
results.  
In any improvement project, utilization of a well-defined improvement procedure is critically 
important. The most commonly used standard improvement procedure in Six Sigma is DMAIC 
(Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve and Control). DMAIC is a structured, disciplined, rigorous 
approach to process improvement consisting of the five phases, in which each phase is linked 
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logically to the previous phase as well as to the next phase.  A detailed description of these 
phases can be found in Stamatis (2004) and Rath and Strong (2006). 
In terms of the tools and techniques used for process improvement, there is only a marginal 
difference between Six Sigma and the Total Quality Management approaches.  But what sets 
Six Sigma apart from TQM, which is perhaps the most important reason behind the success of 
Six Sigma, is the establishment of organizational infrastructure for ensuring continuous process 
improvement.  Thus, Six Sigma should be ideally viewed as a management system that 
integrates strategic objective and measurement systems development, and provides the 
guidance for project prioritization and governance.  It is a performance-management system to 
drive a more focused execution of the overall business strategy. The essential premise of the 
Six Sigma Management System is that there is a leadership team in place whose members are 
willing and capable of engaging in a disciplined, team-based process of continuously monitoring 
real-time organizational performance metrics and then taking action in the form of project 
reviews. The team engages in frequent dialogue regarding performance related to customer and 
market requirements as well as performance related to critical improvement projects. As a result 
of these efforts, an organization-wide dialogue is created that drives top-to-bottom focus on 
daily execution and a culture of continuous improvement. 
Six Sigma identifies five key organizational roles for its successful implementation (“Six 
Sigma,” 2006): 
 Executive Leadership includes CEO and other key top management team members. 
They are responsible for establishing a vision for Six Sigma implementation. 
 Champions are responsible for the Six Sigma implementation across the organization in 
an integrated manner.  
 Master Black Belts, identified by Champions, act as in-house, full-time, expert coaches 
for the organization on Six Sigma initiatives. 
 Black Belts operate under Master Black Belts to apply Six Sigma methodology to 
specific projects. They devote 100% of their time to Six Sigma. They primarily focus on 
Six Sigma project execution, whereas Champions and Master Black Belts focus on 
identifying projects/functions for Six Sigma.  
 Green Belts are the employees who take up Six Sigma implementation along with their 
other job responsibilities. They operate under the guidance of Black Belts and support 
them in achieving the overall results.  
Please note that there exists a large variation in the way the above roles are defined and 
utilized within the Six Sigma implementations in different enterprises and that specific training 
programs are available to train people to fulfill these roles. 
Lean Six Sigma 
As noted earlier, the process improvement methods of Lean and Six Sigma have been 
practiced separately for many years.  However, in recent years, practitioners have come to 
realize that the two methodologies are, in fact, dependent on each other for greater success. 
For example, it is impossible to run a process with minimum waste or at a dependable capacity 
if individual process steps are highly variable.  On the other hand, one can carefully study the 
complex processes, looking for root causes using elegant statistical techniques, and never 
make improvements in cycle-time or productivity that can be obtained from value-stream 
analysis. 
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To the extent Lean and Six Sigma approaches have their own strengths and 
weaknesses, the specific action plan to be followed in effectively implementing Lean Six Sigma 
(for example, Lean first followed by Six Sigma later or vice versa) is dependent on the nature of 
the situation at hand.  For example, the problems related to accuracy and/or completeness are 
usually addressed best by the tools of Six Sigma; consequently, those tools should be 
introduced first. However, if the customer needs quick results, and if the problem is related to 
timeliness or productivity, Lean should be implemented first with an understanding that deep 
and complex problems will be solved only by the subsequent use of the Six Sigma tools. 
In summary, Lean and Six Sigma are rich bodies of knowledge and are mature 
methodologies for solving a broad variety of process-related problems. Each methodology has 
its own approach to process improvement and its own tool set.  Although Lean and Six Sigma 
methodologies can be mastered independently, they can and should be implemented together 
to realize the full benefits of process improvements by any organization. 
Examples of Lean Six Sigma Implementations in the Military 
The combination of Lean Thinking and Six Sigma has proven to be a very effective tool 
in the private sector.  The success realized by top companies such as Toyota and GE has 
inspired the use of Lean Six Sigma in the US Department of Defense (DoD).   Although the DoD 
has implemented a number of process-improvements methodologies with varying degrees of 
success in the past decade, it has begun to explore the potential of implementing Lean Six 
Sigma throughout the entire DoD only recently.  The early results are very promising.  As the 
lean Six Sigma mindset continues to grow among the DoD community and both the Lean and 
Six Sigma practices become more commonplace, the equipment and personnel available to the 
DoD will provide considerably more capability per taxpayer dollar than ever before.  We discuss 
below some examples of Lean Six Sigma implementations in the US Army, Navy and the Air 
Force. 
Army Implementations 
Faced with the expectations of a shrinking defense budget, the Secretary of the Army 
Francis Harvey signed an order in March of 2005 that would implement Lean Six Sigma across 
the entire service.  Currently, several organizations within the Army are implementing Lean Six 
Sigma and are enjoying remarkable results. 
The Red River Army Depot Repair Facility is one such organization (Donnelly, 2006).  In 
implementing Lean Six Sigma, the Red River Depot has made many changes to its HMMWV 
repair line, such as: forming an assembly-line process, using time-managed intervals to control 
the flow of work, organizing employees based on experience and proficiency, cleaning up and 
improving the overall work environment, stocking more and better quality parts to reduce stock-
outs, and training employees to ensure there is no break in continuity on the assembly line.  
Improvement efforts have resulted in the ability to turn out 32 mission-ready HMMWV’s a day, 
compared with three a week in 2004.  The Lean process has also lowered the cost of repair for 
one vehicle from $89,000 to $48,000.  Some of the biggest improvement ideas have come from 
the front-line employees themselves. 
Other Army facilities boast similar progress as the result of Lean Six Sigma 
methodologies.  Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas reduced its repair cycle-time by about 90% and 
increased its production rate by about 50% on M-40 protective gas masks.  Letterkenny Army 
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Depot in Pennsylvania has saved $11.9 million in the cost of building the Patriot air-defense 
missile system. In the Corpus Christi Army Depot, the overhaul time for one T700 helicopter 
engine was reduced by 64%.  These depots improved the consistency of their repair operations 
by increasing the mean time between the engine overhauls from 309 hours to over 900 hours 
and improved the return to field accuracy to above 90% (Moorman, 2005). 
Despite these early successes, the long-term, future and the resulting benefits of Lean 
Six Sigma are far from certain.  Ultimately, the key ingredient for the successful implementation 
of Lean Six Sigma is not simply an order from the top, but the ability of commanders to change 
the organization’s culture and convince the soldiers and employees that Lean Six Sigma does 
work and that it is worth the effort.  The Red River Depot has taken a small, yet interesting, step 
to change the culture of the organization by posting a black cutout figure of a soldier with a 
helmet and rifle with a sign affixed to it that reads, “We build it as if our life depends on it.  Theirs 
do!”  This is to serve as a reminder that their job is about more than a paycheck, and the better 
they can do their job, the more lives they can save.  
Navy Implementations 
The AIRSpeed program is perhaps the best known implementation of Lean Six Sigma in 
the US Navy.  As stated by the Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter in a memorandum in May 
2006, “Lean Six Sigma (LSS) is a proven business process that several elements of the Navy 
and Marine Corps have initiated including training over 500 Black Belts and 1500 Green Belts 
who have facilitated 2800 events and projects.  These activities have averaged a 4:1 return on 
investment.”  The following examples demonstrate some success stories in the implementation 
of AIRSpeed. 
a. In October 2005, Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) accounting practices yielded an 
annual savings of $176.9K, with an additional anticipated saving of $146.3K in waste 
elimination.  
b. Since April 2004, Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Division (AIMD) Whidbey Island 
reduced J-52 aircraft engine repair time from 468 hours to 233 hours and reported 
significant inventory and operating cost savings.  Since February 2006, AIMD Patuxent 
River has seen increased savings due to a 10% inventory reduction and a reallocation of 
166 hours of full-time employees.  
c. In June 2006, Naval Aviation Systems Command’s (NAVAIR) PMA offices began 
replicating successes of other PMA offices, including one office that saw an estimated 
$163K/year savings due to reducing processing time from the 240-days average to a 
predicted average of 15 days.  
The successes are due, in large part, to the training received by the employees that 
emphasizes the use of DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analysis, Improve and Control) methodology 
for process improvement. AIRSpeed attempts to create an enterprise-wide, continuous process-
improvement environment through the incorporation of commercial business practices.  The 
goal of AIRSpeed is to operationalize cost-wise readiness across the Naval Aviation Enterprise.  
There are five anticipated long-term benefits of AIRSpeed: 
1. Reduce total cost of Naval Aviation by reducing inventory, manpower and operating 
expenses. 
2. Support the Fleet Response Plan by providing aircraft Ready for Tasking (RFT). 
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3. Integrate the Maintenance and Supply Support System to provide seamless support to 
the Fleet. 
4. Improve logistics and maintenance response by reducing cycle-time and the logistics 
footprint.   
5. Place ownership and accountability at the appropriate levels. 
Air Force Implementations 
Over the next several years, the Air Force (AF) is expected lose approximately 40,000 
personnel.  This loss of manpower means airmen must work smarter and leaner.  Senior AF 
leadership has decided to utilize the Lean Six Sigma strategy to accomplish this.  Accordingly, 
the USAF has created a new program office, Air Force Smart Operations 21 (AFSO21), at the 
Pentagon with Brig. Gen. S. Taco Gilbert as the Director of the AFSO21 Office (Lopez, 2006).   
The AF already has several examples of AFSO21 at work.  AF Materiel Command has 
applied AFSO21 and returned 100 aircraft to duty, as well as reduced C-5 maintenance time by 
50%.  USAF Europe (USAFE) applied AFSO21 practices—they reduced the number of 
telephone operators by approximately 16% and saved the command $2.4 million (Lopez, 2006).  
The AF has also begun implementation of Lean Six Sigma concepts to their contracting 
activities.  The goal is to reduce the cycle-time required to award a contract in support of new 
operational requirements.  The Global Hawk team followed the Lean Thinking concepts to break 
down the contracting process into a value stream.  They identified steps that do not add value 
and eliminated them.  By eliminating those unnecessary steps, the process times in three steps 
of the contracting process were cut by 37%, 40% and 73%!  
Managerial Implications 
The experiences in implementing Lean Six Sigma in the military have uncovered several 
valuable lessons and managerial guidelines.  They are briefly presented below. 
Active support of senior leaders is a necessity. 
 Articulate clearly the need for change. 
 Commit to the change—make it last through leadership turnover. 
 Change and accountability should be driven from the top. 
 Actions speak louder than words—participate in the effort. 
Initial successes are critically important. 
 Carefully choose initial projects. 
 Assign high-potential employees to those projects. 
 Provide financial and personnel resources to ensure success. 
 Initial successes turn the skeptics into believers. 
Emphasize continuing education and training. 
 Deploy 1% of workforce as full-time Black Belt plus Green Belts, Champions, etc. 
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 Black Belts should be selected from “future leaders of the organization.” 
 Create Master Black Belts to take over training at all levels. 
 Senior organization leaders must be trained and engaged in project selection. 
 Include Productivity Improvement Training in Leadership Development Programs. 
Monitor the Lean Six Sigma projects. 
 Assign concrete goals to project leaders and hold them accountable for project results. 
 Provide stable funding to ensure long-term success. 
 Demand validated return on investment; Keep score in public. 
 Promote a philosophy that it is OK to save a dollar and give it up—it’s not your money. 
 Middle management is likely to provide the most resistance—actively manage their 
participation (increase the ratio between those that get it and those that don’t). 
The LSS methodology was developed in the private sector.  To the extent the 
competitive environment, the organizational culture, and the nature of operational challenges 
are different in private-sector firms than in the Department of Defense, it is essential that the 
LSS methodology be suitably modified in its implementation in the military.   We discuss below a 
set of issues that must be addressed in implementing LSS in the military. 
Experience indicates that the success of Lean Six Sigma depends on employee 
empowerment and participative management.  Since the military is traditionally organized and 
managed as a strict hierarchy, implementing LSS is a challenging task.  Also, frequent rotation 
and movement of officers in their assignments is a common practice in the military.  This 
creates a possibility that the procedures and culture created by one officer in implementing LSS 
can be disrupted when s/he is replaced by another officer. 
In the military, the employees may enthusiastically embrace LSS implementation initially, 
but it is difficult to maintain that enthusiasm towards LSS in the long-run without proper incentive 
systems. Private-sector organizations can give financial incentives to employees to reward their 
contributions to process-improvement efforts.  However, it is almost impossible to give such 
monetary incentives in the military due to the governmental rules and regulations.  Hence, an 
alternate non-monetary incentive system, for example, for career enhancement or for better 
promotion opportunities, must be investigated.  
Another area to be carefully studied regarding implementing LSS in the military is to 
understand the fundamental nature of military operations.  Lean Six Sigma methodologies were 
originally designed for manufacturing assembly systems in which the demands are known or 
predetermined.  As we move closer to a foxhole from a factory, the overall magnitude of 
uncertainty in demand, supply, and environment increases significantly.  Military planners must 
fully keep in mind that the demand and supply are uncertain in many military applications; 
hence, LSS must be selectively implemented in different parts of the military in different ways.  
For example, supply officers may be encouraged, but not required, to apply Lean and just-in-
time concepts to reduce inventory in military operational environments; such should not be 
required due to the inherent nature of uncertain demand and the potentially heavy penalty of 
stockouts that would cause readiness degradation and potential losses of human lives. 
Finally, we wish to point out that while the issues identified above are important and must be 
carefully analyzed by military planners, approaches for dealing with them can be developed.  Moreover, 
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the benefits of reduced lifecycle costs and improved readiness that can be realized from implementing 
Lean Six Sigma are simply too great.  Hence, we believe that implementing Lean Six Sigma in the 
military is a strategically important logistics initiative and recommend that it be undertaken under full 
steam. 
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Abstract 
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Division at Naval Air Station Lemoore achieved time 
and cost reductions using the NAVAIR Enterprise AIRSpeed program of Lean, Six Sigma and 
Theory of Constraints, but could changes in organization structure or management practices 
provide further improvements?  
Organizational simulation software was employed to test interventions that could reduce 
throughput time for the F414 aircraft engine.  A baseline model was developed, and 
interventions were modeled and simulated.  The simulated results indicated that paralleling 
some tasks could significantly decrease maintenance duration while maintaining quality.  The 
intervention was implemented—saving 26 days per engine.  Organizational modeling and 
simulation can identify and pre-test time and cost savings over and above techniques such as 
Lean and Six Sigma.   
Key words: Organizational modeling, organizational simulation, Logistics, Lean, Six 
Sigma 
Introduction 
The Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Division (AIMD) at Naval Air Station (NAS) 
Lemoore, CA, has worked aggressively to reduce engine maintenance time using the tools of 
the NAVAIR Enterprise AIRSpeed (AIRSpeed) program.  AIRSpeed is a system created by the 
Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program’s (NAVRIIP) to enable cost-wise 
readiness across the naval aviation enterprise (Naval Air Forces Public Affairs Office, 2006). 
AIMD Lemoore has achieved time and cost reductions at the maintenance activity level using 
AIRSpeed’s prescribed tools of Theory of Constraints, Lean, and Six Sigma, but could further 
improvements be made by changing the organization structure or management practices?  
In an effort to answer this research question, AIMD Lemoore teamed with the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Graduate School of Business and Public Policy to explore 
organizational modeling as a method for identifying potential modifications to the organization 
which may improve AIMD performance.  Specifically, AIMD leadership focused on improving 
F414 aircraft engine maintenance by decreasing engine throughput duration. 
The objective of this effort was to provide the NAS Lemoore AIMD 400 Division, the 
Division responsible for F414 maintenance, with recommendations on how their organization 
may be restructured in order to decrease F414 maintenance cycle-time.  To meet this objective, 
NPS developed an organizational model of the 400 Division which described their current F414 
maintenance process.  This model was then modified to characterize the impact of 
organizational changes on maintenance cycle-time.   
This paper is organized into four sections.  The first, a literature search, provides a basis 
for understanding organizational modeling in general as well as techniques specific to the 
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POWer software developed by Dr. Raymond E. Levitt’s Virtual Design Team (VDT) research 
group at Stanford University and employed in this project.  The second section discusses the 
methodology for conducting this study.  The third section presents the results of the modeling 
effort.  Finally, section four presents project conclusions, recommendations for restructuring the 
400 Division, and recommendations for future research.   
Computational Organizational Modeling 
In the 21st Century, computational organizational modeling, a new predictive modeling 
technique, has come of age.  It is a tool which has the potential to assess how changes to an 
organization may or may not benefit the organization’s performance (Levitt, 2004).  
Computational organizational modeling as a tool for improving quality is different from many 
other quality-improvement techniques such as Lean, TOC, or Six Sigma in that it does not focus 
on the production process, but instead on the organizational structure that manages that 
production process, and the information flow through that organization necessary to execute the 
production process.  It is based upon the understanding that by improving the quality of the 
organization and the flow of information through that organization, the quality of the 
organization’s output can be improved.   
The technique of organizational modeling is analogous to modeling employed in the 
natural sciences, such as finite element modeling (FEM) or computational fluid dynamics (CFD) 
modeling.  FEM and CFD modeling both break down the larger structure being modeled into 
smaller elements, with each element having its own characteristics: e.g., modulus of elasticity, 
density, viscosity.  With an understanding of how these elements interact, the overall effect of a 
force or moment on the larger structure can be assessed.  Similarly, organizational modeling is 
accomplished by breaking down an organization into smaller elements such as tasks, people, 
and communication methods—each with their own characteristics, e.g., time required to 
accomplish a task, worker experience, communication clarity—and predicting how changes to 
an organization may affect each element and, subsequently, how those elements in turn affect 
the overall organizational performance (Levitt, 2004).   
This detailed level of organizational characterization theoretically allows managers to 
design their organization in the same way that engineers design bridges.  Organizational 
modeling allows managers to perform “what-if” analyses, evaluating, in a virtual environment, 
the effects of organizational constructs in order to identify the structure resulting in the best 
output.  Gaining similar insight without the aid of a modeling tool would be prohibitive.  
Organizations could not withstand the dynamics of change after change simply to determine 
what works best and what does not.   
The organizational model employed in this project is POWer, version 1.1.6. It was 
developed by Dr. Raymond Levitt as part of a suite of Virtual Design Team (VDT) simulations at 
Stanford University. 
Virtual Design Team—POWer 
POWer evolved from the Virtual Design Team simulations, which are based on macro-
contingency theory and describe work in terms of information flow (Thomsen, Kunz, Levitt & 
Nass, 1998).  POWer is based on the premise that no matter what business an organization is 
in, be it production of widgets, design of skyscrapers, or providing hotel rooms, one thing they 
all have in common is they must process information effectively to do their job well (Kunz, 
1998).    
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Theoretical Basis for POWer 
The concept that organizations can be modeled in terms of information flow is based on 
J.R. Galbraith’s theory of information processing.  According to Galbraith, information transfer 
and processing is dynamic.  Due to the complexity of information and, many times, the sheer 
amount of it, there are often instances in which an individual is unable to process all of the 
information he is given because he does not have the skill or experience to make decisions 
quickly enough.  As a result, an exception (as Galbraith defines it) is created.  Exceptions are 
common in today’s fast-paced world in which we are inundated with requests from e-mail, cell 
phones, black-berries, etc.  In Galbraith’s view, organizations are modeled primarily as 
hierarchies; it’s through these hierarchies that exceptions are passed up the “chain of 
command” to be handled by more experienced individuals.  Along with the hierarchical structure 
by which exceptions are passed, Galbraith notes there are also exchanges of information 
between individuals at equal levels in an organization.  These information exchanges can also 
be used to handle exceptions, and are often more effective than those moving up the chain of 
command since they tend less to overload upper-level managers and create additional 
exceptions (Thomsen, Kunz, Levitt & Nass, 1998). 
Methodology 
The researchers visited the NAS Lemoore in order to conduct multiple interviews with 
400 Division personnel.  Information was collected to properly structure the 400 Division model 
in POWer and accurately characterize the properties of each software element.  Through these 
exchanges, a baseline model was created that accurately characterized the operation of the 400 
Division F414 maintenance process. 
Modifications, also termed “interventions,” were identified which have potential for 
decreasing F414 maintenance throughput.  Each intervention was separately created by 
modifying the baseline model.  Comparisons between these modified and baseline models were 
made to determine the utility of each intervention.  Finally, a combined intervention model 
incorporating all individual interventions deemed beneficial was developed and compared to the 
baseline model. 
Figure 1 presents the baseline model of the 400 Division.  The slanted boxes at the top 
of the figure represent meetings.  The human-shaped symbols represent positions within the 
division.  The boxes in the center of the figure represent the primary F414 maintenance tasks, 
while the boxes in a vertical line on the left represent the off-core tasks.   The remaining 
polygons represent milestones in the maintenance process.  
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Figure 1. Organizational Model 
The positions modeled were those that directly impacted F414 maintenance.  Positions 
were modeled in terms of the number of personnel assigned, amount of time available to work 
F414 tasks, qualifications, skill levels, and experience.  Since this engine was one of the six 
engines the division maintained, the time as allocated was 1/6 of the actual time available.  In 
addition, off-core tasks described below were added to a positions’ workload to occupy their 
time when not conducting F414 maintenance.  Figure 2 presents the organizational structure.  
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Figure 2. NAS Lemoore AIMD 400 Division Information Hierarchy 
The terminology used in Figure 2 and throughout this report to reference individuals and 
groups is consistent with terminology used in the Navy’s AIMD.  For clarity, these terms are 
defined as follows: 
Div-0:  Division Officer 
PC Officer:  Production Control Officer 
AZ:  administrative personnel 
41V:  personnel who directly conduct F414 maintenance 
05E:  supply personnel dedicated to the division 
450:   personnel responsible for conducting final tests of the F414 
LPO:  Leading Petty Officer, responsible for the workcenter 
Tasks were modeled in terms of duration, required skills, priority, and complexity.  
Modeled tasks are presented in Figure 3.  The following is a general description of the F414 
maintenance process. 
After the engine is received, AZ personnel begin by comparing information in the engine 
logbook to information in two central databases, AEMS and SAME, which track engine parts 
and engine movement.  Prior to maintenance action commencing on the engine, AZ personnel 
must resolve any discrepancies.  Once completed, 41V personnel conduct a major engine 
inspection (MEI) followed by an engine teardown to determine which engine modules need 
replacing.  Replacement modules are pulled from supply by 05E personnel.  The engine is 
reassembled or “built-up” by 41V personnel, and then sent to the test cell, where 450 personnel 
run it through pre-defined profiles assessing operability.  The engine is returned to the 
maintenance hanger where 41V personnel conduct a post-test inspection.  At this point, AZ 
personnel complete paperwork; Controller personnel sign off the engine as ready for issue (RFI) 
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to an operational squadron. Throughout this process, Controllers are directing the maintenance 
activities. 
 
Figure 3. Work Breakdown Structure of the F414 Engine Maintenance Process 
To ensure positions were continually occupied throughout the F414 maintenance 
process, as they would be in reality, off-core tasks were added to the model to simulate 
maintenance work being accomplished by personnel, other than maintenance of the single 
engine being modeled.   
Meetings were modeled in terms of duration, who attended, priority and interval time 
between meetings.  Meetings were a key method of reliably transferring information between 
personnel.  In general, the division had a set of morning meetings and a set of afternoon 
meetings.   
Rework was modeled as a percentage of work accomplished.  Most F414 rework 
occurred at the test-cell phase of maintenance.   The percentage of rework was based on 400 
Division estimates.   
Additional organizational characteristics modeled included the overall experience level of 
the division, the degree of centralized control, the degree of formality in transferring information 
(i.e., meetings versus hallway conversation), and the matrix strength or connectedness of 
personnel.  
Model Validation Procedure 
Once the model was constructed, the maintenance duration predicted by the model was 
compared to the actual time it should take to conduct engine maintenance.  The actual time was 
calculated by summing the duration of all tasks occurring in series and the longest duration task 
of any grouping of tasks occurring in parallel.  The smaller the difference was between these 
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values, the higher the confidence in the model, and, hence, the predicted impacts of 
interventions.   
Model Interventions 
Once the model was determined to accurately depict the current organization, 
modifications or interventions were made to evaluate alternate organizational constructs which 
might reduce throughput duration.  The following interventions to the baseline model were 
evaluated.  
1. Parallel AZ Acceptance task with other maintenance tasks 
2. Combine AZ and Controller positions 
3. Combine 41V and 450 positions 
4. Decrease organization’s centralization 
5. Add additional personnel to each position 
6. Alter current meetings’ duration and frequency 
7. Combine meetings 
8. Conduct a combined intervention 
The current F414 maintenance process presented in Figure 3 shows a serial process 
initiated by the AZ Acceptance tasks.   
Intervention 1: Considered the impact of conducting the AZ Acceptance tasks in parallel 
with all other maintenance tasks.   
Intervention 2: Personnel assigned to the AZ and Controller positions are combined into 
a single position.  This position is assigned the combination of tasks originally assigned to the 
separate positions.  This intervention was evaluated in two sub-interventions, first without 
retraining individuals and then with retraining.  
Intervention 3: The same as Intervention 2, with the work positions combined.   
Intervention 4: One of the impacts of AIRSpeed is to decrease the centralized control of 
an organization by pushing authority for decision-making to the lowest possible level.  This 
fourth intervention assessed the impact of the division’s further decreasing centralization.   
Intervention 5: Assessed the impact of adding additional personnel to existing positions.   
Personnel were added separately to AZ, Controller, 41V Crew, 05E Crew, and 450 Crew 
positions while holding personnel at all other position constant.   
Intervention 6: Considering maintenance tasks are well defined and the personnel are 
highly skilled, it’s conceivable that that altering meeting duration and/or frequency may decrease 
F414 throughput duration.  This intervention evaluated altering the duration and frequency of the 
0700 morning meeting, the Division’s primary coordination meeting.   
Intervention 7: For the same rationale as intervention #6, this intervention evaluated the 
impact of combining all of the morning meetings while leaving the afternoon meetings separate. 
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It then evaluated the impact of separately combining all morning meetings and all afternoon 
meetings.   
Intervention 8: Based on the results of the single interventions, a combined intervention 
was developed which included those interventions presented above that decreased the F414 
maintenance throughput time.   
Evaluating Interventions 
Interventions were evaluated by comparing four metrics predicted by the baseline model 
to those predicted by the models with interventions.  The first metric was project duration, the 
duration required to accomplish maintenance of a single F414.  Duration was considered the 
most important metric.  The second metric was position backlog, a measure of the number of 
days of work a position has yet to accomplish.  It is analogous to the size of a person’s in-box.  
A position with a high backlog poses a risk of increasing project duration and decreasing output 
quality.  Position backlog is presented as a line graph of number of backlog days versus time.  
The third metric was cost.  Although absolute cost was not a concern for this study, changes in 
costs resulting from interventions were.  Of particular interest were interventions resulting in 
increases in costs associated with the major tasks of engine teardown, buildup, and testing.  
Cost was calculated by the simulation and output in both text and graphic. The fourth metric was 
functional risk, the risk that an engine has defects due to rework and the inability of personnel to 
handle problems.  Qualitative comparisons of functional risk were made using output charts of 
the functional risk.   
For any given intervention, the impact on each of the four metrics was categorized as 
positive, negative, or no impact and given a rating respectively.  For example, a decrease in 
project duration resulting from an intervention would be considered positive, while an increase in 
cost or risk would be considered negative   
Results 
The Results section begins with a presentation of the baseline model validation results.  
The baseline model is followed by a summary of the results of the seven individual interventions 
and the combined intervention.   Finally, there is a discussion of which interventions were 
implemented and their impact on F414 maintenance duration. 
Baseline Model Evaluation 
The actual time required to conduct F414 maintenance was calculated to be 21.77 
days—compared to the baseline model prediction of 21.09 days.  Since these two durations 
were within 3% of each other, there was high confidence that the baseline model was accurate.  
Interventions—Summary of Results 
Table 1 presents a summary of the intervention results.  The first intervention, paralleling 
the AZ Acceptance Task, has the greatest benefit on decreasing F414 throughput duration.  
Other interventions that were beneficial included decreasing centralization, and separately 
combining the morning and afternoon meetings.  The combined intervention, incorporating all of 
these beneficial interventions, resulted in a 35% decrease in F414 throughput duration with a 
slight decreasing in the backlog of most of the personnel. A detailed discussion of the analysis 
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and results associated with Intervention 1 is presented in the following sub-section.  All other 
interventions (including the combined intervention) were analyzed in the same manner. 
Intervention Project Duration Backlog Cost Risk 
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Table 1. Simulation Results for Interventions by Duration, Backlog, Cost and Risk 
Intervention 1, paralleling the acceptance task with maintenance, decreased project 
duration by 7 days from the base model prediction of 21.09 days to 13.77 days.  The impact of 
this intervention on individual task durations and the overall duration are depicted in Figure 4.  
The dark bars represent the duration of the individual maintenance tasks—with the exception of 
the second through eleventh bars, which represent off-core tasks.  The decrease in 
maintenance duration is the result of starting on-engine maintenance tasks at the same time as 
the AZ Acceptance task.  In the current process (Figure 4 left chart), the 14-day AZ Acceptance 
task must be accomplished before any other tasks.  This intervention (depicted in the right chart 
in Figure 4) allows the engine-maintenance-related tasks to begin at the same time as the AZ 
Acceptance task. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Project Duration for Intervention 1   
Figure 5 presents a comparison of the position backlog of the baseline model and the 
model employing the intervention. The comparison shows a slight decrease in position backlog 
resulting from Intervention 1.   
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Figure 5. Comparison of Position Backlog for Intervention 1   
Figure 6 presents a comparison between baseline model costs associated with the 
model employing the intervention.  Figure 6 indicates no significant impact on cost. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of Cost for Intervention 1   
Figure 7 presents a comparison of the baseline model functional risk with the functional 
risk for the model implementing Intervention 1. This comparison indicates a slight risk increase 
for the AZ Acceptance task.  This is not unexpected since this task is now being accomplished 
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in conjunction with other tasks; hence, the time originally devoted by Controller personnel to 
assist AZ personnel in handling problems must now be devoted not only to AZ personnel, but to 
other personnel concurrently working engine-maintenance tasks.   
 
Figure 7. Comparison of Functional Risk for Intervention 1 
The overall rating for Intervention 1 is presented in Table 1.  This intervention was 
considered beneficial because it resulted in a significant decrease in project duration, a slight 
decrease in position backlog, no significant impact on cost, and only a slight increase in 
functional risk for a single task.    
Intervention #8—Combined Intervention 
The combined intervention included the following interventions, which were chosen for 
being the most beneficial: 
Intervention #1—Paralleling the acceptance task 
Intervention #4—Decreasing centralization from high to low 
Intervention #6—Decreasing 0700 meeting frequency to every 2 days 
Intervention #7—Separately combining morning & afternoon meetings 
The impact of these combined interventions on project duration was a decrease from 
21.09 days to 13.72 days.  The backlog for most positions decreased with an increase in only 
one position, the 450 LPO.  There was a slight increase in Teardown task rework cost from 
$26.44 to $36.93, and a slight decrease in the Buildup task rework cost from $48.43 to $22.13.  
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Overall, the changes in cost were not considered significant.  Finally, there was no significant 
impact on functional risk.   
Assessment of interventions 
The results of this study lead to the conclusion that four of the seven interventions to the 
division considered in this study would be beneficial to reducing the throughput duration: 
paralleling the AZ Acceptance task, decreasing centralization, decreasing 0700 meeting 
frequency, and separately combining morning and afternoon meetings. 
The greatest benefit to reducing the F414 throughput duration comes from paralleling 
the AZ Acceptance task.  Although this intervention increases functional risk, this increase is 
minor relative to the decrease in throughput time by 7.21 days.  There is also a consequent 
decrease in position backlog.   
Decreasing centralization, a benefit realized through the implementation of AIRSpeed, 
also has a positive impact on decreasing F414 throughput.  This intervention resulted in a 4.4-
hour decrease in duration.   
By decreasing the 0700 meeting frequency from every day to every other day, F414 
throughput duration decreases by 6.56 hours.  This benefit is the result of a highly skilled 
workforce executing well-defined tasks, allowing personnel to spend more time working on 
engine maintenance and less time exchanging information in meetings.   
By separately combining morning and afternoon meetings such that there is one 
morning meeting and one afternoon meeting that all personnel attend, F414 throughput duration 
decreases by 7.28 days.  At the same time, there is also no increase in functional risk. 
Unfortunately, benefits associated with combining these four interventions are not 
additive.  This makes sense based on their interrelated nature.  When combining interventions, 
the benefit to reducing F414 throughput duration is nonetheless significant in that there is a 
reduction of over 35% from the baseline case representing the current organization.    In 
conjunction with this benefit, there is a decrease in backlog for all positions excluding one, the 
450 LPO, and there is no adverse impact to cost or functional risk.    
Two other interventions considered, combining the AZ and Controller positions and 
combining the 41V and 450 positions, resulted in increases in F414 throughput duration as well 
as increases in cost and risk, with the only predicted benefit being a decrease in position 
backlog for the combined positions.  Clearly, these interventions are not beneficial. 
Finally, the intervention associated with adding additional personnel did not affect F414 
throughput duration, and had no impact on risk.  Obviously, there would be no benefit to 
implementing this intervention. 
Recommended Interventions  
 NPS recommended the 400 Division implement the following interventions 
 Decrease 0700 morning meeting frequency to every other day. 
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 Separately combine morning and end-of-day meetings 
 Parallel the AZ Acceptance task 
The first and each subsequent intervention recommendation should be implemented, 
followed by a period of evaluation.  The priority order of these interventions is based on first 
implementing those interventions that can most easily be reversed.  For example, conducting 
the 0700 meeting every other day is a relatively easy organizational change which should result 
in a decrease in F414 throughput duration.  At the same time, it is an organization change that 
can be reversed if deemed necessary.   
Impact of implementing interventions 
The NAS Lemoore AIMD and 400 Division leadership had significant confidence in the 
results of this study, and chose to fully implement the recommendation to parallel the AZ 
acceptance task while partially implementing the recommendation to separately combine the 
morning and afternoon meetings.  The impacts of these decisions were quickly realized and 
deemed successful.  The following discussion presents three instances in which paralleling the 
AZ acceptance task significantly reduced F414 maintenance throughput time.  Table 2 at the 
end of this section presents a summary of these results.  Following this is a discussion of how 
partially combining 400 Division morning meetings improved organizational performance. 
On 20 October, the 400 Division received F414 serial number 868472 from VFA106, 
NAS Oceana.  On that same day, the engine-acceptance process commenced. During the 
acceptance process, SAME database problems were identified.  Recall that the SAME 
database, described earlier in this paper, is an historical record of maintenance actions 
accomplished on each engine.  Often, an engine is received by the 400 Division for which there 
are discrepancies between data contained in the SAME database and the engine log book.  
These SAME discrepancies were resolved on 7 November.  Prior to implementing the 
intervention of paralleling the AZ acceptance process, teardown would not have started until 
after the SAME database problems were resolved on 7 November.  By implementing this 
intervention, however, engine maintenance began on 23 October when personnel were 
available—saving 16 days, the difference between 23 October versus 7 November. (See Table 
2.)   
In the second observation, on 25 October, the 400 Division received F414 serial number 
868083 from VFA-2.  SAME database problems were identified on 26 October which were 
resolved on 13 November.  By choosing to implement the intervention of paralleling the AZ 
acceptance process, maintenance on this engine commenced on 29 October versus waiting 
until 13 November, thus saving 16 days.   
Finally, on 5 September, the 400 Division received F414 engine serial number 868265 
from the USS Lincoln. On that same day, SAME database problems were identified which were 
eventually resolved on 16 October.  A total of 46 days were saved in this case by paralleling the 
AZ acceptance process since maintenance on this engine started on 6 September.   (See Table 
2.)
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Table 2. Summary of Intervention Results 
Like the impacts presented in Table 2, the AIMD and 400 Division leadership’s decision 
to combine certain aspects of their morning meetings also had a positive impact on decreasing 
the time required to conduct F414 maintenance.  Specifically, LPO coordination efforts 
conducted at both the 0630 and 0700 meetings were combined.  At the same time, the duration 
spent by each LPO in this combined meeting was decreased, allowing them to more quickly 
provide direction to their subordinates.   
At the time of this article’s writing, this intervention had just recently been implemented, 
and quantitative results of its impact were not yet available.  Qualitatively, though, the Division 
Officer in charge of the 400 Division has identified a marked improvement in the amount of work 
being accomplished as a result of implementing this intervention.  Prior to its implementation, 
upon his arrival to the office at 0630 each day, the Div-O would see a significant amount of 
coordination work being accomplished by LPO and PC personnel in preparation for the day’s 
work.  Following the combination of morning meetings, the Div-O arrives at work and now sees 
personnel working on the F414 engines.  Information flow is being accomplished more 
smoothly, thus allowing coordination efforts to be accomplished more quickly; hence, more work 
is accomplished on a given day.   
The AIMD and 400 Division leadership are pleased with the results of these 
interventions.  Both quantitatively and qualitatively, their impacts have resulted in shorter F414 
throughput time and improved organizational performance through better information flow. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This project only considered that portion of the AIMD 400 Division that accomplishes 
F414 maintenance. It considered only tasks associated with maintenance efforts starting from 
receipt of the engine to the point at which the engine is determined ready for issue (RFI).  
Although other maintenance work and collateral duties not directly associated with F414 
maintenance were not directly modeled, generic, non-core tasks were modeled which required 
personnel to perform functions other than F414 maintenance.  By doing so, limitations on 400 
Division personnel’s time to accomplish F414 maintenance were accurately characterized.   The 
scope of this effort was further limited by modeling the maintenance of only a single engine, 
although total available time to accomplish tasks were correspondingly decreased to that 
available for a single engine.   
Future research is needed to track AIMD performance post-implementation of selected 
interventions and to compare data to predicted performance.  Other organizations within the 
NAS Lemoore AIMD (e.g., Airframe Division, Avionics Division, etc.) should also be separately 
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modeled to identify potential organizational changes which may improve their processes.  
Consideration should then be given to integrating these separate models to develop a coherent 
AIMD model which would aid in identifying modifications to the larger organization, thus 
benefiting information flow.  The model developed for this study could also be modified to 
represent engine maintenance divisions in other AIMD units across the Navy.    
Conclusions 
This study in applying organizational modeling to the NAS Lemoore AIMD identified 
several potential modifications or interventions to the 400 Division which could reduce F414 
engine-maintenance throughput time.  These interventions went beyond the process-
improvement techniques implemented by the division under the AIRSpeed program by focusing 
primarily on improving how and when the flow of information through the organization occurs.   
Results have shown a savings between 16 and 46 days of maintenance time on each 
engine: an average of 26 days per engine.  The Leadership also chose to partially implement 
the intervention of separately combining morning and afternoon meetings.  Personnel now 
receive direction on required daily maintenance actions more quickly, which has increased the 
amount of work accomplished each day.   
Organizational modeling provided key insights into improving the NAS Lemoore AIMD 
F414 maintenance process and allowed management to consider the likely impacts of 
alternatives on time, cost and quality prior to making these changes.  The significant 
improvement in reducing F414 maintenance throughput time that resulted from this study 
affords high confidence in achieving future improvements in other Navy maintenance 
organizations via the tools and techniques of organizational modeling.   
Organizational modeling has great potential for improving on outstanding process-
improvement results the Navy has already achieved under the AIRSpeed program. 
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